

The Troublemakers: Enacting European Citizenship in the Anti-TTIP Protests

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“Leg das Buch nicht nieder, der du das liesest, Mensch.”

aus “Die Nachtlager” von Bertolt Brecht

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Abstract

The massive mobilization against the trade agreement 'TTIP' indicates that European politics is no longer only a matter of European elites. Instead, we see that citizens demand to be included in European decision-making processes. The 'TTIP' (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) stands paradigmatically for a much wider range of criticisms of EU politics that have been tackled during the protests. After providing evidence for this claim, the thesis investigates which citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP-protests and how.

A phenomenographic analysis of twenty-nine interviews with Anti-TTIP protestors outlines their protest experiences from the citizens' perspective. The performance-oriented perspective allows us to reconstruct how, in processes of political subjectivation, political subjects as citizens emerge from acts of citizenship. The figure of the 'Troublemaker' stands for these active, responsible, and EU-critical voices that enact the power to influence European politics in their civic interests. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the conflictual politicization of the TTIP negotiations created a dense, transnational network of European civil society actors.

This research provides an essential contribution to the field of citizenship studies and European studies by shedding light on the enactment of European citizenship and its potential to reshape understandings of European citizenship through contentious action.

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The Troublemakers: Enacting European Citizenship in the Anti-TTIP Protests

Introduction

"We want, you know, we want to be troublemakers regarding TTIP. They all said: "Okay, we are going for it." And there is like a couple of voices, critical voices, [but] it's not so strong." (Interviewee 1 2018)

Who are those critical voices? What do they claim? And how strong are they, really? are questions that will be tackled in this dissertation. Above all, however, this research will investigate the figure of the 'Troublemaker': It stands paradigmatically for those citizens who raise political claims, actively resist authority and subvert entrenched power structures in pursuit of meaningful change. The central premise of this research, which is reflected in this title-giving term used by one of the interviewees, is that individuals in democratic societies possess a significant degree of agency and the capacity to actively challenge and disrupt the existing political status quo by questioning the limitations and roles imposed upon them within the political process. The individuals in question, here referred to as 'Troublemakers', actively seek to bring about change and advocate for a new role that citizens can play in European politics. The study investigates the protests against a transatlantic trade agreement (TTIP), in which those individuals enact new forms of citizenship at the European level. It therefore asks: *Which citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests and how?* The interview-based findings portray how the resistance against Anti-TTIP was practiced and experienced by the activists.¹

Previous research demonstrates a gap in our understanding of how politically active citizens understand and execute their role as European citizens (van Deth 2009, 181;

¹ Some of the aspects of this research have been addressed in earlier works (Schröder 2020; 2021; Schröder and Zöhrer 2019).

Jones and Gaventa 2002, v; Stack 2012, 871; Bläser 2013, 352; Gaxie 2011, 27). In the European context, this lack of understanding risks to propagate a distorted portrayal of European citizens as politically apathetic, indifferent or dismissive homogeneous mass (Bermeo 2003, 4; Marcus 2002, 2) In the discourse on European protests, active European citizens are frequently conflated with Eurosceptic voices. This phenomenon is indicative of a broader trend in which the participation of active citizens in political conflicts is still too often reduced to a binary opposition between pro-European and anti-European sentiments. This characterization neglects the complexity and diversity of perspectives held by active citizens, who may hold nuanced views on the European Union and its politics. Furthermore, it risks marginalizing the voices and agency of active citizens in shaping the future of the European Union.

Therefore, these simplified, partial narratives of European citizens need to be critically questioned. The Anti-TTIP protests serve as an insightful case of citizen protest action on a European level that does not match the gloomy picture. From 2014, we witnessed an outstanding mobilization of citizens taking to the streets against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a trade deal that was negotiated between the EU and the US from 2013 onwards. Protests against this trade deal took place all over Europe² and reached a remarkable politicization of citizens. Crossing national boundaries, European citizens united under the common goal to “Stop TTIP” by launching a European Citizenship Initiative. The European Citizen Initiative (ECI) is a mechanism provided by the EU that gives citizens the possibility to influence policies of the EU. Especially after the European Commission decided to reject this petition, the focus shifted from the criticism of the EU’s trade policy to the democratic question: Which role do citizens (want to) play in European politics? This change of perspective prompted a massive and univocal answer: Citizens all over Europe mobilized even more against the perceived undemocratic character of the trade negotiations which were regarded as standing paradigmatic for the nature of European politics as a whole.

This (mostly disregarded) reality of citizens taking part in politics on an EU level is indeed on the rise as Hooghe and Marks (2009) analyzed in their much discussed paper on the ‘Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration’: While until the 90s the

² and to a lower extent also in the US (Buonanno and Dudek 2015)

so-called 'permissive consensus' allowed European policymakers to shape European politics almost in the complete absence of its citizens, the ongoing decline of EU popularity comes with a growing will of citizens to participate in the political decisions made on this level (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 6). This new phase, which they call 'constraining dissensus', started from the 90s onwards and intensifies, as previous research suggests, even more in the context of the EU's financial crisis of 2008 (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 8; Follesdal and Hix 2006; Rauh and Zürn 2014, 122; Guérot 2014, 133; Murray-Leach 2014; Della Porta 2012). Narratives of a so-called 'crisis' that the EU is facing these days are a critical momentum of possible political changes (Samaddar 2010, 139). The crisis' mobilizing force opens up for new spaces to articulate the urgent need for change.

As a result of this, it can be noticed that citizenship practices are increasingly shifting towards supranational or international spheres (Sassen 2002; Isin 2007). In fact, we see that the EU becomes a key site for contention: This new dynamic can be explained by a decreasing importance of the nation state on the one hand and the evolution of politics on the supranational level on the other hand. As a consequence of the EU's increasing political, legal and social integration, European decision-making is more and more entering into the individual's lifeworld (Guérot 2014, 133; Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 2). Citizens demand greater influence on the EU's decision-making processes as they complain about having little say in supranational decision-making. What makes the Anti-TTIP protests an insightful case to study active citizenship is that citizens are motivated to take action not *despite*, but *because* of the experiences of their limited power to influence EU politics. Against the background of the protestors' critique, I argue, their understandings of citizenship are lived and claimed in contentious protest action. Taking into account the shift from 'dismissive consensus' to 'constraining dissensus' as well as the growing claims for a new role for citizens in EU politics, it is necessary to investigate those active citizen subjects in order to understand better these new forms of citizenship practices especially in this critical moment of a 'European crisis'. It allows us to see *which* and *how* new forms of European citizenship are taking shape in this particularly politicized, transnational protest.

Between 2013 and 2016, the rapidly growing Anti-TTIP protests created a dense and transnational network of civil society actors who engaged together against this transatlantic trade deal. The EU has trade agreements with other regions of the world, but TTIP (and later CETA and TiSA)³ caused an outstanding politicization. In 2014, on October 11th, protest actions were organized in 22 countries by hundreds of organizations and tens of thousands of people to stop the negotiations on these three trade agreements. An unprecedented coalition including individuals, grassroots activist groups, social movement organizations, trade unions, and farmers joined together to organize a decentralized European Day of Action, comprising of more than 400 events such as marches, meetings and flash mobs. At the same time, the self-organized European Citizens Initiative (sECI) promoted by the 'Stop TTIP' alliance counted already more than half a million signatures. The European 'Stop TTIP' alliance counted more than 500 organizations from across Europe that cover a wide range of topics including social and labor standards, digital rights, public health, animal welfare, environmental protection, agriculture, consumer rights and essential public services such as education and health. Mildner and Schmucker state: "Trade policy has long ceased to be a policy field in which technocrats negotiate compromises away from the public. But the vehemence with which TTIP is being publicly discussed is new." (my translation Mildner and Schmucker 2016, 309; see also Steiner 2016, 2)

This outstanding politicization can be explained by the scope and the depth of this agreement, which touches upon more than just trade-related issues. Above all, however, it can be traced back to political processes that were considered undemocratic. Therefore, what makes the Anti-TTIP protests an interesting case to investigate citizenship is the fact that they were neither driven by mere Euroscepticism, nor was it a purely instrumental protest against an unwanted trade deal. Protestors were critical against TTIP, but they also challenged European politics in a more general sense by interfering in democratic decision-making processes and asking to have a say in it.

³ In addition to TTIP, the EU was aiming for a number of international trade agreements such as CETA (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada) and the TiSA (Trade in Services Agreement between the EU and 22 other countries) service agreement. In this work, the focus will be on the TTIP trade agreement, however in reality, it cannot be considered completely separate from other trade deals that were negotiated at the same time.

The conflict over TTIP helped to bring together people who are not only critical towards this free trade agreement, but who feel obliged to raise their voice as citizens. In other words: their political engagement is not simply action *against* the EU policies but also raises claims *for* another role citizens want to play in European politics. As the introductory quote suggests, their criticism encouraged citizens to perform a different role of citizens in this conflict: "We want to be troublemakers regarding TTIP" (Interviewee 1 2018). Therefore, the case of Anti-TTIP protests allows to make sense of how protestors understand themselves as citizens. Using the example of a community project, Jones and Gaventa demonstrate, illustrating the case of a community project, how employees of a corporation developed civic identities through their experience of being "active agents of their own affairs" (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 6). Therefore, they propose an understanding of citizenship which takes the concept of agency as its starting point: "conceptualizing citizenship as agency gives a central role to the individual's self-identity as a citizen, and emphasizes the thought and action, which this enables." (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 6). This underlines the importance for the Anti-TTIP protestors to play an active role in defining their roles as citizens themselves - and not to accept the role that is assigned to them by the EU institutions. I claim that in their protest action, another idea of what European citizenship could mean is put into practice. In this line of thought, European citizenship owes its meaning to the practices of the citizens themselves, who re- and deconstruct it in civic action. This implies firstly that the meaning of citizenship is in no way only a given one, since it exists only in materially embodied and bodily incarnated practices. Secondly, it means that a new role for citizens can be enacted by opposing what actors have been experiencing as cultural and social conventions. If citizenship is seen as a performative process of re- and de-construction which is constantly in flux, it will therefore never be fixed who the citizens *are*- the question asked can only be which citizenship is *enacted*.

However, in contrast to the practice-oriented conception of citizenship outlined above, in literature on citizenship we can observe that European citizens are often reduced to the legal dimension of citizenship (i.e. EU-passport-holders) or passive bearers of rights. By differentiating a bottom-up 'achieved citizenship' from the top-down 'received citizenship' (Dahlgren 2007) points to the difference between citizenship as a practice

and citizenship as a status. Such 'classic' concepts of citizenship, in which a top-down approach characterizes the relation of the citizens to the state and vice versa, often also implies a narrow understanding of political participation that allows for practices such as voting and taxpaying (Trumann 2014, 9; 12). This perspective disregards the role of citizens as critical and active co-creators of their political spaces. While the claim for active European citizenship increased over time, civic participation is still too often restricted to support the political system (Cornwall 2008). The research perspective on citizenship unfolded here, questions the normative and exclusionary character of citizenship that is limited to expectations of "good" European citizens or those in legal terms. In the light of the study of Anti-TTIP protest action, it is of special interest how citizenship is enacted in this very moment of disagreement. Unlike the 'Pulse of Europe' movement, which wanted to raise awareness for the so-called 'European idea' that it saw in danger due to populist and Anti-European trends in several European countries, the TTIP-opponents' goal was not the protection, public legitimization and re-production of the current status quo. Instead, the Anti-TTIP movement aimed at a re-construction of European politics when protestors demand participation in and transparency of the TTIP negotiations and in EU politics more broadly. Acknowledging this critical notion of citizenship allows to see the potential that lies in citizenship as a conflictual practice: When political claims are put into practice in active, critical participation apart from or against the polity, this can be seen as a powerful moment of articulating a new role for citizens in action.

The concept of citizenship that I follow here became popular in performative approaches that can be subsumed under the republican school of thought (Pykett, Saward, and Schaefer 2010; Zivi 2011; Isin and Nielsen 2015; Abrams 2014; for an overview see Hildebrandt et. al. 2019). It underlines the self-governance of people through inclusive processes of active public participation. This strand of theory goes back to the works of Hannah Arendt, and even earlier, Alexis de Tocqueville, who, during his time in America was impressed by the fact that "Americans of all ages, all stations in life and all types of dispositions are forever forming associations" (Tocqueville 1969, 513). When more than 100 years later, in 1941, Hannah Arendt came to the United States, she anticipates a more direct form of government by the citizens (Lederman 2019). Arendt's theory of political action is based on the argument

that citizens' experiences in political performances in the public sphere are a basic human activity - and the most encompassing and crucial one. Though in de Tocqueville's American society, this participation applied only to free white adult males and at the same time excluded women, the Indian population and other people of color, as well as enslaved people.

The exclusionary power of citizenship, which denies certain individuals the status of a citizen, must be acknowledged as a constitutive feature of the concept. It is not enough to view citizenship as simply a relationship between citizens and the state, or even between citizens and other citizens, as it also always includes a relationship between those who are 'inside' the political community and those who are 'outside' of it. Rather than ignoring or overlooking the exclusionary effects of citizenship, it is crucial to adopt a reflexive approach to it, which involves actively reflecting on and addressing these exclusionary mechanisms (Gabriel 2010, 19; 25; see also: Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 10). Concepts from the field of performative studies define citizens based on what they do instead of who they are. In contrast to a legal understanding of citizenship or the 'economic' view of citizens as passive 'consumers' of political rights, this research's perspective sees citizenship as enacted in practices and citizens as political subjects that come into being in their enactment.

To learn instead about the protestors' own understandings of their roles as citizens in European politics, experiences play a central role. If citizenship is not lived and practically tried out, or *enacted*, this leads to an "emptied" version of citizenship, that is nothing but a formal status. This suggests that we must "also look behind its institutionalized structures and dynamics. While these are essential, if they are not filled by real flesh-and-blood people with relevant values, virtues and competences, democracy will become merely a hollow formalism." (Dahlgren 2006, 272). This research aims to offer a complementary approach to status- and consensus-oriented understandings of political participation. It underlines the importance of passionate civic practices, which do not strive for consensus, but for creating, occupying and filling out creative civic spaces for exchanging on and opposing political topics. Besides the value of performance-based approaches for citizenship studies, the present research also responds to the lack of constituting the *European* dimension in citizenship concepts by challenging the prevailing concept of citizenship that was long

equated with the notion of the nation-state. It is without doubt that this transfer to the European level will have severe implications for the concept of citizenship (Rumford 2003, 27; 29).

What the shortcomings of traditional concepts of citizenship suggest is the need to look at alternative concepts, which approach citizenship from a critical, transnational and performative angle. The aim here is not to blame previous research, but rather to highlight the possibilities that a more in-depth exploration of citizens' realities can offer. Under the premise of a democratic crisis and the urgent need for changes that accompanies it, it is worth or even required to leave the beaten track. Therefore, I claim that a serious rethinking of the concept of citizenship is needed to grasp the powerful experiences of citizens in the Anti-TTIP protests. Knowledge of enacted citizenship has great importance for citizenship studies and European studies alike. This project thus aims to contribute to debates on citizenship studies and European studies as it highlights the role of citizenship in the context of the discourse on a so-called 'European crisis'. Through its empirical investigation, it aims to develop new perspectives by making visible which and how new subjects as citizens emerge.

To reconstruct why and how the Anti-TTIP protestors experienced themselves as European citizens in the act of protesting, comes with the premise that research on citizenship becomes situated at the microlevel (Joseph 1999, 4; Dahlgren 2007). By that, I seek to convey an alternative concept of European citizenship from the perspective of active European citizens. This is helpful to broaden our understanding of what citizenship means for those who have long been left out of the picture. It should not be ignored that the discourse surrounding citizenship is inherently reflective of a power dynamic, wherein the ability to define and assign meaning to the concept of citizenship is not solely vested in the citizens themselves. Jones and Gaventa observe that the specific interpretations of citizenship that receive attention highlight this power relation: The "power to define citizen status and activity lies not only in citizens themselves" (2002, 7). In my analysis, I focus on those individuals who have taken part in contentious political action against TTIP. With this choice for researching TTIP-opponents, I do turn my attention away from active citizenship in general terms. Instead, I put my focus on active critical citizens by investigating those who have taken

part in a political conflict in and especially about European politics. While those active critical European citizens may still be outnumbered, this minority is by no means negligible: Due to past civic movements of liberalization, we live today in a more pluralistic world with a constantly changing and increasingly heterogeneous society (Balibar 1988, 724; Turner 1990, 199). The actors studied are not representative for European citizens per se, but they are important reference points to explore the enactment of citizenship in European protests.

My research thus concentrates on the political subject, which became active in contentious protest actions against TTIP. But *how* do these actions transform individuals into political subjects as (European) citizens? Authors of this field approached this question from different angles. They are split in advocates of positive and negative identification: While the former argue that we positively identify as citizens, the latter state that it is a process of dis-identification against the existing sociopolitical order. Rancière (1992) calls this process 'political subjectivation' to distinguish it from the (positive logic of) identification. He emphasizes the "discursive and practical enactment" (1992, 60) of citizenship and the role of those democratic actors, who intervene in the "police" (Rancière 1992, 29) order. This is an essential democratic practice, since "the political is the activity that brings the limit [...] back into question." (Simons and Masschelein 2010, 594). As I outlined before, this 'limit' that protestors make visible in their civic action is not primarily one that distinguishes TTIP-opponents from TTIP-proponents. What constitutes the Anti-TTIP protests as an emancipatory and democratic act is their contestation of the role of supportive or permissive European citizens as well as the very manifestation of an alternative role citizens want to play in European politics: "As such, they are, at once, the limit of the governmental regime and its police order, and the new center that brings to light these very new limits." (Simons and Masschelein 2010, 597). From this perspective, political practices such as collective protest action against TTIP are crucial to understand the constitution process of the citizens' roles and identities. This is precisely the potential of civic action, which reaches far beyond a classic instrumental understanding of protest as a medium to show political disapproval.

The concept of Enacted Citizenship (Isin and Nielsen 2008; 2009; 2015; 2008; 2015) is useful when focusing on political subjectivation processes in political action. However, the term seems to be in need of explanation: Isin defines Enacted Citizenship as a form of citizenship that is performed or embodied through actions and practices, rather than simply granted by a state or legal system. He argues that citizenship is not only something that is bestowed upon an individual by a state, but something that is actively constructed and performed by individuals and groups through their actions and practices. Therefore, Enacted Citizenship refers to the ways in which individuals actively participate in shaping and defining citizenship in a particular political community. Isin argues that it is a form of political subjectivation, as individuals are thereby becoming subjects of political power and authority. He states that individuals become political subjects as citizens by claiming rights that go beyond their personal interests. To reconstruct the enactment of European citizenship, I analyze European-wide protest actions against TTIP as 'acts of citizenship' (Isin and Nielsen 2008; 2015). Following Isin and Nielson, what distinguishes activities like voting from taking part in political protest is what distinguishes action from acts, and active from activist citizens: "By contrast to active citizens who act out already written scripts such as voting, taxpaying and enlisting, activist citizens engage in writing scripts and creating the scene." (Isin 2009, 381). Just like Rancière, the concept of 'acts of citizenship' puts central the principle of creating a 'rupture' rather than that of following the 'order': In Isin's work, the concept of 'rupture' refers to the idea that 'acts of citizenship' have the power to disrupt or challenge existing power structures and norms of citizenship. These acts can be seen as ways for individuals and groups to reclaim power and agency, and to reshape and redefine what it means to be a citizen. Along the same lines as Rancière, he assumes that during political activities, new political practices are co-created, new civic bonds are developed, and those experiences not least give birth to a certain kind of citizens: The 'Troublemakers'.

Starting from the critique of an oversimplified narrative of European citizens in a crisis-ridden EU, I want to arrive at the investigation of the enactment of European citizenship that highlights the protest experiences of citizens who united transnationally to criticize and resist the TTIP trade deal. Therefore, the data gathered (based on interviews with 29 active members of the Anti-TTIP movement from 21

European countries) builds the core of the empirical study. The research findings speak to the gap within the existing literature on European citizenship with respect to the enactment of a new role for citizens in contentious political action, asking: *Which citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests and how?* This question is approached by examining *how* political subjectivation has evolved in this specific protest and *which* understandings of European citizenship it both enacts and claims for. The study thereby adopts a constructivist paradigm, which means that its objective is not to offer an explanation for the uprisings, and why they are successful or not, but to reconstruct the enactment of European citizenship in this particular case. The data analysis has been done by using the phenomenographic research approach (Marton 1981; 1986; 1994; 2007). It is a qualitative empirical research framework, which takes seriously the various ways in which politically engaged individuals experience and perceive political phenomena. Using a phenomenographic framework is an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of how protestors make sense of their experiences as European citizens. The methodological assumption that stands behind that choice of method is that I understand the individual as actively creating - and co-creating with others - explanations and narratives that enable him or her to make sense of their experience during the protests, and to develop a political subjectivity in this particular social context.

With this research, I embarked on a journey to explore "various citizenscapes" (Joseph 1999, 14). The results of the study suggest that the protest against TTIP can be interpreted as an act of citizenship. However, by asking *which* citizenship is enacted, I explore three distinct ways in which they see themselves as European citizens, namely as active, responsible and EU-critical citizens. The outcome of my analysis also discloses the importance of responsabilization for the process of *how* political subjects evolve as citizens in the acts of protesting. By that, the dissertation exceeds the aim of the Enacted Citizenship approach to identify solely *if* political actions can be interpreted as an act of citizenship. Instead, it constitutes an attempt to address *which* meaning is given to this role as well as *how* these acts bring about political subjects as citizens. Both are questions that have not been sufficiently researched empirically. How protestors enact their citizenship is important for understanding how citizenship is lived and which meaning is associated with it. However, apart from the empirical

findings, the modest contribution of this research is to add to a rethinking of European citizenship that takes serious its emancipatory potential and thus makes European citizens and their claims visible as active and critical agents of change.

Roadmap of the chapters

This roadmap will provide an overview of the key themes and ideas being explored in the dissertation, and highlight the contributions that each chapter makes to the broader research project. In the following, the main arguments of the chapters and their functions in respect to the dissertation will be outlined. Thereby, I hope to give my readers a better understanding of the overall structure and arguments of this work.

The purpose of the first chapter is to explore the perception of a so-called 'European crisis' as a starting point for understanding the aspirations of citizens to reform European politics and to examine the potential for mobilization that arises from that. Researchers have called for empirical studies on those aspirations, focusing on the citizens' own ideals and perceptions of European politics. Focusing on the growth of citizens' claims for European democracy, this chapter aims to provide insights into the function of collective action in addressing issues that are important to citizens. This proves to be insightful for investigating the Anti-TTIP protests' manifestation of citizenship in the context of this 'European crisis' as it illustrates the potential for mobilization that arises from criticism of the EU.

The chapter starts off by challenging the conventional narrative of a 'crisis' of European democracy and offers a perspective on the concept of the 'democratic deficit' that defines it as the gap between the citizens' desire to participate in European affairs and the current institutional arrangements that do not (enough) allow for such participation. I argue that this gap is widened by growing demands from citizens to participate in European politics and is further intensified by events such as the euro crisis, which has led to increased politicization and calls for alternative visions of Europe. I follow the argument that the traditional permissive consensus, in which citizens allowed decision-makers to rule without opposition, is no longer the norm and argue that this shift may create the possibility for negotiating the role of citizens in European politics. However, this perspective is often overlooked in the dominant

narrative of the 'crisis-ridden' Europe, dominated by a perspective that portrays European citizens as politically apathetic and (by that) contributing to the EU's deficient democratic performance. Furthermore, the text asserts that the current conception of 'citizens' as a homogenous group ignores their heterogeneity and may exclude some political actors that fall outside this predefined category. Therefore, this chapter calls for more research that considers the perspectives and civic practices of those citizens who become active against and within EU politics. Shifting the focus to those citizens who aim to influence the course and outcome of European decision-making allows for examining the enactment of their own understandings of European citizenship.

The second chapter introduces the topic of the protests against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and their significance for investigating European citizenship. I argue that the Anti-TTIP protests are not simply a response to a trade deal, but they offer an opportunity to explore the role that citizens want to play in European politics. By examining the characteristics of these protests, including their size and the specific course of the negotiations, and by considering the historical context in which they occurred, this chapter, first of all, aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the case under study. Secondly, it advocates for a perspective on TTIP that allows narrating the story of its protests as a potential space to enact claims for European citizenship. By investigating this particular case from that view, this dissertation aims to contribute to the ongoing debates about European citizenship in European and citizenship studies. If we agree on the importance of active and critical citizens as a protective mechanism for the functioning of a democratic society, these protests can count as an opportunity for the democratization of European politics, as they seem to politicize European citizens. Even more importantly, in their activism against TTIP, the protesters also seem to challenge the common narrative of European citizens as politically apathetic. Taking this into account, I argue that the Anti-TTIP protests offer an interesting case to examine the process of enacting European citizenship in contentious European action.

The third chapter explores the potential of conceptualizing European citizenship as a practice that includes individuals based on their active participation in the political life of a polity. This approach intends to challenge the exclusionary nature of traditional

conceptions of citizenship, which are often based on legal or cultural criteria and risk excluding certain subjects based on that. To support this view, the chapter first outlines the dominant liberal, republican, and communitarian conceptions of citizenship and identifies and problematizes their defining characteristics and distinctions. Through this review of literature on citizenship theory, I demonstrate the limitations of existing approaches to researching European citizenship, which are often exclusive, top-down, and nationally focused. I aim to offer a critical and reflexive concept of citizenship as an alternative that can help to step out off the beaten tracks and conceptualize citizenship in performative terms. I argue that studying citizenship as a contentious practice that challenges the status quo can provide a more inclusive and empowering approach to European citizenship, particularly in the context of the Anti-TTIP protests. By pointing to the de- and postcolonial call for a conscious choice of subjects of research and their perspectives highlighted by that, I seek to create awareness of the political stance of any research as it gives visibility and attention to some subjects and not others. I conclude by pointing to the need to develop a more sophisticated understanding of how citizenship is enacted and what meaning it carries for the citizens themselves.

By focusing on the acts that create political subjects, rather than assuming subjects of European citizenship in advance, the fourth chapter on Enacted Citizenship argues that this approach allows for the investigation of new and unforeseeable ways of citizenship enactment. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical foundation for the analysis of the Anti-TTIP protests as it aims to clarify the concept of 'acts of citizenship' and how the European scale can be conceptualized within this framework, as well as to consider the implications of this for studying the Anti-TTIP protests. The Enacted Citizenship approach, which can be classified as a critical approach in citizenship studies, differs from other approaches to citizenship in that it emphasizes the importance of considering the lived experiences of citizens, the power dynamics at play, and the specific context in which citizenship is being enacted.

By promoting a culture of discussion and dissent and reexamining traditional understandings of identity, nationality, and membership, the Enacted Citizenship approach seems to allow for a more nuanced understanding of citizenship: The argument that 'acts of citizenship' create political subjects serves as the starting point

for understanding the Anti-TTIP protests as an act of citizenship. The Enacted Citizenship approach seems particularly useful for examining precarious and contested claims to citizenship. It also allows for a consideration of the power dynamics at play and the specific (here: European) context in which citizenship is being enacted. The chapter introduces the concept of scales, which allows for a perspective on Europe that decenters the nation-state and the EU as a polity. I claim this is particularly useful for investigating the European dimension of the protests and how new versions and visions of Europe are being proposed. Overall, the inclusion of the Enacted Citizenship approach in this analysis serves to broaden and enrich the understanding of citizenship by providing a performance-oriented and critical perspective on the Anti-TTIP protests.

The fifth chapter on the research design is structured into three parts about accessing sources of data, generating data and analyzing data. The function of the section on *accessing data* is to justify the choice of interviewees in this study and expound the rationale behind the sampling strategy. It starts off with the argument that it is essential to give voice to a specific group of citizens, namely those who engage in dis-identification with the polity. The reasoning coming from conflict theory is that not only is conflict a natural and necessary part of socio-political life but also that ignoring it can be harmful. Due to the diverse ways the European dimension is experienced, I selected interviewees from different localities whom all have in common that they took part in the Anti-TTIP protests.

The primary function of the next section on *generating data* is to justify using episodic interviews to learn about subjective experiences. The episodic structure of narration, involving the organization of the plot around one or more events, is the most crucial characteristic of this interview style. The episodic interviewing method acknowledges the innate narrative mode of articulating experiences. The main argument of this section is that the episodic interview is well-suited for this purpose because it invites individuals to tell a series of personal stories or experiences from their lives. It focuses on key moments and explores personal perspectives on abstract concepts linked to concrete biographical experiences. It thereby allows for targeting both concrete examples of situations and more abstract and theoretical ideas and concepts, such as European citizenship, by starting from personal stories. In the following, I argue that in

every interview situation, specific power structures must be taken into account. Addressing such issues of research ethics, I outline how and why I made efforts to shift epistemic power to the subjects of research by providing them with various opportunities for engagement in the project. Being aware of the highly contingent nature of transcription, I briefly remark on how the audio data was transformed into written text.

The following section on *analyzing data* is structured in two parts: I argue in the *first part* that the narrative structure of autobiographical statements in interviews plays a significant role in this construction process, as the reconstruction of (protest) experiences through narratives stabilizes subjective drafts of one's memories. These narratives will be analyzed as indicators of meaningful aspects of the interviewees' protest experiences. I expect the interviewees will not relate all their experiences but rather a contingent selection of the most meaningful ones.

In the *second part*, I outline the method of analysis used and reflect on the limitations and potential of the phenomenographic approach in the context of this research. The starting point of this last section is that approaches to citizenship, which predefine citizens based on theoretical frameworks, can obscure other aspects of the citizens' realities and thereby restrict the potential to rethink citizenship. An inductive approach, which starts with the data and allows the theoretical insights to emerge from the analysis of it, is suggested as a more effective way to generate new insights and uncover unexpected patterns. Therefore, I justify the use of the phenomenographic method of data analysis. Phenomenography is a qualitative empirical research framework whose purpose is to address specific inquiries regarding how individuals interpret and comprehend their own experiences. It aims to explore descriptions of how people experience specific phenomena. This approach appears particularly valuable, because it is sensitive to the diversity of experiences: its conceptual framework explicitly acknowledges that phenomena are not experienced in a single, but in a variety of ways. Combined with the Enacted Citizenship approach, which post-defines subjects with claims as citizens based on their performative actions, I argue that one can not only examine whether these actions might be considered acts of citizenship, but also gain a deeper understanding of the meaning of European citizenship from the perspective of the citizens under study.

The sixth chapter is concerned with the main insights and findings of the data analysis. It starts by highlighting the European Citizen Initiative (ECI) against TTIP as the kick-start of the Anti-TTIP movement and outlines how the rejection of the ECI marked the beginning of a new phase in the TTIP conflict: I identify processes of democratization, politicization, and Europeanization as this rejection led to growing demands for the democratization of European decision-making processes, greater attention being given to the movement's claims and eventually resulted in ordinary citizens becoming more politically active and involved in the protests. Therefore, the rejection triggered the movement's growth, as more citizens joined the protests and a transnational network of civil society was established in Europe. As a result, the protests also became more European in nature. Due to their experiences in the Anti-TTIP protests, I argue that the citizens' claims emerge from the profound and far-reaching criticism of the EU's performance in the TTIP conflict but also spill over to its undemocratic structure in more general terms. While disappointment has been an essential trigger for mobilization, alternative paths have been proposed in response to this criticism, including a more citizen-centered decision-making process, shared power with citizens, more transparency and opportunities for civic participation, and an attitude of listening to and taking citizens seriously as political agents. The claims depicted allow us to reconstruct the citizens' role as one that is active (1), responsible (2), and EU-critical (3). It is characterized by the citizens' (1) proactive participation in political processes, (2) raising critical voices against topics and structures that they responsabilize for, and (3) constructive criticism of the EU aiming to improve problematic aspects instead of turning away from the EU altogether.

The concept of Enacted Citizenship is used to outline *how* individuals become political subjects, or citizens, namely through a process of responsabilization: the sense of responsibility beyond personal interests leads to the desire to engage in political action. The findings support this by showing how the act of protesting involves feeling affected by a problem, being aware of one's power to act, and taking responsibility to become active in addressing this issue. Coming back to the argument that European citizenship is a form of citizenship that does not simply replicate national models at a supranational level but operates in a distinct manner, the chapter then turns to the European scale of the Anti-TTIP protests. The Enacted Citizenship approach suggests

that scales such as the European one are not fixed, and static containers with predetermined meaning but somewhat 'fluid' as they are shaped by struggles and contestation. Therefore, I explore the meanings given to the European scale in this specific context of Anti-TTIP action: The actions taken by European citizens are described as 'European' in nature as they have led to the development of transnational cooperation and a feeling of solidarity. While the sustainability of these political ties and their potential for future political cooperation on the European level depends on the future mobilizations of the citizens themselves, the data points to the development of a horizontally Europeanized civil society.

The findings show that the Anti-TTIP protests offer the potential to create and enact new ways of being a citizen within the context of European citizenship. They are presented as an act of citizenship that demonstrates both a rupture in the assumption of citizen support for the TTIP policy and a rupture in the role assigned to citizens in this political process. The interviewees' perspectives confirm that the conflict surrounding TTIP is characterized as not only a clash of interests but also a dispute about the role of citizens in European politics. The protesters' demands for a seat at the negotiation table are described as representing a claim for recognition as a legitimate actor in the decision-making process, constituting a fundamentally democratic practice that brings the limits of the assigned role into question and makes it negotiable. The Anti-TTIP protests are therefore presented as an act of citizenship that asserts the inclusion of citizens in European politics.

Turning to the first part of the research question, *which* citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests, one can conclude that the role of citizens anticipated in this context is one in which the right to participate and to be critical, as well as the duty to act responsibly, play a significant role. Therefore, citizens' role is headlined as 'Troublemakers', which aims to describe powerful political subjects who recognize the crucial role of critical citizens in democratic processes. The term 'Troublemaker' is being used to refer to individuals who actively challenge and disrupt the status quo by calling into question the limits and roles assigned to them within the political process. The title-giving term 'Troublemaker' suggests a willingness to challenge authority and push back against established power structures in order to advocate for change and inclusion. It is used in the context of this research on the Anti-TTIP protests to

emphasize the potential of individuals who create and enact new ways of being a citizen on the European level.

The findings of this research serve as the basis for the thesis' conclusion, which argues that rethinking the concept of European citizenship is crucial for empowering individuals to participate in European politics as citizens. In summarizing and contextualizing the main findings of the research, the conclusion states that despite limited opportunities to intervene in EU decision-making processes, activists experienced their power as citizens in being active in the protests. Furthermore, I argue that these actions have the symbolic power to question and recreate established meanings about what it means to be a European citizen. Research on enacted citizenship may guide new ways of thinking as well as new ways of acting in European politics. Therefore, the chapter closes by highlighting the responsibility of researchers to be aware of how their work contributes to the construction of European citizenship both in theory and practice.

Europe in crisis?

Starting from the argument that what is eventually called 'crisis' is the product of how one perceives reality in respect to one's expectations, I see the perception of a 'European crisis' as a useful starting point to better understand the citizens' aspirations for European politics. Researchers call for empirical studies of these, based on the citizens' own idea(l)s and perceptions of European politics (Gaxie et al.: 29, Van Deth, 2009: 181, Jones and Gaventa; Gabriel; Geißel; Stack). As a first step, I will show how citizens' expectations of the EU changed, and, in a second step, outline new expectations from democracy that citizens have of EU politics. I argue that the citizens' raising expectations to change European politics comes with the potential to mobilize citizens to take collective action for topics that they care for. It is therefore especially insightful to investigate the enactment of citizenship in the Anti-TTIP protests against the background of this 'European crisis', because it helps to understand the mobilizing potential that this criticism entails.

I intentionally framed this section as a question for a specific reason: Current crisis discourses spread narratives of a crisis of solidarity, a crisis of democracy, a crisis of legitimacy, an identity crisis that the EU is facing today (Weiler 2011; Delanty 2014; Murray-Leach 2014; della Porta 2006; critical, see: Beyme 2013, 137). The 'crisis' has become an empty signifier for political, economic and social grievances that exist in the EU. But what is this 'crisis' that seems to be so commonly referred to? From a constructivist point of view, a crisis is a construction and by analyzing such crisis-narratives as such a construct, it tells much more about those naming it than about any detected 'reality'. The aforementioned facets of crises are indicators of what is perceived as lacking in the EU: solidarity, democracy, legitimacy, a European identity.... In other words, it signals a gap between expectations and perceived political realities. The diagnosis of a 'crisis' therefore also entails information about idea(l)s of the political and deviations therefrom. What one experiences as (dis-)continuity are constructions that also always reflect perceptions of 'normality'. 'Normality' is the background against which the 'crisis' can be constructed (Giesen 2012, 343).

If we start from Gramsci's the image of a 'disease', however, I state that the urgent need is not only to find remedies, but to create a discussion about how to treat the

crisis' symptoms. Gramsci is often quoted with his description of the crisis as being in an "intermediate position", in which "the old is dying and the new cannot be born" (Gramsci 1971, 276). Due to this pressure for change, the crisis has the status 'in between' two stages. The search for the 'new', this prospective dimension of the crisis, plays a decisive role for civic engagement⁴: the risk of failure on the one hand and the potential to create something new on the other characterizes two cornerstones of the subjective experiences of this situation. These two forces create the suspense from which the crisis status draws its perception of exceptionalism. Ideals on the one hand and dangers on the other hand are decisive as catalysts for change. They are the vanishing points that motivate and guide civic action.

Therefore, the reason why it seems imperative to acknowledge the context of a perceived European crisis in this research is twofold: First, because, albeit a construction, the crisis is 'real' in the way it has an impact on people's thoughts and actions.. In other words: If a situation is experienced as 'real', they will act upon this and therefore they will have 'real' consequences. This became known as the Tomas-Theorem, named after Dorothy Swaine Thomas and William Isaac Thomas, who stated that "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas and Thomas 1928, 572). It is therefore important to underline that it is not about the 'realness' of the crisis, since believing in its 'realness' is what is expected to influence our actions and behavior (Marton 1981, 178). Second, there exists a specific consequence of this perception, namely its mobilizing force. In other words: Crisis discourses mobilize citizens to start questioning political structures and policies and eventually become active against it (Samaddar 2010, 139). Having said that, this research is more interested in those 'real consequences' than in the 'perceived crisis'. As I will outline in the following, changed expectations and the resulting dissatisfaction with the limited democratic involvement of citizens in European decision-making are a powerful mobilizing force. In the Anti-TTIP protests we can see how such questions seem to undergo an unprecedented rise in politicization and contestation.

⁴ Talking about participation we often use engagement as a synonym, however Dahlgren makes a useful distinction between the terms: He defines engagement as a subjective state in which attention is focused on an object of personal relevance. It is therefore a precondition of participation, which is the concrete, observable activity following from the will and the opportunity to become active (Dahlgren 2006, 24)

According to their influential study, Hooghe and Marks (2009) state that the citizens' expectations of the EU changed from the 1990s onwards. Citizens started to relate to the EU in a different way, namely as citizens' expectations increased over time. This change is described as the shift from "permissive consensus" to "constraining dissensus" (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 5). The so-called 'permissive consensus' describes the silent approval of the process of deepening European integration. More precisely, ordinary citizens felt *indifferent* rather than *in favor* of the European integration process. Since 1991, from the Maastricht treaty onwards, however, the EU and its ongoing integration became more and more questioned, which is described as a climate of 'constraining dissensus'. This implies a change of the citizens' role in the integration process: While before 1991, citizens as political actors were almost invisible in the political decision-making on a European level, from that moment onwards, citizens became more active, more critical, but also more uncomfortable (and therefore more important) for decision-making on this supranational level. This can be perceived as a complication, or even a deterioration, of European politics: political ruling became more 'constrained' by growing skepticism and the political conflicts it created.

And, in fact, euroscepticism became a hot topic in the discourse on European integration, as growing resistance against EU politics evolved (Delanty 2014, 210). However, a hasty conclusion is misleading. Constraining dissensus also points to a politicization of citizens, who are willing to get involved and articulate their claims. Pointing to the crucial need for conflict for the democratic quality of a polity, some authors argue that one main aspect of the democratic deficit is not only the non-representation of the citizens, but also that there is no opposition within the EU. As mentioned before, due to this lack of a democratic conflict culture, critics of the EU institutions and its policies tend to raise their claims outside the institutionalized EU areas. To foster democratic politics, the democratic structures of the EU need to allow for critical contestation (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Rauh and Zürn 2014, 127; Pelinka 2016, 30). Criticism plays a crucial role to ensure the democratic life of each political community, and therefore, conflict must be regarded as a constitutive part of this political life. Hurrenkamp et al. state that the more citizens are actively participating in political decisions, the more conflicts can be expected: "citizens have to learn to

negotiate their environment. Conflict, disappointment, and tension are unavoidable and durable elements of this process." (Hurenkamp, Tonkens, and Duyvendak 2012, 40). This creates an awareness for the fact that the support of citizens is needed for a functioning polity - and their criticism as well.

It means to surmise that the "pragmatic approval [of policies] does not easily translate into identification" (Delanty 2007, 69) - as much as its critique does not translate into the rejection of the polity per se. As Geißel's study (2009) on critical citizens and their effects on democracy shows, it is not the citizens' satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the polity that is a relevant category for the functioning of democracy. According to her study, more important than the level of satisfaction is the citizens' orientation towards criticism. This means that both satisfied and dissatisfied citizens who share the will to formulate or discuss democratic criticism, are more politically active and politically informed, and they are more tolerant towards others. While critical citizens have a greater distance from political leaders, they are at the same time strongly connected to political life and advocate democratic principles (Geißel 2009). More concretely, what fosters the democratic quality of a community are citizens who on the one hand accept democratic principles and on the other hand critically examine their forms and implementation. The keyword here is 'democratization of democracy'. This underlines, first of all, the democratic potential of critical active citizenship and secondly, it also highlights that criticism as such is not unhealthy for democracy, but it depends on the way their criticism is articulated.

When looking for this potential in the European movement against TTIP, challenges should not be glossed over, on the contrary. But the central assumption is that it is the criticism, perhaps also the dissatisfaction that allows human beings to rethink, question and rise up against the existing conditions. This creates a space for alternatives, which are an important prerequisite for mobilization. In contrast to the former indifference towards EU politics, 'constraining dissensus' must therefore be interpreted as a signal for a more active and more politicized citizenry (Delanty 2014, 212; Rauh and Zürn 2014, 122; Falk and Hölscher 2010, 13). In this regard, to question the process of European integration is an important step towards civic emancipation. However, as I will argue, it has not been the last step in this direction.

The Anti-TTIP protests must be understood against the background of this growing criticism that characterizes the European integration process, even more so since the euro crisis from 2008 onwards. Some authors speak of this moment as a “turning point in the history of European integration” (Delanty 2014, 207). Apart from the drastic, life-changing cuts that people from Southern Europe, and especially from Greece, had to (and still) suffer from, this was another decisive rupture in the citizen’s relation to the EU: For many citizens, it was again another proof for the EU’s poor political performance and the EU institutions being detached from ‘their’ citizens. As the euro crisis was presented as a problem that the European elites will take care of, it felt out of reach of the citizens. Even more destructive for civic engagement, it was presented as irreversible (Murray-Leach 2014, 51; see also: Datz 2013). Thereby, the crisis was “actively depoliticized” (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 7). This comes with the risk to make citizens less willing to strive for change, as it reduces their consciousness of their own civic power to influence European politics as well as to see the alternatives at choice (Murray-Leach 2014, 4; Balibar 2016, 17). As a consequence, frustration and disaffection with the political status quo is growing, of which the massive growth of eurosceptic parties is just the tip of the iceberg (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Guérot 2014; Rauh and Zürn 2014, 122). While it fostered eurosceptic forces, it also politicized the topic of European integration and forced decision makers to take into account a more EU-critical public (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 8). Long before the outbreak of the euro crisis, the EU’s status of a close economic community without a strong political community, or in short “a currency without democracy” (Guérot 2014, 133) has been widely criticized. However, the euro crisis of 2008 created serious debates about the elite-centered, undemocratic and unsocial nature of the EU (Rauh and Zürn 2014, 121; Guérot 2014, 133).

In the post-crisis discussion, the lack of the EU’s political dimension became the focus of attention (Guérot 2014, 134; Rauh and Zürn 2014, 121). In particular, the EU started to be criticized for their -missing- democratic structures, for example the decrease in parliamentary control, a weak European parliament, no direct European elections, and a decision-making that is too far from ‘their’ citizens (Follesdal and Hix 2006). However, those critics of the current democratic performance also strive for a practice of democracy based on different qualities than just representation as they claim for

alternative democracy beyond the politics-as-usual (Murray-Leach 2014; Della Porta 2012). More than the exact implementation and definitions of such 'alternative democracy', I want to stress that EU criticism started to focus on the lack of democracy instead of the institutional design: "Democracy as such became the topos of the crisis discussion, replacing the notion of European integration" (Guérot 2014, 134). While the question of more or less European integration has - at least since the 90s onwards - been the main site of contestation, the topic of "democracy has now entered the picture" (Delanty 2014, 211). Political scientists refer to this criticism under the terms of 'post-democracy' (Crouch 2008), 'fugitive democracy' (Wolin 1994), 'facade democracy' (my translation Streeck 2013, 88), 'defect democracy' (my translation Merkel et. al. 2003), 'simulative democracy' (my translation Blühdorn 2013) or as a 'democratic rollback' (Diamond 2008).

In the public discourse, the term of a 'democratic deficit' became dominant, describing the "disparities between the perceived democratic performance and public aspirations" (Norris 2011, 6; see also Follesdal and Hix 2006; Wiener and della Sala 1997, 595). Again, from a constructivist standpoint, Pippa Norris' study is concerned with the relation between the democratic performance of states in regard to the public expectations. Norris distinguishes three factors that influence the democratic deficit:⁵ The *supply* side, which can be understood as the polity's democratic performance, the *demand* side, meaning the citizen's aspirations, and the *intermediary* between them, most often understood as the media coverage or education practices (Norris 2011, 6f.). Applying this idea to European politics, it seems that the EU fails to match the citizens' aspirations. The supply side has been poor in democratic structures from the very beginning: Theory suggests that the EU was not designed to be democratically legitimate. According to Weiler, "democracy was not part of the original DNA of European integration" (Weiler 2011, 172). Bellamy points out that historically, it was the elites that determined the future of the EU by deciding in the name of the citizens. But

⁵ This relates to the differentiation of input and output legitimacy by Scharpf (Scharpf 1999, 16f.), which claims that democratic legitimacy has two dimensions, one refers to the inputs and one to the outputs of a political system. To analyze the EU's democratic legitimacy, one needs to check the balance between two key factors: the level of representation of and participation by the people in the decision-making processes (input) and the degree of effectiveness of the EU's policies for the people (output).

he stresses the point that this elitist character could only be possible because of the "absence of any significant explicit dissent" (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 1). Similar to Hooghe and Mark's diagnosis of a shift from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus, Bellamy et al. distinguish between active and passive legitimation to emphasize this distinction. While active legitimation involves "citizens endorsing and helping formulate its goals", passive legitimation is understood as the "mere popular acceptance of its results" (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 2). This brings us back to the 'demand side' of Norris' threefold triplet, which diagnoses a rising demand to be involved as citizens on the one hand and their criticism of the limited possibilities to officially do so on the other: "In other words, the citizens of Europe have begun to desire to take a more active and critical stance on European affairs than current arrangements permit." (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 2). As European politics entered into ordinary people's everyday lives, the abstract topic of 'European integration' became more tangible and therefore even more contestable (Guérot 2014, 133). A study shows that the more one is informed about and involved in EU politics, the more likely one becomes critical of the democratic performance of the EU (Mößner 2009, 159). This is merely surprising, as pro-European arguments stand on rotten ground as they defend a "flawed, undemocratic and unsocial system" (Guérot 2014, 135). Due to this politicization of European topics in the public debate, Rauh and Zürn argue that the euro crisis must be seen as independent of the level of European cohesion. While European politicians did a miserable job managing the crisis, I will outline in the following how on the level of civil society transnational bonds and European consciousness were created and fostered (Rauh and Zürn 2014, 122; Gengnagel 2014, 290; Balibar 2016, 91).

I state that the change in the EU-citizen relation did not stop at the phase of constraining dissensus. While in this phase citizens started to express their disagreement with the political choices on the EU level, they did not yet come up with concrete alternatives. The debate was still very much about being in favor or against European integration, not about which kind of Europe they strive for (Jachtenfuchs, Diez, and Jung 1998, 410; Guérot 2014, 137; Bulmer and Joseph 2016, 15). From the crisis of 2008, European integration entered into a new phase in which more and more citizens became conscious of and therefore wanted to have a say in EU politics. While

before "Europe as a political space was perceived as irrelevant at best" (Murray-Leach 2014, 3), the euro crisis' debate triggered a politicization of European citizens who started to claim a say in the EU topics they care about as Hooghe and Marks rightly stated: "citizens care - passionately - about who exercises authority over them" (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2).

I want to stress that, on the demand side, citizens formulate rising aspirations for democratic participation and control over EU policies. This is referred to by Gerbaudo as an "*anti-oligarchic view of citizenship*" (Gerbaudo 2017, 7 highlighted in the original) in his study on Anti-austerity movements in Southern Europe. In this study, he points to a shift away from the pure mobilization for a specific political interest to the more general trend of the symbolic "reassertion of the power of the dispersed citizenry against the concentrated power of economic and political elites" (Gerbaudo 2017, 19). He highlights that the claims for different democratic politics comes with a new citizenship narrative, which is meant to make political and economic elites acutely aware of the critical and powerful citizenry and their rights and interests. He notes the crisis of 2008 as one of the triggers to launch the debate on alternative forms of citizenship: "The perception of a crisis of citizenship has prompted a discussion about the possibility of new forms of citizenship" (Gerbaudo 2017, 7). Albeit in the language of citizenship or not, this change in the citizens' actions is pointing in two directions: First, the scale is shifting towards transnational citizenship and second, the quality of the relationship between the state and the citizens is understood as a "bottom-up constitutive process rather than a top-down legal status" (Gerbaudo 2017, 7). In this respect, the EU's decision to introduce the legal status of EU citizenship in the Maastricht treaty of 1992 must be seen rather as a "*symbolic* [my emphasis] step that recognizes the importance of citizens to the Union" (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 3), as it follows a rights-based rather than a participatory approach: It does neither foresee any involvement nor the payment of taxes by the citizens, therefore the "EU citizenship reflects rather than remedies the Union's messy and undemocratic character" (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 3). But the changed evaluation and perception of the EU's political performance indicates that also the role some citizens want to play in it has changed in the last years.

I claim that it is not enough to stop at the mere description of the constraining dissensus in its various terms. More research is needed that allows us to gain a deeper understanding of the citizens' positions towards European institutions and its politics: "The subjective perceptions of citizens and their motives for a positive or negative view are still poorly known. Few researchers have attempted to understand - in the sense of interpretive sociology - what citizens think about Europe and how they envision Europe" (my translation Gaxie 2011, 27). Often summarized under terms such as 'the masses' or 'the public', the perspective on citizens risks to envision 'the citizens' as essentially similar individuals. However, such a conception of 'the citizens' has been criticized for referring to a citizen coded white, male, bourgeois, able-bodied, and heterosexual (Young 1990; Pateman and Mills 2007).

