TY  - GEN
A1  - Meixner, Uwe
T1  - An antinomy for de re belief
N2  - This paper presents a logical derivation, from apparently undeniable premises, of a logical contradiction for de re belief – not merely a description of logical irrationality for it. It also presents a way out of this antinomic situation, a way that does not amount to denying the meaningfulness of sentences that express de re beliefs. However, the effectiveness of the favored way out is put into question, and the possibility of there being true contradic­tions looms large. The ideas presented in this paper refer to problems broached by S. Kripke and W. V. Quine decades ago. The literature addressing those problems is vast. The present paper sets the literature aside (except for Quine and Kripke) and takes a fresh view.
Y1  - 2023
UR  - https://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/frontdoor/index/index/docId/104264
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bvb:384-opus4-1042646
SP  - 1
EP  - 12
ER  -