In reality, 'citizens' as such do not exist, but they are a heterogeneous group of individuals, which does not allow us to ignore their heterogeneity. This group needs to be studied more intensely: Gaxie states that the subjective citizen's positions to European politics and its future is understudied so far (Gaxie 2011, 27; 29). My research confirms that we have knowledge deficits when it comes to the perspectives of citizens on the relation between the individual and the European polity, here referred to as European citizenship. This will not change as long as discourses exclude the expertise of citizens apart from monitoring their 'opinions' in surveys and polls (critical: Bläser 2013). It is long overdue to ask the citizens themselves about their civic practices and which meanings and practices are attached to that.⁶ Overall, more research is needed to understand those new roles enacted by the citizens in European politics: "If we view democratization as a process by which political power moves into the hand of ordinary citizens, then a broader definition of democracy is required, and with such a definition we find that the orientations of ordinary citizens play a central role in democracy" (Welzel and Inglehart 2008, 139). Even more since, according to Rumford, the process of institutional democratization frequently occurs in a "piecemeal fashion" (Rumford 2003, 34), which reproduces distinct boundaries of the democratic vision that political leaders have for the EU. Hence, it is important to closely examine those citizens, who enact their own understandings of European

⁶ Worth mentioning as an exception is the study by Bruter (2004); and earlier: Diez (1999); Jachtenfuchs, Diez, Jung (1998)

citizenship. This shift of focus towards the citizens allows to better understand the role citizens want to play in European politics. Papazoglou states that the times are over when citizens restricted themselves to a permissive consensus, which allowed the decision makers to rule almost without any political headwind (Papazoglou 2010, 231).

What I propose here is that it is important to question conventional ideas of the European democracy 'in crisis'. This diagnosis is based on the assumption that one of the most urgent problems among Europe's many crises is the low level of participation by its citizens. In this rhetoric, the 'democratic deficit' of European decision-making arises from a lack of participation rooted in political apathy of European citizens concerning European affairs. This research project can be seen as a reaction to the widespread narrative of European citizens that often presents a bleak outlook on their political involvement and may even pathologize their political disinterest (Marcus 2002, 2; critical: Wood and Flinders 2014, 159). It does not mean that I disagree with studies stating that the absence of a lively European civil society contributes to the democratic deficit of the European Union (Rumford 2003, 26). But analyzing the potential of such civic initiatives in European society is not only beneficial but also urgently necessary, given that there is a surge in research on "the crisis" and its aftermath, however, the conclusions have remained inconclusive.

Talking about the citizens' lack of democratic participation, even political apathy, their declining trust in the institutions, their missing European identification, and their overall imperfect 'European performance': all of this problematizes 'the European citizens' on the basis of a perspective that silences the peoples' active, critical interventions, and, by that, tends to overshadow new ideas for political alternatives. In contrast to that I define the 'democratic deficit' as a construct that describes the gap between the citizen's desire to participate differently in European affairs and the EU's current institutional arrangements that permit citizens to do so. De Salla points to the idealist and realist dimension defining the democratic deficit as "the tension between the two poles of the democratic ideal and the democratic practice" (Wiener and della Sala 1997, 596).. The deficit is a gap that (also) comes into being through changed and constantly changing demands from the parts of the citizens to influence the European political reality, which increasingly becomes their own. I have shown how especially the euro crisis intensified the politicization of citizens who claim the democratization of

European politics (Rauh and Zürn 2014, 123). I showed how today's citizenry shifted the discussion away from the question of being favorable or against European integration to questions of alternatives of a *different* Europe. By following this line of thought, I opt for the argument that there is much to gain when listening to the citizens' claims as they signal the vast.

This perspective may offer a new understanding of what is often negatively framed as a 'crisis-ridden' Europe: The growing politicization of European politics activates citizens to engage in European issues. Without any doubt, this makes European politics more complicated, slows down decision-making processes and creates conflict among political actors. By that, it also creates a moment in which conflicts allow for negotiations about the role European citizens can play in European politics. The discourse on the so-called 'European crisis' is of crucial as it allows to shed light on alternative visions coming from the citizens themselves. The consequence of this perspective is a debate of European citizenship centered around which citizenship is enacted rather than asking how to enhance the performance of citizens using different devices. This implies that I surmise that citizens possess the ability to impact its course and results. I observe that this is still a blank spot in the debate of the 'European crisis': The orientation towards the crisis' potential has been born out of the observation that there are impressive and multiple examples that contrast this dominant narrative and demonstrate the political will and visions to work on alternatives. This signals how politicization and an engaged European citizenship may be the true remedy for the democratic shortcomings that European politics is suffering from. In the next chapter, I will outline why this is pronouncedly what one can see in the conflictual protest action against TTIP.

More than just one: Introductions to the Anti-TTIP protests

As I will argue in the following, not only is the TTIP *more* than just a trade deal, but also the protests it raised grew out of *more* than just the pure criticism of this transatlantic trade deal. They allow us to understand *more* about the role citizens want to play in European politics. Therefore, it is this *more* that I put into focus in this dissertation, as it allows to add something to the ways in which European citizenship is discussed in European and citizenship studies. Therefore, in this chapter, I will elaborate not only on the case of TTIP and its related protests - however they may be narrated. I also want to create some awareness for the specific perspective on the Anti-TTIP protests, which guides this research. I claim that the conflict around the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) provides an illuminating case to investigate European citizenship which is expected to be relevant for European studies scholars and citizenship scholars alike.

This chapter tackles the question why the Anti-TTIP protests provide insights when investigating this topic by taking a closer look at the characteristics of these protests: Both, the sheer size of the trade deal, as well as the specific course of the negotiations made it a contested issue incomparable with most Anti-trade protests, and even with most European protests in general. However, I will argue that what, above all, makes these protests so informative is that TTIP-opponents started to claim a different role for citizens in European decision-making processes. Hereby, the focus moves towards the democratic question that was already raised in the last chapter: Which role can citizens play in European politics? This is, I will argue, a fertile starting-point to investigate the citizens' enactment of European citizenship in this specific context. As a first step, I intend to show how, due to its encompassing nature as well as the specific course of the negotiations, TTIP became such a politicized issue in the public discourse. Drawing from those insights, the second part concentrates on the specific historical context of these protests and outlines how the European context matters in this respect. To conclude, I make the case for a reflexive way to narrate the story of the Anti-TTIP protest. Also, I will be giving insights into the underlying research aims that shape my own perspective on these protests.

More than just trade: TTIP's encompassing topics beyond tariffs

Mostly unnoticed, the EU has already approved trade agreements with fifty states. But the TTIP seemed to be different as the treaty was facing fierce opposition from thousands of NGOs, trade unions and civil society⁷ organizations, but also politicians and citizens from both sides of the Atlantic. To answer the question of what made TTIP an issue of public relevance, opponents refer to particularities of the contract. Before looking at their concerns in greater detail, two annotations may help to understand the special shape of this treaty. First of all, the sheer size of the economies involved is outstanding: While studies differ with respect to their estimates of the effects of TTIP, they expect it to affect almost half of the global GDP and one third of world trade (for an overview of studies on the economic effects of TTIP see: Felbermayr 2016). Given this, TTIP was likely to attract more attention than other global trade policies. Second, TTIP is not about trade only. As a result of globalization and the explosion of the information society, international trade agreements are no longer only about the exchange of goods (Pauwelyn 2014). They may also include services, investments, regulatory cooperation and other trade-related issues. As a consequence, the agreement's encompassing nature makes it very complex to understand. Nevertheless, the wide scope of the TTIP negotiations – affecting more sectors and industries than any previous agreement – has evoked additional attention among civil society groups.

The argument in favor of TTIP is based on narratives of prosperity as well as statistics of a financial surplus in everyone's pocket. What is dominant in the argumentation for TTIP is a rationalist dimension that addresses the people's reasonability: Proponents of the contract refer to economic models that show gains of the deal as well as numbers of potential benefits per household (Eliasson 2015, 20). Surprisingly, although a positive economic outcome of TTIP is mostly⁸ uncontested, this seems to have failed

⁷ I refer to 'civil society' meaning the sum of different types of organized collectives, whose members have objectives of public interest: "It is the process through which individuals negotiate, argue, struggle against or agree with each other and with the centres [sic] of political and economic authority. Through voluntary associations, movements, parties, unions, the individual is able to act publicly." (Kaldor 2003, 585)

⁸ Beck and Scherrer find a 2% loss to the EU budget as revenue raised from customs duties will be lost (Scherrer and Beck 2014)

in gathering full public support: A growing number of Europeans opposed the trade deal regardless of its economic benefits. The narrative of potential dangers of lowering the well-being of European citizens is the frame that brackets the arguments of the opponents. Also, as I will outline in greater detail later on, they seem to have "successfully managed to frame the agreement in the public sphere as a threat to democracy" (de Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016, 11).

As noted above, arguments in favor of TTIP were dominated by the rationalistic logic of numbers to prove the reduction of unemployment and the growth of the economic force of the EU. But not only: Politicians tried to establish a narrative of TTIP as a long-awaited, uncontestable project of European-American friendship. In their recommendations to the European Commission on the TTIP-negotiations, the EU Parliament talks about the need of setting global standards "in line with our shared values" (Lange and European Parliament 2015, 6) between the EU and the US. This refers to their global responsibility, presenting 'the West' as a role model for how global politics should be like, by setting the norms and standards for future trade agreements. The 'responsibility' to generate wealth and growth in their member states plays a significant role in the EU's argumentation, especially after the economic crisis: *"It is expected to result in more jobs and growth and assist Europe in its long-term recovery from the economic crisis."* (European Commission 2014). These arguments follow a geopolitical logic: The EU's declining importance in global politics, as well as the increasing power of China is made explicit in the pro-TTIP discourse (Dieter 2014). In that sense, the 'partnership' between the EU and the US is seen as a forceful economic unity that is able to compete with China, holding together about half of the global GDP. The narrative of the European-American partnership against potential threats from 'outside' plays a major role in framing the TTIP as an uncontestable project: Michael Froman, the US trade Commissioner, stated in March 2014, referring to the Russian invasion of the Krim: "Recent developments just underscore the importance of the transatlantic relationship. [...] From both a strategic and an economic perspective, the rationale for the TTIP could never be stronger." (Michael Froman quoted in: Emmott 2014). The idea of a closer connection between the EU and the US goes even beyond that argumentation: A closer (trade) relationship to the US is portrayed on the one hand

as a normative obligation coming from a long shared history. On the other hand, it is regarded as a relation that needs to be fixed through even closer cooperation.

On the other side, TTIP opponents were alarmed by the potential dangers of such a far reaching trade agreement. As TTIP covers not just traditional trade issues, such as tariffs and quotas, but the vast majority of the agreement relates to government regulations, it is expected to have huge implications for almost every aspect of life. More specifically, TTIP is seen as narrowing or removing divergent standards across the Atlantic. NGOs refer to these 'European' standards as the painfully achieved products of a long and brutal history of political dispute. In this respect, the buzz word "a race to the bottom" (Corporate Europe Observatory 2013) found its way to the forefront of the discourse. It claims that the erosion of social, workers and environmental rights and standards are in danger. Critics of the deal see the risk that these rights will be sacrificed on the altar of free trade for the benefit of multinational companies. The opponents successfully established a discourse in which opposing TTIP means to defend historically and culturally grown standards and rights, to be a responsible global actor (especially in regard to third countries that are not part of the treaty), and, by that, to hold on to visions of a more sustainable, more social future. Potential economic gains of TTIP mostly failed to win support in the public. As Eliasson puts it: "Politics, not macroeconomic data or models, will determine the fate of TTIP" (Eliasson 2015, 22). His argument is that the Anti-TTIP-network's success in gathering public support can be traced back to the normative framing of such key issues (see also: Eliasson and Huet 2018).

These framings of the two clashing perspectives on TTIP could not be any clearer than in their use of language: What supporters name 'trade barriers', the opponents refer to as "historically constructed social, health, and environmental standards for the sake to safeguard citizens" (Barker 2014, 2). While the European Commission sees them as 'discrimination' against foreign investors, (Krajewski and Hoffmann, 2017., 10) they are regarded by the opponents as a threat to the state's independency from economic powers. Instead of the transparency that opponents claim for, the EC itself demands from them a "certain level of confidentiality" (European Commission 2013). The choice of words show two different agendas behind the stories told about TTIP. Conscious of the power of language, TTIP-opponents established the neologism of 'trade speak': "In

trade speak, “harmonization”—represented by terms such as “regulatory coherence or convergence,” “mutual recognition,” and “substantial equivalency”—results in a downward spiral of numerous safeguards for society and, perversely, constrains governments from setting safety standards higher than trade agreement rules.” (Barker 2014, 5). Public interest groups skillfully presented ‘regulatory convergence’ as preventing future improvements to public safety by cementing current standards, while ‘regulatory compatibility’ and ‘common standards’ are interpreted as euphemisms for lowering labor, environmental, and consumer standards. The different ways to narrate TTIP does not only reflect the controversial positions in this conflict, but it also exemplifies that there is never just *one* story to be told about a conflict. Even more importantly, in the following, I will outline more explicitly my view of the Anti-TTIP protests as well the theoretical and empirical potential this case entails to understand European citizenship.

More than just the content: Criticism of the negotiation process

The Anti-TTIP protests illustrate that global trade is no longer the exclusive domain of economic experts and practitioners in the field, but is a politicized policy relevant for a wider public. I have mentioned before that trade is not just about distributing goods, but it is also increasingly a normative conflict, meaning a struggle about how and what parts of the ‘way of living’ are worth being protected or changed, especially in the light of the increasing global interconnectedness. Understanding this broader ‘cultural shift’ requires moving beyond conventional, rationalist accounts of trade policy which focus on the mediation of economic interests. Rather, a look at ideas and value-based accounts is required. Given the potentially unlimited scope of topics that can be included in the TTIP (there existed a negative list only to exclude non-negotiable topics), TTIP opponents focused on some topics which were of special interest to the public. Those topics of high relevance are a product of contingent, but not random choices. Despite some country-specific issues that gained special attention in national discourses, (Conrad, 2020) what united TTIP opponents is the consensus that TTIP needs to be stopped. In line with the argument of Kalor and Selchow (2013), I suggest that the main source of TTIP-criticism is not the content of this contract, but, as I will

argue in the next part, that it is perceived as a threat to European democracy. In a cross-European collaborative research project, seven field teams researched a range of new political phenomena subsumed under the term 'subterranean politics'. Under the key frame of the financial crisis, they conclude that new protest waves are challenging how politics should be done (Kaldor and Selchow 2012, 7; 10; 14). In the Anti-TTIP movement, the question of democracy has been addressed from two angles: First, opponents identify dangers for democracy if TTIP is approved and implemented.

TTIP is accused of touching the sovereignty of countries in many areas. As I showed before, opponents fear that TTIP sets rules that intervene in the way governments regulate social, food and environmental standards (Daphi et. al. 2015, 7). The key word is 'regulatory cooperation', that is assumed to decrease the regulative power of governments. It goes hand in hand with the opponents' constraints against the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), a political mechanism through which economic entities can sue governments. The controversial ISDS clause was called the "hot potato" (Fox 2015) of the TTIP. By removing different standards across the Atlantic, TTIP seeks to establish equal legal rights for foreign investors. From the perspective of the opponents, however, the ISDS chapter in TTIP is regarded as a threat to democracy since it would allow firms to sue governments if they find evidence of business obstruction – for example in national laws that seek to tighten social or environmental standards. Civil society initiatives condemned the ISDS as unlawful (Buonanno and Dudek 2015, 20). Opposition against ISDS was so intense that the EU postponed negotiations on the ISDS chapter even though ISDS is a common mechanism in trade agreements of the EU. This did not stop civil society from declaring it a controversial and sensitive topic. As the results of the public consultation about ISDS suggests, behind the opposition against ISDS stands the fear of politics being influenced by economic powers that might narrow the governments' regulative power (European Commission 2015). Critics expect less political innovation as a result of ISDS, due to the given risk that governments may decide to withdraw a decision or a law. The fact that a government might have to pay a financial compensation to the investor, ISDS is regarded as holding the potential to influence legislation and infiltrate the voices of the citizens in democratic processes. As a reaction, civil society

organizations established an effective pro-democracy and pro-transparency discourse arguing that no agreement is preferable.

Second, critics of the TTIP claim that the agreement's decision-making processes are undemocratic, because TTIP is negotiated behind closed doors (Daphi et. al. 2015, 7; Finkbeiner et. al. 2016, 49; 51). Anti-TTIP protests can be regarded as attempts to open those closed doors and take a seat at the negotiation table. Especially at the beginning, there has been no serious involvement of NGOs in the decision-making process. Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), an NGO working on the lobby groups in EU policy making, criticizes the way the European Commission's trade department deals with public interest groups trying to influence the TTIP: At the very beginning of the negotiations (winter 2012/13), 298 stakeholders lobbied for TTIP, while 269 of them came from the private sector. 92% of the contacts the Commission had were lobbyists from the business, while only 4% of the consultations and hearings were with public interest groups (Corporate Europe Observatory 2014). The European Commission is accused to ignore the civil societies' concerns about TTIP by not giving them the same access to consultations as other lobby groups from the profit-sector. As Ghailani and Castillo point out, "Opponents of the draft agreement point to the confidentiality of the negotiating mandate as a typical example of the lack of transparency and unwillingness of the Commission and Council to involve the public in this affair." (Ghailani and Ponce del Castillo 2015, 221). As a consequence, not having access to the documents may raise risky speculations: "Without having any draft, activists can be easily accused of scaremongering." (forthcoming: Strange 2015, 8). The lack of transparency surrounding the negotiations created further suspicion towards the 'experts' in the discourse and towards the potential outcome they proclaim (forthcoming: Strange 2015, 1). Having pointed out the main criticism against TTIP builds the basis to interpret its quick and broad politicization.

More than just Trump's merit: The protests' politicizing force

After having sketched out a rough overview of the TTIP's debate, the focus is going to be on the Anti-TTIP protest actions. Just like there is not one story to be told about the TTIP conflict, there is more than one story to be told about the Anti-TTIP protests:

Looking back to the moment when the negotiations of TTIP were launched in June 2013, little attention was drawn too this agreement that was about to become so passionately debated in the following years. But soon after, civil society organizations throughout Europe initiated critical debates surrounding TTIP. What I claim here is that TTIP caused a broad and quick politicization of the European civil society. As I described above, the TTIP contains far more than just tariffs and taxes. The vast multiplicity of concerns that the TTIP raised is represented in the European 'Stop TTIP' alliance counting 515 organizations from across Europe. The list includes trade unions and civil society organizations that represent a wide range of public interests; among others agriculture and environmental protection, public health and education services, animal, consumer and civil rights, and social, digital and labor rights. But at the very beginning, at the end of 2012, some environmental and consumer groups such as Greenpeace and Attac independently started to campaign against TTIP (Finkbeiner et. al. 2016, 20). The underlying force to mobilize was the premise that the EU's higher standards are at risk to be lowered due to the mutual recognition of standards planned in TTIP.

These concerns were published in position papers and panel discussions on TTIP, as well as on the internet (forthcoming: Strange 2015, 6). A study on media activism on TTIP (Bauer 2016) shows that while activists in favor of TTIP are hardly, if at all, visible, he finds that 85% of all TTIP-related statements in German online media come from Anti-TTIP groups. They are the new players in the game: social media activists used a communication style that is much more 'social' in the sense that it both encourages people to share and exchange ideas and information, and promotes two-way debate. On the other hand, the online debate about TTIP was accused of spreading emotion-charged narratives and to be a forum for populist left-wing and anti-globalization groups who express minority views. The online visibility and public interest in TTIP increased over time. As Eliasson (2014, 120) notes, throughout 2013, the topic reached 'the real life', when universities, think tanks and law centers picked up TTIP as an issue of particular interest to the public. Due to the length and the specific course of the TTIP negotiations, the opponents had time to inform, consult and politicize the public. The European Commission however started late in 2013 to assure that the societies' fears were not justified (Finkbeiner et. al. 2016, 18). In addition, the

potential benefits of TTIP promoted by the EC remained diffuse, and so were the citizen's fears of the costs.

In March 2014, the collective will to exercise their right to form a European Citizen Initiative (ECI), a recently established instrument of participatory democracy in the EU, brought together 148 organizations from 18 EU member states in protest against TTIP. They formed the European network 'Stop TTIP', which held more than 500 organizations. On October 12th 2014 the network posted: "The success is incredible! After only five days half a million signatures have been collected." (Stop TTIP Alliance 2014b). On December 4th 2014, when the one million signatures mark was reached, the network proudly posted: "No ECI before could collect as many signatures within such a short period of time" (Stop TTIP Alliance 2014b). Every time a quorum was cracked, the initiative uploaded enthusiastic posts such as "YES WE CAN - STOP TTIP" ((Stop TTIP Alliance 2014b). The ECI was registered in July 2015, but only two months later it was refused by the European Commission saying that the petition does not apply for issues that are still under negotiation, but only for legal acts that are already implemented. In spite of the rejection, or exactly because of that, 'Stop TTIP' took even more decisive and closely monitored action against TTIP: The network decided to hold on to their goal to collect the one million signatures needed for the ECI- and re-name the initiative 'self-organized European Citizen Initiative' (sECI). The appeal against the rejection of the ECI was submitted to the European Court of Justice, while media coverage and public interest further increased (Eliasson 2014, 14).

In October 2014, the Stop-TTIP-network organized the first day of action against TTIP including 450 events in 24 European countries as well as in Canada and the US. In April 2015, the second day of action against TTIP took place: According to the network, a total of 600 Anti-TTIP protests were planned, 50.000 people took to the streets in Barcelona, as well as 200 demonstrations in Germany and 7000 protesters gathered in front of the parliament in Vienna ((Stop TTIP Alliance 2014a). The events taking place during the days of action have further increased the visibility of TTIP-opponents all over Europe and their consciousness of the transnational network (Eliasson 2015, 17; Gheyle 2020, 305). In the following, the number of organizations that joined the Stop-TTIP-campaign and the number of signatures of the sECI enjoyed great

popularity. In December the same year, the 'Stop TTIP'-network handed more than one million signatures over to the European Commission's President Jean-Claude Juncker as a birthday present.

The self-organized European Citizen Initiative (sECI) ended in October 2015. At that point, it counted almost 3,3 Million signatures against TTIP that had been collected in one year. Only a few days later, on the third day of action against TTIP, more than 150.000 people flooded the streets of Berlin in a mass demonstration against TTIP (Finkbeiner et. al. 2016; Daphi et. al. 2015). A bit more than one year later, when Donald Trump was inaugurated in January 2017, TTIP disappeared silently in the file cabinet. Looking at TTIP on this macro-political level, one might think that little is left after TTIP was suspended in the aftermath of the US presidential election 2016. Also, one cannot know how the end of the TTIP-story would have been under a different president. The impact of the protests on the TTIP-negotiations can of course be critically questioned: Only some governments (like the regional government of Wallonia in Belgium) declared publicly not to ratify TTIP. But the actual effect of the public pressure remains in the dark. What is rewarding is to zoom in on the micro level: Not only is the 'Stop TTIP'-network very likely to have fostered transnational cooperation and solidarity between active European citizens, (Caiani and Graziano 2018, 19; Kaibel and Maarfield 2022), I also see the conflict surrounding TTIP as only a catalyst for the general discontent over the marginal role European citizens' play in the politics of the EU. Therefore, in the analysis, it is worth investigating in greater detail which role the Anti-TTIP protesters claimed in EU politics.

More than due to 'the crisis': Contextualizing the Anti-TTIP protests

As stated before, comparing the discourse on TTIP with public interest in other global trade negotiations, TTIP has gained a remarkable amount of media and public attention (Bauer 2016). While this is not equally true for all EU member states to the same extent, the European-wide visibility of TTIP is outstanding compared to the usually low public salience of international trade policies. However, it would be too limited to see the protests against TTIP as an example *sui generis*. While the case of TTIP seems to be unique in some respects, it must be analyzed in its historical context

regarding how TTIP relates to former trade agreements and its counter-movements. There are certain cases that serve as important reference points for the narration of protest history against trade agreements, such as NAFTA, ACTA, and most prominently, the Battle of Seattle. While trade policies for long did not politicize huge masses, Anti-trade protests had reached a peak in the Battle of Seattle in 1999. It established a structure of European civil society coordination of activist work called the Seattle to Brussels Network, or S2B. Strange refers to the struggles on the streets of Seattle in 1999 as the most prominent example of politicization of trade politics (Strange 2015). From an American historical perspective, he sees the Anti-TTIP protests as a "product of the past trade-related mobilizations" (Strange 2015, 87), most notably the protest against NAFTA where a loose network of American and European civil society organizations started to emerge. His article helps to contextualize TTIP protests in the earlier attempts of civil society to have a say in global trade negotiations.

The "'club-like' atmosphere" (Strange 2015, 1) that trade negotiations had until 1980 was increasingly contested by public protests.⁹ It culminated in 1999 in the 'Battle in Seattle' during the WTO Ministerial Conference. The initial plan to launch a new millennial round of trade negotiations was overshadowed by massive street protests outside the Washington State Convention and the Trade Center. In social movement theory, this event is seen as the starting point of the second phase of anti-globalization movements in the United States (Levi and Olson 2000, 325). The number of demonstrators, even the lowest estimates, put the crowd at over 40.000 people. Some of the actors from Europe and America, as well as from Africa, Australia and Asia, ranging from Anti-globalization movement groups, NGOs, Labor unions to student and religious groups, grouped together in a loose network called 'our World is not for sale' (OWINFS) (S2B network n.y.). Disagreement between developed and developing countries at the conference finally forced the ministers to break down the negotiations. The final cause for the collapse of the conference is unclear, but undoubtedly, the massive protest and public politicization of the issue limited the windows of opportunity for the WTO member states. More significantly for the later case of TTIP,

⁹ Strange draws upon the cases of CUSFTA, the agreement between the US and Canada, NAFTA, the agreement between the US and Mexico, and MAI, the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI), which gave rise to the transatlantic network of groups in 1990 (Strange 2015, 84)..

social movement groups created a shared momentum to which they can collectively refer in later mobilizations (Smith 2001).

The myth of 'Seattle' is kept alive in the 'Seattle to Brussels Network' (S2B) in Europe. It was formed in the aftermath of the protests, in order to bring civil societies' criticism of a corporate-driven trade agenda into the context of European politics. On its webpage it refers to the "increasing need for European coordination among civil society organizations" (S2B network n. y.). In Europe, Strange sees the S2B as one of the most important civil society actors in European trade policy (Strange 2015, 87). What the 'Battle in Seattle' against NAFTA was in the US, ACTA was in Europe. The Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement (ACTA) was a multinational deal that was meant to establish international standards for intellectual property rights. After massive protest by civil society organizations, the European Parliament rejected the treaty in 2012. This historical event is still referred to as a success in European trade policy and is also picked up in the TTIP discourse. No matter how many times the political decision-makers stress the difference between those two agreements, the public still equates the two (Martinić and Maljak 2014, 368). It has to be added that the parallels that are drawn by TTIP opponents primarily refer to the EC's way to communicate. The Greens in the European Parliament note: *"Remember ACTA? The Commission is using the same rhetoric for TTIP."* (Andersson 2015). Similarities refer to the dialogue between European Commission and the public, the public's readiness of political mobilization and the final success: In July 2012, the European Parliament voted against ACTA with a vast majority of votes.

The history of protests creates awareness for the fact that TTIP, albeit special, is not the *only* moment when citizens were protesting against trade agreements. When analyzing the Anti-TTIP protests, not only their embeddedness in a larger history of trade protests has to be kept in mind, but also the specific historical context in which the protests occurred. Looking at the protests from a historically-informed perspective, some authors claim that the reason for the specific date of launching the TTIP negotiations in 2011 must be seen in the specific political situation of the EU at that time (Buonanno and Dudek 2015, 7).

When TTIP was debated, the economic crisis was at its peak. At this specific point, the EU wanted to portray itself as a proactive political actor, not helplessly hit by, but

actively shaping the crisis (Bruno 2015, 34). Bruno states that economically hard times offer decision-makers a broader windows of opportunity to include calls from businesses and to open new markets for the sake of more security. Accordingly, the major argument when launching TTIP was that it would improve economic growth and create jobs, and this has since been touted repeatedly by EU officials and business groups. However, as I argued in the last chapter, this economic fragility went along with another, equally challenging situation: While the EU negotiated new bail-out packages, it also found itself in a political depression: *"In this framework (globalization, no control of economy) the political crisis was emerged as a [...] crisis of what could be at the heart of a model of participatory democracy"* (Bruno 2015, 32). The course and character of the TTIP negotiations runs the risk to widen the gap between 'the people' and 'the politicians' – to pick up the rhetoric of the opponents.

These aspects bring me to the point to see the TTIP protests as manifestations of this political discontent and at the same time as an attempt to regain power over the future shape of the EU. As I claimed before, it is useful to go beyond merely looking at the content of the negotiations as economic scholars have sought to do (Steiner 2018, 2). As we have seen, it also seems important to consider the EU's insufficiently democratic way to negotiate it as well as the specific historical context in which the protests occurred. The TTIP negotiations, like other trade negotiations before, took place behind closed doors – while the exclusive nature of negotiations has not changed, it is new that European citizens demand to have a seat at the negotiation table. These civic claims are illuminating as they bring us closer to their understanding of citizenship in European politics.

More than just national: Enacting European citizenship

Building on the argument that the European 'crisis'-context matters, this research starts off from the unique characteristics of this relation. As many authors have pointed out, citizenship in the national context is a different pair of shoes (Delanty 2007; Sassen 2002; Behnke 1997). Due to the fact that the EU is not merely a market union or a state, the unique political construction of the EU is often referred to as a "birth defect" (Balibar 2016, 47). However, others emphasize precisely the fact that this

European polity 'in-the-making' is an advantage as it opens up windows of opportunity for citizens ready to act politically. This stands paradigmatically for the widely discussed idea that new polities produce new possibilities to enact citizenship. The argument is that not only the Europeanization of political influence and control make citizens more aware of the EU's effect on their everyday lives, (Dolezal and Hutter, 2012, 5; Gheyle and De Ville 2018) but it also multiplies the levels on which EU citizens can become active. This means that citizens can choose among the levels they see as the most appropriate for pursuing their interests. This is what Papazoglou calls "responsiveness" of citizenship (Papazoglou, 2010: 221).

Following a definition of European protests as those in which the actors, their participation or targets are European, (Imig 2002, 919) this can be observed on the one hand in forms of protest against international institutions such as the EU and on the other in forms of an increased transnational discussion and organization of European citizens. Lots of research has been done in recent years on the Europeanization of contentious action, often focusing on Anti-austerity protest in the light of a perceived 'European crisis' (Imig 2002; Flesher Fominaya 2017; Gerbaudo 2017). What they have in common is the result that the EU as a political target of such protests shifted into the focus of attention.¹⁰ The same applies to the Anti-TTIP protests, where the EU is becoming one of the main targets of the Anti-TTIP protests (Caiani and Graziano 2018, 19). Using media data of protest events against TTIP, Graziano and Caiani state that "the increasing competences of EU institutions seem to have been recognized by movement organizations" (Caiani and Graziano 2018, 14; 19) as they observe a growing usage of strategies of targeting and mobilizing on a European level.

This is particularly noteworthy as Imig stated two decades ago that the main finding of his famous study from the 1990ies on European contentious action still proves right (Imig 2002, 931). In a study on 10.000 protests that occurred in Europe between 1984 and 1997, Tarrow and Imig found out that only small parts of the European protests¹¹ address the EU, even if it is the responsible political actor (Imig and Tarrow 1999; see also: Dolezal and Hutter, 2012, 7). On the contrary, regarding the Anti-TTIP-movement's

¹⁰ whilst the intensity and dimensions of Europeanization differ a lot

¹¹ using the (very limited) scope of protests which were linked in media reports within the first sentence (Imig 2002, 921)

protests it seems that the EU is perceived as an influential political actor. And rightly so: Technically, all content-related decisions about TTIP were made on the international level between the EU Commission and the US government, while the nation states of the EU only had the right to reject or accept the final contract. First of all, targeting the EU with their TTIP criticism can be seen as a decision about the appropriate level of protest. This shift from the national to the European level thus indicates a changed perception of the EU: What Imig declared a future vision some years ago now seems to hold true: „a growing number of Europeans are ascribing the EU with responsibility for their grievances and [...] they are seeking ways to actively voice their concerns" (Imig 2002, 931). Indeed, TTIP is widely discussed as a 'European issue'- but not only because it is negotiated by the EU as the primary political actor.

Some authors already observe a new form of transnational citizenship emerging that is characterized by growing solidarity across borders (Dubiel 1998, 373). Zürn (2014) demonstrates empirically what the European distribution of the Anti-TTIP protests suggests: He shows that indeed political participation is at least partly migrating to the supranational level (Zürn 2014; see also: Teune 2008, 535; Teivainen 2008, 1; Tarrow 2001, 234). This is observed on the one hand in forms of protest against international institutions such as the EU and on the other in the form of an increased transnational discussion and organization (Strange 2015, 2; see also: Castells 2015). Lots of research has been done in recent years on the Europeanization of contentious action, often focusing on Anti-austerity protest in the light of a perceived 'European crisis' (Imig 2002; Flesher Fominaya 2017; Gerbaudo 2017).

Therefore, the Anti-TTIP protests may also have given rise to a new European actor: It motivated civil society groups all over Europe to discuss TTIP and its implications from a European perspective and to cooperate in targeting this policy on a European level. In an article on why and how the EU became a site of contestation in global trade governance, Strange argues that trade "is not a simple flow process of decision-making, but involves a complex process of shifting identities and politicization" (Strange 2015, 14). Using the Anti-TTIP protests as a point of reference, he states that due to the centralization of trade policy at the supranational level, the EU becomes the central space of contestation for those wishing to influence trade policy (2015, 1). Although the networks and interest groups he has in mind are numerous

limited and effectively elite, he claims that the EU, being the main target of their protest, becomes an "institutional investigator of a wider European identity" (Strange 2015, 15). Other authors come to agree on the potential that new political spaces can create 'new' political subjects: "Globality thus invites contemplation of inclusive transnational public spaces and transnational citizen-subjects" (Brodie 2004, 325; for the same argument, see also: Castells 2015). Sassen, too, thinks of citizenship as contextually 'embedded' and therefore shaped by its embeddedness: "these new conditions may well signal the possibility of new forms of citizenship practices and identities." (Sassen 2002, 285; see also: Delanty 2007, 69; Gabriel 2010, 26; Strange 2015, 2). This argument refers to the EU as a site of contestation that (albeit unintentional (Strange 2015, 26)) helps building new transnational alliances and politicizes new actors in the discussion and protest concerning trade policy. It opens up to view the TTIP-conflict as a chance to enable broader and therefore more powerful contestation of the EU's trade governance.

It seems that European-wide collective protesting triggered the development of an active European civil society network against TTIP that serves as a counter-example to the narrative of growing de-democratization in Europe. It signals a countertrend both to the post-democratic apathy ascribed to European citizens (Follesdal and Hix 2006) and to the re-nationalizing and EU-skeptical tendencies in many European states. Wood and Flinders point out that we cannot think of depoliticization without acknowledging re-politicization as a counter trend. By looking at trends in political science research, they offer a critique of the focus on the "civic decline and political disengagement" (Wood and Flinders 2014, 159) in existing political science literature. This narrow focus is part of what they call "discursive depoliticization practices" (Wood and Flinders 2014, 161), which is a rhetoric that risks closing down critical voices who oppose the current status quo. In the Anti-TTIP protests, we see how European civic society organizations claim to have a say in the course of the TTIP-negotiations. Isin states: "the emerging figure of the activist citizen making claims to justice is the defining figure of contemporary global politics" (Isin 2009, 384; for a similar argument see: de Koning, Jaffe, and Koster 2015, 126). Therefore, it is worth investigating this 'figure' in the context of the Anti-TTIP protests.

Outview: Which story is to be told?

As I mentioned before, a story that is told about a conflict is always guided by a specific perspective. My perspective on the TTIP protests is guided by my research interests, which I outline more explicitly at this point. As I stated before, my dissertation relates to the participation of citizens in the Anti-TTIP protests and tries to investigate their enactment of citizenship in this specific political context. With my findings, I seek to speak to the connection of European studies and citizenship studies asking: Which citizenship do they enact and how?

At this point, it has to be clear why the protests against this Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are an insightful and useful case to examine the process of Enacting European citizenship. I claim that, in the Anti-TTIP protests, protesters enact their understanding of European citizenship in practice, and at the same time oppose against the - in their view - limited and limiting role of citizens in EU politics. By putting the focus on civic participation, I wish to make a contribution to investigate how understandings of citizenship in general, and of European citizenship in particular, are put into practice. The findings will help to better understand European citizenship as it is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests, in particular the roles that European citizens want to play within the political processes on an EU level. This may also increase the visibility of examples of European citizenship practices that have long been lamented as deficient. The common narrative of 'the' European citizens draws a pessimistic picture of their political participation often pathologizing their political apathy. Stating that citizenship is a "hollow" and "meaningless" (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 1) idea for most parts of the European population, the citizen's disillusionment is accused of contributing to the crisis of democracy of the European institutions. What is often left out of that narrative is the direct intervention in political questions that can be observed in movements like the Anti-TTIP protests. Citizens demand more rights to direct participation, however, in contrast to the loud and omnipresent lamentations of the 'un-political' European citizen, this kind of engagement is "effectively depoliticized" (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 7). In the politicized discourse around TTIP, the citizens' understandings of European citizenship may shed new light on the discourse about European citizenship, which I will elaborate on in the next chapter. However, at this

point, I claim that the analysis of the citizens' experiences of the Anti-TTIP protests has great theoretical and empirical potential to understand the role of citizens in current European democratic processes. As we have learned before, the protests against TTIP can be explained by the fact that TTIP is accused of being a *danger* for democracy. Over and above, my argument here is that the civic reaction to TTIP - namely the Anti-TTIP protests - can be valued as a chance for the democratization of European politics, as it politicized European citizens.

To see how the politicization of European civil society is connected to the democratic quality to the EU, we have to take a closer look at the relation between democratization and politicization: Zürn states that politicization is both, the precondition and the characteristic of democratization (Zürn 2014, 57). In the long run, he claims, politicization is a protective mechanism for a lively and functioning democratic society. While acknowledging that politicization never automatically leads to a democratization, Zürn empirically detected some significant effects that can be expected: a rising responsiveness of international institutions towards the demands of non-state actors is documented, increased formal transparency, greater access to decision-making processes, and decisions that are less likely to be just passed unnoticed by national governments due to the increased public attention they gained (Zürn 2014). From this point of view, TTIP was a lucky chance for the EU's democratic (mis)performance: European protesters mobilized around the topic of TTIP, signed petitions, filed a lawsuit against the European Commission, established transnational networks, came together in European Days of Action, exchanged ideas on alternative economic trade policy, took to the streets demonstrating - in short: they were politicized. By digging deeper into their protest experiences, my research on the TTIP-conflict contributes to the understanding of European citizenship and their meaning from the perspective of the citizens themselves.

European citizenship revisited

Citizenship has been conceptualized by the dominant schools of thought as status, identity or practice. However, the following review of literature confirms that those conceptions of citizenship come with the serious risk of excluding citizens based on legal or cultural criteria. As I will show, there is still heuristic potential to look at European citizenship as a *practice*, because it includes citizens based on their activity in the political life of a polity, including the European one. I show why concepts of *European* citizenship have to re-think citizenship beyond the dominant national scale in order to investigate its inherent characteristics. I will start by outlining how citizenship is approached by understandings of citizenship in the three most influential schools of thought: the liberal, the republican and the communitarian conceptions of citizenship. By identifying and problematizing defining characteristics and distinctions in those concepts of citizenship, I will argue that the enactment of citizenship in this project can best be studied by looking at citizenship as a practice that questions and challenges the status quo. The chapter makes clear that there is a lack of convincing approaches to research European citizenship as most concepts are permeated by an exclusive, top-down and predominantly national thinking about citizenship. The chapter concludes that a critical and reflexive concept of citizenship can be a powerful and empowering way to research European citizens in the context of the Anti-TTIP protests.

Approaching citizenship

What is citizenship? Citizenship is not an analytical concept that is easy to grasp. Citizenship theorists agree on the definition of citizenship as *relational*, (Turner 1990; Balibar 1988; Sassen 2002a; Craith 2004; Delanty 1997; Lister 2017; Saward 2013) while the relations described are twofold: On the one hand it refers to the relation between the individual and the polity, on the other to the relation between the individuals as members of the same political community. The two relations are pictured differently in conceptions of citizenship, which focus on different aspects (such as rights, participation, identity) that define these relationships. In other words,

what characterizes these relations varies across certain models of citizenship (Keating 2009, 136). The understandings of citizenship rely heavily on the way these relations are described and on the aspects of this relation they are concerned with. Under different names, these models are ranked by most authors among three dominant (liberal, republican and communitarian) schools of thought, namely those which understand citizenship as a *status*, as a *practice* and as an *identity* (Turner 1990; Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006; Jones and Gaventa 2002; Sassen 2002b; Delanty 1997; Eder and Giesen 2001). In different periods of time, adherents of these three schools of thought have formulated different answers in regard to certain aspects and thereby influenced citizenship theory. In the following, I will therefore outline the different understandings of citizenship in the liberal, the republican, and the communitarian tradition. By that, I will color their potential as well as their limits to understand European citizenship in the Anti-TTIP protests in the context of this research project.

Eder and Giesen distinguish the liberal, republican and communitarian school of thought into the individual, the political and the collective identity paradigm (Eder and Giesen 2001, 5ff.). The 'individual paradigm' is linked to the liberal tradition and sees citizenship as a formal status, which provides individual citizens with equal rights. The 'political paradigm' is concerned with political practice and arises from republican thoughts of political participation. The 'collective identity paradigm' refers to the cultural construction of a shared space of belonging and identification, based on communitarian ideas. The first comes from the Roman, formalized-juridical understanding of citizenship, which is mirrored in the status-based definition of "citizenship-as-rights" (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 8). This 'liberal' conception falls into the individual paradigm, because it is based on individual liberty: the citizens' liberty to exercise their freedoms in society.¹² Here, citizenship is understood as a status which entitles the individual to rights protected by the state as well as basic social and economic security. Marshall's seminal essay "Citizenship and Social Class" (2006 [1949]) became the main reference for a liberal model of citizenship, which defines citizenship as a *status* of membership to a political community that ensures

¹² which also includes the free decision *not* to participate in public affairs

equal civil, political and social rights, duties and the protection of a common law. This status is defined by equal treatment before the law and individual rights (civil citizenship), the right to vote (political citizenship), and social-political protection and economic support (social citizenship) (Marshall 2006 [1949]).

In ancient Rome and Athens, the status of citizenship was reserved to the obviously small group of property-owning, male persons, while slaves were exploited and women were oppressed as they were not considered citizens with equal rights (Turner 1990, 210; Bellamy 2013, 7). Back then, citizenship meant to be a member of a certain status group, deeply embedded in religious and cultural obligations (Dubiel 1998, 369). It is only the modern understanding of citizenship as a universalist and subjectivist ideal to include all people as individual citizens, regardless of their group belongings (Dubiel 1998, 369). Citizenship as a universal and at the same time subjective categorization gained relevance only in the 20th and 21st century (Gosewinkel 2016, 117f.). To obtain the status as a citizen, patterns such as religion, party, and class became irrelevant since, however rights provided by the polity are still accessible only to those group of citizens who hold its legal status (Delanty 1997, 289; Jones and Gaventa 2002, 2). It has to be noted that the status of citizenship is still (used as) a differentiating principle: When with the Maastricht treaty, the European Union in 1992 introduced EU citizenship to the lives of *some* men and women living in the EU, the legal status of EU citizenship provided access to privileges for some citizens, by excluding others (*Maastricht treaty* 1992, 13 Art.8(1)). These 'others' are passport-holders from non-EU countries, who suddenly became a new category of Non-EU-citizens (Siklodi 2015, 820). The fact that EU citizenship is set up as supplementary and derivative of national citizenship, a so-called "second-order citizenship" (Delanty 1997, 296), automatically excludes non-EU citizens on a legal basis. Critics problematize that this goes much beyond the access to legal privileges, as it also risks to be used as "a powerful instrument of social closure" (Brubaker 1992, 23) that reconstructs the borders toward the non-European 'Other'.

This aspect is even more prominent in the communitarian, 'collective identity paradigm' (Eder and Giesen 2001, 5ff.), which challenges the liberal's minimalist, rights-based definition of citizenship by following a more 'ambitious' version of

citizenship based on identification. The communitarian idea of "citizenship-as-belonging" (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 8) focuses on the public good stating that shared values and social cohesion are the basis for a functioning political community (Dahlgren 2006, 269). Proponents of a communitarian view on citizenship argue that especially in the light of the increasing social and cultural diversity within a political community, citizenship is a common tie to connect these different groups through a shared political identity (Oenen 2002, 119; Enjolras 2008, 495). While the liberal perspective on citizenship focused on the relation between the state and the individual, obviously, the focus here is more on the relations among citizens, held together by a 'citizen identity' as a social glue for the fragmented political community. The communitarian idea is that the political community is the site where the construction of a collective identity takes place (Lehning 2001, 242; Jones and Gaventa 2002, 4). A political community's collective identity is (re-)constructed by practices of othering, that means by identifying the 'ingroup' and the 'outgroup', and thereby the 'self' and the 'other' of a political community (Haste 2004, 421; Grossberg 2011, 89; Gebhardt 2017, 153f.). In other words, identification with the group only becomes possible through the construction of a competitive and potentially conflictual definition of a collective 'we' in contrast to 'them' (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 17).

Assuming the uniformity of a people as a condition for their collective identity, the communitarian view is accused to hold on to an essentialist idea of an authentic, homogeneous culture with a common history and values as the central point of reference for identification (Oenen 2002, 113f.; Delanty 1997, 291). This division is not necessarily based only on ethnic criteria such as blood and mother tongue, citizen identities can also have a civic form based on political criteria (Norris 2011, 25). What communitarian models share however is the prioritization of the political community as an instrument to strengthen the connection to the polity. As the primary goal of a shared identity is to hold citizens together, it requires identification with and support of the political communities' goals. The EU is often portrayed as an example of a polity in special need of common ties, as in the EU's political community multiple (national) identities coexist (Oenen 2002, 119; Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 9). By that, communitarians risk to exclude non-members by focusing on social cohesion for the sake of a strong sense of community as well as in reference to an imagined

non-European 'Other'. To assume that citizens perceive the polity as 'theirs' and feel solidarity only for their 'co-nationals' comes with the risk to super-elevate one's 'own' political community (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 5; 7; Delanty 1997, 298). Taking into account the EU's powerful geopolitical position in the world, European citizenship in communitarian terms may therefore add to the aforementioned construction of a unbalanced power relationship between 'Fortress Europe' and the 'Non-European Other'.

The two approaches discussed above span the repertoire of how (different) citizenship can be understood and therefore conceptualized. Both approaches entail high reaching objectives (equal rights) and great promises (to create a collective identity) associated with citizenship. On the other hand, they also show how citizenship risks to exclude, while proclaiming to be universal. In the aforementioned concepts of citizenship, there is a tension between the "rhetoric of inclusion" (Dubiel 1998, 370) and the exclusionary character of citizenship, which deprives non-citizens of this status. At this point, it cannot be ignored that to describe citizenship as a *two-fold* relation between the citizens and the polity as well as between the citizens and their fellow citizens falls short in acknowledging the concept's "exclusionary power" (Lister 1997, 28) and its concomitant discriminating effects. Therefore, I argue that it is crucial to take into account, reflect and address a *third* relation that citizenship entails, i.e. that between the 'outside' and the 'inside' of the political community. Citizenship has to be considered, in Balibar's words, also as an "oppositional concept", (Balibar 1988, 729) as it is always defined in contrast to the 'non-citizen'. Citizenship as a legal, but also as cultural concept has reproduced and continues to reproduce exclusionary mechanisms, and those must therefore count as a "constitutive feature" (Dubiel 1998, 370) of citizenship. Who counts as a citizen is first of all dependent on the requirements of membership, which decide upon inclusion or exclusion (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 2). Such criteria are denoted as the 'social glue', as they also fulfill an integrative function (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 6). What follows is that criteria for membership always integrate as well as exclude individuals from being member. Those 'inside' the political community are in a privileged position compared to those who are not considered part of it. Given this constitutive balance between integration and exclusion, the duty is not to abandon exclusion completely,

but about the question: exclusion on which basis is acceptable? (Dubiel 1998, 372). Instead of a perspective that overshadows this given fact, Dubiel calls for "reflexive inclusion" (Dubiel 1998, 373), pointing to the need to reflect upon the exclusion produced by citizenship.

Following this call for 'reflective inclusion' means to reflect upon the criteria based on which non-citizens are excluded and how fluid these boundaries are. A different approach in this vein is the republican understanding of citizenship as a practice. Unlike communitarians' call for social cohesion and unlike the liberals' top-down set-up of citizenship as a legal status, the republican "citizenship-as-participation" (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 8) focuses on practices of active involvement in socio-political questions. Republican models of citizenship define citizens as all those political subjects with the ability to act in a political community (Harju 2007, 94). One could argue that an understanding of citizenship based on practices, too, is associated with privileges, since active participation entails excluding and discriminating structures. How active a person can be in politics, here understood as political participation, depends largely on his/her social status, which determines the "civic attitudes" (Verba and Nie 1972, 13; see also: Deth 2013, 10) this person inherited.

This being said, practice-based approaches to citizenship are not free from excluding certain subjects. However, as neither the legal status nor identification with an (imagined) political community is a precondition to act as a citizen, practice-based conceptions of citizenship seem to be more accessible to "any [my emphasis] person taking part in public affairs" (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 2). I argued earlier that the ones not having a national passport of the EU are excluded legally from the liberal idea of (EU) citizenship (Behnke 1997, 261). In the light of the last years of the EU's violent and restrictive anti-migration policy, an understanding of citizenship based on practices may also fulfill an inclusive function for 'the citizens of Europe' instead of only for EU citizens (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 17). And in fact, research on noncitizens in a juridical sense, i.e. migrants without an EU passport, has shown that the legal status is not constitutive to participate in processes of political protest as European citizens. A study on Turkish activists by Rumelili and Keyman (2011) explores how activists enact European citizenship beyond the EU by reaching out to European

politicians and the European Court of Justice and by mobilizing campaigns that target the EU institutions. Through these practices, they state, the activists are enacting European citizenship without having legal citizenship (for similar findings see also: Rigby and Schlembach 2013; Johnson 2015). At this point, a linguistic differentiation has far-reaching consequences: EU citizenship is a status, but European citizenship is a practice. The distinction between the two makes us aware that 'EU citizenship' is too often falsely named 'European citizenship'. Just like *being* a citizen from a legal standpoint does not necessarily include participation and identification, *acting* as a citizen does not have the official status of membership as a precondition.

Citizenship as a practice does not restrict 'the citizens' to those individuals sharing a collective group identity. In contrast to the communitarian understanding of citizenship as a means to build a collective tie among citizens and loyalty towards the 'own' political community, republican models of citizenship do not strive for a collective identity among citizens, on the contrary: Republicans argue that citizenship comes into being not by holding rights, but by claiming them. This also seems to make the republican's notion more inclusive, because if the political community is defined by in- and exclusion mechanisms, citizenship criteria change by claims for recognition: Historically, to be an *active* citizen in political affairs has not always been a political ideal. Bermeo's historical analysis reminds us that not always have ordinary citizens been appreciated in political processes, long have they been seen as unqualified to cope with the freedoms and the power that the democratic framework allows (Bermeo 2003, 15). If active, citizens were meant to be supportive of the status quo (Hurenkamp, Tonkens, and Duyvendak 2012, 38). As mentioned earlier, the Greek polis had reserved legal citizenship to the obviously small group of property-owning, male persons. However, the set of rights that citizenship contains changed massively over time, as their composition changes due to struggles, forming and extension of rights (Gosewinkel 2016, 19). Struggles on the criteria and meaning of citizenship have broadened the catalog of rights entitled to citizens. As mentioned before, the most prominent liberal narrative is to portray this path as an evolutionary development: Marshall (2006 [1949]) investigates the change in citizenship discourses over three centuries: From civil citizenship as the individual right to speech and property in the 18th century to political citizenship as the right to exercise political power in the 19th

century. Since the 20th century, social citizenship ensures rights provided by the welfare state. While Marshall is convinced of the citizenship's positive effects on social justice and emancipation, he was criticized for romanticizing citizenship evolution as a 'narrative of progress' (Gosewinkel 2016, 13). This history of progress risks to narrate citizenship as a linear, genuine process, while others stress that there is nothing irreversible about this process (Balibar 1988, 724). This struggle for rights has always been at the heart of republican understandings of citizenship (Turner 1990, 194). Republicans stress an understanding of citizenship *from below*, as they see citizenship not as the passive possession of rights given from top-down, but as rights fought for from bottom-up (Balibar 1988, 724; Turner 1990, 199). On the one hand, this understanding stresses the *active* dimension of citizenship as a practice by including citizens apart from their group belongings. By that, it also sheds light on the revolutionary character that citizenship may entail.

As a consequence, for republicans citizenship also always entails a critical control function towards the rulers (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 9; Delanty 1997, 290). Political participation cannot be reduced to conventional, institutionalized ways of participation such as voting, but also includes critical debate and contention over rights assigned to citizens. While the citizen's criticism once was and is still often seen as an element of crisis and a destabilizing factor in political affairs, it is precisely this critical notion of citizenship that is highlighted among the republican strain of thought. It underlines both, the active agency of citizens as well as their political control function. The critical notion of citizenship can therefore be seen as a counterbalancing mechanism for the aforementioned 'integrative function' that citizenship entails by pointing to moments of rupture with the current status quo (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 6; Delanty 1997, 290; Balibar 1988, 723). By making such claims, citizens challenge the status quo of citizenship. To claim citizenship rights means to aim for acknowledgement as a member of the political community or to "demand for a *better* [my emphasis] citizenship" (Gerbaudo 2017, 15). We can read this "struggle for citizenship" (Balibar 1988, 729) as one that challenges (and thereby potentially) re-defines the status quo of citizenship. In this line of thought, paradoxically, citizenship is part of the structure of a political entity, such as a state or the EU, while it comes into

existence when it questions, reforms or potentially destroys these structures (Gerbaudo 2017, 5).

To bring this to the European level means that the development of European citizenship is then reliant on the practices by the citizens themselves in the political space. European citizenship is to be developed through the practice of claiming a voice in European politics, which is, in Sassen's words, by "developing social presence" (Sassen 2002b, 286). In the context of urban spaces of global cities, Sassen notices such practices which claim a new role of citizens: "These citizenship practices have to do with the production of 'presence' of those without power and a politics that claims rights [to the city]" (Sassen 2002b, 285; see also: Balibar 1988, 724). Moving the citizen from spectators of the political life to the actors in it, European citizenship is then not reliant on the will of political decision-makers in the first place, but on the practices of European citizens themselves. A central process in this regard is 'political subjectivation', which describes the process during which an individual transforms from being an object of politics to a political subject. In the next section, I will outline in greater detail, how political subjectivation can be understood and why it is a useful concept to investigate European citizenship.

Constructing citizens: Becoming political subjects

In the outline mentioned above, Eder and Giesen (2001) differentiate three paradigms of citizenship (individual, political and collective identity) and several authors have made similar distinctions referring to citizenship concepts that combine dimensions of status, practices and identity (Sassen 2002b, 280; Delanty 1997, 288ff.; Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006). I argued in the last section that practices can define the political subject as a citizen and that this is a promising approach to European citizenship in the light of this project. Investigating the enactment of citizenship means to see citizenship as a practice of constructing a political subject as a citizen (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 13; Buschmann, Alkemeyer, and Michaeler 2015, 1; 8). It is therefore necessary to put further attention on the process of how citizens come into being through action, especially and most importantly in the protest setting. This chapter is concerned with the question which practices constitute the creation of the political

subject, the citizen; or, in other words: What makes a citizen? In the following first part, I will answer this question with the help of performance-based approaches to citizenship. In the second part, I will outline how Rancière's concept of political subjectivation can be an insightful tool to elucidate the process of becoming a citizen that goes beyond positive identification prescribed from top-down. This will, in the third step, prepare for my argument that when researching citizenship, we have to start from the - understudied - perspective of the citizens themselves.

Formed or performed citizenship?

On the one hand, Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw state that the participatory idea of citizenship "remains the achilles heel of EU citizenship" (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 9). On the other, we witness a growing effort to include citizens in decision-making processes (Leach and Scoones 2007, 7; Oenen 2002, 123) as the ideal of 'active citizenship' became the buzzword for solving a wide range of problems: It is seen as a means to building connections between citizens and creating social capital, (Putnam 2000) to create "more democracy" (Verba and Nie 1972, 1) or to foster citizens' responsibility (Delanty 1997, 295). Eventually also the institutions of the European Union discovered the concept as a remedy for the democratic deficits it faces (Hoskins et. al. 2006). One reason may be found in the assumption that the citizen's participation serves a double legitimacy function: On the one hand, it is supposed to add to the democratic quality of political processes and its outcomes, on the other hand, the engagement itself legitimates the democratic structures it uses. However, it seems that while citizens are expected to engage in politics, they are reminded to do so only according to the existing limits, posed by rules and top-down developed procedures (Maarten and Hodgson 2013, 34). Van Deth's study on "the 'good' European citizen" (2009), in which he studied the image of the 'good European citizen' by EU policy makers (and other actors), points to the EU's understanding of citizenship, which appreciates supporters of the social and political sphere, not its critics. He concludes that good European citizens are expected to engage in democratic activities, support and engage in civil society organizations and due to this, citizens are expected to become more EU friendly (van Deth 2009, 178).

This study indicates that only a certain kind of citizen is aimed to be constructed. Research has stressed citizenship education as a very powerful site of construction as well as one that provides particularly clear insights in the manifestation of the 'ideal' citizen. In search for the 'good citizen', Abowitz and Harnish investigate contemporary meaning-making of citizenship by using discourse analysis of educational texts (2006). They extract the discourses of the meaning of citizenship in Western Europe and the US in the timespan from 1990 to 2003. At the end, Abowitz and Harnish admit: "Citizenship texts, like all other texts, are shaped by political interests and particular visions of what democracy and the nation-state should be" (Abowitz and Harnish 2006, 655).

This holds true for the European level as well: As citizenship education, too, is emigrating on the European level, Keating asks: "how does the EU conceptualize European citizenship education in the EU policies?" (Keating 2009, 136). Her findings suggest that not only the understanding of the citizen as an active figure in European politics changes, but also the task of building European citizenship as a core policy in EU's educational discourses gained more and more weight. Keating therefore concludes that there is a "significant shift" (Keating 2009, 147) to be noticed in EU policies of European citizenship education. She concludes that the citizen is expected to fit into an EU that is shaped by neoliberal entitlements as well as the claims of the knowledge society (Keating 2009, 148). Lösch goes deeper into this aspect by criticizing the European Union's attempts to fit European citizens to its needs, meaning to make them "citizens with a successful European identity" (my translation Lösch 2009, 853). Most crucially, she accuses the EU to treat citizens as human capital only, that is only interesting when economically exploited. According to Lösch, new systems of closure can already be observed on the European level and risk to support the construction of a Eurocentric, instead of a European identity (Lösch 2009, 856). As she points out, the EU's approaches to European citizenship education are a reaction to the European democratic deficit, and they are, moreover, directed to solve it by creating different EU citizens, who use their (limited) access to democratic processes, which in turn creates trust in the EU institutions (Lösch 2009, 855).

What these examples show is that the construction of citizenship in (educational) practices equip citizens with normative understandings of civic behavior. The EU's attempts of using citizenship to discipline subjects into their normative ideals of 'European citizens' has been interpreted a governmental technique (de Koning, Jaffe, and Koster 2015, 122; Wiener and della Sala 1997; Magnette 2003) One of the reasons why Marxist authors refuse the concept of citizenship is because they understand it as a site of domination of the state (Gerbaudo 2017, 6) The rhetoric of citizenship is accused "to discipline people rather than to set them free, to organize them rather than to emancipate them, to have them listen rather than to have them speak." (Hurenkamp, Tonkens, and Duyvendak 2012, 38) However, I emphasize that abandoning the concept of citizenship as an instrument of state power for class domination risks to oversee the emancipatory potential that citizenship possesses as well: "Citizenship can be both domination and empowerment separately and simultaneously" (Isin 2009, 369)..

Citizens are not only made from above, they can also be constructed from below. Bellamy is stressing the fact that the negotiation over new roles for citizens in the political processes can only happen within a sincere and democratic process of "contestation and negotiation" (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 10). Conflict theory has outlined the productive potential that sociopolitical conflict (under certain circumstances) entails (Simmel 1908; Coser 1964; Mouffe 2000). In the same vein as conflict theorists, Bellamy and Warleigh (2001) point to the politicizing potential of constant (possibly conflictual) negotiation over the role citizens may or are supposed to play when stating: "In other words, there is virtue in living with mess if we can make it ours." (2001, 65). Therefore, a conflictual negotiation about the role citizens (can) play allows for a citizenship that is constructed "as much from below as granted from above" (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 1).

In his influential works on subjectivation, Rancière (1992; 1999) advocates for a differentiation between positive and negative identification: If we positively identify as citizens, we count ourselves as members of a certain political group. On the contrary, negative identification means that our self-understanding as a citizen is rather a process of dis-identification. Following Rancière, dis-identification is understood as political agency against the existing socio-political order and described the process in

which a political subject is created (Rancière 1992). In Rancière's understanding, the governmental subject is one which identifies, while the political subject is one which de-identifies with the dominant order of society (Maarten and Hodgson 2013, 20)). Rancière claims that the process of subjectivation, or negative identification, underlies a negative logic of an 'in-between' which is to be clearly distinguished from positive identification: "The place of the political subject is an interval or a gap: being together to the extent that we are in between" (Rancière 1992, 62). The reason why he distinguishes subjectivation from identification is to underline this negative collectivity based on a common dis-integration from the political order. Authors that follow this strain of thought argue that the political subject emerges in resistance to existent political structures and their predefined role in it (Samaddar 2010, xxiv). This cannot be understood without relating it to the distinction between politics and the political, which became widely used in political theory, and was popularized in the late seventies (for a systematic comparison of the most influential theorists of this differentiation in political theory see: Marchart 2010). As Marchart explains, 'the political' represents the force that challenges established authority, referred to as 'politics'. It starts from the assumption that in a democracy, power is always contingent upon legitimacy, creating an 'empty space of power'. Theorists of this strain of thought (among others: Schmitt, Foucault, Nancy, Mouffe, Rancière, Badiou) reject the traditional state-centered view of 'politics' and offer the concept of 'the political' as its counterpole.

Rancière asks: "Do we or do we not belong to the category of men or citizens or human beings, and what follows from this?" (Rancière 1992, 60). Political subjectivation, as Rancière theorizes it, results from the feeling that some subjects are not recognized (formally or informally) as legitimate actors in this order. They remain therefore in the status of "not-yet-being" (Rancière 1992, 61). Rancière emphasizes the fact that it is not necessarily the formal status of a citizen, but the "discursive and practical enactment" (Rancière 1992, 60) of citizenship that can be perceived as restricted by the governmentality of the system. Following Rancière, the political subject would be the protester who claims to be part of the political process, somebody who does not accept the role of the citizen, which was given to him/her. As we can see, this is part of an emancipatory process, in which citizens position themselves in opposition to how they were positioned by others. It becomes clear that Rancière does not see the

government responsible for the emancipation of its citizens, but he sees this as a fundamentally individual act. Politics, for Rancière, describes precisely this struggle for recognition (Ingram 2006, 237).

By making civic experiences of questioning the status quo, protesters turn into political subjects, i.e. they are becoming political: "Becoming political is that moment when the naturalness of the dominant virtues is called into question and their arbitrariness revealed." (Isin 2002, 275). Political subjectivation in the European setting consequently evolves from a critical confrontation with European politics and subsequent political action: This implies that the development of European citizen subjects will not grow out of abstract norms but from practices among citizens as well as in respect to the EU institutions and civil society organizations: "Instead of producing a common collective identity, contention over Europe's future may actually be creating or crystallizing diverse identities around the opportunities and costs of the integration process" (Imig and Tarrow 2001, 22). I conclude that the process of becoming a citizen is a creative act of constructing and performing one's political identity.

Tracing back political subjectivation in performances

Such an identity is understood here in line with Chantal Mouffe, who argues that identity is a sum of subject positions that emerge from dominant categories with which the individual is confronted in society and tries to fit into (Mouffe 1992; Buschmann, Alkemeyer, and Michaeler 2015, 8). Being an immigrant, being a woman or being a European citizen: each of these dimensions co-exist and shape the other subject positions. People identify with such categories to meet socially expected norms and may de-identify to act in accordance with one's own values. To be more precise, Mouffe argues that due to the processual character of this negotiation process, instead of 'identity', one should rather speak of forms of identification (Mouffe 2000). While this negotiation takes place internally in the subject, a collective 'group' identity emerges through identification with people who share similar subject positions. Therefore, researchers of this field have often supposed a shared group identity as a precondition for collective political action. Turning away from the "core questions" (Walgrave and Verhulst 2007, 3) of protest research (Who? Why? How?), a growing number of scholars started to research the relation between protest practices

and the creation of (political) subjects (Melucci 1995; for an overview see: Flesher Fominaya 2010). The presumption this research starts from is that a pre-established identity informs the civic practices. Especially one's political identity is expected to influence how and which political action is performed: "the way in which people understand themselves as citizens is likely to have a significant impact on their rights and obligations and on whether they participate, in what form and why" (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 13). Dahlgren emphasizes this same point when saying that "to be able to act as a citizen, to participate in achieved citizenship, it is necessary that one can see oneself as a citizen." (Dahlgren 2007; see also: Hart, Richardson, and Wilkenfeld 2011, 771).

Most studies approach this relation based on a given (often marginalized) group that shares a collective identity. This is often summarized under the headline of 'identity politics', which describes the practice of such an already established group formulating claims for recognition in political action (Oenen 2002, 119). It points to the debate about the European demos, which is a long-standing debate in political theory concerned with the question if there is or should be a European demos and under which conditions it evolves (Lehning 2001, 246; Habermas 2011; 2014; 2015). Translated from ancient Greek, the word 'demos' can be translated as 'people', underlining the political dimension of this category in opposition to the essentialistic notion of 'ethnos'. A common position in this line of thinking is to trace back this perceived lack to the EU's inability to create feelings of belonging, which would in effect bring about a European demos. While some democratic theorists tend to presuppose the existence of the demos as a prerequisite for democracy, other authors argue that one should rather think of it as a product of democratic practice (Delanty 2014, 215; Balibar 2016; Follesdal and Hix 2006). The latter state that the demos does not preexist, but is created through collective action in democratic settings. Political subjects become European citizens through political participation, citizens do not exist prior to their enactment of citizenship. They criticize that normative visions of a European constitution (Habermas 1998)¹³ or a European Republic (Guérot 2016)¹⁴

¹³ Habermas suggests that a European political identity should be based on a form of identification with the constitution instead of with the state. His concept of constitutional patriotism is therefore not a supra-national but a post-national vision of how a political identity in Europe might emerge.

¹⁴ Ulrike Guérot outlines the idea of a Europe as a Republic in which European regions actively participate in European decision-making.

presuppose what needs to be first created: engaged European citizens that form a European demos. Therein lies the intellectual charm of this argument, because instead of a prerequisite for democracy, the demos is expected to be an effect of its continuous exercise (Balibar 1988, 724).

Following this line of thought, performative approaches to citizenship look at how political subjects emerge through their enactment (Abrams 2014; Pykett, Saward, and Schaefer 2010; Zivi 2011; Isin 2017; for an overview see: Hildebrandt et. al. 2019). The interest lies here in the process of constructing a political subject as a citizen by performing specific subject positions. Irrespective of the motives that drive people to participate in protests, such approaches to citizenship pay special attention to the question how during performative action political subjects create themselves as citizens. In other words, the performative perspective focuses on the practice, not only on the content, of claim-making. This rests on the assumption that individuals do not *have* but always *perform* an identity in communicative action with others (Dahlgren 2006, 272; Hart, Richardson, and Wilkenfeld 2011, 774). Performance-based approaches to citizenship thereby move the focus from an assumed pre-existing identity to the construction of it.

From this perspective, social life is "a diverse, open stage" (Abowitz and Harnish 2006, 674) where certain subject positions are performed. Research has been done on practices that start from a much broader understanding of what such performances are. For example, Joseph's study on "nomadic identities" (1999) shows how citizenship identities can be reconstructed in creative, improvised practices, such as cinema, soul music, plays, and speeches (Joseph 1999, 14). In a similar vein, in research on migrant youth, Aoileann Ní Mhurchú (2016) argues that citizenship is enacted by creating a space in vernacular music and language for expressions of hybrid political identities and belonging. Besides the creative sphere, subject positions can be performed and created in everyday life settings such as the family context: In a study on Kurdish mothers in London, Umut Erel (2011) looks at how "diasporic citizenship" (2011, 1) as both British and Kurdish is constructed by mothers through their mothering work. Cath Larkins (2014) provides us with a study on children's performances of citizenship by challenging the boundaries of existing balances of rights, responsibilities and statuses,

through their (mis)behavior. What this collection of empirical studies makes clear is that citizenship performances can take place in any practices of everyday life, even apart from the rather narrow definition of political participation.

However, the focus of this research, political protest action, comes with certain characteristics, of which the public character of it may be the most remarkable: Research on political action has underlined the need to "display characters" (Levine 2016) as a substantial aspect of (political) performances. Hannah Arendt's theory may be the most prominent when it comes to this aspect. Her proposition is that the public space, understood in a performative, not in a geographical or institutional sense, is the place where politics happens (Arendt 1967). When people (inter)act with and for each other in public, this brings about a dynamic and visible "space of appearance" (my translation; Arendt 1967, 193). When engaging in political action, values and beliefs are not only put into practice but also reformulated in the public domain. Hence, being located in the public space that arises from citizens "acting and speaking together" (Arendt 1958, 198), citizenship is a practice through which the self is at the same time constructed and publicly revealed. In other words: Political protest action, as any performance, is seen as an expression and at the same time part of an individual's identity construction. During political action, 'private' values and beliefs are put into practice and are thereby re-formulated in the public sphere. The construction of a political identity as a citizen means to see "the individual actively in dialogue" (Haste 2004, 420) with the political world. The construction of the citizen entails how the individual makes sense of the world and how s/he positions her/himself in the socio-political context. This puts the individual in an active role of political identity construction through the interaction with the socio-political surrounding.

All civic performance is understood as both, a subjectivity-building practice and a political tool (Joseph 1999, 15). While research on protest practices tends to focus on the latter, it is argued that also political participation is more than just a means to enforce one's personal interest. Dahlgren (2007) claims that political participation must be understood as an 'expressive' activity in contrast to a pure 'instrumental' one. To see political protests from a performative perspective, then, seems to have heuristic potential that reaches beyond protest as a medium to articulate political disapproval. It

can be considered as the space where the citizen is constructed and performed in political action (Hark 1996, 177). Research on protesters seems to indicate that their political protest does not only reject the current status quo but also brings something new into existence: In their ethnographic research on 'noncitizens', i.e. migrants in the 'noborder' protest camp in Calais, Rigby and Schlembach (2013) analyze how protests were performed and staged and conclude that they go beyond mere opposition but aim to develop a new "politics of equality" (Rigby and Schlembach 2013, 159). In a similar vein, Johnson (2015) is looking at noncitizenship as a political status that is not simply the absence of citizenship, but that has political content in itself: By describing protest experiences of migrants in Europe, he investigates new practices of presence and solidarity that enact political claims which transgress borders and establish noncitizenship as a political subjectivity (Johnson 2015). What these empirical studies exemplify is that civic performance can be viewed as both a means of exerting political influence and as a way to create a sense of a civic self. From this perspective, the Anti-TTIP protests can be investigated as not only a means of expressing political dissent, but also as a space where citizens construct and perform their political identities.

Coming back to the argument that political participation on the micro-level is as much the creation of a political subjectivity as it is the expression of it, it means that citizenship is constructed and reconstructed in constant flux (Joseph 1999, 4). This however allows to raise claims and to challenge and potentially broaden the dominant understanding of citizenship (Isin and Wood 1999). Portraying the example of a community project, Jones and Gaventa illustrate how workers of a company developed civic identities when experiencing themselves as "active agents of their own affairs" (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 6). This case underlines not only the individual's active dimension in the construction of a citizen subject position, but also the aim to eventually use it as an instrument for change. It can be expected that also in protest practices, an(other) idea of what citizenship means to the citizens is put into practice. This also means that citizens taking part in protest may change the role that was assigned to them by institutions from bottom up. It seems to hold true that "when citizens perceive themselves as actors in governance, rather than passive beneficiaries of services and policy, they may be more able to assert their citizenship through

actively seeking greater accountability, as well as through participation in the shaping of policies that affect their lives" (Jones; Gaventa, 2002: 7).

Empirical studies demonstrate how practices of citizenship can challenge the governmental, prevailing concept of citizenship: Palmberger's ethnographic research in Vienna (2022) shows how the care and placemaking practices of refugees can mold political subjectivities and carry the potential to exercise citizenship from below. By investigating a protest of Roma people in Rome, Haradau, Huysmans and Macioti and Squire (2013) show how this protest action ruptures existing scripts of European citizenship by challenging the (im)possibility of free movement for Roma in Italy. Deanna Dadusc et al. (2019) analyze migrant squats as radical spaces that enable possibilities for inhabitation beyond, against and within citizenship, which do not only reverse forms of exclusion and repression, but produce ungovernable resources, alliances and subjectivities that prefigure more livable spaces for all. In the same vein, starting from a critique of the postpolitical nature of politics, Darling (2014) explores migrants' practices of citizenship and suggests that such acts can be powerful forms of political interruption through which new ways of seeing asylum are constructed. These studies suggest that the meaning and practices of citizenship are in no way only given ones. This means firstly that the meaning of European citizenship is contingent and can be modified in practices by the citizens themselves: They can co-create this meaning anew by re-articulating it in materially embodied and bodily incarnated practices. Secondly, it follows that the re-creation of meanings of citizenship takes place as a collective co-creation, which can reflect or oppose the dominant meaning. A performative approach to citizenship can therefore empower and include those who feel left out through the performative act of contestation. The perspective on citizenship as a performance transforms the citizen from a passive holder of rights to an active designer of political life. In this view, public protests can be seen as civic performances which constitute (and potentially irritate or change) dominant understandings of citizenship.

This section highlighted the relevant question where the construction processes take place. The conventional approach assumes that political socialization occurs through duties and rights provided by the state. In contrast to this socialization from top-down,

my research follows a citizen-centered, bottom-up approach of European citizenship: The focus on the citizens' practices implies that I see citizens not as passively formed, but as actively performing citizenship. This means that the citizens' perspectives are of major importance when investigating the protesters' experiences in the Anti-TTIP protests. Therefore, in the following section, I make a point for the inclusion of the citizens' perspectives in citizenship research and the conceptualization of European citizenship beyond the national scale.

Researching European citizenship

Citizenship research has started to investigate the meaning of citizenship to understand the role citizens play in the political community. Authors of the field of citizenship studies have tried to theorize what is understood as a 'good', a 'democratic' or an 'engaged' citizen (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Heater 2004; van Deth 2009). The empirical sources used reach from the images of citizens in the democratic theory literature (Bermeo 2003) to the meaning of citizenship in the public debate (Hurenkamp, Tonkens, and Duyvendak 2012) and interviews with policy makers and civil society (van Deth 2009). As I outlined before, one of the most obvious example of how the European citizen is formed from top-down can be found in educational material on citizenship (Saltmarsh 1996; Abowitz and Harnish 2006; Haste 2004; Bazzul 2015; Parker and Jarolimek 1984; Barber 1989). However, such normative framing can also be found in political rhetoric, state programs, subtext of policies, NGOs agendas and political manifestos, while they often compete and contradict each other (Gabriel 2010, 18; van Deth 2009, 176). What they all share is that these approaches favor a certain kind of citizen over others (Parker and Jarolimek 1984, 6). This is what Koning, Jaffe, and Koster call 'citizenship agendas' (2015) and define them as "normative framings of citizenship that prescribe what norms, values, and behavior are appropriate for those claimings of membership of a political community" (de Koning, Jaffe, and Koster 2015, 121).

What became clear and noteworthy however, is that which meaning of citizenship gets attention is a question that also uncovers a power relation inherent in the discourse on citizenship itself, namely that the "power to define citizen status and activity lies not

only in citizens themselves" (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 7). I have shown how in public, political and educational discourses concepts of the 'good citizen' compete (van Deth 2009, 176; Gabriel 2010, 18). Citizenship concepts are not descriptive, the understanding of citizenship mirrors always a valuation of a certain kind of citizen. Which orientations are seen as favorable is dependent on many factors, such as its cultural, political, historical and social embedding, but also on the perspective of those in power to define citizenship. What becomes clear is that researching the images of citizenship from the perspectives of political decision-makers, political theory or educational institutions means to also encounter the problem of defining, inventing and thus only apparently researching citizens without the inclusion of their voices (Gabriel 2010, 19; 25; see also: Bellamy and Warleigh 2001, 10). If we follow the idea that European citizenship is not something that has to be implemented from above, but something that is and can be created from below, this question can only be approached empirically by talking directly to those involved in those practices.

It cannot be denied that also citizenship research contributes to the visibility of a certain kind of citizen and thereby potentially reproduces normative understandings of what makes a (good) citizen. What is needed, I will argue, are empirical studies on European citizenship that investigate the citizens' understanding of citizenship: "Astonishing as it may sound, there is little empirical evidence available to answer this question" (van Deth 2009, 181) about the citizens' perspective on citizenship. Too little research has been done on the question how the citizens themselves experience their active political participation. What political leaders imagine as an 'ideal type of citizen' is expected to differ from how citizens experience citizenship themselves. As Jones and Gaventa highlight in the preface of their review on concepts of citizenship: "very little is known about the *realities* [my emphasis] of how different people understand themselves as citizens" (Jones and Gaventa 2002, v). Normatively informed ideals tell little about how citizens actually see themselves. Even more problematically, if studies make normative political theories the point of departure from which the 'reality' of citizens are proven against, they risk to portray citizens as apathetic, indifferent or dismissive (critical: Bermeo 2003, 4).

Therefore, a much wider conception of European citizenship is needed in order to take into account the complexities of how individuals experience citizenship and create their political subjectivities. Having this in mind, Mouffe states: "My main thesis is that we need a new conception of the citizen" (Mouffe 1992, 28). A qualitative empirical inquiry of citizenship from the perspective of the citizens themselves allows to go beyond the debate about whether they are good or bad, active or passive, predominantly national or purely European citizens. Therefore, some authors have started to define citizenship as an empty signifier that has to be filled with meaning. Since little research has been done on the "notions of citizenship held by the people whom they study" (Stack 2012, 871), this change in perspective can also highlight new notions of citizenship practices. Stack (2012) argues that researching the understandings of citizenship in this way will provide new theoretical insights in citizenship apart from the standardized and already established theories of citizenship. In his ethnographic analysis based on interview material, he finds several, and most importantly alternative citizenship understandings in the Mexican context (Stack 2012, 873 ff.). His conclusion is that "If social scientists were to pay attention to their informants' notions of citizenship, they might well find alternatives" (Stack 2012, 882) to the dominant models of citizenship. This is, as I will show in the following, even more true for the European context.

While little research has been done from the perspectives of citizens in general, this is even more true for European citizenship: Without doubt, the idea of the nation has been one of the most persistent community categories of the last two hundred years in Europe. It is therefore not surprising that it is also reflected in the dominant thinking about citizenship as it is the model of citizenship we know (best) and therefore it necessarily functions as an important point of reference. Also, the political influence on policy issues is still dominated by the nation states: As welfare, education and culture were competencies of the nation state, they also became "crucial for the socialization of individuals into national citizenship" (Sassen 2002b, 279). While the EU for a long time did not directly affect people's lives, it was also not so relevant for the construction of citizenship. Historically, the future of the EU was determined by the political elites, who made decisions on behalf of the citizens. As European integration and politics was mostly thought of as an elite project (Welzel and Inglehart 2008, 139;

Bermeo 2003, 3), ordinary citizens used to play a tangential role. However, this elitist character of European politics could only be possible because of the “absence of any significant explicit dissent” (Bellamy and Warleigh 2001, 1). As we saw earlier, in their influential “Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration”, Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that, before the 90s, the ‘permissive consensus’ enabled EU policymakers to largely shape EU politics without much involvement from citizens. However, from the 90ies onwards, the ‘constraining dissensus’ developed as citizens increasingly desired to have a say in the decision-making processes on a European level, and, as I argued in the first chapter, even entered in a new phase, where citizens demand having a say in EU politics.

As developments in our democracies bring about new ways to enact citizenship, also research on citizenship inflames again. When in the 1990s political decisions on an EU level became more and more decisive for the citizens’ lives, not surprisingly, from that moment onwards, a specific interest in *European* citizenship can be noticed (Delanty 2007, 63). Many scholars were eager to inquire the construction of another form of citizenship on an EU level as they expect the role of citizenship to change, too (Behnke 1997, 243). They state that in practice, the nation-state is not anymore the most important site for citizenship, its constructions and its practices (Sassen 2002b, 278). Therefore, they envision a “new form of political space within the EU” (Behnke 1997, 261), which is giving birth to new forms to enact citizenship, too. As there are increasing attempts to interact with and include citizens in European political processes, (Enjolras 2008, 497; Wood and van der Heijden 2014, 134; Kolb and Helfferich 2001, 146) it can be expected that this may produce new possibilities to enact citizenship. In other words: Citizenship is shaped by its contextual embeddedness and therefore, “new conditions may well signal the possibility of new forms of citizenship practices and identities.” (Sassen 2002b, 285).

From this perspective, in today’s Europe, there is a growing need to observe possibly new trends in citizenship practices and understandings as an answer to the role that citizens claim in European politics. Beyond national boundaries, so the argument goes, new forms of citizenship emerged that too long have remained covered by dominant ‘national’ categories of citizenship. This shift away from the national level as the

primary scale can be seen as reflecting the massive loss of significance of the nation state's role in a globalizing world (Bonacker and Reckwitz 2007, 14f.). At the same time, the "tremendous transformation of nationality" (Delanty 2007, 63) is accompanied and mutually influenced by the ongoing Europeanization process which gains more and more political influence. The establishment of EU citizenship by the Maastricht treaty can be interpreted as one of the signs which signals the detachment of citizenship from the national context. Following Delanty, a re-thinking of citizenship beyond the national scale is not only necessary, but contains great potential as "it forces us to re-think certain assumptions about nationality and opens up the possibility if [sic!] institutionalizing a new kind of citizenship which may be unrealistic to bring about at the level of the nation-state at the present time" (Delanty 1997, 294). He claims that due to the process of European integration, there should be now a new variety of new models of citizenship apart from the national one (Delanty 1997, 299).

Investigating the role ordinary citizens want to play in European politics points to a blank spot in the discussion. However, it comes with the challenge of capturing citizenship practices beyond the nation state. Because, despite their differences, what the liberal, republican and communitarian concepts share is that citizenship is still located on the nation-state level (Delanty 1997, 299). Regarding today's socio-political interdependence between states and the intermingling of cultures and societies (globally and especially in Europe), most concepts of citizenship fall short of the required reflection on citizenship beyond the nation state. As long as the national scale is mostly unchallenged, it also remains invisible when it comes to conceptualizing citizenship (Delanty 1997, 286). Therefore, problematically, most researchers unconsciously follow a so-called "'scalar model' of European citizenship" (Andrijasevic 2013, 53), which transfers the national model of citizenship to a European level and consequently analyzes the (non)existence of European citizenship according to these pre-existing criterias. This points to the danger that analyzing European citizenship with such concepts risks to limit citizenship to the national understandings of what citizenship has to and can be, independently of its contextual settings (Haste 2004, 414). Regarding the EU's growing impact on citizens' lives and their increasing awareness of it, however, it sounds plausible that also citizenship practices and subjects are emigrating to the European level. In fact, what we can see happening in

the Anti-TTIP protests for long seemed to be only a projection into the future: "If Europe is becoming a polity, we hypothesize, sooner or later ordinary citizens will turn their claims and their forms of contentious politics beyond their borders and towards this new level of governance" (Imig and Tarrow 2001, 7). As this research is concerned with such transnational, European protest practices, it is indispensable to turn our attention to approaches to citizenship beyond the nation state.

While European citizenship, formally as well as an identity and as a practice, is already a political reality, the vast majority of concepts of citizenship emerged out of the national setting and still reflect this national scale (Gerbaudo 2017, 22). This means that if we conceptualize citizenship as "the relation between the individual and the polity" (Sassen 2002b, 280), the 'polity' is most often implicitly equated with the nation state. However, Gerbaudo advocates that especially European citizenship is less permeated of national concepts of citizenship and therefore also less fixed as a concept in general (Gerbaudo 2017, 22). According to him, this holds the potential to connect the meaning of the term with new practices and ideas of citizenship. Delanty underlines the necessity to see European citizenship as alternative to the national version instead of "merely as a derivative of it" (Delanty 1997, 287). Furthermore, Bellamy et al. plea for a "fundamental re-thinking of the ideals and the institutions underlying both the status and the practices of citizenship itself" (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 2).

This holds true even more as citizenship understandings are contingent over time and discourse. This was shown by Brubaker's study on "citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany", which approached the question what is understood as citizenship in a comparative, historical research design (Brubaker 1992). If we acknowledge the contingent character of citizenship and the possibilities of its constant change, it means that it is worth (re)searching possible changes in understandings of citizenship. Especially in this 'new' European setting, we have to be open for the "possibility of alternative forms of political association and space, and the need for theoretical models, that allows us to remain open for such possibilities." (Behnke 1997, 244). The last section implies that the EU's growing impact on citizens' lives and increasing awareness of it suggests that citizenship practices and subjects

are moving to the European level. Turning away from equating the polity with the nation state, I suggest rethinking citizenship beyond the national scale. Literature suggests that European citizenship has the potential to connect the meaning of the term with new practices and ideas of citizenship, and therefore, I claim that there is a need for theoretical models that allow for the possibility of alternative forms of political association and subjectivation. It is worth researching possible changes in understandings of citizenship, especially in this 'new' European setting.

Challenging European citizenship in theory and political practice

The above considerations bring us to the question of what it means to re-think European citizenship, or, as the title of the chapter suggests, to 'revisit' citizenship. I agree with Delanty that "the greatest mistake is to reproduce on the European level a model which has reached its limits on the national levels." (Delanty 1997, 300; for the same argument, see: Tully 2014). His point is that if European citizenship copies the national citizenship model, it risks to also copy the (aforementioned) aspects that are already malfunctioning on a national level. Therefore, it seems necessary to ask whether European citizenship subverts, complements or should even "offer something either similar or totally different" (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 2) compared to national citizenship?

The last chapter draws a dark picture of the dominant concepts of citizenship, which risk excluding certain subjects but also tends to be blind for seeing new political subjects as citizens emerging. Certainly, such challenges are worth considering when doing research on European citizenship. But there is another aspect that absolutely needs to be taken into account: The narrowing of knowledge is not only an epistemological problem but also a political one. As I will argue in the following, epistemic violence erases the multiplicity of perspectives of what European citizenship means. Inspired by the argument from post- and decolonial scholars that not only already existing knowledge is affected by epistemic violence, but it can be displayed as the systematic negation of other knowledge structures, I will put special emphasis on the possibilities of producing, articulating and receiving new knowledge (Brunner 2017, 230). The aim to re-think European citizenship points to the need to reflect on the

normative epistemological considerations that guide this research on European citizenship. Precisely because, turning our attention to concepts of European citizenship, epistemological concerns come into play. Epistemology asks how knowledge comes about, but only rarely has it considered the context of knowledge production. With the emergence of post- and decolonial theories, criticism of the 'context-blindness' of epistemology has increased (Waibel 2014, 101). Bhabra speaks to this, asking: "How are we, as academics, scholars, social scientists and historians, complicit in the variable valuation of lives and experiences – at the very least, in our failure adequately to address the omissions and silences in those discourses and understandings that we know to be inadequate and inaccurate? And what can we do about this?" (Bhabra 2022, 236).

What I aim to do in this section is to share some guiding thoughts about how to conceptualize European citizenship in a research project alert of the fact that researchers, in deciding which cases they study and from which perspective, have the power as well as the responsibility to reflect how this gives visibility and power to certain subjects and not others. In the following, I claim that researchers must recognize the influence of the epistemological and political systems in which they operate. The choices for certain research subjects, and the prominence we accord them as exemplars of citizenship, contribute to their participation in these structures. Furthermore, the production of knowledge can serve as a means of offering "repertoires of action" (Isin 2013, 32) when we attribute particular characteristics to these phenomena.

In regard to the question 'what can we do about this?' I gained valuable insights from de- and postcolonial theory: Pointing to the systematic extinction of alternative knowledge and forms of thinking of the colonized, Santos uses the word "epistemicide" (2015) to explain the clearcut normative categories of what counts as knowledge and what does not. De- and postcolonial thinkers help us to understand that research risks to reinforce the dominance of occidental knowledge which claims universal validity as it was enforced on a missionary basis (Waibel 2014, 101). This hierarchization led to the development of the eurocentric character of knowledge production, distribution and evaluation directly linked to the practices of power. What appears somehow "neutral" (my translation Brunner 2013, 230) to us is the product of violent practices of

enforcing and universalizing Western epistemology by oppressing other forms of knowledge. Such colonial hierarchies are still prevalent today due to the fact that they are constantly reproduced in the coloniality we live in.

The theoretical consideration of de- and postcolonial literature made me conscious of the fact that most concepts of European citizenship are deeply intertwined in structures in which epistemic violence is (re)produced. Epistemic violence describes the violence of science and the knowledge structures it entails. From a feminist and decolonial perspective, Brunner (2013) defines it as the "dimension of violent social relations, which is invested in the knowledge itself, in its genesis, formation, organization and effectiveness." (my translation; Brunner 2013, 227). What is noteworthy here is that the term 'epistemic violence' encompasses not only theoretical and conceptual connotations, but also alludes to real-world political, institutional, and powerful practices.¹⁵ What necessarily follows from that is that scholars need to reflect on their own (epistemically) violent practices instead of situating violence as a phenomenon of "somewhere, someone and somewhat else" (my translation; Brunner 2013, 234). As a consequence, if we as scientists take for granted and leave unquestioned concepts of 'citizenship' and 'Europe', we will most likely unconsciously reproduce the epistemic violence it entails.¹⁶ To theorize European citizenship in its inclusiveness and its multiplicity means to de-center dominant frames of knowing and instead to create awareness and appreciate the pluriversality of different systems of knowing that can co-exist side by side. Without a reflection of those epistemic power structures, researchers are condemned to reproduce (albeit unconsciously) the delegitimization of multiple ways of knowing and thinking. This does, however, not mean that the recognition of pluriversality is enough to undo the coloniality we live in. But acknowledging and reflecting the inclusiveness of the theorization of citizenship

¹⁵ Together with Michaela Zöhrer, I have made this argument elsewhere (Schröder and Zöhrer 2019).

¹⁶ First and foremost, there is a need to counterbalance the relative dominance of Western concepts of citizenship which dominate the discussion of citizenship, while alternative concepts remain unheard: "Western knowledge has managed, controlled, and subsumed non-Western traditions" (Tlostanova and Mignolo 2009, 16). I am mindful of the fact that the main part of the literature that informed this research on citizenship is coming from precisely this dominant Western system of knowledge. My bibliography does not reflect the diverse perspectives and the vast plurality of our world to a satisfactory extent, but rather the eurocentric and androcentric character of the Western (social) sciences. This further underlines the need and the importance of researching European citizenship based on practices narrated by the citizens themselves.

can help to step out of the beaten tracks and conceptualize citizenship "as a process that can, and ought to be, inclusive of differing politics" (Smith and Rogers, 2016, 62).

I agree with Andrijasevic that in citizenship studies, generally, standpoints of minorities are rarely represented or even excluded from the scientific sphere. There is a predominance of concepts of citizenship in which especially those minorities that take to the street to claim their rights do not play a role (Andrijasevic 2013, 49). This reminds us that citizenship is both, a "relational institution of domination and emancipation" (Isin 2013, 36). As mentioned before, the label 'European' as much as 'citizenship' are linked to concepts that risk excluding and disciplining people into governmental subjects rather than allowing (new) political subjects to emerge. The aim of this research therefore needs to be to carve out the emancipatory potential of citizenship practices. The aim to re-think European citizenship therefore also comes with a methodological premise: An analysis which aims to broaden instead of narrowing down our understandings of citizenship cannot start from those dominant understandings of citizenship already conceptualized, but has to make citizenship meanings an object of inquiry. The decision not to make 'European citizenship' an object of inquiry is informed by this line of thought. This relates to investigating citizenship as performed in practices from bottom-up: First and foremost, by starting from *practices* which define citizenship and not the other way around, it evades the danger of unnecessarily delimiting what being a citizen means. 'European citizenship' needs to be regarded as an empty signifier, whose meaning will be explored in the empirical data.

However, what de-colonial, in contrast to post-colonial, thinkers stress is the possible overcoming of the state of coloniality. The decolonial project, Mignolo states, should not stop at the theoretical understanding of how (unequal) knowledge is produced, but should be transferred into practices of epistemic disobedience (W. D. Mignolo 2009; see also: Waibel 2014). This points to two aspects that deserve further attention: First, it emphasizes the need not to stop at the aforementioned criticism, but to let critical thinking guide (political) practice. Second, it creates awareness of the power researchers have to influence the regimes of epistemological and political power. The involvement in these power structures starts from the cases we choose to study as representations of citizenship and the attention and visibility we enforce by that. And it

does surely include knowledge production as a tool to "provide repertoires of action" (Isin 2013, 32) when we as researchers ascribe special qualities to these acts. What becomes central in this respect is the reflection on the meaning of language and a conscious choice of words and concepts: "social scientific texts do not merely present their subjects through the lenses of their data, but represent and re-present - constitute, construct - them" (D. Yanow 2006, 7). From this perspective, theories turn out to be interpretations of the world rather than mirroring it (Hawkesworth, Schwartz-Shea, and Yanow 2014, 35).

Researchers have to reflect on the problematics and opportunities of representing the interviewees' lifeworlds and meanings in the process of analyzing data and writing about it. However, the political character of the act of doing research is often overseen. While for most social scientists it is obvious that their research is shaped by the social world 'out there', they only rarely position themselves towards the sociopolitical influences their research (should) exert (critical: Flyvbjerg, Landman, and Schram 2016; Müllerleile 2014). Problematically, some researchers feel no responsibility for future effects of their writings and results (Platt 1981, 75). Agreeing with Weller that "science provides us with worldviews" (my translation; Weller 2003, 113), I am aware of the influence and the epistemic power that scientific re-presentations of the social world may have. To consider the process of writing as "worldmaking" (D. Yanow 2006, 3) requests to be reflexive and transparent about the question for whom we research. If we assume that knowledge is co-created, it is not independent of the way it is generated: "'knowledge' is always and deeply 'political', tied to the humanity of its producers" (Dvora Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, 370). Research is always influencing and influenced by the world it is trying to understand.

Therefore, a reflexive social science can not just step back to the role of a cognitive supplier for an academic audience. Doing research can and must question dominant knowledge, and by that, it can also create different perspectives on the pluriversal realities that are experienced (Winter 2011). Brunner calls this a "consciously partisan strengthening of alternative bodies of knowledge" (my translation; Brunner 2017, 199). Because doing research is, in my understanding stated above, a practice that *produces* realities instead of one that simply *captures* them, it also has some power to influence which world is to be created. This perspective does not sustain arbitrariness, but

contingency. However, it is not the research itself that will change this world, it is the people affected by it. This means that the way in which research influences and potentially changes certain phenomena of this world is through its traces that it leaves in the public. For what concerns the relation between the public and the researcher, I see this relation as mutually dependent: The researcher is making an offer on how one can understand the world. The public is transformed by it as well as it is transforming their world. Burawoy stresses the point that this "dialogic relation" (Burawoy 2005, 9) is based on the fact that the researcher's own political agenda is inscribed in the interpretation s*he offers to the public. Therefore, it is evident that the researcher's own political agenda can empower certain publics and disempower others. Being interested in those individuals who became politically active in the TTIP protest actions, I focus on the construction of European citizens in political action. This research is concerned with the question which citizenship is enacted and how political subjects come into being as European citizens. In the setting of the Anti-TTIP protests, I hope to develop a more sophisticated understanding of how European citizenship is enacted and what meaning it carries for the citizens themselves engaged in this political conflict. The study thereby aims to broaden our understanding of the emergence of European citizenship as enacted. It does so by moving the focus from the formation of European citizens in passive, governmental techniques to an active, performative construction of citizenship. I am aware that I tell *this* 'story' of the Anti-TTIP movement, arising from my political aim to see citizens as active agents of change. I strive to doing research that spreads knowledge which allows to see the perspectives of citizens who aim to co-create Europe from the bottom-up.

Re-thinking European citizenship in the Anti-TTIP protests

"The current situation of citizenship in Europe is faced with the challenge of reconstituting citizenship in a new key" (1997, 295), Delanty states. In this chapter, it became apparent why: European citizenship in general and the construction of European citizens in protest action in particular, raises fundamental doubts on the inclusiveness of citizenship concepts, the power to define what counts as citizenship and what does not, and how to grasp European citizenship not just as a poor imitation

of the national version of citizenship. Considering these shortcomings, it would be understandable to turn away from the concept of citizenship altogether - if there wasn't the chance to see new political subjects as citizens emerging. Therefore, instead of condemning the concept of citizenship, the conclusion of this section to 're-think' (Held and Hall 1989). European citizenship is a normative call as much as a condition to move on in citizenship studies if European citizenship is to be revisited in an inclusive, power-sensitive, citizen-centered and context-sensitive way.

This relates back to the aim of this study, which is not to answer the question who counts as a European citizen (in legal terms) or what a European citizen should be like (in normative terms), but to detect empirically how European citizenship is enacted by the citizens themselves. This means to speak of citizenship as *taking* part in a community, in contrast to the formalized status of *being* part of it. Such a performative perspective on citizenship complements 'classic' concepts of citizenship in which a top-down-approach of rights and duties characterizes the relation of the citizens to the polity and vice versa. To analyze the individual as a creative and active co-creator of his/her conditions of living, and not as a passive receiver of rights, is the starting point to reconstruct how Anti-TTIP protesters performed their political subjectivity as European citizens in the act of protesting. Following the performative approach, I argued before that in protest action, political subjects as citizens are at the same time created and performed. This goes hand in hand with the assumption that political practices such as collective protest actions against TTIP play a crucial role in the construction process of European citizens. The heuristic potential of studying the citizens' protest actions against TTIP, I claim, reaches far beyond a classic instrumental view of protest as a medium to show political disapproval: Not only constitute such protest activities a way to articulate disagreement with TTIP, they are also the place where the citizens perform their understandings of European citizenship in concrete political action. Political subjectivation can be defined as the process by which one becomes a political subject. The way to research processes of political subjectivation proposed here is to ask: What makes a citizen? instead of what s/he is. This means to accept that it is the acts that make the citizen emerge in its enactment. In Isins words, we have to move our focus "from already defined actors to the acts that constitutes them" (Isin 2009, 383).

I conclude with the observation that too little research has been done on the meanings of citizenship from the perspective of the citizens and that most citizenship theories also entail a power inequality in favor of those writing about, not those enacting citizenship. This is not said here to blame citizenship research and to stop at mere criticism, but instead to point to the potential that lies in a closer investigation of the protesters' experiences from a citizen's perspective.¹⁷ Such an approach allows to research new and bottom-up understandings of citizenship from the perspective of the citizens. This "transformed conception" (Isin 2017, 512) allows to see the different ways how Anti-TTIP protesters constitute themselves as citizens - possibly also contrary to how it was formerly understood or defined top-down. While top-down governmental approaches are trying to construct a certain kind of citizen, the citizens' practices do not necessarily correspond to this ideal. In the case of TTIP, we may explore that citizens who took part in European protests performed another role than the one assigned to them by the EU institutions. I argued earlier that especially when 'new' political constructs such as the European Union gain importance, also new practices of citizenship may arise beyond the national scale. Those need to be investigated by considering *European* citizenship, because otherwise we remain blind to catch those practices that lie outside established concepts of what citizenship is and can be. By carrying out an empirical analysis of protest experiences, the citizens' (differing) conceptions of European citizenship can be found, which may stand in contrast to the abstract governmental 'ideal types' of citizenship. This becomes even more important as those conceptions have been seriously under-studied by political scientists, particularly on an empirical basis.

Remapping the concept of European citizenship will open up for alternative forms of being a European citizen, both in political theory but also in political practice. One approach which seems to allow such a re-thinking of European citizenship is the enactment approach (Isin 2002; 2007; 2009; 2012; Isin and Saward 2013; Isin and Nielsen 2015; Isin 2017). This approach claims that citizens come into being through practices, which are called 'acts of citizenship' (Isin and Nielsen 2015). That implies that the research concentrates on the acts that create political subjects, whilst the

¹⁷ for research on "The role of ordinary people in democratization" see Weltzel, Inglehart (2008)

political subjects that emerge are an outcome of analysis. The enactment approach to European citizenship seems especially useful to research new and unforeseeable ways of citizenship enactment, precisely since it does not assume subjects of European citizenship in advance. Instead, it is conceived as an empirical task to demonstrate that an act of citizenship brings subjects as citizens into being (Isin 2013, 26).

Enacting citizenship in the Anti-TTIP protests

In this chapter, I hope to make clear what distinguishes the Enacted Citizenship approach from other perspectives on citizenship and why it is a valuable perspective to look at the Anti-TTIP protests. After having explored established concepts of citizenship, namely the liberalist and the communitarian strain of thought, in the last chapter, I took a look at practice-based concepts, which approach citizenship as a performance. This is particularly helpful to broaden our understanding of what citizenship could and should mean, since it does not start from a predefined ideal model of citizenship, but from the lived experiences of citizens themselves. The Enacted Citizenship concept stands in this tradition, but adds to it a critical approach. What the last chapter illustrated is that the study of citizenship comes with certain challenges, as the concept of citizenship risks to limit theoretically as well as empirically what citizenship means. What is needed instead is a critical approach to citizenship that allows one to think of citizenship in an inclusive, power-sensitive, citizen-centered and context-oriented way. Those challenges are met here with the help of the Enacted Citizenship approach. It can be grouped under so-called 'critical' approaches, which emerge in reaction to the perceived deficiencies of the aforementioned dominant schools of thought (Abowitz and Harnish 2006, 666).¹⁸ In questioning traditional understandings of identity, nationality and membership, their goal is to foster a "culture of discussion and dissent" (Abowitz and Harnish 2006, 673) in the political community about what citizenship is and can be. What makes them a valuable contribution here is their call to "unlearn the dominant civic lessons" (Abowitz and Harnish 2006, 673) and the claim to investigate citizenship in a new key.

Having outlined the 'big picture' of my dissertation, this chapter aims to serve as the theoretical frame for the empirical material that has been analyzed. It sets up the theoretical lens through which I analyze the Anti-TTIP protests and thereby contributes to the understanding of how European citizenship can be thought of as 'enacted'. The aim of this section is therefore to make clear firstly what 'acts of citizenship' are and secondly how the *European* scale can be conceptualized. The last section concludes

¹⁸ Abowitz groups them under the common term 'reconstructionist approaches' to citizenship

what follows from the theoretical concept of enacted European citizenship regarding my research on the Anti-TTIP protests.

The Enacted Citizenship approach

To start, it seems useful to understand the roots of the verb 'to enact': it is a synonym for 'to become effective', 'to come into force', as well as 'to stage', 'to act out', 'to portray'. This polysemy shows that on the one hand it is about the public representation of citizenship in action ('to stage', 'to act out', 'to portray'), on the other hand it is about change, about a new imperative that starts to exist ('to become effective', 'to come into force'). Conceptualizing citizenship as enacted carries along aspects from both: to create something publicly, to bring something into play, as well as signaling a new beginning and a rupture with what has been the status quo before. How exactly these acts of citizenship can be grasped theoretically will be part of the following section.

Acts of citizenship

"When you act you bring something new into being. That is the most fearsome aspect of acting. Bringing something new into being. There is no guarantee of effects or consequences. It requires literally a leap into the unknown with the courage or doubt of one's own convictions whatever the situation demands. To act is also the core of politics. Not only the kind of politics that takes place in the parliament but also, and more importantly, on streets and squares." (Isin 2017b)

What Isin outlines here on his webpage is the janus-faced character of this "leap into the unknown" (Isin 2017b): It is a challenge as much as it is a chance. When we think about 'acts of citizenship', examples such as tax paying, military service or voluntary work may come to our minds. And it might in fact appear confusing at first sight to hear that voting as such does not count as an act of citizenship in Isin's terms. However, this becomes more comprehensible when considering that an act of citizenship is by definition the break with a routine, with assumptions or understandings: "acts make a difference." (Isin 2009, 379) Following Arendt (1963), Isin

points out that to stage an act also always means to begin - and to reflect that means "not just to begin something new but to enact oneself as that being that makes a beginning" (Isin 2009, 380). Obviously, the Enacted Citizenship approach aims to "step into the participatory" (Isin and Nielsen 2008, 10), as it claims that citizens come into being through practices, which are called 'acts of citizenship' (Isin and Nielsen 2008). That means that the focus here is first of all on the acts, which create political subjects, not on the subjects themselves. In the following section, I will look at these acts in greater detail asking what makes a political practice an 'act of citizenship': How do citizens come into being and what does it mean to perform a *European* act of citizenship?

What are acts of citizenship? This question can be separated into three parts: What is an *act*? What is an act of *citizenship*? And, in the context of this project, what is an act of *European* citizenship? The first is most easily defined in contrast to 'action': 'actions' are described as practices, such as Anti-TTIP protest action, in which subjects exercise their rights to make claims. Acts are defined as entities with a clear start and end, in which they can refer to other (previous) acts. While action such as actors are an important part of it, "an act is neither a practice nor a habit nor an action and yet it applies all these forms of conduct" (Isin 2009, 378). Actions may take place over a period of time, but for actions to be defined as *acts*, they need to result in a "condensed effect" (Isin 2013, 32) through which political subjects are created. Obviously, this implies the fundamental rejection of the understanding of citizenship as a legal status. Instead, it assumes that it is the enactment of one's political subjectivity, not the formal status of being a citizen, which is decisive for political participation.

Therefore, this specific perspective on citizenship helps to better understand the interplay between action and the emergence of political subjects as citizens. In this respect, it seems especially useful, since it does not assume subjects of European citizenship in advance. If we agree on the presumption outlined in the last chapter that "it is precisely acts that produce subjects as citizens" (Andrijasevic 2013, 57), it is conceived an empirical task to demonstrate that an act of citizenship brings subjects as citizens into being (Isin 2013, 26). Isin sees "citizenship as performed subject positions" (Isin 2013, 27): citizens are not predefined (for example by law or by locality), but emerge through the performance of citizenship. By claiming rights, in Isin's words,

they are "responsibilizing" (Isin and Nielsen 2008, 1) themselves for claims that go beyond their individual interests. In a similar vein, Delanty distances himself from the idea of 'civic duty' and instead turns towards the concept of 'responsibility': "It is possible that the idea of responsibility becomes the basis of a notion of citizenship as participation. In order to see how this is taking on a concrete form, it is particularly instructive to look at new social movements and the notion of citizenship they imply" (Delanty 1997, 295).

Isin's understanding of a "collective political subjectivity" (Isin 2013, 31) is rooted in the idea that subjects with claims are political actors, in the sense that they stage acts of citizenship publicly as representative of others who hold the same subject position. As I argued before in reference to Mouffe's theory (1992), subject positions come into being through dominant categories that the individual is confronted with, such as: being a woman, being an activist, being homosexual, being a person of color, being European (...) while each of these dimensions is shaping the others. In the light of this research, I will focus on if and how a particular subject position - being a European citizen - emerged in the moment of protesting. The link between the activist citizens we see protesting (called "bodies" (Isin 2013, 23)) and political subjects we don't see (who share the same "subject positions" (Isin 2013, 29)) is precisely that: Activist citizens, or 'bodies', perform the subject position of a wider collective and thereby make it possible to identify with them.

The term 'acts' then describes a series of actions (such as protesting, demonstrating, launching an initiative), which in sum "eventually create a declaration that constitutes a subject – individual or collective – as a political subject without prior authorisation. To be more precise, the act produces two political subjects simultaneously: a subject with specific claims and a subject with the right to have rights." (Isin 2013, 33; following Arendt 1958) Arendt is an important reference point in this respect: Isin connects Arendt's conception of "the right to have rights" (Arendt, 1994: 296) with acts of citizenship by saying that apart from the specific claims, the political subject also exercises his*her right to claim rights. Acts of citizenship are always "dialogical or relational" (Isin 2009, 379) as they always articulate the claim to be heard by and therefore address another party - as abstract as they may be. To claim one's rights is

what constitutes actions as an act of *citizenship*, whereas rights are not understood in a narrow sense as legal rights. It can be responsibilities and identifications, symbolic, cultural or economic rights which citizens call into question (Isin 2013, 13). Often, but not necessarily, the struggle challenges (aspects of) the current legal framework, or makes implicit or explicit claims to the established order (Isin 2013, 40). This reminds us of the fact that the set of our current legal rights is a product of past struggles, too. Isin's definition of rights follows a relational understanding: "rights are relations that reflect dominant sites, scales and subjects of citizenship" (Isin 2013, 25). This goes back to the point that citizenship is also a matter of domination and emancipation (Isin 2013, 27; 36). However, it is not considered as black and white as Rancière's understanding of 'playing part or no part', (Rancière 1999, 30) but it is a spectrum of (marginalized) groups which are (perceived as) less visible, less recognized, less accepted. This struggle is situated on a personal level as much as it has a political dimension: Citizenship acts are performing, and thereby bringing into existence, what they ask for: enacted citizenship is "asserted and possessed" (Saward 2013, 220) at the same time. In acts of citizenship lies the idea to disrupt such dominance in order to create new spaces for political subjectivation.

This aspect of 'rupture' is an important point which is expressed by Badiou saying that "the essence of politics is not the plurality of opinions. It is the prescription of a possibility in rupture with what exists." (Badiou 2006, 24) In this sense, acts of citizenship enact this possibility being "creative, unauthorized and unconventional" (Isin 2013, 24). However, as Arendt (2022), amongst others (such as Badiou, Rancière, Derrida) reminds us: ruptures contain beginnings; and in fact, Arendt is an important reference point here: In her book "vita activa" (1958) she distinguished three types of activities (labor, work and action), whilst the essence of 'the political' is action, defined as to begin and to govern. A rupture with the given may create beginnings, i.e. new possibilities to enact one's rights. It is important to note that this rupture may challenge both: concrete, given policies, but also dominant understandings of citizenship itself (Isin 2013, 15). With Isin, we can differentiate between what Isin calls 'activist' and 'active' citizens: The latter is defined as citizens, who actively engage in the existing framework of political participation (Isin 2013, 42; Andrijasevic 2013, 54).

Coming back to the argument that there has been a lot of progress in integrating citizens in the decision-making on a European level, (van Deth 2009, 183) those 'active citizens' seem to be appreciated actors in European politics. However, in his study on "the good European citizen", van Deth comes to pose the question if policy makers want only some citizens and not others to participate in only some ways but not others? (van Deth 2009, 183). Those who may fall outside these predefined roles are 'activist citizens', as they are operating at the boundaries of this order and are exploring new possibilities beyond. This difference is illustrated with the metaphor of playing a scene: While 'active citizens' follow the existent script which sets the rules of how to participate, 'activist citizens' re-write or transform those rules to their own needs (Saward 2013, 231). While active citizens are appreciated by political institutions as parts of a lively democratic debate, activist citizens are quickly considered as threats for the social order (Harju 2007, 96). However, they are highlighted by political theorists as vital resource to ensure the democratic quality of any political space and of the European one in particular (Balibar 2004, 49). Again, this differentiation reminds us that what sets the frame for our contemporary conceptions of citizenship is defined by former struggles, which back then exceeded the limits of that time.


What these claims share is an orientation to justice: claims of justice exceed the individual interests and thereby signal an act of citizenship, because they are articulated by someone who enacts its role as a citizen, i.e. by a subject claiming rights (for everyone) (Isin 2009, 381). What is expressed is the struggle for those "injustices [which] seem most important and related to their social lives" (Isin 2013, 22). This process of making claims of injustice public and standing up for recognition in this respect is what Isin calls 'becoming political': "Becoming political is that moment when one constitutes oneself as a being capable of judgment about just and unjust, takes responsibility for that judgment, and associates oneself with or against others in fulfilling that responsibility" (Isin 2009, 376).

Consequently, acts are defined as acts of *European* citizenship if they "make (or refuse) claims to European citizenship." (Isin 2013, 15). This means questioning concrete aspects of the European status quo and to perform (different) understandings of European citizenship. By that, as I argued before, at the European level we see that

subject positions are claimed, which were not visible before (Behnke 1997, 243; Sassen 2002, 285; Delanty 1997, 299; Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 2; Isin 2013, 37). Therefore, it is worth taking a closer look at the European level and how to capture it theoretically and methodologically.

The European scale of citizenship

As the European dimension is of special interest, I will outline first the role of sites and scales in the Enacted Citizenship concept and then move on to relate this to the European citizenship setting which I aim to inquire.



map of TTIP free zones [private screenshot]

What we can see here is a map of so-called 'TTIP-free zones' in Europe, which derives from a mayor's network of European cities against TTIP. This map illustrates not only a tight network of solidarity (at least in Western Europe), but it also exemplifies a new

political landscape of spaces of contestation: Sites become visible in acts, which means here the mayor's decisions to declare their city 'TTIP-free'. Sites are understood as places where actors bring issues, interests, themes into play by claiming rights concerning these topics. Thereby, they transform courts, squares, streets, media, networks, borders and other places into 'fields of contestation'. In the case of the Anti-TTIP movement we can see how protesters flooded streets, squares, parliaments and political meetings where they brought up the question of the role of citizens in European politics.

As *European* citizenship is at the center of interest in my research, necessarily the question of the political unit appears. However, in contrast to national or ethnic conceptions of citizenship, the approach I follow understands scales as defined by their appropriateness to citizenship enactment (Isin 2013, 26). This means to take acts of citizenship as a starting point, from which scales emerge instead of starting off from predefined units of a particular scale. As a consequence, the focus shifts from a political unit defined by geographical or legal limits to formally unknown scales of citizenship. The idea behind this is to locate European citizenship right where it happens: Coming back to the mayor's network of cities against TTIP, it happens in the non-EU, Swiss city of Zurich, but not in the Italian city Bologna. We have already seen that the departure point of the analysis are claims enacted through actions. Those actions take place at locations, which can become 'sites' of citizenship when containing a strategic value for the protest (Isin 2013, 33). This is for example the case in Anti-TTIP-demonstrations in front of the European parliament: They do not just take place anywhere, but in the heart of EU politics and right at the citizens' representative institution. This carries a special meaning in regard to the claim to make their voices heard in the EU's negotiation process surrounding TTIP. The site chosen by the protesters articulates a certain scale, as it addresses the representative institution of citizens on an EU level. While the symbolic character of this site clearly relates to EU politics, the scale does not have to be restricted to the EU level. It may cut through different national, cultural, symbolic and geographical layers. These layers become visible in acts of citizenship (Isin 2013, 26).

This differs from conceptions of citizenship in which scales and sites mutually contain each other and thereby reproduce classic frames of citizenship participation, while

alternative understandings of citizenship remain unnoticed. What differentiates such 'alternative' concepts of citizenship, can only be understood in contrast to 'dominant' ways to conceptualize citizenship. As I outlined earlier, citizenship became equalized with nationality, just as the scale of the nation state became the unquestioned point of reference for political action (Balibar 2004). While the nation state is still the dominant scale for citizenship action, (Isin 2009, 369) there are also new political spaces entering the political sphere. As I showed earlier, *European* citizenship is often understood as a legal status confined to national citizenship and enabling participation in EU politics according to clearcut ways and within frames defined top-down. While this is not even similar to the understanding of Enacted Citizenship, it is necessary to take into account that this is the dominant understanding of European citizenship, however, "it does not determine it." (Isin 2013, 6). Proponents of the Enacted Citizenship approach rank among those who criticize that many researchers follow a so-called "'scalar model' of European citizenship" (Andrijasevic 2013, 53), which transfers the national model of citizenship to a European level.

What the Enacted Citizenship approach proclaims, however, is that it "neither copies nor reproduces nation-state citizenship" (Isin 2013, 5). The reason can be found in the concept of scales which I defined above: The scale of an act of citizenship is not understood as a container, such as the EU or the nation state, but as cutting through pre-defined boundaries and defining its own limits according to the concrete context of the act. It assumes that any protest action's site is not randomly chosen, but somehow connected to the act itself. By investigating those acts we can see new political spaces emerging, which are not predefined by territories, but exceed national boundaries. The Anti-TTIP-movement may be an example for creating such a new space, defined by the sites where people took action when they organized transnationally and transatlantically against the trade deal. Coming back to the map of TTIP-free zones, we can see that it is the acts building up a specific network of inside and outside, depending on who is taking part in it: The fact, for example, that the Italian city Bologna is *not* declared TTIP-free but the non-EU, Swiss city of Zurich is, shows that acts of European citizenship do not stop at pre-defined, legal borders, nor do they automatically include those within those borders. Therefore, the 'European scale' cannot be imagined as a "conventionally constituted and bordered juridico-political

space" (Isin 2013, 5). It is seen instead as the emerging field in which political subjectivation processes of European citizens take place. In Isin and Saward's words: It is defined as a contingent and flexible scope in which a "new European citizenship is struggling to be born alongside the struggle to invent and foster new ways of becoming and acting like Europeans as members" (Isin 2013, 7). If these new spaces appear on the scientific radar, we can also see new subjects of citizenship coming into being (Isin 2013, 26).

We see here that scales are not levels of political entities such as the EU or nation states, but rather levels of meaningful action, that unite actions into acts of citizenship. This perspective on the European scale has the advantage that instead of prefixing the scales' boundaries as a container-term, they become an empirical question. To analytically specify scales we have to start from the analysis of acts which take place at specific sites (Isin 2009, 371). Therefore, the Anti-TTIP protests are not defined *per se* by the European scale, but it becomes an object of inquiry which levels of action in this protest emerge as meaningful. Consequently, we cannot presume in advance that in the Anti-TTIP protests *European* citizenship is enacted. But as my analysis will show, the European scale entails - however different - meanings for and in the Anti-TTIP protests.

Consequences for my research

What follows from this theoretical lens of Enacting European citizenship regarding my research on the Anti-TTIP protests? In the following, I will sum up the basic principles of this concept for my research project.

The ontological position the Enacted Citizenship approach rests upon is the understanding that acts of citizenship create political subjects. If we follow the idea that citizens are defined through acts rather than through formalized rights, it becomes clear that citizens are defined here as political, not as legal subjects. Understanding citizenship as a practice in which a political subject, the citizen, emerges, entails the potential to see something new: "Citizenship understood as political subjectivity shifts our attention from fixed categories by which we have come to understand or inherit

citizenship to the struggles through which these categories themselves have become stakes" (Isin 2009, 383). In this struggle, (possibly new) actors, sites and scales of citizenship emerge. If we agree on the understanding of "citizenship as an instituted subject-position" (Isin 2009, 370), then we also come to share the position that this institution is not something natural, but constitutes itself in social and political struggles (Isin 2009, 370). Having said this, this approach is especially useful to research those who claim rights of citizenship especially when it is "precarious and contested" (Isin and Saward 2013, ix). The Enacted Citizenship approach aims to evade the exclusive categories which are dominant in approaches to citizenship by post-defining subjects with claims as citizens and, by that, allows to research precisely those who would otherwise fall out of those categories. This explains why much of the research done on 'acts of citizenship' investigate non-formal citizens in legal terms (e.g. citizens without a European passport) (Rigby and Schlembach 2013; Johnson 2015; Rumelili and Keyman 2011; Palmberger 2022; Bendixsen 2013; Darling 2014; Dadusc, Grazioli, and Martínez 2019). But not only those treated as 'outsiders' of a political community claim recognition as *citizens*, also other groups are not defined by the political authorities as such: For example, Andrijasevic uses the example of sex workers who gathered in front of the European Parliament to claim their rights in an ongoing political debate as well as to position themselves as active citizens in contrast to the public perception as victims (Andrijasevic 2013, 53).

Enacted Citizenship research has focused explicitly on those who demand a *different kind of* citizenship, those who claim for more or different rights as a citizen. When the Anti-TTIP protesters take to the street protesting, it is their way to make the citizens' voices heard by the European decision-makers. When they demand to have a seat at the negotiation table of the trade agreement, it is also about being recognized as a legitimate actor in this political process. Recognition is "a vital human need" (Ingram 2006, 230) and therefore it is hardly surprising that political action results from such claims. Interestingly, in this rupture with the status quo, the protesters seem to enact a different understanding of citizenship. This perspective on protests transcends political participation's purely instrumental function, and acknowledges that performing citizenship may have expressive, transformative effects (Dahlgren 2007).

The second section of this introduction to the Enacted Citizenship approach asked: What exactly does 'Europe' mean in this respect? Remembering the problematic nature of concepts that define Europe by fixing it to a limited set of attributes or by contrasting it to a constructed 'Other', this project aims at a dynamic construction of Europe "as an open ended idea" (Isin 2013, 5). Especially in regard to the European dimension of the Anti-TTIP protests, the approach of scales offers a way to decenter both the nation state and the EU as a polity - and brings into existence new versions and visions of "opening Europe up" (Derrida 1992, 76). If we follow the idea that scales (such as national or European) are not defined by their territory or law, but by the meaning that is given to it through enactment, it also means that 'Europe' and identically '*European* citizenship' are signifiers (rather than signified), including a variety of meanings which need to be explored empirically. As scales are defined by their appropriateness to the citizenship enacted, neither the existence nor the meaning of this European scale is pre-set. This approach helps to research 'Europe' in an anti-essentialist way that accounts for the diverse meaning that it entails. If the European scale turns out to be meaningful for the Anti-TTIP protests, it is due to the meaning given to it in the protesters' acts of citizenship. In other words: Only the investigation in their enactment of European citizenship gives us access to their meanings of European citizenship and may possibly change our perspectives on European citizenship and our understanding of what counts as that.

As I have shown before, most citizenship theories pre-define a subject of citizenship, the citizen, based on some fixed criterions. This does not only drastically limit the spectrum of who counts as a citizen, but also takes away power from the citizens to define themselves as such. As mentioned in the last chapter, this point is made very clear by Andrijasevic (Andrijasevic 2013, 55) who understands the Enacted Citizenship approach as a methodology that is able to include subjectivities of minority groups. As she shows, it is thereby closely connected to feminist theory in criticizing the dominant "logic of difference" (Andrijasevic 2013, 55) which constructs citizens on the basis of exclusion of its negative counterpart (those *who do not* have the same nationality, *who do not* speak the same language, *who do not* conform to the norm). Instead, the aim here is to let the political subjects speak for themselves through their political claims articulated in acts: If citizens do not exist per se, they have to "constitute *themselves* as

those with 'the right to claim rights'." (Isin 2013, 27). As a consequence, what matters is not who *is*, but what *makes* a citizen? When starting from acts of citizenship, we can explore a broad range of political participation, which not only changes our understanding of 'the political', but also brings about new actors with new claims on this political stage. When new sites of contestation appear, also new sites of belonging and identification are offered which not infrequently cross social, national and other borders. This opens up for alternative enactments of citizenship which so far remained unseen and unheard (Saward, 2013: 231; Isin and Saward, 2013: 13). This makes the Enacted Citizenship approach not simply a different perspective in contrast to 'regular' citizenship studies, as Andrijasevic suggests, but it must be seen as an "alternative mode of knowledge production" (Andrijasevic, 2013: 62). Andrijasevic claims that the possibility to research citizenship beyond established concepts of it makes it a "critical methodology" (Andrijasevic, 2013: 49): The approach aims to catch the mobilizations of voices, which often remain unheard in established concepts of citizenship. In this way, she states, it challenges dominant ways to understand and do research about citizenship (Andrijasevic, 2013: 49).

Consequently, we can conclude that acts of citizenship are "stretching scales" (Isin 2009, 383) and thereby bring about new actors (those claiming rights). Having embarked with the claim to rethink European citizenship, the Enacted Citizenship approach entails the potential to grasp both, the citizen's ways of constructing and reconstructing European citizenship: "To study acts of citizenship is to study ways that individuals enact themselves as citizens - and may in the process reshape the very understanding of citizenship that they enact." (Saward 2013, 231) I want to stress that the Enacted Citizenship approach is therefore a theoretical as well as a methodological contribution to the understanding of European citizenship: Theoretically, it helps to understand how European citizens emerge as claimants of rights. Methodologically, it enables us to research European citizenship beyond the restrictions of established concepts of citizenship.

I mentioned before that this approach is the lens through which I will look at the Anti-TTIP protests. Just like any approach, this one also puts certain limits to what can be seen from this perspective. First, acts inherit certain normative ideas, ideologies

and personal motives that the analysis of acts does not grasp. Apart from the fact that motives are in any case difficult, if not impossible, to articulate and not easily observable, for this approach the question of which reasons drove actors to participate is not of interest (Isin 2009, 381). As acts of citizenship are not judged by their motives, struggles over European citizenship can also, for example, include eurosceptic¹⁹ positions, which can be considered as one of the most extreme examples of calling for a different European citizenship. However, not all actions can be considered acts of citizenship. It is the orientation towards justice, not the personal interests, which will be crucial to identify if the Anti-TTIP protests are an act of citizenship. What follows is that, according to Isin, such acts can be studied even without any verbal expression or explanation by the actors - or even without their conscious reflection of it (Isin 2013, 40). What is more informative than giving reasons *why* they engage, is precisely the action they take in struggles: "A performative perspective on citizenship enables researchers to study various acts of making rights claims [...] without making prior assumptions about the presence or absence of that which might be called citizenship." (Isin 2017a, 505) This relates to the question: If acts of citizenship help us to understand how European citizenship is enacted, how do we study them?

What the Enacted Citizenship approach provides is a concept of citizenship in performative terms: As enacting citizenship means that "people perform their rights to have rights by asking questions about justice and injustice" (Isin 2013, 22), I will stage the Anti-TTIP actions as the object of analysis to understand which citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests and how. As I investigate them, I think in line with the Enacted Citizenship approach as follows: When studying acts and subjects of citizenship, we have to start from actions and bodies. In this project, the action of interest is political protest and the bodies involved are protesters in the Anti-TTIP movement, which I interviewed regarding their protest experiences. Due to the focus on practice, experiences play a central role in this research, as they are expected to be the language in which the interviewees narrate their actions as well as the meaning given to them.

¹⁹ Euroscepticism is an ambiguous and contested term. In this regard here, it is understood not as engagement against the current performance of the EU, but as the rejection of the existence of this political entity altogether.

Such meaning-making processes are at the center of interest when it comes to rethinking European citizenship. Therefore, this research turns away from traditional instruments of analysis of public opinion on European citizenship, most prominently used in the Eurobarometer monitoring tool by the EU (European Commission 2014, QA19).²⁰ Being predominantly interested in whether the respondents see themselves as a European citizen or not, this data tells us little about what European citizenship means for those being asked. Turning towards the meanings given to their practices instead, (Holston 2009) I am not directly asking for their perspectives on citizenship. The reason for this methodological choice is twofold: First, as Isin mentions, it is not to expect that citizenship is the category in which protesters would frame their actions (Isin 2009, 381). I do not neglect that political claim-making in the language of citizenship exists. On the contrary: As it was empirically researched in Gerbaudo's study of Anti-Austerity movements in Southern Europe (2017, 1), a new discourse on citizenship is at the core of new waves of protest. However, what he identifies as the "language of citizenship" (Gerbaudo 2017, 1) is a citizen-centered rhetoric used *strategically* by social movements to mobilize as many people as possible, regardless of their (right or left) political position as well as of their political experience (Gerbaudo 2017, 11f.). The reference to 'citizenry' and 'every citizen's rights' then serves as one of the unifying narratives of the movements. While this makes sense for strategic communication in social movements, the extent to which the category of citizenship plays a role for ordinary citizens in their political action must be critically questioned. Dahlgren points to this as a severe difficulty when studying the subjective meanings of citizenship: Even "if citizenship is a dimension of the self, this does not mean that people necessarily give the word 'citizen' a meaning that resonates with them; they may have other vocabularies." (Dahlgren 2000, 338) Therefore, the Anti-TTIP actions do not have to be headlined as such by the interviewees. As mentioned earlier, I see citizenship as an attribution used in the act of interpretation by the researcher.

²⁰ The question that was asked in the Eurobarometer Questionnaire was: "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A free trade and investment agreement between the EU and the USA" (European Commission 2015, QA19(5))

The second reason for not directly asking for citizenship is that citizenship seems to be too much of a normatively loaded construct. Being sensitized of the use of governmental techniques for constructing citizens from top-down, its norms are expected to drastically influence the idea(l)s of what citizenship is supposed to be. This means that in asking citizens about the meaning of citizenship, I might rather find out what it *should be* instead of what it *is*, as well as what a citizen is *supposed to do* instead of what s/he *does*. Meanings of European citizenship are per se and often unconsciously permeated by those normative standards and it seems likely that the interviewees' answer on European citizenship cannot be freed from the epistemic shortcomings it entails. To be more precise, all knowledge gained by asking interviewees about their understanding of European citizenship may itself carry reductions of a special form, a special content and/or special practices of European citizenship. This epistemic limitation makes other aspects invisible that lie outside the established, theoretical concepts of European citizenship and will thereby delimit the potential to rethink it.

This twofold challenge is met with the Enacted Citizenship approach by post-defining citizens based on acts. Civic performance, such as protest action, translates subject positions as citizens into observable political behavior: As I have stated before, individuals do not *have*, but always *perform* an identity in communicative action with others. Through the analysis of the interview data, in a first step, I ask whether the actions undertaken perform an act of citizenship and then, in a second step, which political subjects are being produced: "while bodies perform actions, acts perform subjects" (Isin 2013, 23). Researching *European* acts of citizenship means that acts make claims to *European* citizenship, in content, scope or actors. In the light of this research project, it means that action, such as the Anti-TTIP protest action, may be decoded as an act of *European* citizenship depending on the meanings given to the European scale in their protest action. To answer these questions, it is important to consider the sites of contestation (i.e. the struggle around certain issues), which are defined as products of "a constellation of bodies in action" (Isin 2013, 23).

While performances of subject positions can be observed, the -radically subjective - meaning associated with it cannot be fully explored only by observation. Therefore, as a second step, this research will exceed the Enacted Citizenship approach, by not only

asking 'if' but also 'which' citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests. If the Anti-TTIP protests can be considered an act of citizenship, I go on investigating *which* political subject is created in the Anti-TTIP protests. This means turning the attention to the meaning given to the citizenship enacted. By asking for the experiences made in the Anti-TTIP protests, I also hope to understand more about which meaning is given to the European scale as well as to the enacted role as a citizen. In concrete terms, this means that instead of starting from a pre-conceptualized understanding of citizenship, the analysis' focus is on the meaning of citizenship as the object of investigation.

As mentioned earlier, this meaning will never be fixed, but will always be an object of struggle. Not *despite*, but *because* citizenship is in constant flux, subjects are able to "redefine it in a dialectic of conflicts and solidarities" (Balibar 2004, 49f.). The research question 'which citizenship is enacted?' picks up on this point. Asking 'what is citizenship?' tends to overlook that citizenship is a construct, and not only that: As I showed before, it is a normatively loaded one (Parker and Jarolimek 1984, v; Bazzul 2015; Westheimer and Kahne 2004). However, to ask 'which citizenship is enacted?' takes into account that the framing of citizenship is an act of interpretation (Isin 2009, 369). Following Isin, it is important to note that 'acts of citizenship' are a term that necessarily includes the interpretation by the researchers, "who write themselves into the act" (Isin 2013, 22; 32). It is the reconstructive work of the researchers that has to make explicit why they interpret certain acts as acts of citizenship (Isin 2017a, 519). Consequently, it is the researcher who decides what counts as an act of citizenship and why. Even more importantly, as I will point out in the next chapter, serious reflection of the researcher's aims and positioning is needed as subjectivity is a constituent part of the research process.

The inquiry of the research question 'which citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests?' is an attempt to illuminate the colorful 'in-between' of two dominant extremes to portray 'the European citizen', which too often remains a black and white stencil of it. The question seeks to move beyond such oversimplified analyses and strive towards a conception of citizenship that avoids portraying citizens either as powerless figures in a neoliberal and corporate-dominated political establishment or as a homogenous mass that is apathetic, disinterested, or dismissive. Instead of

pathologizing European citizens in the setting of the European democratic crisis, I seek to understand how citizenship is enacted by the citizens themselves. This allows us to broaden our perspective on the question of who 'the European citizen' is and can be in the Europe to come.

Research design

The term 'research design' evokes the imagery of a careful plan for every step of the research which is designed to fulfill the researcher's expectations. While this is often the way research is presented retroactively, it is usually not what we as researchers experience during the processes that eventually constitute the so-called 'research design'. Research starts from the aim to understand a certain phenomenon by making use of systematic approaches "within an attitude of doubt" (Pachirat 2006, 386). A predefined process would therefore deprive researchers of their most interesting parts of their job: the adventurous discoveries of *unknown* territory in an academic landscape in which they feel at home. Ambiguities and uncertainties constitute the very reason for science (Giesen 2010, 25). If we understand scientific work as a practice and not as technical operations that follow a previously written script, it also means that it is a constant process of adjusting, developing and rechecking the initial plan which includes careful reflection and transparent articulation of the decisions made. Considering this, I follow the understanding formulated by Yanow and Schwartz-Shea: "research design is about making choices and articulating a rationale for the choices one has made." (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2011, 2)


In the following, I will outline the methodical choices I have made, starting from the distinction between three practices of accessing, generating and analyzing data. In this chapter, I would like to proceed along these lines. In the first section on *accessing sources of data*, I outline how the sampling was carried out in this project. In the next part on *generating data*, my understanding of the nature of interviews is summed up and the characteristics of the episodic interview style used in this research is described in greater detail. I also enumerate the formation conditions of the data I worked with (interview transcripts). The final section on *analyzing data* goes on to explore the process of meaning-making as well as the method of analysis and reflect on the limits and possibilities of the phenomenographic method in the context of this research.

Accessing sources of data: Sampling

What is often simply called 'collecting' data is what I will refer to as 'gaining access to sources of data'. What the difference in terms suggests is a refusal of the image of a laboratory-like situation in which the researchers pick up the data that exists independently of the researcher him*herself. When interpretivists use the term *gaining access* to data, it suggests that before being able to generate data, scientists have to find ways to enter this stage of research. In other words, what is described is a variety of tasks aimed to prepare the data generation: They span from the task to find the 'right' people to talk to, to create a trustful relationship with them, and to develop the skills to deal with the next research step. The word *gaining* access, however, also carries along an additional meaning which points to the constant work on "human relationships that need to be created, fostered, and nurtured in an ongoing fashion over time" (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006a, 116).

This project focuses on those citizens active in the Anti-TTIP protests. It thereby makes citizens the protagonists of the protests and by that of potential political change, too. However, the term must not be misunderstood as *any* people, because the vast majority of people have never been active in protests. There are good reasons to give voice to this group of citizens and not others: As I argued earlier, when asking which role citizens want to play in European politics, it is especially interesting to look at those who emerge in dis-identification with the polity. As conflict theory suggests, conflict is not only part of but also fulfills important functions in our socio-political life (Coser 1964). It would be harmful to ignore those fields of tension as well as the subjects involved: Hurrenkamp et al. diagnose a "steady diet of conflict", (Hurrenkamp, Tonkens, and Duyvendak 2012, 40) and warns that this is dangerous, as conflict is not expected to fade away over time, but rather to aggregate: "It is very likely that once we start to listen to the experiences of the citizens as citizens, even more conflictual topics and criticism will enter the public debate. When listening to the stories that citizens tell, we have to expect that discontent and anger inevitably will be a part of these stories" (Hurrenkamp, Tonkens, and Duyvendak 2012, 41). My sampling was arranged to capture the experiences of this certain kind of citizens. This also means that the choice of the interviewees was made due to their protest experiences, not because their experiences are expected to be representative of a larger population

(Blee and Taylor 2002, 100). I followed two principles of sampling: First, I strived for *completeness* in the meanings of European citizenship by acquiring new interviewees until the topic was saturated. Most of the interviews were conducted during a three-month fieldwork phase, in which I traveled around in Europe with a camping van.



[private screenshot]

I continued to complement the sampling with four additional interviews in the geographically more remote places Madrid (Spain), Athens (Greece), Stockholm (Sweden) and London (UK). The reason was the need to diversify the localities in order to eliminate the risk of limiting the choice of participants to the more 'central' parts of

Europe that were reachable with the van. This brings me to the second principle which is "*similarity and dissimilarity*" (Blee and Taylor 2002, 100; Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002, 100). It means that while I strived to find activists all over Europe, their protest took place under the same institutional actor, the Anti-TTIP movement. While the similarity refers to the involvement in the movement with the common goal to 'Stop TTIP', the differences are potentially endless. However, the locality was expected to be particularly meaningful when it comes to the European dimension which is expected to be experienced in multiple, not universal ways. Manuela Boatcă's work (2010; 2015; 2021) raises awareness for an understanding of Europe as an empty signifier filled with meanings (in forms of narratives, images, experiences, memories, heritages and myths) which are continuously re- and de-constructed. Her concept of 'European multiplicity' aims to describe the variety of ways in which Europe is constructed, perceived and lived by putting special emphasis on the inner-European hierarchies and cleavages of power (Boatcă, Sérgio, and Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2010, 2). Taking these historical and cultural contingencies of the meanings of Europe into account, I was vigilant about the interviewees' geographical contexts. However, it has to be noted that due to the perspective on citizenship as a practice, interviewees were not required to hold the status of EU citizenship, quite the contrary, it made the legal status of those being interviewed irrelevant. This is important to say since, in fact, Anti-TTIP protests were not attended by EU passport holders only and consequently also my sample contained non-EU citizens in a legal sense.

To achieve this maximum-variation sampling, respondents were recruited from different (non-)organizational and local backgrounds as well as through different strategies to gain access. In preparation for the field trip, I used two ways to access these sources of data: First, I called for potential interviewees via facebook groups, because this was one of the main media for the movement's organization (Bauer 2016, 23; Strange 2015, 6). On facebook, local initiatives (called 'Stop TTIP [name of the city]') had been formed in the 'Stop TTIP' protest campaign and were still more or less active even after the end of the negotiations. In fact, the biggest part of participants were recruited by advertising participation in the research project via facebook:



TTIP - Aktionsbündnis - (Wien)



Nora Sophie Schröder

6. Juni 2018 · 🌐



Bist Du gegen TTIP aktiv geworden? Hast Du im Rahmen des Anti-TTIP-Protests europäische Erfahrungen gesammelt?

Dann würde ich Dich gerne kennenlernen!

Diesen Sommer (im Juli, August und September) fahre ich mit meinem Bus durch Europa um Menschen wie Dich zu treffen. Ich möchte mehr über die unterschiedlichen Erfahrungen im Anti-TTIP-Protest lernen und wie diese das Denken und Fühlen über Europa und die Rolle europäische/r BürgerInnen verändert haben.

Egal, ob Du ein/e erfahrene/r AktivistIn oder ein/e engagierte/r BürgerIn bist: wenn Du aktiv in den Anti-TTIP-Protesten beteiligt warst und bereit für ein Gespräch bist, dann melde dich bei mir. Wenn Du mir eine private Nachricht über Facebook schickst, freue ich mich, Dir nähere Details über meine Forschung und das Interview zu geben.

Wenn Du jemanden kennst, der an diesem Aufruf interessiert sein könnte, leite die Anfrage gerne weiter.

Ich freue mich von Dir zu hören! Nora Schröder.



Marius Weinkauff und 1 weitere Person



Gefällt mir



Komentieren




Teilen

[exemplary screenshot, for the full version in both English and German see appendices: Call for Participation; Schröder 2018]

The other part of the interviewees were contacted via so-called "national contact points", extracted from the 'Stop TTIP' alliance's website.²¹ Here, potential interviewees

²¹<http://STOP-TTIP.org/contact-points>

were addressed directly via Email as they were listed as contact persons of their home country:



[exemplary screenshot, for the full version in both English and German see appendices: Email to national contact points; Schröder 2018]

Based on this a priori sampling, I was able to fix appointments with interviewees beforehand and then continue with broadening the sample by using the snowball system during fieldwork. After the interview, every interviewee was invited to name people they know who might also want to talk about their experiences in the Anti-TTIP protests. By that, I was able to contact interviewees in locally and organizationally very diverse settings. The European-wide spread of respondents recruited through the snowball system already indicates the high level of transnational interconnectedness of the movement. It is consciously chosen as an additional approach besides the two others which risk reinforcing certain voices while silencing others. Interviewing is a

delicate process, in which we see questions of power in action: Who has the right to decide who will be included? Who has the right to speak for whom? Those exemplary questions make it clear how science itself is a social practice which cannot be separated from the world it inquires and its respective power structures. This makes interviewing a technique that on the one hand aims to give respondents the power to speak for themselves. On the other hand, socio-political power structures are necessarily mirrored or even reproduced in the interview context. My choice to include the snowball system on site, was informed by a healthy portion of skepticism nourished by such considerations.

Generating data with episodic interviews

We often read about 'findings' based on the 'given data' and the 'evidences' that were 'discovered'. These terms linguistically imply an understanding of data that has to be 'collected', rather than 'created' or 'generated', as interpretive alternative terms suggest. The difference roots in the question if data is considered as 'things given' or as actively constructed, here in the act of interviewing and transcribing. This constructionist approach that I decided to follow is based on the understanding that data is co-generated in the process of research itself. It is a contextualized interplay between the researched and the researcher that eventually co-creates the data that I carried home in the form of audio files, transcripts, notes in my research diary and memories. What follows is that the researcher is not external, but an active creator of the data generated.

Interviews as shared worlds

In the academic community, interviewing is often seen as an easy instrument to collect data (Roulston 2011, 362). Even though or precisely because interviewing is one of the most often used methods to generate data, it remains not seldomly used unreflectively. In other words, its presuppositions and epistemological foundations are often taken for granted. Roulston however warns from underestimating the interview's challenges. It is problematic to provide too little transparency on the epistemological

and methodological considerations that guided this method's choice. Therefore, I will outline in the following which understanding of interviewing was followed and why the interview method is a good fit for this research project.

An interview is understood here as a "guided conversation" (Blee and Taylor 2002, 92), guided by features that structure this specific setting. This setting does not make it an 'unnatural' conversation, however, it follows different modes and rules of communication than those in everyday-life. I understand it as a "subset of talk" (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006a, 117; Alshenqeeti 2014, 42). The aim of the interview is to collect statements about the life-world of the interviewee (Alshenqeeti 2014, 40). These descriptions contain interpretations of the reality experienced by the interviewee, narrated in thoughts, ideas and memories. This perspective stands in sharp contrast to the perspective of 'descriptions' as direct representations of the world which are tried to be captured the most accurately possible. Blee and Taylor differentiate between the goal of those (mostly quantitative) methods, whose goal is to condense the data to see the bigger picture ("data condensers" (Blee and Taylor 2002, 109). On the other hand, other (mostly qualitative) approaches are "data enhancers" (Blee and Taylor 2002, 109) aiming to see new aspects of a research object. This relates to the aim to understand the Anti-TTIP protest actions as an act of citizenship that allows to see new political subjects as citizens emerging.

Following the research question *which citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests and how*, I outlined earlier that I am interested in the meanings given to citizenship by participants of the Anti-TTIP protests. I decided for face-to-face interviews, because direct verbal interaction is needed to reconstruct meanings of citizenship, as they are neither observable nor directly measurable. Therefore, a verbal method had to be chosen in order to grasp the content and structures of meaning. In analyzing verbal utterances, implicit, sometimes unconscious meanings become manifest and therefore understandable for the researcher. The interview allows the researcher to gain way more information by adding the "semantic context of statements" (Blee and Taylor 2002, 94) instead of relying on the official speech of the movement's documents. Blee et al. also refer to the fact that the subjective meaning (making) of their lifeworld and their political action as well as feelings, hopes and associations

become accessible through interviews. Whatever relates to the meaning of citizenship is more easily addressed in interviews, where emotions and feelings of belonging can be articulated. Secondly, the perspectives of the ordinary citizens themselves can better be captured in personal interviews than in documentary sources, in which the most powerful leading figures spread their voice (Blee and Taylor 2002, 93; 94). In comparison to action research on-site, (for an example from the field of protest research, see: Andretta and Della Porta 2014) conducting interviews turned out to be a powerful method for doing this research in the context of the Anti-TTIP protests, as interviews are still possible in retrospect. Interviews via phone or video call was out of question, since I am convinced that for a deep understanding of the field it is essential to enter my interviewee's lifeworld also in a physical sense: "we must set our feet deeply into the geographies and realities" (Lederach 2005, 5). Therefore, I decided to travel with a van that allowed me to explore these lifeworlds with a maximum of flexibility in time and space.

Due to my research interest in the subjective meanings of citizenship, an interview style is needed that helps to capture subjective experiences and reflect upon them. One interview mode which fits well to this aim is the episodic interview, as episodic interviews start from the assumption that there is not the one *single* narration in which the topic can be captured. Instead, it "invites individuals to tell a series of personal stories or experiences from their lives." (Farrimond 2012, 212) Flick describes episodic interviewing as a method for "using people's narratives for collecting social science data" (Flick, 1997: 2). A narrative means for him a series of events in a specific coherent sequence. According to Flick, narrative meaning-making is an active cognitive process of organization (Flick 1997, 3). It starts from the episodic structure of narration, meaning that the plot is organized around one or more events (Viehöver 2014, 78). According to Farrimond, this kind of interviewing acknowledges the "innate narrative" (Farrimond 2012, 212) mode of articulating experiences: Instead of asking for chronological summaries, the interviewer targets key moments freely associated to specific topics of interests. However, the interview is not reduced to concrete examples of situations, but it also explores personal perspectives to more abstract and de-contextualized knowledge linked to concrete biographical experiences. When

asking for those theoretical ideas and concepts such as European citizenship, the question starts from personal stories and explicitly requests to connect both.

Flick points to four important criteria that characterize the episodic interview, namely non-directionality, specificity, range and the focus on situations (Flick 1997, 15). The first one, non-directionality, refers to the rule that the interviewee is supposed to select the situation that was relevant for what the interviewer is asking. Comparing it to the critical incident technique by Flanagan, he outlines the strength of episodic interviewing in the fact that it allows the interviewee to select the episode told to exemplify an experience, not situations fixed in advance (Flick 1997, 14). The second criterion, specificity, can be understood as the need to talk about concrete situations and to avoid drifting off into abstract thoughts and hypotheses. Later, he outlines that the episodic interview aims at contextualizing experiences, rather than de-contextualizing them (Flick 1997, 14). The third one, range, is of special importance in my work, since it describes the disclosure of varieties of experiences due to the fact that the experience is picked by the interviewee him*herself. He thereby underlines the wide range of possible experiences of importance which may "focus not only problematic situations, but also positive, surprising, satisfying etc. situations" (Flick 1997, 15). The last criterion Flick lists is the focus on situations, where the personal context is seen as the starting point of all narration in the interview: Flick wants to "give space to the interviewee's subjectivities and interpretative feats in the principle of situational narratives" (Flick 1997, 14). The focus on situations differs from the narrative interview in the important detail that in the episodic interview the units of narration are supposed to be much smaller. Compared to the extensive amount of narrative data resulting from the narrative interview, the "small scale situation based narratives" (Flick 1997, 17) of the episodic interview are only one type of data to be conducted. The second type is argumentative data, in which concepts are outlined and semantic knowledge is articulated (Flick 1997, 17).

Flick lists nine phases of the episodic interview (Flick 1997, 5) which I do not adopt one-by-one in my research. However, the structure helps to gain some orientation in this interview mode, by formulating questions and developing an interview guide. My interview guide consisted of a number of questions to capture the respondents' way of

experiencing the phenomena under study. My main interest was: Which experiences (of citizenship) did you make when participating in the Anti-TTIP protest? I will briefly outline the structure as well as the questions of the interview guide (for the full version, see appendices: interview guide; Schröder 2018). In the beginning of every interview, I explained the research project in general terms and opened up for questions concerning me, the project and the method. Also, I was transparent about the style of the interview since the episodic questions ("Can you tell me about a situation when..." / "Was there a moment when...") might otherwise be confusing. Next, the episodic technique was explained before every interview, to give the interviewees an idea of what to expect by saying: *"I would like to talk to you about your personal experiences of your participation in the Anti-TTIP-protests. I'll ask you lots of times, can you tell me about a situation, story or experience related to your participation in the protests. OK?"* While Flick points to the potential problem to explain the interview style and make the interviewee accept the episodic structure of talking (Flick, 1997: 18), I rather experienced it as a relief for the interviewee to be asked to talk more about personal experiences than about an abstract topic.

In the beginning of the interview, the first experience with the subject of interest (here: the Anti-TTIP-protests) suits well. Therefore, I always started with a narrative impulse: *"Let's start from the very beginning. What led to your involvement against TTIP? Can you please tell me about this situation?"* followed by a first question on the range of actions against TTIP the interviewee was involved in: *"What kind of action did you take against TTIP? Can you give me some examples?"* On an abstract level, interviewees were asked to give a subjective definition of the research subject and to tell corresponding situations. Most central in the interview was the topic of European citizenship, therefore I was asking for more concrete and personally embedded understandings of European citizenship: *"What did it mean for you to be a European citizen during the protests? Do you have an example of a situation when being a European citizen played a part?"* as well as *"Do these experiences you mentioned change your understanding of being a European citizen? Can you think of a situation that illustrates this change?"*

I tried to clarify the role as well as the ascribed meaning of the research subject for the interview partner. To get an idea about the respective relevance of protest experiences, the interviewee was asked to tell a meaningful experience during the protests: *"If you*

have to think about one concrete experience in the Anti-TTIP Protests, which was the most meaningful to you? Why?" I asked my interviewees for the most meaningful protest experience, knowing that "it is the interviewee's subjective relevance" (Flick, 1997: 7) that aims to be revealed by this question.

The interviewee is asked to outline personal relationship to the central aspects of the research subject, such as his/her feelings when the ECI was rejected: *"You mentioned the "European citizenship initiative". How would you describe your feelings when the European Citizens' Initiative was rejected by the European Commission? Please tell me about this moment."* Also, one of the last questions would address the reflection of one's participation in the movement in retrospect: *"What does it mean to you today that you were engaged in the protests against TTIP?"* The next question points to the potential in questions that tackle future prospects: *Could you give me an example of how these experiences affect your life today and in the future?"*

Closely connected are questions to describe his/her subjective view to general aspects of the research subject such as towards the "Europeanness" of the Anti-TTIP-protest: *"You mentioned "Europe". If you think back to your involvement, in which ways did you experience your participation against TTIP as European? Can you tell me about a specific situation which makes this clear for me?"* Since I am interested in potential of European protests, I asked my interviewee to assess constructive and destructive conditions which *"In your opinion, [...] made this experience possible, strengthened it / made impossible, weakened? Could you please think about a concrete example to illustrate this for me?"*

I gave the interviewee option to end the interview when s/he thinks that everything important has been said. At the end of each interview I was asking the interviewee if s/he wants to add something to what has been said so far (Flick, 1997: 11): *Before we finish, is there anything you would like to add that you haven't already mentioned?*

Generally speaking, the questions in the interview were directed in two ways: On the one hand, I was "elaborating the interviewees personal relation to its central issue" (Flick 1997, 9) on the other, I was investigating more general topics (such as the meaning of (European) citizenship (see appendices: interview guide; Schröder 2018, Q5) or potentials and conditions for (European) activism (see appendices: interview guide; Schröder 2018, Q8)) by asking the interviewee's opinion on it (Flick 1997, 10). In

order to get prepared for the interviews, two pilot interviews were conducted and the written transcripts of both interviews were provisionally analyzed in order to adapt the questions to fit the purpose as well as to ensure my confidence in interviewing as a practice. After every interview, I constantly re-checked all questions of the original interview guide to see whether the questions are impulses for beneficial results.

Other than the careful preparation of the interview guide suggests, I ended up following a less structured interview style. While the aforementioned questions were formulated in advance, they were not necessarily posed identically or in the same order. Rather than speaking of an 'unstructured' interview, the structure is here defined by other factors than the interview guide. In the same vein, the interview cannot be called 'open-ended', as I directed the conversation in a purposive way regarding the research question. To put it differently: "the curiosity to know is what drives the conversation" (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006a, 219). I followed a mode of interviewing which is best described as 'conversational' and characterized by a discursive exchange in the communication. A conversational interview can be defined as "an exchange with a focused listener who is eager to devote the time to hear the respondent's views" (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006a, 218). This being said, while giving them the freedom to express their perspectives, I also tried to be as transparent as possible regarding my main interests (exemplary see: Interviewee 23 2018). In the same vein, I also punctually shared preliminary hypotheses that generated from my interview experiences (exemplary see: Interviewee 23 2018; Interviewee 9 2018; Interviewee 6 2018; Interviewee 24 2018). It turned out that the interviewees' spontaneous reactions to this created important feedback for further considerations.

This means that most questions were raised spontaneously in the interview situation depending on the topics that the interviewees brought up themselves. The structure of the interviews developed from the description of experiences of political engagement identified by the participants themselves. I used minimal prompting to give the interviewees as much room to express their points of view as possible (Marton 1986, 153; Bowden 2000, 8). This implies that I made sure that no ideas were introduced in the interview unless the participant had already expressed them, as the episodic interview focuses on self-chosen topics in the context of their experiences. Consequently, in the episodic framework the order of questions is not important (for a

counter argument see: Blee and Taylor 2002, 99). I experienced that flexibility is key: What the interviewee is stressing is expected as what s*he experienced as the most meaningful. Recurring and emphasized topics that the interviewee advocates gave me precious information about the personal evaluation of certain experiences. To be transparent, in preparation of the fieldwork I defined the interest of study, European citizenship, and identified concepts central to the research question, such as political subjectivation, Europe, political participation. However, these aspects were considered as limited sketches of the research topic and therefore used as not more than just guiding lines. During the interviews, I was in an attitude of curiosity about what else was there to be discovered.

While for example the first question: "What led to your involvement against TTIP? Can you please tell me about this situation?" (see appendices: interview guide; Schröder 2018, Q1) stayed more or less the same in all of the interviews, the question: "What did it mean for you to be a European citizen during the protests? Do you have an example of a situation when being a European citizen played a part?" (see appendices: interview guide; Schröder 2018, Q5) turned out to be too abstract. Through this question, the interviewee was asked to narratively (re-)construct his/her understanding of European citizenship. I experienced that most people have a limited or no clear understanding of what (European) citizenship means to him/her and therefore had difficulties to describe it and I realized that the answers turned out to be empty in content. As I outlined in greater detail in the last chapter, it proofed right that 'citizenship' is not the term in which protesters would frame their actions. Therefore, I encouraged the interviewees to talk about experiences in their civic engagement in the Anti-TTIP protests. These experiences were analyzed regarding the meanings of (European) citizenship. This narrative approach is based on the idea that, in a narrative act, the subject organizes his*her experiences in his*her own way according to what was important for him*her. Narratives "explicate actions in relation to the webs of beliefs of the actors" (Bevir 2006, 287). By that, I encouraged the interviewees to articulate their role as a European citizen in the Anti-TTIP protests and the meanings given to it. Interviews were audio recorded and took between 60-90 minutes. This turned out to be a good length to find the balance between repetition and deep understanding, between

my curiosity and the interviewees' amount of time and energy as well as between the creation of trust and the possible attention span.

Research ethics and epistemic power

As mentioned before, interviewing is a delicate process, in which we see multiple dimensions of power in action: Who has the right to ask what? Who has the right and who has the obligation to answer? Who has the right to decide who will be asked? Who has the right to speak for whom? Those exemplary questions make clear how doing and participating in interview research itself is a social and also a very powerful practice. It cannot be separated from the world it inquires and its respective power structures. This makes interviewing a technique that, on the one hand, aims to give respondents the possibility to speak for themselves. On the other hand, socio-political power structures are necessarily mirrored and possibly reproduced in the interview context. Following the concept of epistemic power, (Brunner 2017) it is important to reflect on powerful or powerless behavior and the hierarchies I experienced and reproduced. Besides other things, such power relations can depend on aspects like age, gender, experiences, nationality as well as (and in this specific context most likely) profession: In the research interview, the researcher is in a powerful position due to the fact that s*he is 'guiding' the interview process, asking questions and thereby putting limits to the (non-)sayable, starting as well as ending the interview. As Riley et al. point out, however, the researcher is not necessarily *always* in a powerful position (Riley, Schouten, and Cahill 2003). Several experiences with my interviewees haven't proven this right, for example when I was invited to the interviewee's home. In retrospect, I consider this as one of the most interesting experiences as it flexibilized the power structures at work. For example, the interviewees were asking me, the researcher, about my opinion or interpretations of a certain phenomenon which signals a very natural 'conservational' mode of communication on eye-level.

Despite these positive experiences, I am very aware that I cannot diminish power structures which arise from different subject positions. What becomes apparent here is that to co-create knowledge with the people involved is based on the idea of delimiting hierarchies, not difference. However, I do think that I can create a context in

which those asymmetries become insightful rather than destructive. What is the first step however, is to reflect a priori upon possible power mechanisms at work and consciously create contexts that allow asymmetries to become a creative force in the interview situation. Although there is no general way out, there are context-sensitive ways to deal with it. As noted above, every interview situation comes with specific (power) structures inscribed in this kind of interaction. Informed and sensitized by questions of research ethics, I took measures to balance out power asymmetries by shifting epistemic power to the researched. However, this should not be misunderstood as a co-researcher approach like in participatory or action research (Bradbury and Reason 2003; 2008; von Unger 2014) which allows the researched to actively participate in the collaborative research of practice-relevant phenomena. While the interviewees were not included in the joint creation of new knowledge (f. ex. through the collective interpretation of the data), I decided to give the interviewees involved in the project the possibility to engage in several ways that I will outline in the following.

The relation between me and the interviewees can be understood as a "conversational partnership" (Ashworth and Lucas 2000, 302), as I supported and followed the interviewees' reflection and memorization of their experiences in the Anti-TTIP protests. The research participants were invited to unfold the way they see the world (here: the way they experienced the Anti-TTIP protests) guided by an empathetic vis-a-vis. I understand empathy as the "intentional embracing of the other's meaning" (Yanow 2006, 22) which also decenters the role of the researcher. As active listeners, interviewers support the interviewees' reflection on their own ideas which become alive by putting them into words. In this narrative act, as the interviewee organizes his*her experiences, the interview situation triggers a series of reflections and reasoning concerning the meaning of these protest experiences.

One decision that resulted from this reasoning to shift more power towards the interviewee was the episodic interview style (Flick 2011; 1996). Against the background of a power-sensible and empowering agenda, interviewees are only asked to elaborate on something they have brought up on their own. This is meant to give (epistemic) power (back) to the interviewees, since they decide which topics to bring up in the interview, depending on what they consider as meaningful. Another decision

was to use a technique called “informant feedback” or “member checks” (Schwartz-Shea 2006, 104; Cherry 2005, 59; Riley, Schouten, and Cahill 2003), in which the researched check if what the researcher means to have understood is right. This choice was informed by the understanding that I explore the interviewees’ personal terminologies and the meanings associated with it. Thereby, I am in the role of a lay eager to understand, while the interviewee is considered the expert²² of his*her life. What follows is that a so-called ‘informed consent’, by which the interviewee agrees to the use of the data generated, should be more than just a formal act. As the interview as well as the analysis of the data is in constant flux, the participant’s consent can only be seriously ‘informed’ when staying in contact with participants throughout the research process and including them in the discussion of the research outcomes (Klesse 2007, 46). Therefore, I used this technique in several stages of the research process: Besides the formal approval for the recording and use of the data before the interview, I also doublechecked if I understood correctly what they said during the interview. This not only gave the researched the possibility to correct my understanding right away, but it also helps to change the asymmetric relationship that typically exists between researchers and researched (typically characterized by a power imbalance towards the researcher) and tries to overcome these conventional roles.

After the interview, I forwarded the respective interview transcript as well as the first draft of my findings to every interviewee and asked them for feedback. This goes beyond Flick’s suggestion to give back the transcripts to the interviewees in order to create some transparency (Flick 1997, 22). I did not only ask the respondents to consent or to disagree with the data generated (e.i. the interview transcript) but also, if needed, to veto my interpretations of it. My experiences ranged from very concrete feedback (e.g. to blacken certain parts of the interview) to no reaction at all. The feedback on my findings further informed my understanding of their reading of it as well as their specific focus which gives me additional information about the way they understand themselves and their protest actions. They also feedbacked how they experienced the interview, namely: as a space to reflect, share and express deep understandings and meaningful experiences during their Anti-TTIP engagement. This

²² on the problematic distinction of lay and expert in a classical sense see: Bolam (2003)

also had positive effects on the interaction and exchange between the political and the academic field as some interviewees decided to circulate the short summary of my findings in their circles.

Even if all phases of the research are pervaded by reflexive moments, in the interview itself there is little capacity to enter into an abstract reflexive mode. This comes only later: In the analysis of the transcripts, I created the code "challenging interview situations" to capture moments when something challenging happened in the interview. The code is nourished by the memories of that situation as well as of the re-reading of the transcript. The decision to reflect upon these situations results from my conviction that an interview is always a co-constructed setting and thereby underlies uncertainties as well as interactive dynamics. The social, lively and unforeseeable interaction between equally involved partners is what brings about the collective co-creation of knowledge. Jensen et al. stresses that seemingly irrelevant or unsuccessful interview passages often reveal particularly meaningful information about the phenomenon to be investigated (Jensen and Welzer 2003, 7). What is perceived as 'challenging', is, just like the question what is 'harmful' or what is a 'sensitive' topic, a very personal question and cannot be answered a priori (Klesse 2007, 47; von Unger, Narimani, and M'Bayo 2014, 3). The decision to mark such 'challenging interview situations' in the transcript and by that to acknowledge and draw attention to the extraordinary is the starting point to reflect upon them. Researchers have to observe the "connections and disconnections that arise in this intimate setting" (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006a, 118). Analyzing such situations was therefore a conscious confrontation with this level of experience which is otherwise running unconsciously and not specifically addressed in the analysis.

To close, I will briefly mention some of the useful techniques to reflect upon such situations that I used in this research: After the interview, Flick proposes to write what he calls a "context protocol" (Flick 1997, 11) in which basic information about the interviewee and impressions of the interview shall be noted. I decided against this rather shallow technique and used written and verbal memos directly after the interview, as well as a research diary and creative methods (drawing) to report my impressions during the fieldwork phase. Directly after the interviews, I made memos partly in written form, but mostly by recording audio files. In those memos, I captured

my initial feelings, reflections and considerations. In the research diary, I elaborated on them and took a closer look at the general interview situation. Since I used the research diary after a lapse of time, the character of the reflections would differ in depth and distance. As there was always something in the interview which was impossible to put into words, I also used more creative ways to express my observations (in drawings). Little has been said about how it can be used constructively in the research process, but for me, creatively expressing these aspects of the interview situation helped me to reflect on those aspects of my memories. It has to be noted that the infinitive process of reflection is always only punctually interrupted by these techniques due to the need to fix (preliminary) results. Therefore, I see this chapter as a necessarily unfinished reflection about the researcher-researched relationships in this research project. It is also a vigorous call that the (inter-)subjective character of the research is not to be diminished, as positivist methodologies suggest, but can become a constitutive and valuable component of the meaning-making process - *if* it is carefully reflected and purposefully analyzed.

Transcripts as reconstructions, not representations of speech

While the positivist idea of ready-made data implies that it simply has to be carried home from the 'field', in qualitative research the primary data, here: the interviews, are left at their origin, while qualitative researchers are conscious of the fact that what is carried home is a (limited) representation of it: the audio file that will eventually be transcribed into transcripts. This also makes clear that the basis of the analysis is not the primary data, but only a rather small part of it (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006c, xviii).

Using the symbol of a photograph, Mishler (2003) argues that the connection between what we experience as interview 'reality' and the transcripts we make of it is not just natural, but also constructed: "transcripts are our constructions and making them is one of our central research practices" (2003, 317). Therefore, I find it important to share, albeit briefly, how the transcripts of the interviews were constructed. Ideally, the transcription should be done personally by the researcher him*herself to get familiar with the data (Askerlind 2005b, 116). In my case this was not possible, so most of the

transcriptions were done by an assistant trained to transcribe the audio according to my needs. The main agreements were twofold: First, to transcribe only some parts of the interview. It seems noteworthy that instead of selecting relevant parts to transcribe, I excluded some parts from the transcription. The reason is that the conversational interview mode and its unpredictable outcomes brings about new paths of the conversation of which some must retrospectively be considered off-topic. The second agreement concerned the level of exactness in transcription. Unlike for a linguistically-based analysis, there was no need for a transcription that included so-called "non-words" (like 'ähm', 'uh', breathing, laughter and silence). Therefore, I decided for a transcription mode that follows content and comprehensibility and therefore left out partial and mispronounced words as well as non-words. The final transcription was edited afterwards in order to complete it, as some parts were easier to understand with some background knowledge.

Analyzing data

What is often called 'data analysis' is here referred to as the practice of 'analyzing data', so "more verb than noun" (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006b, 203). This is meant to underline the iterative character of the meaning-making processes. Looking at the topic of meaning-making in the analysis and the process of data analysis, this section aims to highlight how the process of analyzing data was structured in this research.

Meaning-making in the analysis

Interpretative scientists can be understood as allies of the interviewees in understanding what is meaningful to them: "a human (or social) science needs to be able to address what is meaningful to people in the social situation under study. It is this focus on meaning, and the implication of that focus, that the various interpretative methods share." (Yanow 2006, 9) In the analysis, evidence is not seen as something preexisting in the material world, but it is rather a product of acts of sense-making (Yanow 2006, 9). Why can we understand each other at all, then? The interpretive answer is that as individuals we are also part of communities, with which we share

certain experiences, context knowledge and life worlds. In those communities, collective meanings are (re-)produced and serve as a pool of reference points by which the individual's meaning-making processes are shaped. The shared material, such as language, traditions, memories and practices or even more basic experiences that all humans share, provide the context in which individual meaning-making takes place. While the possibility of mutual understanding, it is not a given, but again a co-generated result of human interaction. Most importantly, through communication (Knoblauch 2004, 5).

If we consider interviewing as "a process of co-creation of meaning" (Stelter 2010, 864), the definition of meaning is of central importance: It results from the "experiential, embodied involvement in the issues of the research interview" (Stelter 2010, 859) when the interviewee makes sense of his*her behavior, feelings and thoughts. It is therefore related strongly to the question "how the participant interprets and understands a given situation" (Stelter 2010, 861). Stelter defines 'meaning' as a contextualized, narrative restructuring of experiences of past, present and future (Stelter 2010, 861). The temporal dimension underlines that experiences itself are not unbounded to previous experiences as well as one's embeddedness to former (historical) events and history. Experiences are then the result of a complex and half-conscious negotiation and construction process.

Most importantly, Dewey (1997 [orig. 1916]) makes us aware of the fact that mere activity is not automatically experience. Experiences can then be understood as the reflexion of practices, here triggered by and articulated in the interview. It is when thought and action connect that they create experience: What connects the two poles is what Dewey calls 'intelligent action' (see also: Saltmarsh 1996, 18; Linder and Marshall 2003, 272). It means to make sense of our experiences and a precondition for this reflection is to formulate them. The reason is that reflection processes continue and often consolidate only in retrospect when experiences are organized narratively. I claim that such processes of reflection and self-positioning are triggered - also - during interviews. The interview is a crucial moment for the (re-)construction of those experiences, as they come into being in their linguistic and narrative arrangement. Flick underlines that experiences do not have a narrative structure per se, also they do not have *one single* narrative structure, instead, experiences are reconstructed by telling

them as a story (Flick 1997, 3). For example in the interview situation, the interviewee creates "narratives about themselves and events in their world" (Stelter 2010, 861). Such narrative constructions are the "continuous interpretative process" (Stelter 2010, 861) that forms one's personal reality in the very moment of the interview. Consequently, the knowledge creation that takes place in this setting is not replicable; it is jointly created in this very moment and setting.

What follows is that the interviewee's autobiographical narratives are itself results of a construction process which is expected to take place (also) in the interview: This is a "prospective, retrospective and situative self-construction which was to take place interactively during the interview" (Kraus 2000, para.8). The narrative structure is an important aspect of the construction process, as the narrative reconstruction of such protest practices stabilizes subjective drafts of one's experiences. I argue that such narratives play a significant role in the process of meaning-making as they can be analyzed as indicators of meaningful aspects of the experiences in protest. In other words: Interviewees will tell neither *any* nor *all* experiences they had, but a *contingent selection* of the most meaningful ones. Asking about the experiences made in the Anti-TTIP protests therefore prepares the ground to reconstruct meaningful aspects for the subjects that impact on their understanding of European citizenship.

All experiences are based on individual perceptions which are in turn structured by meaning-making processes. Therefore, the narration is a conglomerate of meaningful aspects of their civic experiences from a radically subjective perspective. This must be regarded as a conscious choice to circumvent the reproduction of a predefined canon of citizenship understandings. To make this even more clear: It is not about the 'realness' of their experiences, as this research is also not concerned with the 'realness' of the world experienced, but about the meaning that is given to it. Coming back to the Thomas-theorem, believing in its 'realness' is what is expected to influence our actions and behavior (Thomas and Thomas 1928; see also: Marton 1981, 178). Being interested in human meaning-making also means to have "a recognition of and sensitivity to the ambiguities of human experience" (Schwartz-Shea 2006, 92). As body and mind are connected in experience, they are the result of a complex and half-conscious negotiation and construction process which is expected to produce ambiguities and a variety of unexpected meanings. In the context of this work, it must

be regarded as a strength that the interpretive method is “studying situations in which the meanings of words and deeds are not or are not likely to be congruent” (Yanow 2006, 19).

This is not least due to the fact that experiences are not the pure reconstruction of information, but they are also always connected to emotions - in fact, they become meaningful only by this connection to the affective level. The liberal perspective, which is still dominant in most discourses on citizenship, sees the citizens follow their interest in making rational choices (Dahlgren 2006b, 268). But many authors have pointed to the fact that political participation is as much a rational act as it is a passionate and emotional act (Dahlgren 2006a, 26; 2007; Mouffe 2000; Sassen 2002, 281; Samaddar 2010, 139; Harju 2007, 94; Marcus 2002; Bargetz and Freudenschuss 2012, 108; Hsu 2008, 252). Experiences include the immanently lived perception (which in German is called 'Erleben') as well as the experiential comprehension of self and situation (the German 'Erfahren') which results from interpretative reflections based on one's specific positionality (Stelter 2010, 863). Based on this two-dimensional concept of experiences, we can assume that body experiences are closely connected to the cognitive processing of the experience and even precede them. I therefore explore in the episodic interview two kinds of knowledge: Flick distinguishes between the *episodic* knowledge as concrete, situational and contextualized and the *semantic* knowledge as abstract, generalized and decontextualized (Flick 1997, 4). By giving meaning to these two dimensions of experiences, a personal reality is constructed.

Borrowing from the phenomenographic method of analysis

It has previously been argued that dominant approaches to citizenship tend to rely on exclusive categories which can obscure other aspects of the concept that fall outside of established, theoretical frameworks. This epistemic limitation can restrict the potential to rethink citizenship. It's worth noting that a deductive approach can be useful for testing and refining existing theories, but it may be less effective at generating new insights or uncovering unexpected patterns in the data. In contrast, the inductive approach, which starts with the data and allows the theoretical insights to emerge from the analysis of the data, may be more effective at generating new

insights and uncovering unexpected patterns. In short, this means that to rethink European citizenship, one has to start by inductively exploring the different ways in which individuals experience themselves while participating in protest actions. By examining the data on these experiences without preconceived ideas about what counts as meaningful or relevant, researchers can capture the diversity of ways in which citizens express their political subjectivity as a citizen. The Enacted Citizenship approach seeks to overcome this limitation by post-defining subjects with claims as citizens, based on their actions and practices. It starts from the premise that civic performance, such as protest action, can translate subject positions as citizens into political behavior and can therefore be analyzed as such. Therefore, the theoretical lens of 'acts of citizenship' proposed by Engin Isin will be used to answer the question of whether these (various experiences in) protest actions can be considered acts of citizenship. This theory suggests that individuals engage in a variety of political and civic activities to express and perform their citizenship. By analyzing the experiences of the Anti-TTIP protest actions through this lens, one can not only examine the ways in which these actions might be considered acts of citizenship, but also gain a deeper understanding of the meaning of European citizenship from the perspective of the citizens.

Therefore, this research proceeded in two steps: First, I explored the data without having theoretical presumptions about citizenship that restrict the multiplicity of meanings ascribed to European citizenship by the citizens themselves. This means that the answer to the question what European citizenship means for the citizens themselves did not precede the research, but it will be the result of it. When starting from the meaning-making processes of the citizens themselves, the phenomenographic approach allows to explore the data in a way that allows for the the multiplicity of meanings ascribed to European citizenship by the citizens themselves. Second, I identified acts of citizenship based on the theoretical criteria that the Enacted Citizenship approach provides: In short, the Anti-TTIP protests can be considered an act of citizenship if the protesters involved enact claims for justice and demand rights that go beyond their personal interests as they responsiblize on behalf of others in their activism. Thereby, they create a rupture with the dominant practices or understandings of citizenship and display a subject position that might otherwise

remain invisible. This two-step approach must be regarded as a conscious methodological choice that is aware of the fact that by pre-defining these action as (acts of) citizenship we decide what counts as meaningful and relevant and what does not. Post-defining the term inductively however, enables to capture the dimensions of meaning of European citizenship from the perspective of the interviewees. It takes into account and values that there is a great diversity of how citizens express their political subjectivity as a citizen and it relies on the presumption that the interviewees are able and willing to make sense of it.

One of the most widely used ways to inductively analyze data in a qualitative way is grounded theory (Strauss and Glaser 1967). However, my method of data analysis is inspired by phenomenography which is not completely different from, however also not congruent with grounded theory (for a comparison see: Kinnunen and Simon 2012, 213). While there are some overlaps between the two, this method, called phenomenography²³, fits more explicitly my research objectives, since it is designed to explore how people make sense of their experiences.²⁴ Experiences are seen as the relation between an object and the subject that experiences them (Marton 1994, 30). Therefore, phenomenographic research does neither focus on the object nor the subject, but on the relation of the two. Phenomenography is, just like grounded theory, a qualitative empirical research framework. Phenomenography aims to explore the descriptions of the ways in which people experience specific phenomena (Marton 1981, 177).

It seems an appropriate way to answer the research question relating to the ways in which Anti-TTIP protesters enact a certain kind of citizenship in action. First, because I do not seek to gather a complete understanding of the experiences of single individuals; instead, phenomenographic analysis focuses on identifying the

²³ Despite the similarity of the names, phenomenography is not to be misunderstood as a branch of phenomenology (Marton 1981, 180f.) Originating from educational sciences' aim to understand the processes happening when experiencing a phenomenon, it rests epistemologically and methodologically on different grounds (Marton 1986, 154) While for both, experience is central to their methodology, phenomenography is about the different ways to understand and experience a phenomenon. Phenomenologists are only peripherally interested in this while striving for an understanding of the 'essence' of the phenomena reconstructed from experiences. This 'essence' can be understood as the objects of experiences. This means that phenomenologists are striving to reconstruct the world as it is experienced (Knoblauch 2004, 3) Phenomenography instead, it interested in the experiences of the world as primary focus.

²⁴ For an differentiation on different strains of phenomenography see D'all Alba (2000)

qualitatively different and similar ways in which a phenomenon is experienced by a group of people (Askerlind 2005b, 118). Secondly, the outcome of the analysis is not a theory, but the descriptive presentation of the different ways to experience the phenomenon (here: the enactment of citizenship in the Anti-TTIP protests) on a collective level. This approach enables me to build a sense of how (potentially different) the participants in the Anti-TTIP-movement experienced their participation in the Anti-TTIP protests. The result of this phenomenographic study are so-called 'categories of description' which describe the respondents' differences and similarities in which they experience citizenship (Marton 1981, 196; Askerlind, Bowden, and Green 2005, 82; Cherry 2005, 57). Thirdly, the approach is especially useful to learn about new ways of seeing European citizenship, as it is sensitive to the individuality of experiences, in the sense that people experience phenomena in a variety of ways, without seeking to record every possible way of experiencing the phenomenon under analysis (Cherry 2005, 58; Askerlind 2005a, 63).

Realizing the danger of mechanisms and practices to marginalize alternative knowledge as well as the potential of the different ways of being a European citizen, phenomenography became an appropriate methodological choice in the context of my research. Forth, it values the subjective meaning-making by looking at the ways of experiencing phenomena from the perspectives of the people experiencing them: "Just as the botanist finds and classifies previously undiscovered species of plants, phenomenographer must discover and classify previously unspecified ways in which people think about certain aspects of reality" (Marton 1988, 146; see also: 1981, 189). The diverse range of experiences and unique perspectives on a phenomenon can be regarded as a powerful way of seeing the different kinds of experiences that were made by the citizens. The varied experiences of citizens, in turn, can serve as supportive factors in becoming influential modes of action as European citizens: The 'powerful way of seeing' can promote 'powerful ways of acting' as European citizens.

Let me briefly outline the main steps in the analytic procedure of phenomenographic coding. As Zhao states in comparison to Grounded Theory: "Researchers who base their study on grounded theory can find a relatively clear step-by-step guideline to analyze the data and build their theory and model, whereas there are no detailed instructions in the phenomenographic approach." (Zhao 2016, 116) I consciously

borrowed some parts from the phenomenographic method and not others depending on what suits best my research interest. The gathered data is understood by phenomenographers as contextualized and shaped by the specific conditions under which it was created: "The set of transcripts as a whole represents a snapshot of the ways of experiencing the phenomenon by a particular group of people at a particular time and in response to a particular situation." (Askerlind, Bowden, and Green 2005, 81)

I started by uploading all interview transcripts into MAXQDA, a coding program, in which I inductively created codes and subcodes while reading through the transcripts separately (Marton 1988, 153). The first step of phenomenographic coding is therefore comparable to open coding in grounded theory, in which the complete transcript is structured into codes after a first read of the full transcript with complete openness. As I am conscious of the fact that I as a researcher decided which utterance is assigned to which (sub-)code and reflected this powerful analytical practice, I understand the analysis of the transcripts as an ongoing process which goes back and forth between opening and closing interpretations. These interpretations arise from the iterative analysis process between "*coding, categorizing and analyzing*" (Blee and Taylor 2002, 111). I did not make use of predetermined coding categories, but I developed a focus on aspects central to my research question and aligned with the enactment approach. More precisely, I purposefully identified patterns in how the protests were experienced by the interviewee. I looked at which personal experiences are narrated and which relative importance is given to them. In doing so, I identified ways in which their actions are experienced and claims are enacted. In this first phase of data analysis, such key aspects in each interview were identified and coded.

Naturally, when constructing the codes inductively from the interviewees' meaning-making, the list of codes was growing while I worked myself through the total of thirty transcripts. Therefore, in a second reading, I went through all the transcripts again and added codes or subcodes to single utterances that had not been existing when going through it for the first time (Marton 1988, 154). The transcripts touched upon very different topics, because the interviews were influenced by their local and situational contexts of this specific setting which shifted the interviews in different directions. The sum of codes occur from the dialogues with the people I talked to, but not all of the codes can be retrieved in the single transcripts. The second step tackles

the so-called 'pool of meaning' which is the sum of all utterances (codings): In this third reading, I started with the codes and read all the codings connected to it. Creating subcodes helped me to organize the diverse utterances connected to the theme (the code). This was important to refine the codes by deleting or relocating unsuitable codings in order to have a preliminary definition of the code as explicit as possible. Also, I was able to define relations between the code and its subcodes, amongst the subcodes as well as between the specific subcodes and other (sub)codes.

At this point, I departed from phenomenography, as I started to organize the codes according to my research interest that asks which citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests and how. In this last step, I integrated the theoretical perspective of Enacted Citizenship into the analysis. During the coding process, my goal was to make sure that data is not being forced into predetermined theoretical categories. Rather, the intention was to use data to inform the creation of categories that might subsequently be connected to the idea of Enacted Citizenship. As a result, when I started coding the data, I didn't explicitly search for proofs of Enacted Citizenship; instead, I concentrated on the participant's statements, behaviors, and experiences as they organically appeared in the data. It was only this last step, when I looked at them again through the theoretical lens of Enacted Citizenship.

The rationale was to identify if the Anti-TTIP protests are an act of citizenship. Through a process of re-reading, codes with similar content were grouped together and eventually condensed in the results of the analysis of the Anti-TTIP protests. This process was not a linear one, but rather a repetitive oscillation between the utterances, the research question and the insightful strings that connect the two. Data that didn't align with the Enacted Citizenship approach was nevertheless incorporated in the findings if it provided an answer to the research question. Most importantly, this includes the in-depth analysis of the process of political subjectivation, which allows to answer the second part of the research question "and how?". The Enacted Citizenship approach doesn't provide a detailed theoretical framework about how individuals become political subjects. Isin merely claims that this happens when they take on responsibility for matters greater than their personal interest.²⁵ Going beyond this oversimplifying claim, I delineate the distinct phases of this process of

²⁵ see chapter "The Enacted Citizenship Approach" 89 ff.

responsibilization. Guided by the Enacted Citizenship approach's criteria for an action to be an act of citizenship, the next chapter will provide answers to the research question *which* citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests and *how*.

Presentation of findings: In search of the Troublemakers

In the previous chapters, I outlined this research's relevance and interest in the enactment of European citizenship in the Anti-TTIP protests as well as how I went about accessing, gathering and analyzing the data to investigate this topic. This chapter intends to disclose what the gathered data looks like and how to make sense of it. In this study, I set out to explore the perspectives of citizens on their activism in the Anti-TTIP protests. In order to best capture and convey the nuances of their experiences and viewpoints, I chose to present the findings in a way that allows the reader to enter into the lifeworld and perspectives of the interviewees. By presenting the data in this way, I aim to facilitate a deep understanding of the citizens' perspectives and the factors that shape them. Through this approach, I hope to offer a more nuanced and empathetic understanding of the issue at hand. To investigate the activists' meaning given to the citizenship enacted, I start from the experiences the interviewees made in the Anti-TTIP protests. Following the Enacted Citizenship approach (Isin 2002; 2007; 2009; 2012; Isin and Saward 2013; Isin and Nielsen 2015; Isin 2017), I reconstruct if and how acts of citizenship bring about political subjects as citizens, and, in the context of transnational protest action, specifically as European citizens.

To answer the open question if the Anti-TTIP protests are an act of citizenship, in the first step, the focus will be on the actions and bodies and the question if they are acts that constitute political subjects as claimants of rights (i.e. citizens). I will be starting with the analysis of the rejection of the European Citizen Initiative (ECI), which stands paradigmatically for the formation of the Anti-TTIP protests as an act of citizenship. It created a central turning point (or a "rupture" in Isin's words (Isin 2013, 24)) as it brought to the fore the central claim that literally 'moved' the activists in the protests: They claim for a democratization of European politics and a new role of citizens within it. It will therefore be studied at the very beginning of this chapter.

The subsequent three-fold structure of this chapter follows the research interest by repeating the title-giving *Enacting European citizenship*, when it asks: Which *citizenship* is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protest? How does the process of *enacting* citizenship bring

about subjects with claims? And what meaning is given to the *European* scope of their activism? It thus reconstructs three interrelated, but separately analyzed, focal points of this research: 1) the claims for a certain kind of citizenship, which answers the first question 2) the process of political subjectivation, which answers the second question 3) and the European scale of their activism, which answers the third question. The findings show that and how the interviewees performed an act of citizenship and moreover indicate three main characteristics of the kind of citizenship that these 'Troublemakers' assert and possess in their enactment, namely an activist, responsible and EU-critical citizenship. In the last part of the chapter, I discuss those findings and highlight their inherent potential.

The rejection of the European Citizen Initiative

"I mean, the fact that it got rejected was the kick-start we could only dream of."
(Interviewee 10 2018)

The question whether the Anti-TTIP protests can be interpreted as an act of citizenship is approached by highlighting the importance of the European Citizen Initiative (ECI) for the issue at hand. The ECI is a mechanism provided by the EU that gives citizens of the EU the possibility to engage in European decision-making in a more direct way. This means that after having collected one million signatures from at least seven member states of the EU, the European Commission will deal with the ECI's demands. In this section, I aim to show that the rejection of the ECI was a central turning point in this respect: It created a rupture with the given as it triggered the feeling that citizen's concerns are not accepted as legitimate criticism in the TTIP negotiations. In reaction to that, protests expanded and raised voice against a general discontent with the role citizens (can) play in European politics. In other words: It created citizens as political subjects with claims. Consequently, in this first part of the chapter, I outline how the conflict surrounding TTIP became a catalyst for the general discontent over the marginal role European citizens' play in the politics of the EU. The rejection of the European Citizen Initiative was a key moment insofar as it brought forward the perceived undemocratic design of European politics and especially the marginalized role of citizens within. In the very moment when the European Commission rejected

the 'Stop TTIP'-ECI, these questions were raised explicitly by the protesters, who, in how they reacted to the ECI's rejection, turned from active to activist citizens. Therefore, I argue, one can speak of a turning point as the rejection of the ECI triggered three processes: Besides the increased attentiveness for the democratic aspects of the conflict, the rejection caused instantaneous politicization. As a consequence, not only the topics, but also the personal composition of the movement changed: I argue that not only expert activists, but also ordinary citizens joined the movement against TTIP. Why? Outrage over this decision and the feeling of responsibility to act encouraged citizens to join the movement and demonstrate against this trade-agreement. What started as a movement of professional activists who lobby against specific aspects of the TTIP, ended up being a dense European-wide movement of politicized citizens who stand up for more direct civic participation on an EU level.

Horizontal Europeanization through the self-organized European Citizen Initiative

The European Citizen Initiative (ECI) is currently the most direct civic instrument at hand to intervene in European politics. More concretely, it is an EU-provided mechanism that gives legal citizens the opportunity to participate directly in EU decisions. This means that in case a million signatures are collected from at least seven EU member states, the European Commission will take into account the ECI's demands - albeit in a non-binding manner. The ECI is often praised as "the first transnational instrument of citizen-participation and agenda-setting worldwide" (Peñarrubia Bañón 2016, 7). Previously, the only way for citizens to directly influence political decisions was to exercise their right to petition in the EU Parliament. At the initiative of NGOs and grassroots organizations, in the year 2011 the ECI was eventually introduced by the EU Commission, the EU Parliament, and the European Council. The first ECI was released on the symbolic date of the 'Europe Day', May 9th in 2012, followed by ECIs of various topics such as animal rights, water privatization, ending roaming fees, and more.

However, whether the ECI per se can be described as an instrument that enables “both direct and participatory democracy in a unique way” (European Parliament. Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 2018, 1), as the European Parliament does, has to be critically questioned. Can it fulfill the self-set goal to be a concrete example of the approach to “bring the EU closer to its citizens”? (European Parliament. Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 2018, 4) Critics question the ability of the ECI to promote the participation of citizens, as it is, first of all, not easily accessible: There are high prerequisites for initiating such a petition, which makes it difficult for some and impossible for many organizations to start one. Furthermore, the participants authorized to sign an ECI are limited to EU passport holders, which reflects the EU’s legal understanding of who counts as a citizen. The predetermined form of this political instrument of “direct and participatory democracy” (European Parliament. Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 2018, 1) appears to correspond to the need to keep the way citizens participate ‘under control’, as participants are asked to adhere to this predetermined procedure for democratic participation. Despite these structural limitations, it is equally questioned how ‘directly democratic’ the ECI really can be, as the outcome is not binding. This means that the European Commission will only examine the proposal of a registered ECI and decide whether or not to take the matter forward. There is no binding process that the demands have to be translated into political decisions. This reveals the symbolic nature of the ECI as much as it unveils a very limited understanding of democracy.

Saward (2013) argues that by pre-setting these limits of who is allowed to participate and how, it radically reduces the resonant understanding of what democracy is and, above all, can be. While the ECI does not (directly) harm European democracy, it nevertheless reveals some shortcomings. First of all, as mentioned above, there is no legal binding for political representatives to engage with the demands that are put forward. This points to the symbolic character of the ECI: Besides the practical ambition to engage citizens in European political affairs, the design of this mechanism shows that it is used as a tool to raise awareness at the citizen’s level for their status of European citizenship (Saward 2013, 221). By doing that, it aims to strengthen a more direct link between the EU and its citizens besides representative national politics. However, this is not to be confused with ‘direct democracy’ in which citizens gain direct

power over political decisions. Saward classifies the ECI as a participatory democracy tool (Saward 2013, 227), whilst being critical of the exclusiveness of both the entitled participants as well as their political practices. Not only that participation is restricted to those with an EU passport, they also have to stick to a previously fixed procedure of democratic participation, which Saward describes as “scripted” (Saward 2013, 228). The ECI echoes the EU’s concept of citizenship²⁶, which rests on pre-structured and controlled ways of participation by a limited number of EU citizens defined in a legal sense. In this respect, under “the lens of enactment” (Saward 2013, 230) it seems that this tool denies those acts outside of the domain of already existing forms of civic participation (and, as Saward rightly adds, those voices critical of the EU (2013, 230)). If we understand democracy not in a technical, but in the aforementioned “direct and participatory” (European Parliament. Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 2018, 1) sense, this mechanism risks to limit, rather than to promote, the participation of citizens. At best, so he concludes, it can be seen as an *attempt* by the EU to establish a more direct connection with its citizens (Saward 2013, 221).

Against this background, it seems futile to place great hopes on the ECI’s “*politicizing function*” (European Parliament. Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 2018, 97). Indeed, as I will argue in the following, it was the *rejection* of the ECI, not the ECI itself, that triggered a wide politicization of citizens and helped the movement to expand their trans-European ties. How did this come about? On the 25th of September 2014, the European Citizen Initiative ‘Stop TTIP’ was intended to start. Great hopes were placed on this participatory instrument, as the European Greens in a press release see it as “a landmark development” to take into account the “voices of citizens” (The Greens/EFA 2014). Before the expected starting date however, the ECI’s registration was rejected by the European Commission on the 10th of September 2014. As high as the aforementioned aspirations were, as big was the disillusionment prevailing after its rejection. A collective of NGOs involved in this ECI comments: “The European Commission strengthened the democratic deficit and the fears of many citizens and NGOs by its decision not to approve to the European Citizen Initiative “Stop TTIP”” (European Anti-Poverty Network 2016, 8). As we will see later on,

²⁶ a “particular, individualistic liberal-democratic view of active citizenship” (Saward 2013, 228)

emotionally charged reactions were expressed also in the interviews. Outrage can be attributed to the fact that the ECI was seen as *the* EU's democratic instrument that should make the voices of the citizens heard.

At the moment of rejection, however, it confirmed the EU criticism that Anti-TTIP protestors had yet before: "Well, we were like ... what else could we expect? Really, we expected [it] because the European Commission had some problems from the very beginning with the Initiative and this topic. It was rejected on the basis that we can't ask to stop something which isn't already done. In power. And the counter-argument was: - "If it is done, it is irreversible. [...] So it was like understanding that there will probably be these kinds of actions from the European Commission." (Interviewee 25 2018) Despite this frustration, I argue, it was the moment when a democratic dimension was added to the TTIP conflict: the confirmation of the EU criticism did not lead to averting, as it could be expected, but, on the contrary, to an even increased willingness to use their democratic rights as citizens: to demonstrate, to criticize, to take legal action, and to organize as a European civil society. And not least by creating a self-organized European Citizen Initiative (sECI), that, one year after its start, had become the largest ECI ever. More than 3.263.900 signatures against TTIP and CETA were given to the European Commission in November 2015, but even more importantly, a dense and reliable network of civil actors had been created.

This process of 'horizontal Europeanization' is expected to have potential to outlast the cooperation during the sECI: "So I think that the point of ECI is the connections you make in civil society. [...]. ECI is more like a vertical [sic!] ... horizontal thing! So in that regard, it's great and it's been easier for us to make connections and work with other groups throughout Europe because they have that very same campaign. So that becomes a point of reference." (Interviewee 13 2019). Another 'point of reference' is the decision to file a lawsuit against the European Commission in front of the European court to double-check if the rejection of the ECI ist lawful. This must be considered far more than just a legal act: It indicates a serious shift in the power of the citizens to raise civic claims against a very powerful actor, the European Commission. not surprisingly, the moment of rejection is described by one interviewee as a "catalyzation

of the movement": "we got more compacted and more powerful and more active and proactive and being at step that we have to really do something." (Interviewee 8 2018)

Understanding TTIP as a democratic question

This indicates that the end of the ECI marks the beginning of a new phase in the course of the Anti-TTIP protests, which is characterized by a 'double democratization': The rejection reinforced the democratic claims against TTIP in particular, and, in more general terms, a democratization of European politics. Until then, the protest was mainly motivated by the goal to influence the contents of the TTIP contract (which includes regulations that affect policies such as GMO, labor rights, consumer rights, fracking...). Data from a protest study of the demonstration in Berlin on October 10th in 2015 shows that 53% of all protesters expect negative effects on democracy if TTIP is implemented (Daphi et. al. 2015, 7). However, it cannot be denied that critics of TTIP have been concerned with democratic questions from the very beginning. Democratic issues played a role before the rejection regarding the TTIP treaty, since it was expected that, for example, arbitration tribunals or the gaining power of multinational companies could lead to a shift in power in favor of the economy. However, the rejection of the ECI in particular raised new and confirmed existing doubts about the democratic quality of the negotiation process. Furthermore, the protests not only targeted the undemocratic conditions of the TTIP negotiations, but also the decision-making process of the EU in general.

Besides raising concerns for the possible effects the TTIP contract may have on democracy, activists were criticizing the decision-making process itself, which was perceived, even more after the rejection, as undemocratic. Following this perspective, the rejection of the ECI stands paradigmatically for what is perceived most fundamentally as problematic in EU politics: The EU is accused of being undemocratic in several respects. The rejection confirmed the feeling that the EU excludes (critical) voices of its own citizens. This 'birth defect' is mentioned one year later in a statement by John Hilary, a former member of the 'Stop TTIP' citizens' committee, after the sECI was completed: "The 3 million signatures collected for this petition shows that the people of Europe stand firmly against these corporate-driven trade deals. The people

of Europe have spoken, the politicians must no longer turn their backs on their constituents." (Hilary, quoted in: EurActiv 2015) The democratic quality is further ensured by public debate over contested policies. Interviewees raise attention for the lack of debate concerning TTIP: "then there was also some sort of attention brought more on democratic level of participation and, you know, lack of democratic debate from other organizations that are more, like, liberal, that work on the rule of law or human rights. They recognized that, you know, that there would be a very important international agreement and there was no public participation, public discussion." (Interviewee 1 2018) One year after the ECI was rejected, this interviewee emphasizes the perceived gap between the EU and its citizens, as well as the position that the citizens' (critical) voices are constitutive for European politics and should therefore gain greater attention. Existent tools to participate were criticized as too little democratic, in the sense that they are not easily accessible, non-binding and eventually even rejected. In particular, the high-prerequisite application for an ECI and the associated difficulties in reaching the quorum were mentioned to illustrate how disappointing the rejection was for them: "And it is indeed super heavy and it is almost impossible to do it. [...] And in the end what you get is just that the Commission has to answer. They just say: - "Thank you, no, thanks."" (Interviewee 10 2018)

The interviewees also point to the intransparency in the TTIP negotiation process, which takes place behind (at least for the general public) closed doors and keeps much of the documents in secrecy. Another aspect connected to the critique of intransparency concerns the perceived unfair treatment of public interest versus economic business interest groups, which are more often invited to consultation meetings in Brussels. As we will see in greater detail later on, interviewees articulate the feeling that EU politics is undemocratic in the sense that it is out of the reach of active European citizens due to its intransparency and lacking possibilities to participate as citizens.

I claim that this awareness for democracy intensified when the ECI was rejected. If we zoom into this specific moment that brought about this change, we see how democratic questions regarding citizenship in the EU moved from a content level to a process level to the structural level: Before the rejection of the ECI, democratic questions were mostly raised in the context of regulations within the TTIP contract

that were expected to affect democracy, for example by giving more power to multinational corporations. Democracy played a role in the protests with respect to the contract itself, on a content level. On the process level, however, the rejection raised doubt about the democratic quality of the TTIP negotiations and public debate, as it was experienced not only as an *unjust* but also as an *undemocratic* treatment. Moreover, the structural level was touched when a general debate occurred about the undemocratic policy-making in EU politics and the role of the citizens within. What the findings suggest is that European citizens want to have a say in European politics - and to experience the limited opportunities to do so is exactly the deficit of democracy they criticize. In that sense, the kind of European democracy they strive for can be interpreted as one based on civic participation. This claim for democracy is reflected in the statement the movement published to announce their counter-reaction to the rejection of the ECI- a self-organized ECI: "We won't allow the European Commission to silence us and will continue our resistance to TTIP and CETA without their permission! We will challenge the Commission's decision in the European Court of Justice and we will set-up a self-organized ECI. Democracy is not granted from above, it is made from below!" (Stop TTIP Alliance 2014) As this quote indicates, beyond the case of TTIP, the democratic question negotiated in this conflict is: Which roles do and can citizens play in the political processes in the EU?

Politicization of ordinary citizens

The Anti-TTIP protests have been particularly successful in mobilizing large numbers of people at the European level. This must be also attributed to the rejection of the European Citizens' Initiative 'Stop TTIP' - as paradoxical as this may sound. Since the ECI is one of the few instruments for citizens to take part in political decisions in Europe in a more direct democratic way, the rejection of this civic request had awakening consequences. It politicized citizens in the moment when it raised awareness of the fragile construct of democracy and put democratic questions into focus, asking: What role can European citizens play in shaping European politics?

This change towards the claim for a greater role of citizens in European politics is accompanied by increasing interest for TTIP by the general public. This politicizing effect can be traced back to the democratic doubts that activated even more people who shared the same concerns. It triggered the need to claim their rights of participation, both on a democratic level (by putting it on the political agenda) and on a juridical level (by bringing it as a case to the European court). As the findings suggest, the feeling of having the civic responsibility to act, motivated many more people to become an active part of the protests. At the beginning of the negotiations in 2013, the movement consisted mostly of experienced activists who were already active in networks or organizations against specific political issues affected by the potential TTIP agreement, such as global trade (for example ATTAC), ecology (for example Friends of the Earth) or food and consumer safety (for example Foodwatch) (Bauer 2016, 6). The perceived threat that the rejection posed on European democracy motivated ordinary people to stand up against this perceived injustice in protest. When the Stop-TTIP alliance announced plans to set up a self-organized ECI, they explicitly emphasized this civic dimension, addressing directly those ordinary citizens: "Let's carry out the ECI as intended, ignoring the rejection! We have the legitimate right to do so! We *as citizens* [my emphasis] have a matter to bring up with EU institutions, so over the next couple of month [sic!], we will carry out an 'ECI from the bottom up'. By standing strong, we *the citizens of Europe* [my emphasis] can together Stop TTIP and CETA." (Stop TTIP Alliance 2014). As this call exemplifies, the public is addressed to join the protests *as citizens*.

"In 2015 happened a tragedy ..." (Interviewee 4 2018), one interview partner dramatically opened the conversation about the rejection of the European Citizens' Initiative. Even if on the one hand, the rejection is viewed by the activists as a mistake, as unjust, as unacceptable, the headline quote puts into focus that there are also empowering consequences that the rejection of the ECI triggered: "I mean the fact that it got rejected was the kick-start we could only dream of." (Interviewee 10 2018) The 'kick start' of the self-organized ECI was decided by a core team that was already prepared for this option. But the strength that the movement gained through this rejection was not only due to those expert activists, but also spilled over to large parts of the population who had not previously been interested in this trade agreement. This

is the decisive reason why the sECI was viewed as a success, albeit in a different way than initially expected: Instead of the formal acceptance of the demands by the EU institutions, the informal sECI resulted in significantly more people being mobilized and the network of supporters has been enlarged massively: "The European Citizens' Initiative, yes. That may have brought more people together. So maybe it's not this official one, but we're making it official and we're making it even stronger. And I think that was the greatest." (Interviewee 15 2018)

Summary

"people demand a voice, we don't have it yet, but at least we know that we want a voice." (Interviewee 14 2018)

As I just outlined, the official end of the ECI was the beginning of a new phase in the TTIP conflict that is characterized by processes of democratization, politicization and Europeanization: First, the movement's demand for a civic democratization of European decision-making processes gained major attention. Second, ordinary citizens politicized and joined the protests, which, thirdly, through the launch of the s-ECI, became much more European in return. In this sense, the rejection left not only the feeling that citizens' concerns are not accepted as legitimate criticisms of the TTIP, but the protests also expanded to raise voice against a general discontent with the role citizens (can) play in European politics. The data shows that the rejection triggered far more than just a change in strategies (such as organizing a sECI and filing a lawsuit against the European Commission), but it framed the TTIP discourse as a democratic question. Equally important, the rejection of the ECI triggered the massive growth of the movement itself, because more citizens joined the protests and created a dense, transnational network of civil society in Europe. One can therefore speak of a moment with the potential to experience, practice and create new forms of citizenship on a European scale.

While the rejection of the ECI was only the beginning of a phase of Anti-TTIP protests, the findings underline that these processes perpetuate throughout the subsequent protest experiences. Protesters will begin to see themselves as protectors of

democracy and their protests as an act to defend democracy. The interviewees are clear about the fact that they want to participate in the decision-making processes and to make their voices heard in the political debate surrounding TTIP. By formulating the will to participate, they reclaim their civic power. One of the experiences they will make in the ensuing period is to realize "that their voice matters, if they are loud enough and organized." (Interviewee 9 2018) They will start to experience themselves as powerful and increase their knowledge and skills about how to use this power. Looking back, they will see how they broadened their "space for influence" (Interviewee 22 2018) to make their civic voices heard: "people demand a voice, we don't have it yet, but at least we know that we want a voice." [me: "Did you feel that that happened?"] (excited:) "Yes!" (Interviewee 14 2018) Above all, they will become 'Troublemakers'. On this empirical level, we see that Anti-TTIP activists were trying to gain a voice in the decision-making process through *active* citizenship in the first place. They collected signatures and mobilized supporters to take action against TTIP using the legal instrument of a European Citizenship Initiative (ECI) from the framework of EU politics. However, when the ECI was rejected, they appealed against the decision and started to oppose the treaty as *activist* citizens. As they create a rupture with the 'predefined script' of this democratic process as well as with the understanding of citizenship that was assigned to them from top-down (by the EU institutions), it seems that they perform an act of citizenship. The following section will dig deeper into the question which claims are enacted in these protests, that helps to answer the question: *Which citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protest and how?*

Claiming citizenship: Enacting European CITIZENSHIP

"Sie müssen auch wie Bürger an der Politik [teilnehmen]. Das ist Politik."²⁷
(Interviewee 21 2018)

To answer the question *which* citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests, it is important to consider the sites of contestation (i.e. the struggle around certain issues), which are defined as products of "a constellation of bodies in action" (Isin 2013, 23).

²⁷ "They must also [participate] in politics like citizens. This is politics."

Those products, as I can show, are more than just political resistance against TTIP, but are more fundamentally about European democracy and the role of citizens within. Acts of citizenship are characterized by claims for justice referring to rights understood as "relationships that reflect dominant sites and actors of citizenship" (Isin 2009, 376). Citizenship is enacted by so-called "subjects with claims" (Isin 2013, 41). The interviewees' claims can be subsumed under two main categories, namely transparency and participation. This is no coincidence. The claims brought up by the interviewees correspond to their main criticism of the TTIP, namely the lack of democracy, which is understood in terms of a lack of participation and intransparency. In fact, even beyond the case of TTIP, the interviewees criticize that the EU is anything but democratic. The lack of democratic structures is mostly referred to in terms of *intransparency* and the *exclusion of civic actors* in European decision-making. As I showed before in reference to political science literature, this phenomenon is subsumed under the label of a 'democratic deficit' (Norris 2011, 6). However, the interviewees' understanding goes beyond the claim that the European Parliament has too little power and the Commission too much. While the interviewees agree on that, they are not satisfied with purely institutional representation. Besides having suggestions on how to restructure the EU, they acknowledge that structural changes are not enough to truly democratize it. Consequently, a more fundamental rethinking is needed. Throughout the TTIP conflict, I detect how experiences of exclusion shifted the debate towards fundamentally democratic questions: "It was really reclaiming the power of who decides in the EU" (Interviewee 14 2018). To be more precise, what can be subsumed under the term 'democratic deficit' describes the experienced gap between the intention of citizens to participate in EU politics and the limited possibilities to do so. As outlined earlier in reference to Hooghe and Marks' post-functionalist theory of European integration (2009), this phenomenon results from the EU's insufficient adaptation of the possibilities for civic participation after the raise of a 'constraining dissensus'.

In the last part, we already saw how TTIP became a democratic issue far away from 'just another trade deal': It started to be regarded as harmful for consumer rights, health and environmental standards and food security, but not only: Even more so after the rejection of the ECI, it was also considered a sign for the lack of democracy in the

negotiations. However, this was just the first step in this direction, since the experiences made in the Anti-TTIP protests revealed further problems in the democratic structures of European politics as a whole. Those experiences raised fundamental democratic doubts "if it is at all possible to have participatory democracy at all" (Interviewee 22 2018). The ideal to participate in EU politics as active citizens as well as informed and respected actors in political decision-making clashed with the political reality experienced in the TTIP conflict. Throughout the TTIP negotiations, they realized that they cannot play the role they want to play in EU politics. The aim of the following analysis is to investigate the role citizens (want to) enact in European politics.

When we ask: 'Which role do citizens (want to) enact in EU politics?', it targets two layers at the same time, which overlap: The interviewees *claim* to have another role in EU politics, and by that, they *enact* their understanding of citizenship in their political practices as the aforementioned quote suggests: "*Sie müssen auch wie Bürger an der Politik [teilnehmen]. Das ist Politik.*"²⁸(Interviewee 21 2018). When this interviewee refers to the citizens' duty to take part in politics 'as citizens', he has a specific understanding of citizenship in mind. Coming back to the title 'Enacting European citizenship', this part focuses on the *citizens*, more specifically on the understanding of citizenship enacted in protest. As I pointed out before, 'citizen' and 'citizenship' alike are polyseme terms, they can refer to a great variety of meanings. I analyzed the way how and in which context it is used in order to indicate the multiple meanings of the term: Which understanding of citizenship is reflected in the interviewees' experiences of protest? Through the analysis, I identified three themes of how citizenship is conceptualized. The interviewees' understanding of citizenship can be reconstructed as one that is enacted as active, responsible and EU-critical. As we will see, these aspects are deeply entangled as well as mutually influential, but they can be considered separately for conceptual reasons. I will start with the enactment of *active* citizenship.

²⁸ "They must also [participate] in politics like citizens. This is politics."

Active citizenship

Citizenship is experienced as a relation between the polity and the members of it, here: the EU and the European citizens. As we will see later, what is called the 'EU' varies as much as the meanings associated with it. What is important to know at this point, however, is that the findings suggest that the relation to the polity is anticipated as one based on mutual trust, interest for and respect of the position of the other. However, the TTIP conflict revealed deep trenches between the citizens and the EU institutions, which were widened and/or created by experiences in the Anti-TTIP protests. The interviewees are deeply disappointed by the way they felt treated in the course of this conflict, of which the rejection of the ECI was just the beginning. This criticism is the starting point to understand how they anticipate their relation to the EU. Therefore, I start by outlining some of the main problems in this relationship as experienced by the interviewees.

"We can see it in the European elections all the time: There's a very low participation rate in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and it's getting lower and lower and lower because people just feel a huge distance to the EU institutions and they feel that they don't represent them and they think that they're doing politics against them. I think that is a growing sentiment. It is not a majority in most of the European countries, yet it is a growing sentiment." (Interviewee 29 2019)

This quote summarizes some of the main problems of the relation between the citizens and the EU. As perceived by the interviewees, it is characterized by 1) mistrust in the EU's will to have a political debate on TTIP, 2) the feeling of exclusion and 3) that the EU politicians are not deciding what is best for the citizens. In the following, I will outline all three of them including the reasons that are given for this. Let me first start with the connection between these aspects: The first aspect is clearly linked to the other two aspects, in a double sense: First, mistrust in their political representatives is caused by the lack of citizen-orientation in their politics and second, the will to participate and control is nourished by that. While both are not mutually exclusive, it is interesting that the last two aspects, the feeling of exclusion and the impression that political decisions are not based on the principle of the common good, envision different roles of citizens: While the first stresses an actively engaged citizen, that

participates and controls the political decisions being made, the second follows the idea of representational politics in which politicians act in the name of the citizens - while for the latter case a bigger amount of trust is needed, which, as we will see later, is fading in the TTIP conflict.

In a protest camp in Brussels, activists invited the EU representatives to debate the TTIP contract and its negotiation process. They envisioned a constructive face-to-face dialogue with European policy makers, but in contrast to this, the activists experienced how politicians refused this invitation to talk and even tried to avoid contact with them: "Sie flüchten vor uns."²⁹ (Interviewee 21 2018) Similar situations raised complaints about politicians not being ready to discuss about TTIP in public, which strengthened an impression of a lack of interest concerning the citizen's needs and interests. In the moment when the ECI had been rejected, this supposition seemed to be reassured: "Wir hatten da ja auch diese europäische Petition. Das hat die zwar nicht interessiert, natürlich nicht die Herrschenden. Es wurden aber über drei Millionen Unterschriften gesammelt."³⁰ (Interviewee 27 2018) As a consequence of this, EU politicians were accused of excluding the public opinion on TTIP, even to the extent that the EU was accused to actively ignore or deny the citizens' voice altogether. The rejection of the ECI, as *the* tool for citizens' participation, is used to demonstrate this experience: "So even the only existing tools for the Civil Society to participate in the EU Institutions and the processes through these legislative initiatives was denied." (Interviewee 29 2019) This reinforces the feeling that EU politicians are making politics too far from the citizens.

When they wonder how it is possible to "smash off the table hundreds of thousands of voices of the European public" (Interviewee 9 2018), interviewees see other powers at force. What is hinted here as 'other powers' are actors such as big, multinational corporations, lobbies, financial groups, banks and the industry: "*they do protect the investors, not the citizens.*" (Interviewee 28 2018) Such affiliations of power are seen as one reason why politics does not serve the citizens interests. The so-called 'other powers' seem to have more influence and the EU shifts towards their economic wills.

²⁹ "They flee from us."

³⁰ "We also had this European petition. They weren't interested in that, of course not the rulers. But more than three million signatures were collected."

In the course of the negotiations, they felt discriminated compared to other actors from economically powerful sectors, as corporate lobbies seem to be treated differently from the civil society actors. The governments are accused to follow these economic interests, while politics is expected to address the general interest of citizens: "On claiming government to be more responsible to its citizens and voters when deciding on such issues. I don't see really any turning point in the near future. Just opposite. That it's because the TTIP is also, I see it as some sort of authoritarian ... authoritarian-like arrangement, well top down that is narrowing down decisions." (Interviewee 1 2018) As activists felt this power difference, they accused EU politicians not to govern in the name of the people. It raised the criticism to follow a market-oriented rather than a citizen-centered logic of politics. More concretely, the European democracy is seen as in danger or even already hollowed out by the lobby power of such big corporations: "C'est un déni de démocratie. Ce n'est pas le peuple qui importe, qui impulse la politique européenne ce sont les grandes entreprises."³¹ (Interviewee 2 2018) Both the corporations are accused of taking over political power and the politicians are accused of letting it happen and even supporting it. This is detected as a shift of power from the political to the economic sphere.

The fact that corporate powers are seen as way too powerful and the EU politics therefore more keen to "*protect the investors, not the citizens*" (Interviewee 28 2018), is not regarded as a punctual problem that can be narrowed down to the TTIP case, but a general feeling of the citizens towards the EU: The EU is accused to prioritize the interests of corporations over the will of European citizens. Even worse, this trend is perceived as a growing sentiment. The involvement of other political powers is seen as one of the biggest threats to European democracy, as the EU's policies are expected to be influenced or even co-created by economic powers: "most of the meetings of the negotiators were with the transnational companies. And of course it was undemocratic." (Interviewee 29 2019) This criticism does not only illustrate the lack of trust in democratic procedures on the EU level. The deep disappointment reveals their initial expectations towards the EU "to communicate and have a dialogue with the civic movement. Otherwise it is a broken link." (Interviewee 4 2018) They perceive this

³¹ "It is a denial of democracy. It's not the people who matter, who drive European policy, it's the big companies."

relation of mutual interest and respect to start with communication. That indicates how such experiences nourish the feeling that there is no interest in the concerns raised by the movement.

What additionally adds to this feeling is the intransparency of the negotiations, which is interpreted as an intentional exclusion of the TTIP critics. Especially in the case of TTIP, exclusion is reflected on the level of accessibility: Not only that the material published is difficult to access, as well as difficult to handle and to understand, citizens also have the impression to be consciously left out of the political debate. This also concerns the lack of instruments to influence European politics or the lack of knowledge about existing rights and ways to participate: "they don't understand what is the way how they should kind of approach it or like what is the what is the medium they should kind of connect it." (Interviewee 23 2018) The TTIP negotiations, which took place behind closed doors, made the EU look even more like a 'fortress' from the perspective of the interviewees. The citizens are asking: "How about transparency? How about press? How about opinion? You tell me after you do it? No! I think that now European structures are not any more looking for the people." (Interviewee 4 2018) They criticize the superficial 'transparency' only ostensibly obtained by flooding citizens with information. For example, it is being complained about the extensive contract ("*One thousand five-hundred and thirty pages. One thousand five-hundred and thirty pages!*" (Interviewee 28 2018)) in very technical language, not taking into consideration the language barrier to understand texts in juridical form. As one interviewee condensed the problem: "Wenn Sie im Meer schwimmen, sind sie am Ende trotzdem noch durstig."³² (Interviewee 5 2018) In other words: not *any* kind of transparency is appreciated. Therefore, the results of the so-called 'transparency initiative', initiated by the former trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, were not satisfactory, as documents were published massively, which did not make anything more, but only less clearer: "Überhäufung mit Information führt zu Desinformation. Das ist ganz logisch."³³ (Interviewee 5 2018)

These experiences triggered doubts with respect to EU politics and decision-making in more general terms. We can see how in the TTIP discourse, the intransparency as well

³² "If you swim in the sea, you still end up thirsty."

³³ "Information overload leads to disinformation. It's very logical."

as the leaks fueled further mistrust. The intransparency of the negotiations was seen as an aspect that endangers democracy and politicians are criticized to create a 'fake transparency'. In this regard, intransparency was criticized to kill the debate on this topic: "On voyait bien que c'était fait en catimini qu'on mettait devant le fait accompli qu'on voulait nous mettre devant le fait accompli etc. Donc c'est totalement inacceptable dans une démocratie. C'est totalement insupportable!"³⁴ (Interviewee 2 2018) Therefore, one of the most important results of the Anti-TTIP movement was the success to pull these topics into the spotlight: "Not that we have good trade agreements now. But at least they are not negotiated only behind closed doors anymore" (Interviewee 14 2018). In this respect, the experiences in the TTIP debate also triggered mistrust in the EU's decisions in general. The problem is seen in the decision-making process in the Council, where decisions are taken in secret and ministers are not obliged to justify their decisions. As I will show in greater detail later, mistrust towards politicians points to how seriously they take their representational function and their duty towards their constituents.

Their claims to have a voice in the negotiations, especially since the citizen's lives are directly affected by TTIP, can be interpreted as a reaction to the exclusiveness of the negotiations. This impression seems to be approved in the moment when the ECI is rejected: The ECI is understood by the interviewees as a request to examine further and to discuss openly the pros and cons of this trade agreement in a public debate. This added to the feeling that not only their formal request, but also, in a more symbolic sense, the concerns of the citizens are being rejected. However, inclusion is not easily achieved: Even when the EU changed its behavior to take into account the growing criticism of TTIP, this did not dissolve, but rather reinforced these pre-existing tensions.

Concerning the interaction with the TTIP-critical public, the European institutions are interpreted to move "from a defensive to a offensive strategy." (Interviewee 29 2019) In the beginning, the defensive strategy was marked by tactics of avoidance, ignorance and deflection, such as to avoid the obstacle by shifting the attention to CETA,

³⁴ "We could see that it was done on the sly that we were putting in front of the fait accompli that they wanted to put us in front of the fait accompli, etc. So it's totally unacceptable in a democracy. It's totally unbearable!"

concealing the content by complex abbreviations and terms and to slow down the process of negotiation until the protests fade out. The intransparency as well as the leaks fueled further mistrust: "There were so many leaks that every time the leaks had just proved the things that were said before." (Interviewee 13 2019) The second phase with a more offensive strategy is marked by the wider consultation of critics and the increase of transparency, the so-called 'transparency initiative'. However, limited participation options, superficial consultations of the critics and a discussion over predefined choices of minor changes could not meet the citizen's expectations. Also, the ECI is seen as only a "shadow process" (Interviewee 23 2018), because the people's opinion can be ignored in the end. This is not only the case for the ECI, but also in other forms of consultations. They lament a limited choice of options: "So the only discussion we could have was like: -"Page three of the mandate. We could add this word."" (Interviewee 10 2018) From the perspective of the interviewees, these consultations are seen as a means to make the treaty "bulletproof" (Interviewee 1 2018), meaning that their criticism is used to spot passages that may potentially threaten the treaties' approval. Therefore, participating in such consultations also means for the activists to take into consideration "that we often do more damage" (Interviewee 1 2018). This is why they do not only see this kind of participation as superficial, but also as potentially endangering the movement's goals.

As I mentioned before, this change towards more inclusion and transparency did not cause more satisfaction with how the EU handles the conflict surrounding TTIP. Interviewees summarize this dissatisfaction as the imbalance between the impression to be heard and seen, but not to be included. Their experiences are now even more characterized by the feeling that despite their disagreement being heard, they are not listened to by the EU institutions. For them, this means that there is not only a lack of interest in their critical perspective on TTIP, but they also have the feeling that they are not taken seriously as informed, powerful and qualified political actors. This nourished the impression that their discontent does not cause a real problem for the Commission: it creates the impression that politicians are not *able*, but that there is *no will* to share power. This shows that part of the relation between policy makers and citizens should be their readiness to accept and take into account each other's political positions to enter into a democratic dialogue. In other words, they do not only want to

debate, they also want to be listened to: "Who invited us to speak?" (Interviewee 4 2018) they ask, which refers back to the exclusion of civil society at the negotiation table. This reveals that they expect politicians to reflect on and seriously prove the arguments brought forward by the movement.

However, in the course of the TTIP negotiations, they feel that their arguments against TTIP are not taken into account: "Die Kommission hat sich nie mit den Argumenten auseinandergesetzt, die Kommission hat versucht das zu ignorieren oder verächtlich zu machen, ins Lächerliche zu ziehen, und so hab ich auch viele Bundestagsabgeordnete in Diskussionen erlebt."³⁵ (Interviewee 26 2018) We can see that even though the EU's strategy changed and the negotiations became more transparent, the feeling remains that the deeper structure of politics stayed the same- while some interviewees state that now there is even less space for democratic intervention after TTIP: "So the reaction of the Commission is even less democratic space. So concretely it becomes impossible to stop these kinds of treaties." (Interviewee 10 2018) This pessimistic evaluation is connected to the interviewees' experience that there is no will to change political processes in the interest of the citizens: "the Commission doesn't even wants us to consult you about this and doesn't even want that this takes place." (Interviewee 10 2018) The so-called 'inclusion' of the citizen's voices is regarded as a show on the surface, which does not seriously consider civic interests. But not only the mode, also the instruments to participate do not meet the expectations of the activists. Tools to participate are needed to allow people to co-create European politics. But despite them seeing and making use of different ways to engage in European politics, the interviewees criticize the lack of instruments. As we will see in the following, they lobby for new, better and different instruments to participate.

Apart from the lack of instruments, they criticize or refuse the actual instruments at choice. As the most prominent example, after the experiences outlined before, the European Citizen Initiative is not (anymore) seen as a meaningful democratic instrument: "Für mich ist das kein Vorbild für Demokratie. Für mich ist das keine Demokratie."³⁶ (Interviewee 21 2018) Interviewees acknowledge that new instruments

³⁵ "The Commission never dealt with the arguments, the Commission tried to ignore it or to scorn it, to ridicule it, and that's how I saw many members of the Bundestag in discussions."

³⁶ "For me, this is not a model for democracy. For me this is not democracy."

of decision-making, such as (online and offline) public consultations, have been tried out throughout the TTIP conflict. However, they see that having the instruments is not enough for a functioning democracy, as it can happen that “even if you give the people participating a voice, if the result is against your plan then you even impose you still impose those treaties. And that really shows the undemocratic nature of the EU.” (Interviewee 29 2019) The interviewee refers to a public inquiry by the EU if ISDS should be included in the treaty, in which the clear majority of respondents voted against it and it was still included. In this respect, if citizens are included in decision-making, they feel that the range of options is narrowed down from “top down” (Interviewee 1 2018). “Real” inclusion, in their understanding, exists if “there is nothing that can take place without you anymore” (Interviewee 1 2018). Not being asked for their opinion provokes a feeling of betrayal, especially since it is the citizens who are directly affected by the policy.

Going back to the relational understanding of citizenship, we see how this criticism deeply affects the relation between the citizens and its representatives, which is in danger of being a “broken link” (Interviewee 4 2018). However, the experience of these treatments as unjust also resulted in a massive rise of the political demands to be heard, listened to and included. The political disillusionment and low trust in their political representatives is deeply connected to the experiences of being forced into this passive role. Even though the EU institutions changed their behavior towards the movement in the course of the protests from a defensive to a more offensive handling of their criticism, these strategies were experienced as superficial, as they did not offer instruments to include civic perspectives in the decision-making process. Coming back to the conceptualization of a democratic deficit as the gap between expectations and the status quo, the relationship is becoming unstable because the polity is too slow to react to the changing political role that citizens want to enact on a European level. From this perspective, it is to note that the relation between the citizens and the EU is worsening *because of* and not *despite* the fact that citizens (want to) participate more in EU politics. Still, the *active* role of citizens seems to be experienced as a way to gain back control and power in order to balance this unequal relation of power.

What the findings show is that Anti-TTIP activists are not ready to accept the role of citizens as passive bearers of rights. It becomes clear that the interviewees refer to a

participatory understanding of citizenship rather than to citizenship as a status or a collective identity as their claims are pointing towards more civic participation. The role of citizens that is anticipated here is one in which participation both as a *right* and as a *duty* plays a significant role. Civic actions are the settings in which they “make sure that your message is being heard” (Interviewee 14 2018). In their opposition against TTIP, citizens are considered as the actors who themselves shall draw the red lines of negotiation instead of relying on the EU’s competences and mission to decide on behalf of its citizens: “Die Meinung ist, dass die Bürger selber die Grenzen machen für Unterhandlungen, die nicht legitimiert werden durch eine Demokratie.”³⁷ (Interviewee 21 2018) The right to participate in decision-making is legitimated and fueled by being affected by these decisions: “sie wollen selber mitwirken, sie wollen in bestimmten Fragen, die ihr Leben unmittelbar berührt, da wollen sie mitsprechen”³⁸ (Interviewee 26 2018). Consequently, their idea of active citizenship stands in sharp contrast to the feeling of being degraded to a passive actor in politics. Very clearly, they also refuse to be reduced to a narrow understanding of citizenship that sees citizens as voters only.

The quest for more civic involvement in the TTIP negotiations is accompanied by the consciousness that this participation, and therefore also the change in the role that citizens play in the EU, is not a punctual, TTIP case-specific engagement, but has to be as much fundamental as continuous:

“Man darf sich ja nie der Illusion hingeben: dann engagiert sich für irgendwas und plötzlich hat man nen Zustand erreicht, der is dann statisch stabil und dann is ein Problem gelöst für alle Zeiten. Ne, ich denke, wir befinden und ständig in dynamischen Prozessen und Veränderungen und man darf sich nicht der Illusion hingeben, irgendwann sind die Probleme gelöst und die Welt is in Ordnung. Es wird immer wieder ständig Auseinandersetzung geben und man

³⁷ “The opinion is that the citizens themselves set the limits for negotiations that are not legitimized by a democracy.”

³⁸ “They want to be involved themselves, they want to have a say in certain issues that directly affect their lives”

muss sich dafür engagieren, dass das einigermaßen im Gleichgewicht bleibt."³⁹
(Interviewee 26 2018)

This means that participation is not only a means to reach a certain goal, but it is considered part of the self-understanding as a citizen to engage actively in public affairs. Therefore, it is not surprising that an *active* understanding of citizenship is dominant in how they perceive their own role as a citizen. This highlights the participatory aspect of a republican understanding of citizenship, in which participation constitutes the major principle. Indeed, as I will show next, their understanding of citizenship also picks up the critical 'activist' notion of republican citizenship.

Responsible citizenship

The emotional reaction to the exclusion outlined in the previous paragraphs is often formulated as disappointment or outrage, and it seems to contribute to a decline of trust in the political processes due to the experiences the interviewees made during the protests. As we saw, little trust in the will that politicians want to correspond to the citizen's interests nourished their criticism of 'post-democratic' politics (Crouch 2008): a technocratic management of the social world, which is administering the conflict surrounding TTIP rather than working through and with it. However, the latter is precisely what the protesters strive for: To underline the need for more direct participation of the citizens, one of the interviewees tells me this story about the relation between citizens and politicians as a family relation: When the parents (the political decision-makers) are deciding for the children (the citizens), they will rebel against this paternalism. Whereas when parents and children join together in a serious debate and find a common solution that everybody agrees with, they will be some sort of compromise (Interviewee 5 2018). While this association allows some interpretations of the role citizens and politicians are supposed to play, it also underlines the positive perspective on conflicts as a way to improve and reconnect

³⁹ "You should never give in to the illusion: then get involved in something and suddenly you have reached a state that is then statically stable and then a problem is solved for all time. No, I think we are constantly in dynamic processes and changes and one should not give in to the illusion that at some point the problems will be solved and the world will be fine. There will always be controversy and you have to make a commitment to keep it reasonably balanced."

politics to the ones that it is directed to: A situation in which politicians make propositions (such as a new TTIP contract) to the citizens and they refuse, is, following this interviewee's argumentation, not problematic and can even revive the political life in a good way.

The findings suggest that the interviewees see conflict as a way to enhance the democratic quality of the political process. Their ideal would be the confrontation with the TTIP conflict among equally respected political adversaries. Being the negotiator of the TTIP contract with the US government, the Anti-TTIP activists see the European Commission as the main adversary. But conflicts arose not only between the movement and this political institution, but also between different political levels: "we created conflict in parliaments, within national governments or with municipal governments towards their national governments and then again with the European Union." (Interviewee 29 2019) This also roots back to their 'relational' understanding of citizenship, according to which those adversaries argue against and discuss with each other in an open conflict. However, the feeling to be excluded from the political discourse was a decisive factor for questioning the democratic legitimacy of the TTIP contract as well as for becoming active against it: "Da [in der Demokratie, my own remark] muss ich die Leute mitnehmen. Ich glaube das ist, dass war auch das Symptom, wo es angefangen hat. Wo die Menschen das Gefühl hatten, dass sie nicht für voll genommen werden, da das wirklich einen Faktor war, wo die Lücke irgendwie auseinander geklappt ist. Man trägt ja vieles mit."⁴⁰ (Interviewee 5 2018) Their experiences of being disregarded in this conflict first became noticeable in moments, when differences in power and inclusion were experienced, and later on informed the interviewees' understanding of politics as a struggle.

It is of special interest how they experienced their role as citizens in this conflictual setting: When the TTIP conflict emerged due to the citizens' dissensus with the agreement and the way the negotiations were managed by the EU representatives, for the general public, the conflict remained mostly invisible as the media first seemed to be disinterested in the criticism raised by the TTIP opponents in this early stage (Eliasson, 2014; 2018). As a reaction to this lack of recognition, the manifestation of

⁴⁰ "There [in a democracy, my own remark] I have to take people along with me. I think that's the symptom that started it. Where people felt like they weren't being taken seriously, that was really a factor where the gap kind of widened. You go along with a lot."

the conflict was forced into being: The interviewees express a strong urgency to raise awareness for this topic in order to create a space of discussion and reflection on the political implications this agreement is expected to entail. However, this discussion targeted the TTIP in a narrow sense and had caused a broad politicization of different actors, as the topics that the contract touched upon were nearly infinite. Later on, it had been extended to more general questions that concern the role they want to play in these debates as citizens: They want to take a more active role and try to be part of decision-making. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, they want to be consulted, asked for their opinion and get informed about ongoing negotiations. Again, the reasoning is based on the idea of affectedness, which gives them the urge to be consulted. In this respect, to lobby for one's interests is seen as necessary in order to include citizens' perspectives in the public process of decision-making. It is the aforementioned criticism that encouraged citizens to engage against these problems and this links back to their understanding of citizenship as conflictual.

I argue that, besides the demand for active citizenship, the interviewees enact an activist citizenship as they make themselves responsible to vitalize this democratic dimension by igniting a conflict on issues considered as problematic. Coming back to the distinction between 'activist' and 'active' citizens by Isin (2009, 367ff.) active citizens are those who actively engage in the existing framework of political participation and are widely appreciated by political institutions as part of a lively democratic debate. Activist citizens, on the other hand, operate at the boundaries of this framework and explore new possibilities beyond it. They rewrite or transform the rules of participation to suit their own needs and are often considered threats to the social order. However, as I argued before, activist citizens are a vital resource for ensuring the democratic quality of any political space, including the European one. As the data suggests, the lack of public debate was thus seen as a main problem for democratic participation in politics: "then there was also some sort of attention brought more on democratic level of participation and, you know, lack of democratic debate" (Interviewee 5 2018).

Public debate seems to be most crucial for their understanding of a democratic process. They are asking for a practice of debating in order to ensure the democratic quality of political processes. Therefore, the lack of debate about the TTIP was

criticized as much as the actual content of the negotiations: "And for us it's most important also not only these detrimental impacts but the fact that we are signing it and we are accepting it without any public discussion. So I mean [...] it's impossible to give signatures to something without any sort of discussion." (Interviewee 1 2018) More insistently, they even see it as a "moral and ethical responsibility to address these issues" (Interviewee 1 2018). As debate was seen as crucial to ensure the democratic quality of the political decision for or against TTIP, the fact that a controversial debate about TTIP was missing was the reason to dig deeper into this topic: "Und das war so der Grund warum ich dann einfach gesagt habe: "Mir reicht die allgemeine Diskussion nicht." [...] Ich wollte selber die Grundsatzentscheidung treffen und deswegen habe ich mich da informiert. Genau."⁴¹ (Interviewee 5 2018)

For some, this was of such an outstanding importance, that they were against TTIP first of all because of the way it was negotiated and in order to increase the democratic quality of these political processes in the long run: "Mir war es ja nicht nur, dass ich gesagt habe, wir sind dagegen, um es jetzt kaputt zu machen. Wir wollten dagegen sein, um eine Basis zu ebnet."⁴² (Interviewee 5 2018) Looking only at this democratic level, the criticism of TTIP was not just a political instrument, but an end in itself. One could even say, they rejected it in order to increase the debate. However, this should not suggest the intellectual shortcut that they raised this conflict *only because* it was previously non-existent, but they did feel the need to position themselves against what they considered a 'bad deal' and to dismantle what politicians and the media portrayed as a good deal for all. Activists were trying to underline this criticism linguistically: "We called it a "Foul Trade Agreement" to say like: - "This is not like a trade agreement you might think of. This is not free trade. This is corporate trade."" (Interviewee 13 2019) The goal to create a basis for democratic debate on a contested policy on the EU level was one of the motors for their activism.

This reasoning from the lack of debate, because of which many people haven't heard about the negotiations of the trade deal. One of the main goals of the movement, therefore, was to raise attention for this topic. The movement's main activities were organizing public debates, collecting signatures on the streets or demonstrating in

⁴¹ "And that was the reason why I then simply said: - "The general discussion is not enough for me." [...] I wanted to make the fundamental decision myself and that's why I informed myself about it. Exactly."

⁴² "I wasn't just saying we're against it, just to ruin it. We wanted to be against it to level a base."

order to make TTIP a public concern. Through their activities, they wanted "to reach the general public, not only the ones that already knew about it" (Interviewee 23 2018). This reflects the idea that the debate is 'democratic' from their point of view if it does not remain an elite discussion. Therefore, they reached out to citizens to make them aware of the main dangers connected to TTIP. Politicization processes through the TTIP conflict are seen as one of the main achievements of the movement: "you really see how the whole international trade policy negotiation.. it's democratized and is now a topic that is discussed on the street, I think really something has changed for the better. Not that we have good trade agreements now. But at least they are not negotiated only behind closed doors anymore, people demand a voice, we don't have it yet, but at least we know that we want a voice." (Interviewee 14 2018) As this interviewee points out, TTIP is expected to have led to some deeper changes in the way trade agreements are dealt with.

Politics is understood as 'conflictual' in the sense that political conflicts are closely connected to democracy. The lack of political debate, the interviewees suggest, comes from a lack of conflict. As a consequence, activists felt obliged to *create* this conflict and to talk about TTIP critically, because "if we hadn't done it, no one would have cared." (Interviewee 13 2019) Time is outlined as being a big factor when it comes to democratic debates, as they are very time-consuming. Political powers are accused to use their power to delay negotiations or to speed them up artificially to impede a public discussion. Both is considered as dangerous for the democratic quality of decision-making. Considering these dangers, they felt responsible to launch a public discussion on TTIP. Ideally, this debate should be based on facts and information including a critical perspective on those: "Ich finde das belebt auch und das muss keiner als Kritik wahrnehmen."⁴³ (Interviewee 5 2018) This ideal becomes more concrete in practice in the following experience of an activist in contact with a senator:

"She [the Senator, my note] said: - " I never heard about it" -. It was a she, the senator. - "And I know nothing about it. Nobody told us anything." - And she decided to talk with different groups of interest. With us which are saying "No" and then hear our arguments. It is important to listen to all the [people]. And she talked with others of course. I respect this way. It was the beginning of a dialogue.

⁴³ "I think that's invigorating too and nobody has to take that as criticism."

I don't know her last opinion, what were her final conclusions, but the importance of inviting us to speak, to put the documents and the arguments. It is important."
(Interviewee 4 2018)

The last sentence underlines the importance given to an open and controversial dialogue with their decision-makers. We can see that this interviewee aims not to persuade, but to truly inform people about the risks of the agreement. Their activism showed some response, which in turn encouraged them to move on: Concerning the people's lack of knowledge the activists feel that they have contributed to raise awareness and even activity against TTIP. However, with some restrictions, in the sense that even if they managed to bring their criticism on the public and medial agenda, it was not sincerely discussed as a topic in its more structural and fundamental depth. On the one hand, they were criticizing the media for not really contextualizing the arguments and discussing them, but only reproducing them as truth. On the other hand, they managed to create more critical media coverage of that topic: "Generally it was a silence. So our success was that with these debates we managed to attract some of the journalists to write about TTIP critically." (Interviewee 1 2018) All in all, they see that the critical voices they added to the picture made it more complete: "So you can see it in its totality, you see the whole picture, not just a fragment. I think we contributed to see the bigger picture." (Interviewee 25 2018)

As we see, by 'debate' they do not mean superficial persuasion, but a sound debate highlighting both perspectives on TTIP. This does neither mean that the perspectives on TTIP itself cannot be conflictual, nor does it mean that they give up their critical stance on it, but the debate is supposed to be balanced. The conflicts they created were therefore valued as political successes, because it encouraged the debate on TTIP. For example, one interviewee points to the impact that the Anti-TTIP movement had on the consciousness of other actors in the field, especially regional parliaments, which became more aware of the influence and responsibility: "But there was a moment when we said: - "Hell, the 'Stop TTIP' movement was able to create huge political conflict and that regional regional parliaments say: "We have to be more conscious, We have to be more responsible with EU politics."" (Interviewee 29 2019) The interviewees see their responsibility in this conflict to reach towards a more democratic Europe, not only to 'win' the battle against TTIP: "Am Ende hat es vielleicht

nicht das Ergebnis gebracht, aber dafür ist eine Demokratie auch nicht da. Natürlich kann ich mal in der Minderheit sein. Das ist auch in Ordnung. Wenn ich in der Minderheit bin, muss ich mich der Mehrheit fügen. Aber wenn ich als Minderheit schon von vornherein den Mund halte, wobei sich bei TTIP natürlich fragen lässt, ob das jetzt die Mehrheit oder die Minderheit war, wenn ich den Mund halte und nichts sage mache ich mich mitschuldig." (Interviewee 5 2018) This means that it is not only and maybe not even primarily about the result of the debate, but rather about the responsibility and readiness to act if there is no political discussion about such a far reaching policy as TTIP.

Analyzing how conflicts are understood abstractly by my interviewees as well as how they dealt with it in concrete terms, reveals more of their understanding of politics and citizenship per se. As we have seen, interestingly, one of the biggest problems for the activists (and a reason for them to engage) was the impression that their disagreement was not seen as part of a conflict that has to be taken seriously by the European Commission. To put it a bit more bluntly, Anti-TTIP activists mobilized, (also) because they saw a lack of conflict concerning TTIP. A feeling that there was no 'real' debate in public, no serious discussion represented in the media and no interest in counter-arguments shown by the EU Commission was one of the reasons to make this topic more conflictual. Here, we can see how the conviction that conflict opens up for political debates led them to create a new space to discuss the TTIP contract. "We want to be troublemakers regarding TTIP" (Interviewee 1 2018). This this quote, which gives this dissertation its title, reflects the perceived need for more fundamental criticism of the TTIP contract openly discussed in a public arena.

But how do they see their own role in this process, or in their own words: "What is your citizen's responsibility?" (Interviewee 11 2018) According to the findings, citizens must inform themselves and others and thereby have to "be aware of the problems and alternatives" (Interviewee 1 2018). What seems fundamental to acting as a responsible citizen is the process of consciousness raising: The interviewees' roles as part of the civil society are seen as intermediary agents between the general public and the political. The knowledge they have (for example from leaked sources) is their privilege, but also creates responsibility. Their task is to spread this information in order to encourage ordinary citizens to join the protests. Furthermore, they also feel a high

responsibility towards their fellow citizens, as they want to protect and to instruct them how and why to get engaged: "to explain like: "You need to care about the European Union"" (Interviewee 13 2019).

This relates back to the process of responsabilization that indicates that an action can be considered an act of citizenship. The interviewees' responsibilities are oriented in two directions: First, to make claims and their voices heard towards the decision-makers and second to create awareness and solidarity in other citizens. In both roles, the findings suggest that the interviewee feel as 'the favored few', which means that they see themselves as multipliers with a special responsibility that they need to fulfill due to certain privileges they have. These privileges can be personal and structural factors that play a role in this process of responsabilization as for example, having access to money, personnel, skills and time seems to encourage professional civil society actors to become active on this topic. In other words, it triggers responsabilisation when the conditions to engage are favorable. In this sense, the feeling of responsibility should be considered as spectrum, on which the interviewees take different positions. While their activation is preceded by this feeling of responsibility, not every interviewee feels it the same way. However, what they all share is the general belief that the citizens themselves are responsible (in parts) for political outcomes. Therefore, another duty they have as citizens is that of a 'watchdog' of the political. As powerful parts of the political they have the duty to engage when an important decision such as the TTIP deal is about to be made. This collides with the EU's (presumed) understanding of the 'good' citizen who allows politicians to rule untroubled, which is mentioned by this interviewee: "if people trust the government, then everything is fine. All calm." (Interviewee 19 2018) In contrast to that, however, the feeling of a civic responsibility and the consciousness "that we are all part of what is happening" (Interviewee 20 2018) is a decisive factor to act like a citizen: The role of the 'Troublemaker' is born.

The figure of the 'Troublemaker' is, as I outlined in the introduction, a self-description of one of the interviewees, which refers to their role as political actors, who cause some trouble for the political status quo. Politicians cannot just move on, they cannot continue with their 'business as usual', as there are people on the streets and sometimes in front of their offices claiming a say. This 'trouble' is seen as an important

asset to European democracy. It is regarded as the citizen's right, and, first of all, as their duty. In fact, we can find the classical idea of rights and duties reflected in the interviewees self-understanding as citizens: "Wir Bürger haben Rechte und Pflichten."⁴⁴ (Interviewee 21 2018) However, this is neither the end of the quote nor the end of this line of thought. This must be further explained: What is interesting is that these rights and duties are seen as mutually codependent, they are not fixed, but in constant re-negotiation. As we have seen, there is a lack of trust in the EU due to the feeling that fundamental rights are not respected. For example, when privileging economic powers over citizens' interests and the common good. In the same vein, the claim for more information about the TTIP is connected to the more general demand for more transparency in European decision-making. To summarize, there is not enough trust that the EU, meaning the European politicians, fulfill *their* duty to protect the citizen's rights and govern on their behalf. This lack of trust created the demand towards politicians to "be more responsible to its citizens and voters when deciding on such issues" (Interviewee 1 2018). However, as interviewees criticize that they do not feel their rights to be (enough) protected, this is considered as a 'breach of contract'. As a consequence, citizens feel invoked or even obliged to turn into 'Troublemakers'.

And this is how the quote and its line of thought continues: "Wir Bürger haben Rechte und Pflichten. Wir haben und Rechte und Pflichten und ich kann nicht sagen ich gebe ihre ... etwa keine Gewalt [anwenden], aber die Pflicht vom Staat [ist es] die Grundrechte zu respektieren... in der Flüchtlingskrise, in der Eurokrise und in dem neuen Handelsabkommen wird das Grundrecht durch unseren Staat unterminiert. Und das können wir nicht ... wir können das nicht tun. Das können wir nicht akzeptieren."⁴⁵ (Interviewee 21 2018) In other words, civil disobedience, but also more generally to take in a critical stance, is seen as a justifiable and necessary instrument to, in the interviewee's words, 'defend democracy'. Consequently, I intended to show that not only does the criticism of certain policies determine civic action, but it is also the collective duty of citizens to defend their rights, and more generally, the state of

⁴⁴ "We, as citizens, have rights and duties."

⁴⁵ "We, as citizens, have rights and duties. We have rights and duties and I can't say I'll give yours ... not to [use] force for example, but the duty of the state [is] to respect fundamental rights... in the refugee crisis, in the euro crisis and in the new trade deal the basic right is being undermined by our state. And we can't do that...we can't do that. We cannot accept that."

democracy as a whole. This brings me to the conclusion that the responsabilizing process of the activists brings about a citizen who feels responsible to be informed, to inform others and eventually to bring their criticisms and concerns into the political decision-making process. However, this role is seen as a balancing one, which reacts to how conscientious the state fulfills its duty to protect the citizens' rights and devotes their political decisions to the common goods. While the citizens' active role is considered as necessary to maintain the democratic quality of politics, to cause some trouble 'in the name of democracy' is also considered appropriate in certain situations. Also, as we will see later on, the process of responsabilization is of major importance when it comes to the topic of political subjectivation.

EU-critical citizenship

It seems almost too obvious that the European level is of great importance for the experiences of citizenship in the context of this European protest which targets the European institutions and its policies. Therefore, let's step back and ask, taking into account the concept of scales, what are the meanings connected to 'Europeanness' and (how) do they matter for their experiences of citizenship?

The fact that the European dimension is omnipresent in the protests due to the topic (a European policy), the setting (a European-wide discourse) and the actors (the EU as well as European civil society actors and citizens) of the conflict does not mean that it is the only level of importance. On the contrary, the local and regional level became particularly important for the protests, as a more direct and personal interaction was possible. Therefore, the campaigning was spread out to the more rural areas by special tours or informal exchange between the regions. Not only was there a need to exchange, to inform and to mobilize, but there was also a need for "empowerment" (Interviewee 25 2018). The subnational level became an important space to mobilize against TTIP when creating so-called "TTIP-free zones", where it was the municipalities and their mayors who declared themselves TTIP-free: "So that was like even more sexy because you have the local level and the European level without the national level." (Interviewee 22 2018) While it is true that the national governments lost importance as a level to address their claims, still, the nation state was experienced as a significant

space to become politically active as interviewees felt more powerful on the national compared to the European level. This is rooted in an understanding of the EU as a conglomerate of the national stakeholders: The national governments were not only considered important for the final decision for or against TTIP, but they are more generally considered responsible for decisions on the European level.

The question who decides in EU politics seems to be decisive for where they direct their activism to. The findings do not give a clear-cut common understanding of this question. For some, it is the nation states only, due to the supranational institutional construction of the EU. For what concerns the EU Commission, in which the member states are represented, the EU becomes just another level of national decision-making. But there is also the other side of the coin: The so-called 'two table'-metaphor (the same national politicians sitting at two (the national and the European) table at once) illustrates why national politicians blame the EU for outcomes they are actually responsible of: "the government always says that anything bad is imposed by Brussels." (Interviewee 10 2018) Interviewees see their national governments using the EU as a scapegoat for any national development to the worse.

For others, the national level lacks power because it is externally controlled by the European system. In this case, the EU is seen as an unitary actor deciding both on the EU level as well as imposing decisions on and *for* the national level. The nation states instead lack power, knowledge and skills to create EU politics, and the national electives "are already sold out" (Interviewee 1 2018), meaning that they do not have their own agenda, but just follow along what the EU tells them to do. This reflects power inequalities within the EU member states, which continue to exist: The conditions and history of the countries is seen as an important factor regarding their power in EU politics today. Also the size of the country and consequently its seats in the EU Parliament are considered important aspects: "this feeling like we are just too small and we are just irrelevant that we can't change anything" (Interviewee 1 2018). However, for some, the relatively low power of the country in respect to others in the EU relieves them from responsibility, for example, "Croatia usually just is happy not to be in the focal point in any of the decision-making processes." (Interviewee 22 2018)

The power discrepancies are often exemplified with Germany being the most powerful country in the EU: "If you want to understand European politics and where the power

lies, you need to be interested in Germany, because Germany calls the shots in the European Union. Like it, you can hate it, but that's the way it is." (Interviewee 13 2019) The relative strength Germany has is seen as contributing to other countries' weaknesses, as Germany is seen as the leading power in political decisions. Another reason that matters is the EU membership history of the country, especially for new "EU countries: "Yeah, but look: We are new countries. And also the level of, we are treated differently, with a different voice ... we are given a different power, I mean less power." (Interviewee 9 2018) As a consequence to this, the nation state level seems to be unable to represent critical voices towards European policies, for example to say 'no' to TTIP, as states would not be able to hold up their power against the political dominance of the EU or other member states. Such power inequalities and conflicts between member states are also reflected in the creation of the Anti-TTIP movement, as they seem to be recreated on the level of civil societies: While the German Anti-TTIP movement is very broad from the beginning, others are struggling to raise money to start a strong campaign. However, as we will see later, the movement 'Europeanized' in a different way: While inequalities did not disappear, they managed to use them in a constructive way, meaning to exchange on their strengths to learn from each other.

While the findings show different understandings of the decision-making processes in the EU (as a unitary actor or as a conglomerate of nation states), the meanings connected to it indicate a lot of similarity. What is striking is that these meanings are still connected with the EU's ideals or "founding principles" (Interviewee 16 2019), such as peace, open borders, cultural diversity, sharing the same norms and standards, as well as basic rights. The EU is associated with progress, modernity, and hope. Many interviewees share their personal disappointment when those ideals were put into question. A notable example is the EU membership process, which is loaded with expectations: "In that process, Europe was seen as something, you know, some sort of light at the end of the tunnel. And everything will be great when we join the EU because then it will be like we were always European and now everybody will know that we are European. And it will be some sort of you know standard. Norms will be advanced. It will mean that we will foster ... we will kind of enhance these with our effort as a kind of society striving to become a member." (Interviewee 1 2018) For the 'younger' EU member states, the new 'EU reality' was loaded with disappointment and the

realization that there is a great discrepancy to the ideals the EU is associated with. In other examples, it was the EU's management of the financial crisis of 2008, which created this impression.

Apart from this criticism, the EU is perceived as a neoliberal project, which is felt far away from the lives of the people. One interviewee parallelizes the EU with a big trade deal, as it is seen as a purely economic project: "the European Union is in the DNA a big free trade agreement, a big free market. And we have to destroy that. We have to really overcome that and that neoliberal politics are imposed over all other political criteria above international human rights, legislation, constitutional rights. So we have a lot of things to do still there in the European Union." (Interviewee 29 2019) Just like in the TTIP, beneficiaries of the EU's decisions are expected to come from the financial and economic sector. But even more importantly, this quote exemplifies the wish for a political EU that the interviewees strive for.

Since the TTIP conflict concerned the relation between the EU and its citizens, it was possible to create and re-create a more direct link between the two, by the citizens enacting their role as *European* citizens. As we have seen, the different (subnational, national, European) levels are regarded as separate, but interconnected. Most importantly, however, they are seen as *more or less suitable* for a specific protest action: "It really depends on the level most suitable. I don't think that it's sort of an eye opener: - "Oh, we need to always be like this."" (Interviewee 22 2018) In the TTIP conflict, their orientation towards the European level is made very clear: "*we need to make this a European story.*" (Interviewee 22 2018) The European level is important for questioning the legitimacy of the deal, for creating awareness of an important policy, but also on the level of identification, solidarity and cooperation among citizens. They underline their civic responsibility when they say "the EU is us. EU is our government." (Interviewee 10 2018). However, the EU already feels to be "so far away" (Interviewee 23 2018). Politics on the supranational level is still rather difficult to grasp and even though there is a clear conviction that it gains and deserves more attention, EU politics is still seen as playing a subordinate role. As a consequence, "the level of discussions about European issues is very limited" (Interviewee 25 2018), which was impeding the public debate about TTIP at the beginning. The complexity of TTIP further added to the political distance between the EU and its citizens and a limited understanding of EU

history and politics, in return, is expected to affect the citizen's readiness to claim their rights.

All in all, the European dimension is present, however not omnipresent, when it comes to the way the interviewees experienced themselves as citizens in this conflict. Their perspective on the European Union and their role within frames their experiences of citizenship: On the one hand, they appreciate the unfinished character of the EU as it creates new windows of opportunity to act out civic participation. On the other hand, it is precisely this 'incompleteness' of the EU which makes it necessary to claim basic rights of civic co-determination in EU politics. Aggravating this situation, there is much less knowledge and professional experience from the side of the activists for what concerns the political proceedings on the supranational level. At the same time, gaining access to this level means a broadening of possible allies, new topics, and innovative ways to mobilize and campaign that can be illustrated looking at the Anti-TTIP movement: The movement's transnational approach was experienced as very promising. While the national level lost importance, the supranational and the subnational levels gained significance for the citizens' political participation.

As a consequence of the experiences made in the Anti-TTIP protests, on several layers, a de-romantization of the EU politics took place: The (pro-European) activists lived the harsh EU-political reality which was perceived as not democratic (enough), exclusive, superficially managed and unjust. While the ideals of the European Union, as outlined before, are explicitly supported, its current shape is criticized or even refused: *"So in principle, he's in favor of cooperation between people and between governments.[...] But then he found out that this this European Union is not, does not correspond to his vision for cooperation between people."* (Interviewee 16 2019) The experiences made as citizens in the Anti-TTIP protests added to their EU-critical stance. The hopes associated with the EU have been disappointed and the experiences made were even lowering their estimations. What is noteworthy at this point is that these unfulfilled expectations of the EU created a (new) consciousness about the EU's deficits. Remembering the mobilizing potential of crises outlined in the first chapter, this is not necessarily problematic: While it creates dissatisfaction with the polity, it can also trigger a force for change. In fact, the discrepancy between ideals and reality of EU politics is not the endpoint of their political engagement. For the Anti-TTIP protesters, it

was the starting point of raising political debates on a more fundamental level: What kind of Europe do we want? In what kind of (European) society do we want to live? What distribution of power is democratic and sustainable in European politics? These questions remain unanswered, as they are meant to be discussed more broadly in a public debate. But what can be stated is that the interviewees see the EU as a construct that needs to be changed - and therefore they get this change started. As part of this change, they enact a new role that citizens can play in European politics.

Against the background of the active and responsible role that citizens in the Anti-TTIP protests enact, one has to specify their understanding of citizenship as European. The last sections outlined the interviewee's political concerns and critique of the European Union in the case of TTIP and beyond. The following story told by one of the interviewees reflects the tension in which the movement operated, namely that between EU criticism and a blunt rejection of the EU as a whole:

"Ich habe Unterschriften gesammelt unter den Bekannten und wir waren auf einer großen Veranstaltung. Und da war ein junger Mann und ich fing an zu sprechen: - "Wissen Sie, dass die europäische Union einen Vertrag mit den USA abschließen?"- Und dann sagte er: - "Okay, wo soll ich unterschreiben? Europäische Kommission ohne uns. Ich unterschreibe gleich." - Okay, so haben einige Leute gedacht. Und zum Schluss wir haben ein bisschen Angst, dass diese Initiative ein bisschen gegen die EU ist. Ich bin für die EU. Ich denke dieses Projekt, dieses EU-Projekt ist sehr wichtig für Europa. Und dann hatten wir ein bisschen Angst, weil wir müssen ein bisschen anders mit den Leuten sprechen. Wichtig ist die Europäische Kommission, weil die Leute reagieren: . - "Ahh, Europäische Kommission ohne uns. Das wollen wir nicht."⁴⁶ (Interviewee 17 2018)

⁴⁶ "I collected signatures from acquaintances and we went to a big event. And there was a young man and I started to speak: - "Do you know that the European Union make a deal with the USA?"- And then he said: - "Okay, where should I sign? European Commission without us. I'll sign right away." - Okay, that's what some people thought. And finally, we are a bit afraid that this initiative is a bit anti-EU. I am in favor of the EU. I think this project, this EU project is very important for Europe. And then we were a bit scared because we have to talk to people a little bit differently. The European Commission is important because people react: . - "Ahh, European Commission without us. We don't want that."

This reaction is what another interviewee describes as an allergy (Interviewee 2 2018), as an immediate and unreflected reaction against the EU institutions. Besides the problem that there is this automatism when it comes to EU politics, it also highlights the fine line between Euroscepticism and EU criticism that often appear identical at first glance. What crystallizes in the experience of this interviewee is the risk that the campaign against TTIP is misunderstood as an Anti-EU-campaign. To put it simply: the findings make clear that the activists are not against the EU, but against TTIP and the way the EU handled it. Still, this does not protect them from being classified as 'Eurosceptic'. What best sums up the interviewees' EU-critical attitude is this typical beginning of a sentence: "I'm very pro European, but..." (Interviewee 1 2018).

What they all agree on however is the need to be more critical of EU politics and to question it publicly if needed. Despite the disparity between criticizing and rejecting the EU, which has been exemplified in the previous quote, we can see that the interviewees opt for a reform of the EU: "I think I tried, I think I always try to separate between the current EU leadership and the EU as a concept. Saying that you can fight against what the neoliberal EU is doing right now and that still doesn't mean that you're against the EU." (Interviewee 10 2018) Their criticism is based on the reformist perspective, that the EU is a political construct that needs to be improved. In other words, they fight not in a *revolutionary*, but in a *reformist* way. This 'reformist approach' is best symbolized by an interviewee comparing it with the renovation of a house: instead of tearing down the whole structure, they seek to adapt the house to their needs. The claim for more power for citizens in combination with less power for states should, however, not be misunderstood as the "storming of the bastille" (Interviewee 21 2018), but a re-evaluation of the role of citizens in European politics. It means that not the people in power, but the distribution of power should be changed: It is not the citizens who want to become the new rulers, but they want to be heard by their representatives.

Since the TTIP opponents consider themselves not as opponents of the project of the EU, it seems very important for them to differentiate between those two: "it really is a really common short circuit to say that if you're against some European politics about, I don't know, GMO or nuclear power or whatever, then you're against Europe." (Interviewee 23 2018) However, some have the feeling that "you shouldn't be criticizing anything really" and therefore they have to "fight with this barrier of explaining why are

you critical at all." (Interviewee 23 2018) Against the presumed concept of the 'good citizen', in which, dangerously, 'trust' is equated with political support, critical citizens feel judged with suspicion. In breaking with such expectations of how they should behave as 'good citizens', they are causing disorder. They feel perceived as troublemakers, as calmness is supposed to be better than a conflictual disruption of the sociopolitical order - even if it is for the sake of a more democratic debate. However, a silencing of critical voices is expected to come at a high price: "Yeah, being in favor of or against the European Union is a false debate, because it does not permit to talk about a lot of alternatives existing." (Interviewee 29 2019) As a consequence, fundamental questions risk to remain unsolved, having the potential to become the foundation of a 'different Europe': "It was really about our society. How our society is organized, like how we respond to the real global issues with which affect us. And this is not about European Union "Yes' or 'No', or inside / outside the European Union." (Interviewee 29 2019) What most of them claim instead is a deep change: a different Europe.

It is striking how different EU criticism is considered compared to national criticism. As there is no pronounced democratic tradition to criticize and critically debate EU politics on a regular basis, interviewees feel more used to criticize national politics. While we have seen that the EU is considered a particularly open political space to enact citizenship due to its provisional character, it is also particular in how its criticism is managed: "Wir haben darüber gesprochen, dass auf europäischer Ebene passiert was auf nationaler Ebene nicht wirklich passiert, nämlich, dass nämlich die inhaltliche Politik mit den Institutionen an sich gleichgesetzt wird."⁴⁷ (Interviewee 24 2018) However, the findings also reveal that 'being critical' is not self-understood as an important democratic value that adds to the quality of decisions and democracy itself. On the contrary, we can reconstruct from the interviewees' quotes that this can, also in the national context, be an important change of perspective when motivating others to become active:

"And to get people to understand that you can be critical about some policies and some whatever we have in Estonia, then you are not against the

⁴⁷ "We have talked about the fact that what is happening at European level is what is not really happening at national level, namely that policy on content is equated with the institutions themselves."

government directly, you are not against that and no Estonian state, you're not against democracy. This is not really ... people don't understand. They understand on a technical level you can say that you're against it but they still consider it as sort of not anarchist but well you probably have some kind of personal problems because you are against everything and we have the nice Estonian family here and we are part of the same tribe. And you shouldn't be against like one of like yourselves ..." (Interviewee 23 2018)

It cannot be disregarded that individuals were torn between their general support of the EU and the (sometimes fundamental) criticisms they have. A one-sided EU-criticism is what they consider as equally problematic, not the least because it moves achievements and potentials of the EU into the background. Media as well as civil societies have the responsibility to contribute to a balanced and non-dramatized coverage and education about the EU. An interviewee used a German proverb that says: Do not throw the baby out with the bathwater (Interviewee 24 2018). It warns from discarding something valuable along with something undesirable. Since the EU is still in the making, the interviewees see that there is much to gain when citizenship is enacted in the European setting, where new practices and understandings of citizenship are waiting to be found and tried out. Being critical about EU politics does not keep them from being pro-European. In fact, it is the *"big gap"* (Interviewee 16 2019) between what the EU is and what it could be that motivates them to take action. As outlined in the previous paragraph, the current status quo is seen as anti-democratic, elite-centered, unequal, 'fake' and not social. Coming back to their ideal of the EU's principles, what they fight for is an EU which implements its founding principles. It stays obscure what these principles are that the EU is asked to root back to. But what is more important to note is that they detect a disparity between their ideals and the real-life experiences they gained in the TTIP protest. It seems to be this disparity that fuels their activism.

Criticism is a social and reflective practice of evaluation. In this respect, 'being critical' is not enough; rather, it is important to elaborate and reflect on *how* to be critical. As I just stated, in their criticism of EU politics, the interviewees distinguish clearly between EU criticism and Euroscepticism. In other words, they do not refuse the political idea of the EU, a position here framed as Euroscepticism, but wish for an alternative EU that

can be obtained by reform. The latter will be called EU criticism. The findings show how there is clear need for this distinction, as too often EU criticism is equated with EU skepticism. Especially in the TTIP conflict, the interviewees mention situations in which they were titled 'Eurosceptic' when criticizing the course and content of European politics. The other way around, the attribution to be in favor of the EU does and should not be equated with supporting EU policies. They underline the paradox that the EU polity is perceived as being fundamentally rejected, when only EU policies are refused. They, on the contrary, clearly distinguish between those two sorts of criticisms: *"So it's not like everyone has the same reasons to vote against, some people are in principle against the idea of the European Union and some people are against the policies that now it represents."* (Interviewee 16 2019) Being aware that both kinds exist, they distance themselves both from 'EU bashing' and from a romanticizing EUphoria. This is what is meant by EU-critical citizenship.

Summary

"Das ist von uns, wir machen das selbst." (Interviewee 5 2018)

Throughout the last paragraphs, it became clear that the profound and far-reaching criticism of the EU's performance in the TTIP conflict in particular and its political structure in more general terms highlight the discrepancies between the status quo of EU politics and the citizen's expectations of it. These disappointments were definitely an important trigger to mobilize, combined with a declining level of trust, nourished by their experiences in the Anti-TTIP protests. Against the background of these criticisms, alternative paths can be reconstructed: a more citizen-centered decision-making, which means an orientation by the policymakers towards the citizens and not towards so-called economic powers; sharing power with citizens, which means to include the citizens' political participation in the decision-making process; more instruments to make this civic participation possible; more transparency in the decision-making process, a lively, open and especially open-ended debate, understood as a means to democratize democracy; an attitude to listen to citizens and to take them serious as powerful political agents.

The experiences of citizenship that are portrayed indicate which citizenship is enacted: In the Anti-TTIP protests, citizens claim for rights of participation and transparency. However, the political subject that is created through these acts of citizenship is an active, responsabilized and EU-critical citizen. Their enactment of a different understanding of the role of citizens in European politics can only be fully understood in respect to their experiences made in the Anti-TTIP protests. As we have seen, they were mostly disillusioning: Above all, the rejection of the ECI (that later turned out to be unlawful) and the intransparent and exclusive negotiation process raised questions about the role citizens (can) have in EU politics. However, in the course of the protests, the activists formulated answers to these questions. In their acts of citizenship, they enact a different understanding of the citizens' role. There are diverse ways in which this role is performed, what they have in common however is that citizenship is enacted as

- 1) *active* meaning that citizens participate proactively in political processes and raise their (critical) voices as well as control the way decision-makers exercise their power,
- 2) *responsible* claimants of rights that need to be taken seriously in their proposals and criticisms by the political decision makers, because they acquire knowledge and professionalize in regard of relevant topics and structures and provide solid arguments for the basis for an informed decision
- 3) *EU-critical* in a constructive sense in order to improve the problematic aspects of the EU construct, in contrast to a blind (EU skeptical) anti-stance.

In sum, the role of citizens that is anticipated here is one in which the right to participate and to be critical as well as the duty to act responsibly play a significant role. The way they see themselves as European citizens is possibly best summed up by the above-quoted interviewee saying about the EU: "This belongs to us, we do it ourselves." (Interviewee 5 2018) We see that the responsibility to act is created as it "belongs to us", which in turn also opens up space to change it by their own action: "we do it ourselves". Their role as 'Troublemakers' of the political is that of an attentive, claiming and criticizing political subject within the discourse, who creates some trouble for the sake of democracy. It is not that of a political ruler who takes over

power. This distinguishes them from revolutionary forces, whose goal is to deprive decision-makers from their power. The activists' goal however, is a reform of the distribution of power in favor of the citizens. However, their own power as citizens was discovered only through participation, as we will see in the next part. What I will outline in the following is how these experiences not only created space for new transnational cooperation and a sustainable European network, but they also enabled citizens to develop a new self-understanding as European citizens. It created an awareness of the citizen's power, its limits and potentials and how to use it. We will see how action informs political subjectivation and how, reversely, a new self-understanding is performed in protest. In this mutually dependent, circular process, I aim to show how acts of European citizenship bring about political subjects as European citizens. What turns out to be equally important however, is that this process takes place in a collective, of which the interviewees felt part.

Political subjectivation process: ENACTING European citizenship

"But then when TTIP came I realized that there is something even higher or more important that could affect us all." (Interviewee 9 2018)

The first part of the analysis showed that the rejection of the ECI created political subjects with claims. The next section outlined which claims were central and how, by enacting them, an activist and EU-critical citizen was created. To make actions an act of citizenship, claims are always directed towards "citizenship as justice" (Isin 2009, 372). And in fact: The interviewees make clear that what is crucial is the feeling that it is not right or even "insane" (Interviewee 3 2019). Isin states: "to be a citizen is to make claims to justice" (Isin 2009, 384) and this, in turn, makes acts of citizenship political acts. Therefore, this section asks: How did the Anti-TTIP protesters become political subjects with claims? The short answer to this question is: through *enacting* citizenship. Following the enactment approach, it's acts where subjects constitute themselves as citizens (Isin 2009, 377). The political subjectivation process is seen as taking place in the enactment of an act of citizenship, where claims towards the political are communicated. A more detailed look at the subjectivation process however displays *how* citizenship is enacted.

Despite their criticism, their will to participate in EU decision-making is not diminished by the limited possibilities to engage. The growing interest to know about EU politics and eventually to have a say in it as citizens or civil society is not thwarted by the lack of instruments and by the exclusion from EU politics. Despite all the disappointments and setbacks, they feel responsible to act. Surprisingly enough, we can detect that the experiences outlined in the last part entail the potential to develop a self-understanding as a European citizen: As we will see, this is only possible, because citizens became politicized. In the TTIP conflict, we can see a politicization process taking place, in which citizens responsabilized for the opposition against TTIP in the realm of EU politics. When claiming rights, in Isin's words, activists are "responsibilizing" (Isin and Nielsen 2008, 1) themselves for claims that go beyond their individual interests: As we have seen in the previous section, Anti-TTIP activists cared for issues that go far beyond the expected outcomes of TTIP, but concern the future of European democracy as a whole. 'Responsibilizing' as a verb underlines that it is an act, a process, in which citizens actively involve in political issues. As we will see, it is decisive for the process of political subjectivation and therefore of central interest to understand how the 'Troublemakers' came into being.

"For me it was quite incredible all she was saying and all the others were just sitting there quite relaxed. And I thought: - "Oh my god." - I mean they were all paying attention, but they were not as blown." (Interviewee 18 2019) In this quote, the interviewee shows him*herself surprised about the reaction of "all the others", who keep calm in view of the threats by TTIP. The interviewees themselves disclose how they have been moved emotionally describing feelings of anger, outrage, shock and fear in the moment when they were learning about TTIP. As we will see, the process of responsabilising starts from this emotional reaction as they realize how they are directly affected by this policy. On the contrary, political passivity was traced back to people's inability, unwillingness or fear to be held accountable: "I think they are afraid of being responsible or accountable or something" (Interviewee 23 2018). Obstacles why one would not participate range from disinterest or a lack of knowledge, structural reasons such as a lack of time and energy, to emotional detachment.

Most importantly, as a consequence, the feeling of responsibility is missing as "no one really felt an ownership." (Interviewee 13 2019) The interviewees' feeling of

responsibility is based on realizing that they, on the contrary, do have the necessary conditions, means, skills, information and therefore feel the responsibility to become active. The aforementioned categories that keep undefined 'others' from getting involved correspond to their three main incentives to act: In contrast to emotional detachment, the interviewee's feeling is that they are directly affected. The second aspect is an awareness both of the policy and the problems it entails, and, even more importantly, of the political power each individual has to oppose them. Thirdly, the feeling of responsibility, is the decisive trigger to get involved. In this part, I will elaborate on the feeling of *affectedness*, *power* and *responsibility* that activated them to take part in the protests as European citizens.

Feeling affected and having emotional reactions

Intense personal experiences, which caused suffering and disappointment triggered the need to become active. This did not necessarily happen only due to the TTIP conflict. A Greek interviewee explicates, using the example of the European austerity politics, this as a process of a *"wide-spread realization, that this European Union that is taking this sort of decisions is not the one we would like to have and that this should change. So it politicized people. It turned people political. It turned people.. it had them start to think about what the European Union is and what it does."* (Interviewee 16 2019) We can see in this quote how the feeling of being directly affected by a policy is closely connected to this emotional reaction, and this is equally or even more outstanding in the case of TTIP. Especially at the first encounters the interviewees made with TTIP, we can see these emotional reactions expressed most intensely. It upset them, but it also sparked their interest and the need for more information. However, as we have seen, the intransparency and exclusive access that characterized the negotiations caused strong emotional reactions, that ranged from anger to disappointment, mistrust, fear and outrage. The feeling of affectedness stands in blunt contrast to the experienced exclusion from the negotiations.

Being negotiated on a European level, EU trade policies are often experienced as far away. More generally, as the interviewees point out, the EU itself feels far away for many citizens and even more such a complex policy like TTIP. However, TTIP raised

awareness of the importance of EU politics among the interviewees: "But then when TTIP came I realized that there is something even higher or more important that could affect us all." (Interviewee 9 2018) This realization led to a rise in consciousness about the influence of European politics on citizen's everyday life. In turn, it politicized EU (trade) politics: A new dimension of the political, namely the EU level as a space to enact citizenship, came in sight. The realization that EU politics directly affects them was just the first phase of the process of responsabilising. The decision to become active was, according to the findings, connected to this feeling to be affected by a certain topic or a policy.

We can see that emotional reactions accompany the consciousness of being affected by TTIP. Such emotions ranged from shock, to anger, to outrage, to worries of what will be the effects of TTIP. The choice of words often underline the interviewees' emotional agitation: "And then also it has a negative impact on democracy because you already feel defeated. You already are defeated. You are now put into ...[...]. And it's like unbelievable, you know. And you cannot believe that it's taking place and happens to you." (Interviewee 1 2018) Emotional reactions to injustices were experienced both by the activists themselves as well as when informing others about TTIP. Their reactions such as "That's insane!" (Interviewee 3 2019) were quoted by the interviewees when illuminating the details and potential effects of the TTIP contract. The experiences of how they were treated in course of the negotiations and increasing opposition 'traumatized' them - while their activism in the Anti-TTIP protests, in turn, can serve as a kind of 'therapy': "Und für mich wars, muss ich ehrlich sagen, auch ne Art Therapie. Weil ich hab mich dermaßen aufgeregt über diese Unverfrorenheit, über diese Art von Politik, wie man hier eigentlich über die Interessen des Gemeinwohls - könnte man mal zusammengefasst so sagen - hinweg geht nur im Interesse globaler Unternehmen."⁴⁸ (Interviewee 26 2018) Taking action seems to help to cope with these emotions.

⁴⁸ "And for me it was, to be honest, a kind of therapy. Because I got so upset about this impudence, about this type of politics, how the interests of the common good - one could put it in a nutshell - are only ignored here in the interests of global companies."

Awareness on two levels

'Awareness' is, in fact, a polysemous term, that is not clearly defined, but often mentioned by the interviewees as being fundamental for their political action. In the interviews, it is distinguished in two interfering and mutually informing processes: On the one hand it refers to the consciousness of the problem, on the other to the consciousness of being able to do something about it. The latter aspect must be regarded as something quite different from the first: The awareness of the problem is dependent on education about the TTIP contract, and especially of the broad consequences and potential dangers it entails. The awareness of their possibilities to act against it, however, is based on the interviewee's self-efficacy.

The raising of awareness for the problems the TTIP entails starts when they were confronted with information on this topic for the first time. One reaction is described in the following quote: "It was a huge, very long E-mail with a lot of explanation, with a lot of links. I read through it like twice and I was like: - "Really, something should be done about this."" (Interviewee 12 2018) As simple as it may sound: a precondition for their activation is to know about the problems it entails: "My point is that if you want to make a change in something or be active in some issues that seems to be problematic, you first need to be aware of it." (Interviewee 9 2018) This position reminds us of the strong claims for more transparency of the political process and an open debate. If we recall that the process of responsabilizing is about getting involved in something that goes beyond one's own interests, knowledge about the consequences of TTIP added awareness about how it will affect European democracy, and, by that, their lives and that of their fellow citizens in the future. The responsibility to make those fellow citizens aware weighs even more once they gained knowledge about TTIP's possible effects: "I mean, it's of course also some sort of moral and ethical responsibility to address these issues particularly if you are environmental activist and you see what you think can take place." (Interviewee 1 2018) This feeling of responsibility proliferates due to the socio-political importance the topic carries. As I have already pointed out, the interviewees see politics as a constant struggle and negotiation, and therefore citizens have to constantly insist on their rights. Due to the sociopolitical effects that were expected from TTIP and the deep influence on the

citizens' lives, the negotiations had to be more broadly discussed and more fundamentally criticized than they were at that time. This is the point when the criticism of the contract turns into criticism of the EU's democratic structures and a more fundamental debate was claimed. Interviewees make the point that especially *because* TTIP is such a complex topic, it needs to be debated in even greater detail.

One of the main goals was to raise awareness, understood as the information (of a wider public) about the dangers and risks of TTIP. However, to inform a broader public was a success as much as a challenge for them: "The biggest problem that we faced was that nobody knew about this stuff. TTIP, ISDS, all this, you know, strange groupings of letters and what is going on? So, our biggest problem was the awareness raising ..." (Interviewee 25 2018), especially when involving them in action. According to their experiences, their activism against TTIP succeeded in creating more awareness: "I just have a lot more people thinking critically about this topic in the civil society, in academia, in the media." (Interviewee 29 2019) First of all, the protests created awareness in the public for the TTIP contract as such. More importantly, it sensitized them for the critical aspects of this policy and politics in general. For example about aspects that exceed pure questions of trade and the citizens' role in this policy making. Along with the TTIP conflict and the related debate, TTIP became "dirty words" (Interviewee 11 2018), meaning that it had a bad effect on the public's opinion on TTIP: "No one wanted it. So yeah, I do think it was because of the movement. And that of course is a very powerful feeling, because it was like one of the biggest goals that I could have taken on probably." (Interviewee 11 2018) Through their criticism, addressed to their fellow citizens, a broad and quick politicization took place. But such successes also had another outcome, as they passed the message to the citizens that they also have power to intervene in the political process and to question policies like TTIP.

By engaging in the TTIP debate, they started to understand more about the topic of TTIP and trade as well as about the way politics and participation functions on an EU level. As one interviewee notes: "So yeah, at some point the organizations really wanted to be more professional." (Interviewee 1 2018) It gave birth to expert knowledge about trade and, more specifically, about TTIP: "we developed quite serious numbers of the experts." (Interviewee 25 2018) The way they fostered this

professionalization was through trainings, expertise sharing, and simulations. The interviewees elucidate that they gained much more expertise about the policy, the TTIP contract, but also about EU politics: In particular how to campaign against a policy on a European level: "I think I'm more informed if there is a need to sort of or have another issue that needs to be engaged on both national and European level, I think that all of those involved in the movement have an idea of what needs to be done." (Interviewee 22 2018) The need to find ways to influence politics from a subordinated position forced them to study the formally existent rules to participate: "So yeah indeed it was an exercise about getting to know better of what we have a say in." (Interviewee 10 2018) This means that besides the level of policies, they "were learning how to mobilize ourselves" (Interviewee 9 2018). This can be exemplified in their proactive and independent creation of means and strategies to participate.

As I outlined before, interviewees criticized that there were too little tools accessible. Their awareness for their own power was raised when they started to create their own tools: Tools like the sECI or TTIP-free zones, European Days of Action and a glass box with the 'secret' TTIP contract in front of the European parliament were created or combined in a new way. In doing so, they compared themselves with 'artists' choosing among a wide spectrum of campaign tools: "Es gibt ein Riesenfeld, so wie Künstler: man kann verschiedene Materialien nehmen und dann irgendwie mixen und machen. Und das verändert auch viel im Laufe der Zeit."⁴⁹ (Interviewee 15 2018) The protest experiences appear to have a broad professionalization effect as the level of expertise grew not only for expert activists, but for all actors involved. While they were unprepared at the beginning, now, they feel more prepared for future political conflicts. Coming back to the two layers of awareness, one can see that there is a considerable effect on both: Within the movement, there was expertise created by learning about the trade deal on the one hand, and how to influence it on the other.

Some of these competences will last for future mobilizations: "I think, I mean, I would say at least the success of the movement was that we were learning how to mobilize ourselves. I am hoping that next time, if there is a next time of any kind, we would be more prepared, more organized, more aware of the possibilities of cooperation."

⁴⁹ "There's a huge field, like artists: you can take different materials and then kind of mix and match. And that changes a lot over time."

(Interviewee 9 2018) In discussions and interaction with other experts they experience themselves as efficacious as other parties. However, the interviewees are facing the double challenge of feeling excluded from the political process on the one hand and seeing the need to use the limited impact they can have as citizens on the other.

The responsibility to act

In the interviews, the responsibility to act is marked by utterances such as "Il faudrait faire quelque chose"⁵⁰(Interviewee 2 2018), "this is something for me" (Interviewee 11 2018) and "We need to do something" (Interviewee 22 2018). While only very few of the interviewees use the word 'responsibility' as such, it is this feeling of responsibility from which their activism starts. As I mentioned before, we can define 'responsibilizing' as publicly raising claims that go beyond the interviewees' personal interests. Responsibility is expressed towards several, abstract groups of strangers, such as to fellow citizens, towards a national or European political community, or even a more general responsibility to the earth, the planet and their place in it as a "part of everything that is happening" (Interviewee 20 2018).

The feeling of responsibility, as elucidated in the interviews, occurs due to the fact that they, as activists, are well informed about TTIP and want to share their information advantage with other citizens: "also ich fühle mich als Bürger der sich nun mal in dieses Thema eingearbeitet hat und viele Informationen gesammelt hat, ich fühle mich eigentlich jetzt verpflichtet diese Informationen meinen lieben Mitbürgern mitzuteilen, zu informieren."⁵¹ (Interviewee 26 2018) As we saw in the last paragraph, through their professionalization, they became experts, which made them feel responsible to do something about it: "I feel responsible for doing something about this because there's only such a small group of people that knows about this trade agreement and what trade can do to the world." - I felt like I had this valuable knowledge that not everyone knew of. So I felt a lot of responsibility to do something about it." (Interviewee 11 2018)

⁵⁰ "Something should be done"

⁵¹ "So I feel like a citizen who has familiarized himself with this topic and has collected a lot of information, I actually now feel obliged to share this information with my fellow citizens, to inform them."

From this lead in information compared to their fellow citizens follows the “moral and ethical responsibility to address these issues” (Interviewee 1 2018) as well as the obligation to share their knowledge. For some, this was connected to a critique of the media that was not taking up this position of spreading information and starting a critical debate about TTIP: “So I was doing basically the journalist job because no one else was doing it. So I started.” (Interviewee 9 2018) In fact, this seems to be one of the biggest problems and at the same time an often mentioned trigger of responsiblizing that they faced in their activism: Because no one else felt responsible for the topic, they had to act. Even though some felt that with their engagement they were already surpassing their competences. In such difficult situations (for example, when fulfilling jobs, that they did not choose) their responsibility was pushing them forward. It felt, as one interviewee put it, without alternative (Interviewee 24 2018). While some experienced this as a burden, some felt it as a “mission” (Interviewee 11 2018) that they, as part of the favored few, had to face. This aspect becomes especially important as we have seen that there is little trust in those who are seen as technically responsible. In sum, it is notable that having the knowledge, the capabilities and the personal and structural possibilities to engage against TTIP made them feel responsible to act, while the emotional basis of their action is the feeling of affectedness.

As I outlined earlier, when the public became more aware, more became interested and eager to act in the topic of TTIP, it started a lively debate, and even conflict, about these issues, which reached much beyond the TTIP. Besides the concrete policy, citizens became more aware of trade politics, as much as it created more general awareness about the politics of the EU and the (defective) democratic processes. As I argued before, the democratic potential of this protest is rooted in the conflict they created around topics of broader significance than just a trade deal and the discussions this raised: “Yeah we were all talking about the future of the planet. And it was also this dissatisfaction with the model of society, politics and economy. And TTIP was just a beautiful horizontal topic that presented an opportunity for anybody to see something that they’re interested in and to say: - “That is why it is important.”” (Interviewee 22 2018) The debate was created by making TTIP a topic of a conflict, both in the public as well as within national parliaments, parties, between and in the EU institutions and

their American counterparts: "But there was a moment when we said: - "Hell, the 'Stop TTIP' movement was able to create huge political conflict and that regional regional parliaments say: "We have to be more conscious, We have to be more responsible with EU politics."" (Interviewee 29 2019)

Therefore, we can speak of a politicization process that created alternative thinking "about a new society, a whole new way of production and consumption." (Interviewee 29 2019) With that in mind, this awareness is expected to have created public knowledge that civil society can build on in the next "battle" (Interviewee 13 2019; Interviewee 10 2018). One interviewee refers to this potential using a metaphor: "And there is small, in Spanish we say Pozo ... Pozo is when you cook ... where the substance of your soup is, you can still have this basis for future mobilizations or future work on trade and investment." (Interviewee 29 2019) Even if they are also aware that the citizens' attention might be only short-term, temporary and limited in terms of numbers, it makes the interviewees self-conscious that they do not have to start "from zero" (Interviewee 10 2018) in the next campaign.

The Anti-TTIP protests as space to experience civic power

Even though the civil society made politicizing experiences during the TTIP conflict, they express disappointment that "it's kind of sad that we had to generate such a strong voice in order to be heard. It wasn't enough just to write our members of the European Parliament in thousands, it had to be tens of thousands. And it still wasn't enough, you know." (Interviewee 9 2018) In their activism, interviewees are confronted with challenges that can be expected to thwart their activism. One of them is the experience that they don't feel to have much power on the European level. What made them feel powerless is the impression that there is no real debate, but just a superficial participation of the public, in which they can only choose from pre-selected alternatives. Therefore, they even experience the consultations of the civil society as "disempowering" (Interviewee 10 2018). As I mentioned earlier, they fear that the EU uses the public's criticism in a destructive way. While this is another sign for their low trust in representatives on the EU level, who, giving priority to economic powers, strengthen the feeling that they have no control over European politics. For some, the

consciousness that their democratic power is so limited, came along with the experiences during their involvement in the TTIP protest: "Also ich hab den Eindruck, dass die Leute auch gemerkt haben auf der europäischen Ebene das stimmt manchen nicht, das ist in vielen Bereichen undemokratisch. Weil es hat vorher keinen Gegenstand gegeben, oder selten einen Gegenstand gegeben, mit dem die Leute sich so intensiv auseinandergesetzt hätten"⁵² (Interviewee 26 2018) These experiences bring us back to their fundamental criticism of the undemocratic status quo of the EU. It also unravels why a better TTIP is not satisfying their more structural intentions to democratize the EU. We can see here that, along with the experiences during their involvement in the TTIP protest, there is a rising consciousness for the minor role citizens play in European politics.

While those restrictions and the passive role associated with it make them feel powerless, their political activism against TTIP is an empowering experience. Just like their powerlessness was experienced vividly in their activism, also the civic power was discovered while participating: "Es sind die Bürger, denen bewusst geworden ist, dass die Politik nicht mehr kann ohne die Bürger. Das die Bürger die Garantie sind für was Politik ist."⁵³ (Interviewee 21 2018; see also: Interviewee 7 2018) Therefore, I argue that the Anti-TTIP protests can be regarded as a space to experience their influence on political decision-making. Facing limited possibilities to intervene as citizens, they interpret it as an indication that "*the European Commission wants to keep all the power*" (Interviewee 28 2018). Periodical elections cannot balance out this power inequality. Therefore, they claim for more rights to participate, apart from voting. In doing so, the interviewees frame the exclusion from the political process as a question of power. However one, in which power shifted - unexpectedly - towards the underdog: "... it's always like this David and Goliath thing that we always have these situations where a small weak has a victory over a big one." (Interviewee 1 2018) As I will show, as an important experience in this process of political subjectivation in the TTIP protests, an awareness of their own power was generated. They reflect that they don't have a lot,

⁵² "Well, I have the impression that people have also noticed at the European level that some people aren't right, that's undemocratic in many areas. Because there hasn't been an object before, or there's seldom been an object that people would have grappled with so intensely"

⁵³ "It is the citizens who have realized that politics can no longer function without the citizens. That the citizens are the guarantee for what politics is."

maybe also not enough, power - but even with these limited possibilities they had managed to slow down the process, to start a serious public discussion over TTIP by using the power at their disposal. Some are more optimistic than others that these political power structures can change after TTIP. What history shows, however, is that in the case of TTIP, the power they had was *just enough* to prevent TTIP.

As we will see in the following, experiences in the Anti-TTIP protests are not only dominated by disappointments and setbacks, they are also characterized by the growing consciousness that the protesters actually have civic power. This feeling of power goes beyond a mere functional understanding of citizens' power. An example would be the power of citizens as voters: The feeling of power is created by voting politicians in and out of office, assuming that politicians are dependent on their voters' voices. However, a feeling of power can also be created by being part of a movement, in which people join together as a collective and stand up for their claims. It becomes more concrete in this anecdote by an interviewee who told me his personal story of empowerment when he heard that the Wallonian government refused to sign the contract of CETA:

"That's really, I don't know, I have this one moment where I personally felt hopeful was the 13th of October 2016. I was in [Wallonian?] Parliament and I just heard that Austria was backing down from blocking CETA so basically Wallonia was by itself, the last one to stand and the last one to refuse to sign. And [??] went to the Belgian Parliament and pronounced the discourse that is now if you look at the [??] on a page on the big discourses of history: it is in there. It may be a bit exaggerated but still I have to admit at that moment I was like: - "Okay. I am kind of proud." - And I came out from this building in Namur and walked back to my car and drove back to Brussels. And just on the way to my car I could see stickers of "Stop TTIP", "Stop CETA" all over the city and then driving back to Brussels I just passed under the tunnel with big graffitis of "Stop TTIP". And also on the [Villa ??] just besides the Berlemont in the European neighborhoods on the streets every 10 meters because we had our big demonstration just two or three weeks before that. Still today there is written "No CETA", "No TTIP", "No TISA". It's kind of going away now but you can still see it. I felt like we did ... we conquered this space, this is ours." (Interviewee 10 2018)

This short report portrays how the power of the few, may it be the Wallonian government, which refuses to sign, or fellow citizens opposing the trade deal, is nourished by signs of support. The 'we' that the interviewee refers to in the last sentence still had to be created in performative action, such as the demonstration that had left marks of solidarity on the walls.

Not only did they experience themselves as powerful, they also found ways to demonstrate their power. Notable examples are the access to secret information, made public in leaks of parts of the contract, but also their decision to start a self-initiated ECI. It underlines the citizens' will to use their power to influence decision-making from bottom up. Besides that, they were creative in developing new transnational tools to mobilize, participate and articulate their disagreement. For example, the European Days of Action against TTIP, the declaration of TTIP-free zones and the organization of transnational protests and coalitions reflect the role they fulfilled as self-organized, creative and responsible agents of change. They did not feel like being listened to, but still they managed to create the power to speak up. Therefore, the potential of the Anti-TTIP experiences is to realize that "their voice matters, if they are loud enough and organized." (Interviewee 9 2018) This is explicitly mentioned as an outcome of their experiences within the Anti-TTIP protest: "Now you really believe that it has an impact and it's possible to change stuff. I think because of this experience." (Interviewee 11 2018) To make themselves heard and "that it's possible to have change from the bottom up" (Interviewee 22 2018) are transforming experiences. The TTIP protests created experiences for them to feel the ability to make a difference as citizens: "I think that it's important because it also shows that it's possible to have change from the bottom up. If you are actually loud enough that regardless of how much they wanted to ignore you that it actually can't happen." (Interviewee 22 2018) The personal impact is experienced as very empowering as they are filled with pride about what they managed to fight through. The personal expertise that was gained in the process was not only making them feel more powerful, but also enabled them to make special experiences, such as giving speeches and sharing their expertise.

This role is one that plays an active part in European decision-making, which differs from the former mind-set that citizens have no power to do so: "Not like what you're used to hear like: - "Oh we can't make a change as people"" (Interviewee 11 2018). Becoming consciousness of their civic power implies a realization that neither structures nor institutions are natural, on the contrary, they are all products of human decisions and can therefore also be changed by humans. However, the will to participate is not perceived enough for a sustainable change of the role citizens can play in EU politics. The interviewees claim that its obstacles are also rooted in the anti-democratic structures that are not responsive to the civic will to participate: "So the structures which are obsolete in Brussels must take into consideration the voices of people." (Interviewee 4 2018)

In the Anti-TTIP protests, we can see how this feeling of power is connected to the fact that citizens responsabilize for issues that go beyond their personal interest. In fact, this change towards more civic European politics is not only empowering, but also entails a lot of responsibility. As I have shown before, they see a responsibility for citizens to defend their rights, because they realize that TTIP affects them. However, whether these mismatches are translated into civic action depends on their perception of their own power. It is precisely when citizens experienced their civic power as meaningful in political processes that they also felt the duty to act out their rights and ideals, in other words: to enact their responsible, active and EU-critical understanding of citizenship. What we can extract from this is that only information is not enough for enacting citizenship: There is a fundamental need to develop a feeling of affectedness rooted in an emotional reaction and an awareness of the problem as well as of their own power to tackle it.

However, as this interviewee mentions, the responsibility to act can also feel intimidating: "Das wichtigste ist, dass – und ich spreche von Belgien – dass wir Bürger Angst hatten vor unseren eigenen Kräften. Und nicht ... ich meine was ist Kraft. Kraft ist nicht "Raaaah!", Kraft ist nicht präntentiös, Kraft ist nicht mehr sein zu wollen, mehr scheinen zu sein. Das ist nicht Kraft. Kraft ist Politik."⁵⁴ (Interviewee 21 2018) In this sense, the TTIP protest experiences are considered as a "big lesson to the European

⁵⁴ "The most important thing is that – and I am talking about Belgium – that we citizens were afraid of our own strength. And not... I mean what is power. Power isn't "Raaaah!", power isn't pretentious, power isn't wanting to be anymore, seeming to be more. That's not power. Power is politics."

public" (Interviewee 9 2018). It can be interpreted as a wake-up call for the citizen's power and responsibility alike. As such, this has the potential to stand for a bigger change as it is perceived a "benchmark" (Interviewee 1 2018) for future mobilizations. The experience of feeling powerful in this protest is expected to have far-reaching effects on the general motivation to engage: "So it really made me believe that you can actually stop things and create a change." (Interviewee 11 2018) This quote highlights how, in the Anti-TTIP protests, this interviewee experienced civic power, which was making them more self-conscious and eager to act.

Summary

"It turned people political. It turned people.. it had them start to think about what the European Union is and what it does." (Interviewee 16 2019)

'Becoming political' means as they "constitute constituents (actors with claims)" (Isin 2009, 383). In the last sections, I outlined which subjects are constituted and which claims are put forward. This section showed *how* these subjects with claims became political subjects, namely by responsabilizing beyond their personal interests. This is also why the aforementioned disillusioning emotions did not end up in passiveness or political apathy: Instead, protesters turned political by developing a feeling of responsibility to act. Isin and Nielson state that the responsabilizing process is the very beginning of becoming a citizen subject (Isin and Nielsen 2008, 1f.) One could summarize this process as constituting the birth of the citizen: In the moment when the emotional opposition turns into the responsibility to become active, the citizen is born. Starting from this responsabilization, I detect how the citizen's active contention as well as their alignment with other European protesters in their action led to a process of political subjectivation as European citizens in the Anti-TTIP protests. This process of political subjectivation describes how individuals are turned into citizens, here by the act of protesting. I claim that if we want to understand how people develop to political subjects as citizens, we must look at what kinds of experiences they make. Starting from the experiences in the TTIP protests, it becomes more concrete how citizenship is enacted through processes of responsiblizing for political action. The findings show that one becomes a citizen by acts of citizenship, i.e. by making the

experience of being a citizen in action: namely, in the feeling of affectedness, in being aware of the problem and one's power to act, in responsabilizing to become active and in the reflection of the civic power these practices entail. As we have seen, the Anti-TTIP protests bring about political subjects as citizens. However, it is important not to overlook the context in which they enacted their citizenship. As we will see in the next section, the movement against TTIP was a European-wide movement that therefore addresses *European* citizenship.

Horizontal Europeanization: Enacting EUROPEAN Citizenship

"This was my experience so far, being part of something bigger that is important." (Interviewee 20 2018)

In the last chapter we learned about 'Pozo', which is the rest of the soup, that you can metaphorically heat up for the next mobilization whenever needed. As we have seen, the politicization of a wider public spreaded broadly and, in an exceptional intensity, across borders. Although transatlantic ties to the American Anti-TTIP actors have also been created, it was primarily experienced as a European campaign. What qualifies these protests as an act of *European* citizenship is that it made claims to *European* citizenship. By making an appeal to the EU institutions claiming more rights to participate in these negotiations as well as in European politics per se, it performed a different kind of European citizenship in resistance. However, what meaning is given to the European scale in their enactment of citizenship? How exactly the several layers of 'Europeanness' played a role for the interviewees is important to understand the *European* dimension of enacting citizenship. The activities of the Anti-TTIP movement fueled the interconnectedness between activists. Actions like the sECI, local decentralized initiatives, the collective organization of the movement, demonstrations and other protest events, allowed the European ties in civil society to grow massively, not only in terms of actors and localities, but also in terms of skills and solidarity.

Three layers can be detected on which the Europeanization took place: European coordination, European activities against TTIP and growing European ties. I learned

about the very beginning of this European-wide coordination on TTIP in one of the interviews:

“And that is why we called immediately for a first European-wide coordination meeting on that issue. That was actually in the embassy of Austria in the European Union, because they have something that is called the „Arbeiterkammer“ which is like ... it is not a trade union, but it is like a tool of the trade union movement towards the negotiations with the government and they had their office in the Austrian embassy in Brussels. So we used their office and their room. And the room was packed at that time. So that gave it already a kind of signal that a lot of environment, big environmental NGOs and the European confederation were involved like „Transport Environment“, the „European Environmental Office“, „Greenpeace“, Europe ... the farmers movement, the women's movement, the Trade Union Confederation based in Brussels. So they came from different European countries, but also the bigger like civil society organizations based in Brussels doing all the time towards the European Commission or the European Council or the European Parliament were there. So that already gave you the idea that something bigger was going on. That was like the first move from the Seattle to Brussels Network, to organize this first European-wide movement. And from there it started to grow.” (Interviewee 29 2019)

Those coordination meetings remained important, because they were planning collective transnational actions (such as European days of action, demonstrations, the (s)ECI, how to approach politicians, and acts of civil disobedience), they were trying to understand and study the TTIP contract and had discussions about their positioning in this debate. I argue that besides this transnational coordination and action, the emotional component of building European ties was of major importance to build a European consciousness: Beyond borders, they were supporting and helping each other, both financially, emotionally and by giving each other tips what (not) to do as well as inspiring each other. Personal connections turned out to be the linchpin for transnational political action. Nicely put by this interviewee, this quote confirms that it is one of the most central aspects: “And maybe the content this is not so meaningful in the sense that you don't have different types of work groups. But just to get to know

the people and what other problems they have and how they operate, this [is] really useful." (Interviewee 23 2018) The experience to know who to call was mentioned as very meaningful and, in regard to the protests, as an outcome that outlasts the TTIP-specific protests. As we have seen before, this is especially true for the per se European tool, the sECI, that created a horizontal Europeanization of civil society. In the following, I will outline these three European dimensions in greater detail.

European actions, transnational cooperation and building European ties

The Anti-TTIP movement cooperated and exchanged intensively on a European level, especially when it comes to European action. 'European action' is understood as transnational activities that take place simultaneous in various locations across Europe, such as European Days of Action as well as European-wide demonstrations or the collection of signatures within the framework of the sECI. Not taking place on different occasions, but equally European were actions coordinated and planned by several European partners, such as the biggest Anti-TTIP demonstration in Berlin on October 10th in 2015. The transnational cooperation of these events include action planning and performing, understanding and studying the content of the TTIP contract, helping and supporting each other in case of problems, and discussing their own position towards TTIP.

The movement's activities can be considered 'European' in a double sense: First, they were taking place all over Europe and second, they were carried out by people and organizations from across Europe. As the activities were embedded in a European setting, the interviewees see them as "part of the broader scale, European-scale activities." (Interviewee 1 2018) Even though many of the activities were taking place in the political center of the EU, Brussels, they were trying to decentralize it. Consequently, the actors, too, came from all over Europe. On the one hand, this was seen as exceptional, as the size, the strength and the broadness of this network was growing massively. On the other hand, it was building on already existing networks from former mobilizations. Some of these connections were already established through other activities, but were revitalized through this cooperation. What was underlined as important and novel in this respect was the inclusion of Eastern and

Central European countries, which have not been so present in those networks before: "Actually, the campaign against TTIP and CETA created, ... for the first time I think, an all European network, because it was like ... because not only Western Europe but Center and Eastern was involved as well." (Interviewee 25 2018) However, it was stated that national differences in terms of civic engagement and access to resources continued to exist. However, the mere inclusion of the Eastern European countries was important for the unity of the network, as this was experienced as a long-standing desire that was finally fulfilled: "Yeah, that we felt finally, for the first time we felt that we were kind of unified in some case." (Interviewee 9 2018) This "bigger, but also [...] more complete union" (Interviewee 29 2019) is facilitating long-awaited interaction among its members.

The high level of cooperation, taking place in person and online, was underlined as an exceptional experience. The online coordination took place through video conferences, phone calls as well as mailing lists. While most meetings in person still took place in Brussels, hostings in other capitals such as Vienna, Berlin or Sofia helped to decentralize the movement. It also helped to broaden the movement, as they were joined by activists, think tanks, and party members from the region as well as representatives from all over Europe and the US. In addition to that, there were constant attempts to recruit more organizations to join and the alliance, counting 500 organizations, soon became so broad that there was the need to establish a 'Stop TTIP' office. This headquarter eventually located in Berlin was supposed to help to coordinate and ensured that there were national contact persons in every country.

As I already mentioned in the last part, one important aspect of this networking was knowledge exchanges throughout the joint organization of events: "Like the level of knowledge was great. The fact how much we learned on the gatherings. Also like our common planning like of the European Day of Action. It worked out better than planned." (Interviewee 12 2018) It is this knowledge exchange that speeded up the process to build up a profound knowledge basis in order to get prepared for confrontation. Experts of certain topics of the trade deal traveled across Europe to spread their knowledge, and the different backgrounds represented in this broad network allowed them to become experts in many different aspects of TTIP: "We

worked together. In TTIP more than fracking. In TTIP were also people involved with cyanide mining, it was involved people about [??] laws, people concerning public health, trade unions...." (Interviewee 4 2018) As a consequence, this means that the complexity of TTIP, touching upon many different aspects of life, was not only a challenge. In combination with the broadness of the movement it allowed them to gather together actors covering different fields of expertise.

Not only knowledge about trade, but also different ways of campaigning and mobilization strategies were exchanged and appreciated. For example, the interviewees noticed a learning effect in how to explain complex topics to ordinary citizens in order to get them involved: "it's something I have learned from all of this campaigns and also from this TTIP campaign.[...] you should try to [...] make it understandable for people." (Interviewee 23 2018) Soon, the movement started to share common symbols such as a "big inflatable Trojan horse that was touring around Europe" (Interviewee 3 2019). Another symbol was a big pen that stands for the call to sign the sECI, or an inflatable hammer, which referred to the debate on international arbitration courts (ISDS) as part of the TTIP contract. The Europeanization of these actions created a "repeating effect in many places" (Interviewee 29 2019), including more rural areas. Carefully prepared material, such as analyses and studies on TTIP were not only passed to the participants of the movement, but also to their political representatives (for example to MEPs in the national and European parliament). An exhibition was translated into different languages and toured across Europe, as well as media and campaigning content was used by actors across Europe. It should not be excluded that one interviewee problematizes this de-contextualized copying of practices: "they kind of make themselves heard, but it doesn't really work." (Interviewee 23 2018) This underlines that it still remains a challenge to connect best practices in order to propagate their success.

Through the collective sharing of knowledge, activists gained insights into other activists' challenges and achievements. A lot of knowledge was created through mutual observing of what is going on in other European countries, but even more, it had a mobilizing effect to see one another's actions and successes: "It helps for us, for the campaigners, it is really mobilizing for us, like: "Woow! see what these guys did! We want also." In that sense it's really positive and helping" (Interviewee 14 2018).

While the media coverage about the protests was rather minimal at the beginning, it still created a collective space of pan-European reference: *"We were watching the news and we saw that there were protests in Europe everywhere, we saw the protests in Berlin there were hundreds of thousands of people."* (Interviewee 16 2019) Using media sources from other countries also helped to develop a more profound picture of what TTIP is about, it created more consciousness about conditions in other European countries and it also created a *European* perspective instead of a purely national one. These experiences of mutual observation, I state, affected the interviewees' European consciousness. As we will see later in greater detail, aspects of this European consciousness is a Europeanization of thinking and feeling that I can detect in the findings. When one interviewee says *"Ich denke, ich denke europäisch."*⁵⁵ (Interviewee 21 2018), we see that Europe has become part of their life reality.

While the European level clearly gained importance through the Anti-TTIP protest experiences, in the findings, the national level was often left out completely. This can be partly explained by the explicit interest in the European dimension of this research, however, in some of the interviews the irrelevance of the national level is made explicit: *"Also ich fühle mich nicht als Luxemburgerin. Das interessiert mich nicht. Sicher, wenn ich in Luxemburg bin, habe ich Vorteile, aber mich interessiert das nicht. [...] Ich fühle mich als Weltbürger."*⁵⁶ (Interviewee 27 2018) Identity is indeed understood as multi-layered, while for many interviewees the regional and European level have a relatively high importance compared to the national one. While it would be hasty to generalize this insight, very clearly, their feeling of Europeaness is based on personal experiences. They refer to the feeling of Europeaness in the context of transnational or European experiences: Apart from the European protests against TTIP, they mention experiences such as living in other European countries or in a border region where national borders were crossed regularly. Therefore, feeling European does not stay untouched by the EU's restrictive way to deal with the protests.

Acts generate emotions such as solidarity and the feeling of belonging. In the TTIP movement, effectively, such binding practices were generated in Collective Days of

⁵⁵ "I think, I think European."

⁵⁶ "Well, I don't feel like a Luxembourger. I'm not interested. Sure, when I'm in Luxembourg I have advantages, but I don't care. [...] I feel like a citizen of the world."

Action, Anti-TTIP demonstrations and internal meetings. Collective experiences of such kind seem to play an important role to build up connections and trust as well as solidarity among the members of the movement. They enable the members to have personal exchanges and to share negative and positive experiences in political work. As we have seen in the last part, emotionalization was a decisive factor to mobilize. This is true for negative as much as for positive feelings: While learning about the TTIP caused fear and anxiety, collective experiences of powerful action triggered hope and strength. Take, for example, the numerically largest Anti-TTIP demonstration in Berlin on October 10th in 2015, which is referred to as one of the most empowering experiences by the interviewees. Besides the mere size of more than 250.000 participants, the event was emotionally very charged. Protest forms differ in their emotional intensity: Theory suggests that artistic forms of action, such as the 'Tango against TTIP' at the demonstration in Berlin, are emotionally more intense than less performative forms of protest such as the collection of signatures (Juris 2008). On top of the emotional experience, these actions preserve another crucial aspect of constructing a collective identity: They form the foundation of a shared narrative for both 'insiders' and 'outsiders' the movement: *"I would say that the march that happened in Berlin, the large one, was becoming a case study, point of reference, not just for the Anti-TTIP movement, but in general."* (Interviewee 16 2019) In fact, the findings reinforce that the demonstration in Berlin became part of the transnational founding myth of the TTIP movement. Such common narratives further added to the cohesion of the network.

The experience of cooperation on a European and an international level helped to build not only a network, but also solidarity between the NGOs and citizens engaged in the movement: *"I think the solidarity character of the movement was very key."* (Interviewee 29 2019) This solidarity manifests in sharing resources, which includes to *"share not only money, but also people and some slogans and coordinate."* (Interviewee 23 2018) Solidarity was felt with fellow protestors throughout Europe, but also, to a lower extent, the US. Indeed, it was created by participating in the movement and its protest action, even if it was difficult: *"I heard that occasionally: - 'Even if you feel like you are facing a lot of opposition in Sweden. Please try! Try to do something' - So we still felt like we had to do something. We couldn't be like: - 'It's difficult, let's do something else.' - We*

still had to try and do something. And we tried our best I think, because we were so few." (Interviewee 3 2019) This quote also underlines the 'responsibilizing' of the interviewee, earlier defined as getting active for claims that go beyond their personal interests and, in his case, also against the obstacles they face.

The experience of collective action against TTIP and direct interaction with other activists were emphasized as the highlight of their experiences. Throughout these collective activities, a dense network was created among activists, citizens, organizations and pre-existing networks engaged in the field of trade politics. Personal connections enhanced the feeling of collectiveness: "But on a very [sub?] level of grassroots movements and initiatives, I feel a very strong interconnectedness and a big level of cooperation and sharing and discourse." (Interviewee 9 2018) Interviewees stress the fact that "being part of something bigger" (Interviewee 20 2018) was an important element to create this feeling of belonging. New structures of cooperation among civil society actors strengthen the feeling that they are pursuing the same goals and sharing the same concerns: "And so to me I was perceiving the surrounding countries more as a threat to us. But then when TTIP came I realized that there is something even higher or more important that could affect us all." (Interviewee 9 2018) In fact, it turns out that the precondition for the common actions of diverse European actors were a common goal as much as a common threat, for which other differences and conflicts were put on the side. The external threat, TTIP, as well as the common opponent, the EU Commission, triggered the need to "feel European [my emphasis] *in this situation, more than in others*" (Interviewee 28 2018).

For what concerns the common goal to 'Stop TTIP', an important aspect mentioned is the feeling not to fight alone, but *collectively* against this seemingly invincible opponent. The fact that activists from all over Europe felt mistreated created a space to mobilize collectively, since they were all affected in a similar way - which made transnational action not only reasonable, but possible in the first place: "How I see it personally was: Now there is some sort of transnational political action, which can be together and coordinated and this is the opportunity for, you know, people of Europe, citizens of Europe to go together against something that will reflect on all member states." (Interviewee 1 2018) For some, this created a shift to perceive people from other countries not as a threat, but as potential allies in the same battle. As this

interviewee points out, they felt unified in a common goal, which was to end TTIP: "Yeah, that we felt finally, for the first time, we liked that we were kind of unified in some case. Kind of united for a cause which we very very strongly felt, if this would break or if this was going to be passed the effects would be incredible on many levels. And I think a lot of people understood this." (Interviewee 9 2018) This common external threat, TTIP, as well as a common political opponent, the European institutions, helped to create these connections despite all differences. Coming back to the rejection of the ECI, it also makes clear why, against this opposition, the movement created an even greater feeling of community.

The experience of being part of a European network was seen as very meaningful as this quote underlines: "Especially this international dimension was probably the most important to me. Sitting around someone on this table, people from all across Europe discussing all this stuff, describing their political situation to us and we to them. So yeah this international was probably the most important." (Interviewee 25 2018) The Anti-TTIP protests gave birth to new connections and contacts, which created a broadness of the movement that was even surprising for the interviewees themselves and is expected to have had a political impact on the TTIP negotiations. But even apart from the case of TTIP, I claim that the aforementioned European activities created a "pan-European perspective" (Interviewee 23 2018), that enabled the participants to develop a European consciousness. This European consciousness is explicitly mentioned in the interviews as being developed in the course of common activities. While it did not develop out of nothing, as some networks pre-existed already, shared experiences of collective actions revived this European consciousness, which allowed "to build a momentum amongst... in the movement. to keep the momentum alive" (Interviewee 14 2018).

Summary

"Making a political tie, a tie between them." (Interviewee 28 2018)

Following the Enacted Citizenship approach, scales (i.e. the dimension which is tackled, here: Europe) are not 'containers' with fixed meaning, but they articulate

themselves through acts: Sites and scales are regarded as “fluid and relational qualities that are formed through contests and struggles, their boundaries become a question of empirical investigation” (Isin 2013, 24). My empirical investigation of the interviewee’s meaning of the European scale in the Anti-TTIP protests shows that those actions are ‘European’ in the sense that they are born out of transnational ties between citizens and a horizontally Europeanized collective against TTIP. Different facets of cooperation created strong ties among the members of the movement: Not only did they learn from each other by exchanging on similar problems and ways of campaigning, but they also cooperated in collective actions, campaigning and exchanging resources in terms of personnel, money and information. Most importantly, however, they thereby created a feeling of community. The solidarity spirit among the movement is both an outcome and a cause of this sense of community. Does this community, one can ask, show signs of a European civil society in the making? If we understand civil society as “the realm of free association where citizens can interact and pursue their shared interests, including political ones” (Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2006, 26), it seems to be a good fit. In fact, some interviewees interpret the Anti-TTIP protests as part of a creation of a civil society on the European level. Apart from this question if a European civil society is in the making or not, these experiences clearly created a network of partners, which is expected to remain active, or can potentially be re-activated. Future actions became ‘Europeanized’: “we are now planning on a European level.” (Interviewee 25 2018) However, what also stand out is that there is no *natural* unity among European civil society actors, but it needed to be first *created* along the communalities of a common threat, a common goal and a political adversary. It is the Anti-TTIP movement which created those “common voices” (Interviewee 4 2018).

There are sustainable consequences that last: The networks are used or are expected to be used for future mobilizing and campaign work. The contacts created are assumed to remain active, and new actors (f.ex. from the Eastern European countries) got involved and are expected to stay. All in all, as this interviewee puts it, “this whole effort that was done to make sure we have people in every member state, that is something that is still super useful today.” (Interviewee 10 2018) The interviewees expect this experience to last and to propagate even more political cooperation on this

supranational level. However, if those personal connections can last depends, as one interviewee puts it, on the question if a 'political tie' was managed to be built: *"the importance of reality is that you have to make real political connections. It's not the question of watching into the eye of the people but making a political tie, a tie between them."* (Interviewee 28 2018) It is not a given, but rather a window of opportunity that has to be used in the future. If and how this potential is exploited, remains in the hands of the citizens.

Outview: The potential of the Anti-TTIP protests in an EU in crisis

"we kind of won the battle, but lost the war" (Interviewee 13 2019)

Coming back to Isin's quote that claims that "acts make a difference" (Isin 2009, 379), it seems indispensable to conclude this analysis asking *which* difference can be detected from the findings. The analysis started by analyzing a meaningful moment in the Anti-TTIP protests: When the ECI was rejected in September 2014, it was giving the movement a "kick-start" (Interviewee 10 2018) for three interrelated, but conceptually distinguished processes: the politicization of citizens, the democratization of European politics and the Europeanization of civil society. These findings suggest that this was a moment of great potential. While these findings will be discussed as *consequences* of the Anti-TTIP protests later on, this section will start by outlining the interviewees' assessments of its *effects*. The differentiation between 'consequences' and 'effects' (following Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn 2003; Giugni 1998) helps to capture the different dimensions of the potential of the Anti-TTIP protests.

Four years after the rejection of the ECI, the interviews gave the activists a space to reflect about what is left of the Anti-TTIP movement. While this spectrum of answers reaches from 'nothing' to 'a lot', this discrepancy can be attributed to different understandings of the question. Unlike its 'consequences', the 'effects' of a protest refer to visible changes that are expected to be directly caused by the action (Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn 2003). Starting from this causal thinking, we see at the policy level a successful campaign due to the fact that TTIP did not come into force. However, this is only a temporary success. There is little hope expressed by the

interviewees that their activism created a fundamental rethinking of trade politics, on the contrary: They expect TTIP to come back under a different name. The experiences of the Anti-TTIP protests disappointed their hopes for structural change even more: "And in this year of 2016 we stayed for a while because we had hopes. Hopes, hopes were not accomplished ..." (Interviewee 4 2018) Their activism was experienced as ineffective, at least when it comes to so-called 'big politics'. They had great hopes and aspirations, but found out that the structural problems cannot be fixed so easily, especially, because the willingness for 'real' change on the side of the politicians is seen as very low. Even though their protest *"played a very large role in policy making"* (Interviewee 16 2019) the concrete policy, TTIP, the interviewees could not see that they can change EU politics, apart from some minor adjustments. For example, something that has changed thanks to the movements' actions is the level of transparency of the TTIP negotiations: "...but that really fascinated me and I always lorded the whole movement for that because it's something that was always negotiated behind closed doors and for the first time since 3 years ago, 2 years ago, 4 years ago, it is now public. It is in the public domain which is really necessary." (Interviewee 14 2018)

Yet, in some respects, the power and political space is even seen as shrinking. The rejection of Wallonia to sign the TTIP is one example where this becomes salient: "they made sure that for the next treaties Wallonia doesn't have this veto vote anymore. Actually Belgium doesn't have any veto power anymore. They changed the rules so that the next big trade agreement after CETA is that one with Japan and there it just needs a qualified majority in the Council." (Interviewee 10 2018) Even though some parties changed their political position during the negotiations, it also counts only as a preliminary success of the movement. While some are more optimistic than others that the EU's political power structures may change after TTIP, the general experience can be headlined: "we kind of won the battle, but lost the war" (Interviewee 13 2019). It describes the experience of having stopped TTIP, while not having achieved any structural change for future deals. Despite this rather pessimistic resumé, they specify their activism as building "islands within a system that you want to change, because the revolution is not going to happen." (Interviewee 22 2018) They do think they have influence as citizens, but an extremely limited one: "Manchmal können wir

ein Pfefferkorn hinzufügen."⁵⁷ (Interviewee 27 2018) Thinking about real alternatives is replaced by "maneuvers" (Interviewee 1 2018), that can only prevent the worst. As one interviewee condensed it: *"And that's all really small, that does not change the big picture."* (Interviewee 16 2019) However, little changes are seen as the only possible way to move forward. But the fact that their influence is experienced as so limited does not imply that it is unnecessary. In another view, as we will see, the Anti-TTIP movement is experienced as a great success.

Even for those who see no changes on a structural level, their personal experiences were central: "we didn't change anything on a general level because it was still voted through. For me personally I think it was really important. I was empowered by it and felt like even as just one person in a small network you can still make some difference in that way." (Interviewee 3 2019) Not only was their activism experienced as empowering, uplifting and inspirational, it was also an occasion to reflect on "who I am and how I want the world to be" (Interviewee 18 2019) as they enact their personal values and ideals in the protest actions. As these experiences were reflected, it also created a consciousness over the role citizens want to play in European politics. To capture this potential, it needs a shift from looking at 'effects', to analyzing 'consequences' that refer to non-causal, contextual outcomes of the protests against TTIP (Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn 2003; Giugni 1998).

The difference between the two can be illustrated using the example of the Alternative Trade Mandate: On the content level, serious work has been done in order to present alternatives to TTIP. Activists referred to an alternative concept of 'Fair Trade' instead of 'Free Trade' and wrote an 'alternative trade mandate' published and supported by civil society organizations all over Europe. In this mandate, activists outline concrete political steps necessary when moving towards a fair trade philosophy. However, this did not have any visible effects so far. It is rather the reflection about alternative (trade) politics, which is regarded as necessary to shift the focus from specific topics like the TTIP to bigger questions that concern the future of the EU: "So it was very very important for the political discussion again to return to these important issues. Not just the issues of the small scale [...]" (Interviewee 25 2018). What is meant by these

⁵⁷ "Sometimes we can add a peppercorn."

'important issues' apart from the visible, direct effects 'of the small scale', is what I am going to call 'consequences' and am going to outline in the following. Looking at those 'consequences', three long-term processes with potential were found. The rejection of the European Citizenship Initiative (ECI) against TTIP is a focal point in which those three dimensions appear. As I clarified before, since the Lisbon treaty in 2007, EU citizens have the right to start a European Citizen Initiative, which gives them the right to bring up a topic of importance on the political agenda. However, the ECI against TTIP was rejected due to formal reasons, which caused a democratic outcry from the side of the citizenry: It politicized not only a larger number of citizens to join this protest and solidified trans-European bonds, it also shifted the agenda of the movement towards the democratic question: Which role can citizens play in European politics?

Starting from the understanding of citizenship as a relation between citizens and the polity (and their representatives), the interviewees express a clear understanding about how this relation is supposed to be designed. However, their experiences of intransparency, the perceived unfair treatment of public interest versus economic business interest groups and insufficient democratic procedures in the TTIP negotiations have had serious consequences for this relation: "The continuous lack of transparency of the negotiations by the European Commission has led to a loss of legitimacy and widespread rejection by the public" (European Anti-Poverty Network 2016, 8). Those experiences disturbed the relation between the EU and its citizens, as citizens have the feeling to be excluded, not taken seriously and not being (enough) informed about policies that affect their lives directly. We have seen how experiences of exclusion and intransparency add to European criticism concerning this policy as well as European politics more generally. It would not be surprising if this leads to frustration, a loss of trust and political apathy and it is not new that, for many citizens, the EU already feels far away and difficult to access. In combination with a lack of the knowledge, skills, tools and self-confidence to engage in European politics, this draws a gloomy picture of the future of European democracy.

The findings show that the activists do not trust the political elite to find ways to change this situation. The more the trust in European democracy declined, the more

essential they experienced the responsibility to take an active, EU-critical role as citizens. However, they also realized that they cannot play the role they want to play in EU politics. Such experiences triggered the reflection about the citizens' role in European democracy. Digging deeper into the meaning of citizenship from the perspective of the interviewees, the findings show that interviewees claim and enact an understanding of citizenship on the European level as active, responsible and EU-critical agents of change. They express a clear need to change the current status quo and the Anti-TTIP protests were an occasion to put this vision into practice. The fact that the EU gains in competences creates a need, but also a new consciousness to take part in these decisions as citizens on an EU level (Imig 2002, 922). Therefore, it is not surprising that literature suggests that citizens increasingly are getting involved in EU politics and claim their right to participate also in confrontative ways (Rauh and Zürn 2014, 122f.; Hooghe and Marks 2009, 5; Delanty 2014, 212; Falk 2010, 13; D. R. Imig and Tarrow 2001).

In the protests against TTIP we can see how more consciousness was created for several topics that were raised through the TTIP conflict. First of all, there is more attention given to the EU (trade) policies. The broad politicization of citizens created an awareness of the EU's trade policy more generally and TTIP in particular. Even more importantly, it made people aware that they want to have a say and be listened to in EU politics. Against the growing tendency to a client-like understanding of citizens, (Harju 2007, 97) among the findings dominates a different concept, namely that of active citizenship. Motivated by their feeling of responsibility to act, citizens got ready to take up action themselves and were empowered by their protest experiences in turn. In the interviews, the interviewees clearly express a sympathy for a more participatory, democratic participation in political decisions on an EU level. Since the involvement of citizens through elections is considered insufficient, they claim a more lively participation of citizens in European decision-making. Above all, they want to be 'listened to' in the public sphere. Balibar refers to this as "effective presence" (Balibar 1988, 724). In the Anti-TTIP protests, citizens enacted this role by claiming a say in the TTIP negotiations. What they claim is to provide the instruments as well as to create spaces for conflictual debate on European issues. By claiming for those rights, I argue that the protests became a political space to perform European citizenship as active,

responsible and EU-critical. Taking into account that "rights are relations that reflect dominant sites, scales and subjects of citizenship" (Isin 2013, 25) it becomes obvious that here, those relations are critically questioned.

However, there is no blind optimism for what concerns this political battle; on the contrary. While the interviewees became more conscious that EU politics *should* change, however, they differ in their opinion if this change is going to happen: While some are positive and declare hope for EU politics to change, others are more cautious and start from reformist, bottom-up changes to create at least "islands within a system" (Interviewee 22 2018) that match their expectations. Uncertainty about possibilities of change refer to the structure of the EU, which is seen as undemocratic and exclusive in its roots. What makes them even more pessimistic about the possibility of European democratization are their experiences in the TTIP conflict, where they found themselves disillusioned by the superficial changes and adjustments as a reaction to their activism. As we have seen, these experiences rather led them to realize the EU's resistance to reform. However, the EU's restrictive way to deal with the protests created even more awareness of the need for a democratic and democratizing political debate. As politics is thought of as per se conflictual, citizens felt responsible to raise critical voices and stimulate discussion over content, process and structure of European politics.

What was earlier referred to as the 'democratic deficit' in Europe comes precisely from the fact that citizens want to participate more in European politics: they want to have a say in what is important for them and what affects them. However, they experience limited opportunities to do so. This created a conflict, which is expected to fuel the debate and protests surrounding TTIP in a constructive and sustainable way. This manifestation of the conflict was appreciated as conflictual debate is understood as a constitutive element of democratic politics, and even more, as an interaction which has the potential to democratize politics as positions are articulated openly and negotiated in public. Interviewees articulate an understanding of democracy which includes constant struggle and contention over political positions and their solutions. They do not follow the 'illusion' of reaching a state of peaceful stability in democratic life. Using Chantal Mouffe's terms, the interviewees argue for 'agonistic politics', in which conflicts are constitutive parts of political life (Mouffe 2014) If they are dealt

with in a democratic mode, they become crucial for progress and sociopolitical changes. Not only do they perceive this state of stability as unrealistic to achieve, they also make clear that it would not be desirable for democratic means, due to its stagnation and lacking dynamic. As we saw, most experiences in this conflict had an empowering effect, however, some experienced it as a very stressful, even war-like relation (Interviewee 6 2018). Mouffe would name this an 'antagonistic' conflict between two enemies, in contrast to 'agonism', which describes the conflict between two adversaries. Following this terminology, the movement understood itself not as enemies, but as opponents of the TTIP as a subject of democratic debate.

However, the conflict exceeded the mere dispute on TTIP as a trade deal. Instead, I argue that the conflict about the role citizens (can) play in European politics must be regarded as an important asset of the protests: As I outlined, the topic of democracy raised fundamental questions about the role of citizens in the EU. By that, the Anti-TTIP protests triggered a discussion about the very nature of the European Union. Such fundamental questions, however, did not touch upon the approval of the EU polity as such. I claim that their EU-critical stance should not be confused with Eurosceptic positions. Della Porta argues that it makes sense to differentiate between the EU-critical role of those who engage against the current performance of the EU (by her referred to as 'critical Europeanists') and 'Eurosceptics' who reject the existence of this supranational entity altogether (della Porta 2006, 16). The EU itself was experienced as a provisional construct in need of reform, but one which also offers space to enact alternatives to the current status quo. While the experiences in the TTIP conflict did not change the people's perception of EU politics for the better, the interviewees detected new (open and closed) windows of opportunities due to its provisional status and have been trying to use them in their interest.

What the success of the Anti-TTIP protests show is that the EU-critical and activist citizenship they enacted was essential to stop TTIP, and, more importantly, triggered subjectivation processes in the interviewees. As Dahlgren points out, political subjectivation and the awareness of their civic power becomes crucial for democratization processes: "In short, people's identities as citizens (however defined), with their sense of belonging to – and perceived possibilities for participating in –

societal development becomes a crucial element in the life of democracy." (Dahlgren 2000)

'Enacting European citizenship', the subtitle of this dissertation, is concerned with the question how individuals become active as *citizens*. In this respect, the findings show three significant aspects, which facilitate commitment and involvement: Two important aspects are the feeling of being affected and the concomitant emotional reaction as well as an awareness of the problems and the political power to attack those challenges as a citizen. But first and foremost, the findings show how democratic citizenry is created in and through processes of responsabilizing for political claims in civic action. The process of responsabilizing, even if it is not named as such, is considered as one of the most important aspects of civic engagement (Schudson 2006, 603). In fact, theorists interested in the question: "What happens to make someone get involved? What preconditions facilitate commitment?" (Haste 2004, 430) show that morally loaded issues are of great importance for the individuals and therefore trigger their personal engagement. Haste explains that "taking responsibility for pursuing one's moral insight" (Haste 2004, 430) is often the reason why citizens take action.

Equally important turned out to be the awareness of the potential dangers of such policies as well as seeing opportunities to have a say in the making of these policies. In the experiences made in the Anti-TTIP protests, we can see how the protesters develop a consciousness of their civic self, which they publicly perform in protest action. Acts of citizenship are staged in the public domain: Acting as a citizen means to 'speak up' or, as Van Oenen says to "act up", (Oenen 2002, 121) in public. 'Enacting citizenship', in this respect, must be conceptualized as a performative process, in which those civic demands are enacted in public. The experiences affect their self-understanding as European citizens. As we can see in the findings, protesters start to understand themselves as citizens with the right and the responsibility to co-create the political structures they live in. However, the construction of a citizen's subjectivity seems to be a circular, not a linear process: Civic experiences shape the protester's subjectivity as a citizen and, at the same time, their civic self-understanding is performed in protest. To put it simply, the understanding of being a European citizen is both, result and cause of the protest action. Because the self-understanding as a

citizen can also *stimulate* future political action: "In short, in order to be able to act as a citizen, it is necessary that one can see oneself as a citizen, as subjectively encompassing the attributes this social category may involve" (Dahlgren 2007, 60). Equipped with a self-understanding as a citizen, experiences of civic power strengthen the readiness to act as a citizen.

I argue that *because* and not *despite* those experiences their activism fostered their self-esteem and self-awareness as a powerful actor in European politics. In their experiences of protest, citizens experience themselves as powerful actors on the European politics level. Schudson points to the importance of citizens becoming aware of the political power they have as it enables them to act: Not only did they protest on the streets, inform and campaign against TTIP, they also used the instruments given to fight for their rights: "The capacity of individual citizens to raise a ruckus by suing powerful corporations has become a significant political force." (Schudson 2009, 39) This power goes far beyond the mere political-juridical effects of such lawsuits: It strengthens the feeling of civic power, politicization and creates public awareness.

What is noteworthy is the distinction between the formal approval of civic participation and the subjective belief in one's self-efficacy and power. While the first aspect has to be fought for in European politics, the latter made them develop a sense of 'self-efficacy' or 'agency' throughout the collective experience of protest. Self-efficacy means that a person conceives him- or herself as being able to deal effectively with a certain task. As already Albert Bandura (1978), who proposed the first and best known theory of self-efficacy, pointed out, this personal judgment is rooted in personal experiences as the most powerful source. Concerning citizenship action, some authors propose to take the concept of agency as a starting point (Mößner 2009, 173; Haste 2004, 430; Boyte and Scarnati 2014; Abowitz and Harnish 2006). Abowitz defines 'agency' as "the idea that individuals and groups act - that citizenship is something that happens when people are engaged in activity for, with, on behalf of, or even against others. The goodness of agency seems to be a key assumption in all understandings of citizenship" (Abowitz and Harnish 2006, 680). The idea of "conceptualizing citizenship as agency gives a central role to the individual's self-identity as a citizen, and emphasizes the thought and action, which this enables." (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 6) In the example of a community project, the authors

illustrate how workers of a company developed civic identities when experiencing themselves as "active agents of their own affairs" (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 6). The active involvement of the workers in defining their civic identity was a fundamental component in the construction of their civic self-understanding, and eventually, their use of it as an instrument for effecting change. This 'sense of agency', it is on the one hand a precondition for and on the other hand originates from the (political) action itself (Lister 2017).

According to the findings, the experience of agency in the protests had an impact on the protesters' subjective feeling of power as a citizen. Or, to put it differently: Enacting citizenship gave them access to the experience of civic agency. Jones and Gaventa's study finds that "when citizens perceive themselves as actors in governance, rather than passive beneficiaries of services and policy, they may be more able to assert their citizenship through actively seeking greater accountability, as well as through participation in the shaping of policies that affect their lives." (Jones and Gaventa 2002, 7) This means that not only the personal and structural preconditions to participate are essential, it also requires the strong belief in one's own and the group's effectiveness and civic impact. In their resistance, the findings suggest that the Anti-TTIP protesters have gained this "consciousness of agency" (Samaddar 2010, 136).

What is important to note at this point is that this subjective feeling of power does not evolve isolated from *collective* experiences. Most prominently, Hannah Arendt expanded our understanding of power by defining it as constitutive, collective, and performative. Let me go into detail in regard to each of the three aspects: First, power is *constitutive* in the sense that it is part of the inherent nature of all collectives and therefore needs no further justification (Arendt 1975, 53). What they need, however, is legitimacy, which can only result from the support of the citizens (Arendt 1975, 42). This leads to me to the second aspect mentioned by Arendt, which describes the *collective* character of power, as the power of these groups depend on the collective of the people who join together. Power, therefore, is not an individual, but a collective phenomenon, which exists only as long as the collective exists: "power is never exercised by an individual; it is owned by a group and only exists as long as the group holds together." (my translation; (Arendt 1975, 45) The groups form in action, which brings me to the third point that characterizes Arendt's conception of power: Power, for

her, is based on the human capacity to act in *performative* alliance with others, in which solidarity and a common sense of group belonging evolves (Arendt 1975, 45). This happened when the broad series of protest actions created a fertile ground for future mobilizations on a European scale.

The public's awareness and consciousness of such policies as well as more and deeper knowledge about the processes on a polity level left traces in the activists as well as in the broader public. As others have stated elsewhere, (Juris 2008) protests have social effects: The successful mobilization against TTIP broadened and deepened the network of civil society actors across Europe: It is now closer connected, more diverse and more numerous than before. It is this combination that created new skills, new knowledge and new tools of civil society actors which can empower them in the future. As this action took place on a European scale, it created a European network against TTIP as well as transnational bonds of cooperation and personal contacts. I have shown that in the Anti-TTIP movement such collective ties have been created in collective, transnational protests and meetings. More concretely, they have been created by a feeling among 'equals' who experience the same threat - TTIP - and act towards the same goal to 'Stop TTIP'.

Indeed, the title-giving 'Enacting European citizenship' must also be seen as a process of locating the self in relation to others: "constructing the citizen does not go on just inside individual heads" (Haste 2004, 420). The feeling to be part of a collective 'fight' against TTIP evokes a sense of solidarity and strength that gives courage and hope, especially in times of setbacks. A European civil society needs 'living', personal exchanges and collective experiences as a prerequisite for the transnational cooperation over distance. These Europeanization processes are based on the common affectedness and responsibility to act. The collective performance of European actions as much as the planning of it created a reference space for a European consciousness and (future) European civic action. In their action against TTIP, they acquired expertise in organizing, performing and enforcing the civic power they have, which can be expected to have a sustainable effect on future mobilizations. In the case of the Anti-TTIP movement, we can see how different actors created a broad, European coalition that despite all differences managed to unify under the common goal to 'Stop TTIP': "These political actors, deeply local, yet firmly

cosmopolitan, have the power to create movements that are based on highly valuable networks and rapidly shifting targets of attack. They are successful therefore in advancing mass coalitions. They facilitate the democratic spirit." (Samaddar 2010, 237)

The findings show that European citizenship is a special case of citizenship as it does not copy the national version of citizenship on a higher level, but functions in a different way. It offers potential to create and enact new ways to act as a citizen in this supranational political context. The enactment of European citizenship as 'Troublemakers' means to constitute powerful political subjects with the consciousness of the necessary presence of citizens as the origin of all political power. As the Enacted Citizenship approach states, an essential element of acts of citizenship is rupture. In the Anti-TTIP protests we find both, a rupture with the taken-for-granted support of the citizens for this policy as well as a rupture with the role that was assigned to citizens in this political process. It is the latter that makes the Anti-TTIP protests an act of citizenship.

To make this more concrete, it is useful to come back to how Rancière understands politics and, in connection with it, dissensus. The two are closely linked, as politics is always happening in the mode of dissensus (Ingram 2006, 243). Dissensus, for Rancière, is not merely a conflict of interests, but a "dispute about what is given, about the frame within which we see something as given." (Rancière 2004, 304) What does this mean in the case of the TTIP conflict? The conflict over TTIP is not primarily one that distinguishes TTIP opponents from TTIP proponents. While disagreement over this policy of the EU (here: TTIP) is a conflict of interests, what constitutes the Anti-TTIP protests as an act of citizenship is the dissensus over the role citizens (can) play in European politics. When they demand to have a seat at the negotiation table of the trade agreement, it is also about being recognized as a legitimate actor in this political process. Understanding the Anti-TTIP protests from this perspective, we can identify the protesters as those actors, who intervene in the political ("police" (Rancière 1999, 29)) order by asking making claims for recognition. This is an essentially democratic practice of the political, in Rancière's terms, since "the political is the activity that brings the limit [...] back into question." (Simons and Masschelein 2010,

594). In other words, the protester's dissensus puts a limit to the role assigned to them by the EU and thereby makes this role negotiable.

Coming back to the core of Rancière's model of political subjectivation, it is the moment when those who have not been perceived until now, become publicly visible within the current European political context. In the context of this research, it underlines that the Anti-TTIP protests are an act of citizenship that constitutes political subjects as citizens ('Troublemakers') who claim for political inclusion in European decision-making processes. The title-giving idea of the 'Troublemakers' posits that citizens possess a substantial agency in democratic societies, as they can actively challenge and disrupt the status quo by calling into question the limitations and roles imposed upon them within the political process. Through their actions, these individuals, referred to as 'Troublemakers' in this study, aim to bring about change and advocate for a new role citizens can play in European politics. The examination of the Anti-TTIP protests serve as the contextual lens through which the potential of individuals to create and enact new forms of citizenship on the European level was analyzed. Through this examination, the study was able to demonstrate the capacity of citizens to actively resist authority and subvert entrenched power structures in pursuit of meaningful change.

Conclusion

"Now you really believe that it has an impact and it's possible to change stuff. I think because of this experience." (Interviewee 11 2018)

This thesis sets out to investigate European citizenship in the context of the Anti-TTIP protests. The Anti-TTIP protests are an outstanding example of citizen-driven, transnational contentious action against the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the EU. The above mentioned quote highlights that this action changed not only the course of the negotiations of this trade deal and potentially the future of European (trade) politics, but also those who participated in it. The subject of this study are these "Troublemakers" who, in the act of protesting, turned into European citizens.

This reflective conclusion ties together the themes of this research project, underscoring the central argument of citizens as powerful, active participants in European politics. The conclusion starts by outlining how my positionality and political aims shaped the research focus and methodology, setting the stage for the subsequent summary and classification of the research findings. The second part outlines the research subject (the Anti-TTIP protests) as well as the gap that this research intends to fill. It first contextualizes the Anti-TTIP protests in current discourses on the "European crisis" and the EU's democratic deficit, offering a framework for understanding the movement's formation and growth. Challenging the portrayal of European citizens as passive and Anti-EU, the research advocates for their recognition as active political actors. Building on this argument, this specific research perspective aims to fill a research gap that investigates European citizens as powerful actors in European politics.

The third part presents the findings of the research question that asks: Which European citizenship is enacted and how? It will touch upon both the "which"- and "how"-part of the question, while at the same time addressing the limitations of current research and suggesting new directions for further investigation in European, protest and citizenship studies. The enrichment of Isin's theory of Enacted Citizenship using interview data shows how insightful empirical approaches can be to expand the

understanding of citizenship. By doing so, the findings shed light on the practical manifestations, political subjectivation processes and meanings of acts of citizenship.

The very root of this research: How the researcher's positionality and aims frame this study on European citizenship

The following part delves into the personal and political motivations that underpin the research. This is of special importance as these positions established the foundation for the study, shaping the research setup and methodology as well as setting the stage for a unique exploration of European citizenship. By asking *which citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests and how*, this research relates and at the same time tries to differentiate from the vast amount of research that has been done about the Anti-TTIP protests.⁵⁸ Considering that “to enact” also means “to stage”, one can compare these protests to a public stage, on which an act of citizenship was performed. My role as a researcher, looking at it off stage, is nevertheless an influential one: I need to decide which aspects should be spotlighted, chose the right position and proximity of the light, the choice of the angle as well as the best use of tools. All of this fuses into a unique perspective that allows to see some parts in bright light while others remain in the dark. Therefore, the specific focus of this research on certain aspects of the Anti-TTIP protests, highlighting citizens' agency and powerful democratic practices, is itself a personal as well as a political decision. This research stems from the acknowledgement that the practice of conducting research can empower certain publics while disempowering others. Ultimately, the decision to let citizens speak for themselves and about themselves, is aiming to empower citizens to critically evaluate and thereby improve European policies.⁵⁹

This perspective influenced this research project on two levels: First, by examining protest activities as potential (acts of) citizenship, the research aimed at post-defining (as opposed to pre-defining) European citizenship. This roots in my analysis of a wide range of citizenship studies literature, where I identify the danger of limiting citizenship to specific normative ideas of what a good citizen should be like. However, the concept of Enacted Citizenship makes the assumption that people make claims to citizenship

⁵⁸ see chapter “More than just one: Introductions to the Anti-TTIP protests” 36

⁵⁹ see chapter “Challenging European citizenship in theory and political practice” 79; especially 83 f.

based on their performative actions rather than based on labels or attributions that are placed on them. Therefore, relying on performance-based approaches to citizenship, the research question moves the focus from an assumed pre-existing identity to the performative construction of it.

Secondly, these positions also influence methodological decisions, which were guided by a sensitivity to power dynamics and a commitment to empowering my interviewees. The choice of an episodic interview style allows to understand the meaning of European citizenship from the interviewees' point of view, placing particular emphasis on what they see as important and meaningful. Sharing their episodes without being interrupted, setting the focus on topics important to them, reviewing the transcript as well as removing passages they didn't want to be included in the thesis and giving feedback on my findings, provided the interviewees with various ways to engage in the research process.⁶⁰ Coming back to the image of the "stage", I chose to selectively illuminate aspects of the Anti-TTIP protests that not only challenge existing norms, but also empower citizens to continue questioning and reshaping the democratic politics of the European Union.

Filling the Research gap: Findings challenge passive portrayal of citizens amid 'European crisis'

The following part highlights the subject and the intention of this research in criticizing the prevailing narrative of European citizens and how it is embedded in discourses of the so-called European crisis. Instead of a prescribed image that depicts European citizens as passive and Eurosceptic, the chapter argues for a recognition of citizens as powerful and active participants in European politics.

By situating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) protests within the broader context of the European crisis and democratic deficit,⁶¹ I outline how especially since the Euro crisis in 2008, there is growing skepticism that the EU acts in the name of its citizens. This goes hand in hand with an improved understanding of the fact that many decisions which directly affect people's lives are decided on this supranational level. In this specific historical context of distrust and discontent

⁶⁰ see chapter "Research ethics and epistemic power" 120

⁶¹ see chapter "Europe in crisis?" 25ff.

towards the EU, the Anti-TTIP protests are an insightful case in which individuals who have previously been left out of the picture of a crisis-ridden EU are pushing to the fore. While for a long time there was a so-called 'permissive consensus' (Hooghe and Marks 2009) towards EU policy-making, from the 90s onwards, citizens have increasingly called for a greater role in decision-making processes that impact their daily lives. This has led to a phase of "constraining dissensus" within the EU, which has resulted in more conflicts, but also created more opportunities for debate and direct engagement between the EU and its citizens. Therefore, the Anti-TTIP protests need to be seen as part of a broader change in the role citizens want to play in European politics: The citizens' will to participate more directly in European affairs stands in sharp contrast to the experience that the instruments and opportunities provided by the EU are not matching the people's will and mode to take part. The key term 'democratic deficit' is describing precisely this mismatch between the will to participate and the limited possibilities to do so.

The analysis portrays how the perceived undemocratic and intransparent negotiation process on TTIP served the opponents as yet another proof for the citizen-unfriendly politics of the EU. While the European Union has already been considered undemocratic and exclusive, it was the rejection of the European Citizenship Initiative (ECI), which was meant to increase citizen engagement in EU decision-making, that signaled a significant turning point of the course of protest: Being upset about the rejection of the ECI and the EU's undemocratic, exclusionary nature it stands for, the movement's demand for a civic democratization of European decision-making processes gained major attention. This process can be described as a "democratization of democracy" (my translation Balibar 2012, 15): It starts from the assumption that democracy is a process that is always in flux rather than a form of regime obtained and possessed.

It also has to be acknowledged that the Anti-TTIP protests are embedded in a long history of Anti-trade protests. Notable examples include the "Battle of Seattle" against the WTO in 1999 and the protests against ACTA in 2012. Therefore, a vast network of groups and activists devoted to keeping an eye on trade policy and organizing for action was cultivated prior to the TTIP negotiations. However, the fact that TTIP covers a wide variety of economic and social problems that have an impact on citizens' daily

lives (such as consumer protections, labor rights, environmental standards, and public services) is what has led to the large number of protests against the deal. Because of this, TTIP became extremely visible and served as a catalyst for the mobilization of several, widely disparate groups beyond the "usual" trade policy actors. These groups included public health advocates, environmentalists, labor unions, and consumer rights supporters. The Anti-TTIP protests, which brought together a wide range of civil society organizations across Europe, are evidence that it was precisely this diversity that had led to the broad coalition that joined under the common cause to STOP TTIP.⁶²

I argue that TTIP politicized citizens from diverse (organizational) backgrounds, who joined the protests and triggered the massive growth of the movement. The subsequent period of contentious actions all over Europe created a dense, transnational network of civic actors. This process of horizontal Europeanization started when the existing formal opportunities of civic participation through the ECI reached an end and active citizens turned into activist ones.

But what is the specific perspective this research adopts (and promotes) on these citizen subjects? Coming back to the aim of post-defining European citizenship in acts of protest, I state that counter-narratives and re-interpretations of a dystopian narrative of Europe's citizens having lost control over its political course, are urgently needed. This thesis sets off by problematizing that discussions on active citizenship are often shaped by normative political interests and visions of how a "good" European citizen should be and act like.⁶³ When citizens fail to live up to these normative standards of "good citizenship," they are often accused of passivity or euroskepticism. What still too often remains unseen is that some of the desired 'active European citizens' are already active beyond this rigid path. Looking at current trends in political science research, criticism arises on the focus on the "civic decline and political disengagement" (Wood and Flinders 2014, 159) in existing research literature. This narrow focus, they argue, is part of "discursive depoliticization practices" (Wood and Flinders 2014, 161), which is today widely known as the TINA-principle: The narrative, that 'There Is No Alternative'. This rhetoric risks closing down possible civic movements and critical voices who

⁶² see chapter "More than just trade: TTIP's encompassing topics beyond tariffs" 37

⁶³ see chapter "Europe in crisis?" 25ff.

strive to improve the current status quo. This research's aim is to spotlight such initiatives and the alternatives they strive for.

It implies not only a criticism of concepts which understand citizenship only as a top-down mechanism, but also the urgent need to direct more attention to empirically researching those who actively (want to) take part in shaping the future of European politics. Therefore, to better understand the ways citizens want to take part is essential and a practice-oriented perspective on active - not any - political subjects is a powerful way to investigate this shift from permissive to constraining attitudes of European citizens - without neglecting the fact that this group is still a minority. However, by taking into account their perspective, it becomes possible to make them visible as active creators - not passive victims - of European politics.

If we agree that narratives are not only "models of the worlds, but also for the worlds" (my translation; Viehöver 2014, 69), especially researchers have to ask themselves what it means for the political practice if we continue to diagnose citizens' 'post-democratic apathy' in a 'crisis-ridden' Europe (Follesdal and Hix 2006, 556; critical: Wood and Flinders 2014, 159). If the possibilities of sociopolitical change are dependent on the way we think about its limits as well as its potential, (Wright 2010, 23) it is of special importance to *rethink* European citizenship also taking into account those active and critical European citizens that this research puts into the spotlight: the 'Troublemakers'. This research sets off to see the citizens' criticisms as symptoms of the discrepancy between the status quo of EU politics and citizens' expectations of it, allows to understand the EU's 'crisis' as a mobilizing force: Namely, a force that literally 'moved' the Anti-TTIP protestors striving towards an approximation of the two, which triggered meaningful political action. The findings highlight the intensity of politicization as the TTIP negotiations as well as the role of citizens in it were transported into the realm of the political sphere.

What becomes visible (that might have otherwise been left unnoticed) when looking at the Anti-TTIP protests in this way? Against the background of the European crisis discourse, the findings show an outstanding degree of participation by the citizens and its powerful effects. This research's perspective on active citizens changes not only the main characters, but also the plot and the tone of the narrative about 'European citizens': By highlighting the ways Anti-TTIP protestors enact European citizenship, it

puts into focus a European civil society consisting of active, responsible, and EU-critical political subjects who possess a considerable degree of civic power. The research findings demonstrate that despite the limited opportunities for citizens to intervene in the EU's decision-making processes, activists experienced a sense of empowerment as citizens in participating in these protests. However, this power goes beyond the perceived ability to influence European politics, but wields the symbolic power to question and recreate established meaning-making about what it means to be a European citizen. Coming back to the figure of the 'Troublemaker', it posits that citizens possess a significant degree of agency within democratic societies. This research draws a picture of how they can take decisive action to challenge the existing order by questioning the boundaries and responsibilities imposed upon them within the political process. Through their actions, Anti-TTIP protestors advocate for a new role for citizens in European politics. The examination of the Anti-TTIP protests serves as the case through which the potential of citizens to create and express such new forms of citizenship on the European level was analyzed.

Beyond Isin's theory: Empirical analysis of the enactment of European citizenship and political subjectivation processes

In the following, I will outline the main findings of this research and how it draws from as well as goes beyond the concept of Enacted European citizenship. The discussion includes limitations of certain aspects of European studies, protest research and citizenship studies that this study revealed. Isin's seminal work on Enacted Citizenship is essential in attracting scholarly attention to the theoretical underpinnings of citizenship. Starting from the point of seeing citizenship not as a state-ordained status but as dynamic acts of engagement, it has the power to revitalize the discourse on (European) citizenship. However, Isin's theory of acts of citizenship is primarily theoretical and conceptual in nature. It provides a framework for understanding and analyzing different forms of citizenship practices. While the theory does not rely on empirical evidence or data to support its claims, instead, Isin draws on historical and philosophical analysis to develop his arguments. Without questioning the relevance of

his thought-provoking theory, empirical data on acts of citizenship can extend beyond this existing theoretical framework in three ways.

First, this dynamic and fluid nature of citizenship also comes with very diverse ways individuals understand and perform their roles as citizens: What does it mean for them to be European citizens? While Isin cannot give an answer to the question *which* citizenship is enacted, this research's empirical investigation detected the activist, EU-critical and responsible characteristics of the citizenship the protestors express in their acts. It is through this empirical lens of this study that I can chart a more nuanced portrait of the Troublemakers' meaning of citizenship that transcends the boundaries set by the theory.

Second, the interviewees' narratives of participation, resistance, and subjectivation reveal not only that, but also *how exactly* the TTIP-opponents transitioned from active participants within institutional frameworks to actors of resistance (activists) that challenge traditional conceptions of citizen roles. By refining the stages of responsabilization,⁶⁴ the findings also provide more insights into the process of political subjectivation in the context of the Anti-TTIP protests. And third, not only can this empirical research provide data that exceeds ("which"?) or refines ("how"?) prevailing theoretical propositions within the Enacted Citizenship approach. By using the narratives, stories, and lived experiences collected through the interviews, it can also add more color to the picture: The theoretical conceptualization of citizenship as acts gains dimensionality from the engagement with the empirical world.

The starting point of the empirical analysis of the interview-based data was to understand if the Anti-TTIP protests can be considered an act of citizenship. An act of citizenship is characterized by a rupture with the current status quo.⁶⁵ The activists, perceiving undemocratic treatment in the TTIP negotiations, felt compelled to assert their rights and demand a role in co-creating policy. By doing so, they transformed from *active* citizens, seeking engagement through formal channels like the ECI, into *activist* citizens, challenging the subordinate role assigned to European citizens in these negotiations. These new citizen subjects on a European scale are worth exploring further. The aim of this research was thus to extend the current knowledge

⁶⁴ see chapter "Political subjectivation process: ENACTING European citizenship" 178

⁶⁵ see chapter "Acts of Citizenship" 89

about European citizenship asking: *Which citizenship is enacted in the Anti-TTIP protests and how?*

The concept of Enacted Citizenship states that by focusing on the acts that create political subjects, rather than assuming subjects of European citizenship in advance, it contributes to seeing new and unforeseeable ways of citizenship enactment. To make it more concrete: Looking at the Anti-TTIP protests as an act of citizenship brought to the fore citizen subjects of a certain kind - "Troublemakers" - which could have been otherwise considered as "just" activists, concerned individuals or even Eurosceptics. To outline *which* citizenship is enacted, the Enacted Citizenship approach suggests starting from the actions which reflect the protestors' claims: Based on episodic interviews with active participants of the Anti-TTIP protests, the phenomenographic analysis of the data outlines the citizens' criticism of the EU's negotiation of the trade deal TTIP and its political structure in general. By claiming for a more citizen-centered decision-making, instruments for civic participation as well as transparency in the political process, the protestors raise claims that go beyond their personal interest as well as beyond the specific case of the TTIP trade deal. As citizenship is at the same time asserted and possessed, the interview data allows to see that the political subject (that is created through these acts of citizenship) is an active, responsible and EU-critical citizen. This understanding of the role of citizens in European politics is characterized by active participation of its citizens, a responsibility to control and intervene in political processes and a constructive EU-criticism that aims to reform the distribution of power in favor of the citizens.

Obviously, these characteristics of active, responsible, and EU-critical citizenship are not the only and 'true' way in which citizens generally understand and enact their citizenship. This assumption would fail to take into account the citizens' diversity of perspectives and experiences. Instead, it's clear that the findings are a snapshot of specific individuals in a particular historical context, which nonetheless provides valuable insights into the meanings attributed to the role of citizens in EU decision-making procedures and in politics more broadly. However, the research goes beyond that by asking *how* citizenship is enacted, which points to the process of political subjectivation, that turns individuals into political subjects.

The question *how* this understanding of citizenship is enacted means turning away from the idea of constructing a positive identity as citizens. European political elites have long attempted to unite people under the concept of a European identity: The European flag, the EU passport, the Erasmus program, and other initiatives all aimed to establish a European identity from top down. This study examines a case in which the development of a European identity is not mandated from above: "Thus, we need a plausible way for the European people to be citizens of Europe, having a joint responsibility for developing and implementing collective policies, without assuming that they must share a deep identity as European citizens." (Bellamy and Warleigh 2001, 3) While I do not deny that governmental action plays a crucial role in identity building processes, this research aimed at investigating the political subjectivation processes of citizens through contentious action. In doing so, it gives back the citizens their control over defining (civic) European identity by enacting it in practice.

By that, it addresses the gap of empirical research on the construction of European citizens in protest settings. Traditional protest research often focuses on structural factors such as socio-economic conditions, political opportunities, and resource mobilization. By incorporating political subjectivation, this study delves into the personal and collective transformation process that occurs through participation in protests. The process of political subjectivation is characterized by the feeling of affectedness, the awareness of the problem, the power to act, the responsabilization to become active and the reflection on the civic power that these practices entail.⁶⁶ These aspects must be considered crucial for how the protesters turned into citizen subjects by acts of citizenship.

The research sheds light on the affective dimensions of protest participation by examining the process of political subjectivation, which divides into sentiments of affectedness, awareness of the issue and one's capacity to act and a sense of responsibility to do so.⁶⁷ The findings of this study state that emotions like disappointment, anger, and hope play a crucial role in motivating individuals to take action. These results provide Mouffes' claim regarding the significance of passion in politics (Mouffe 2000) more empirical support. This adds a rich, qualitative layer to understanding what drives people to join movements and it can stimulate the

⁶⁶ see chapter "Political subjectivation process: ENACTING European citizenship" 178

⁶⁷ see chapter "Meaning-making in the analysis" 125; especially 128

conversation about the emotional triggers that motivate individuals to become politically active.

As I just showed, political actions not only contributed to the movement's goals, but also gave birth to the creation of political subjects as citizens. Coming back to the introductory quote, in the Anti-TTIP protests we see that despite the limited opportunities, a new consciousness of the citizens' power arose, which has the potential to create more 'trouble' in the future. I state that evaluating the micro-level gains of such civic experiences is just as insightful as evaluating the movement's larger political successes. While the success of the movement may be measured by its ability to stop the TTIP negotiations or by potential changes in EU politics, such as increased consultation of the public and greater transparency, the findings suggest that there is more to explore. It may help to recognize that a crucial asset of European protests lies in the civic politicization and its impact on citizens' roles and identities. This is important to further explore, as this process of politicization has the potential for long-lasting transformative socio-political change, even after the streets in Europe are empty again. Therefore, European studies should expand their focus beyond the much-debated question if a European demos exists and delve deeper into the development process of those political subjects who may bring this demos to life.

While it is not this research's intention to ask if the Anti-TTIP coalition shows signs of a European demos in the making, the findings do provide evidence for how a shared protest experience, including shared struggles and goals, can strengthen a sense of European belonging. This contributes to the understanding of how European civil society can mobilize across borders, fostering a sense of European solidarity and collective identity as citizens. Picking up on the discussions on the current state of European civil society,⁶⁸ these findings suggest that European civil society is not just a theoretical construct but an empirical reality that can influence policy-making and political discourse.

However, more research would be needed that post-defines the "Europeanness" of political action and further explores the meanings associated with it. The Enacted Citizenship approach posits that scales, such as the European scale, are not fixed and static entities with pre-determined meanings, but rather possess "fluid and relational

⁶⁸ see chapter "Formed or performed citizenship?" 63ff.

qualities that are formed through contests and struggles" (Isin 2013, 24). This approach takes acts of citizenship as a starting point from which the European scale emerged, instead of starting off from predefined units of a particular scale. In light of this perspective, the present study investigated the meanings attributed to the European scale in the specific context of Anti-TTIP activism. Following the concept of scales, the research concludes that the actions are 'European' in the sense that they are born out of transnational ties between citizens and a horizontally Europeanized collective against TTIP.

The study found that different facets of cooperation created strong ties among the members of the movement, creating a feeling of community and solidarity.⁶⁹ However, the interviewees also express the fact that inner-European hierarchies and cleavages of power between the member states, especially between Eastern and Western Europe, continue to exist. That points to the need that researchers of this field have to unravel the multiplicity of 'Europes' in citizenship practices rather than to subsume them under the common header 'European' citizenship. This would allow to make visible the different meanings of 'Europe' which come into existence in acts of citizenship. It is worth investigating further this multiplicity of Europe, as it is not solely a factual reality, but can also become a great source of potential when it becomes an object of scientific research. Just like the images of the 'good European citizens' are not enough to capture European citizenship, the *different* ways Europe is conceptualized and experienced need to complete our limited understandings of what Europe means for citizenship practices. By taking into account what matters for citizens in real-life experiences of Europe, research of this kind can complement formerly simplified understandings of Europe and help to challenge the notion that (comm)unity can only be achieved by following a uniform idea of 'Europe'.

To close, I want to come back to the argument that it does make a difference how we as researchers write about European citizens. As I have shown, the fields of citizenship studies and European studies are constantly evolving and it is crucial that researchers remain mindful of the ways in which their work contributes to shaping the discourse on European citizenship. As one of my interviewees commented on this research: "c'est important parce que ça fera aussi.. ça sera aussi une trace de ce qui s'est passé.

⁶⁹ see chapter "European actions, transnational cooperation and building European ties" 195

C'est important l'histoire." (Interviewee 2 2018) If we take this serious, researchers of the field of European studies as much as citizenship studies need to be aware that their work contributes to the construction of the object they aim to explore (for the same argument, see: Wiener, Jorgensen, and Christiansen 1999, 531; Diez 1999). In other words, the attempts to capture European citizenship all contribute to the construction of our understandings of it. I claim that as researchers, it is our responsibility to make a conscious decision: Depending on the way something is narrated, agency is de- or re-constructed, as well as relations of power are reproduced or called into question (Viehöver 2014, 73).

Through its empirical research, the study demonstrates the ability of citizens to co-create the politics they strive for. Therefore, this research has highlighted the importance of citizen participation in shaping EU (trade) politics and the need for further research empowering such activism in creating structural change. What the empirical findings suggest is that such acts of citizenship against TTIP are located between the existing and the not-yet-existing: They are striving for something to come into being by enacting it. Therefore, acts of citizenship are crucial to point to the open-ended character of politics: "the possible is a key element in the definition of politics" (Isin, 2008: 4). What happens to 'the possible', now that citizens experienced that "it's actually possible to change stuff" (Interviewee 11 2018)? It is important to notice that the trend towards more civic participation in European affairs is not a linear process, but rather characterized by fluctuations. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the willingness to engage in European citizenship is continually increasing, (Rauh and Zürn 2014, 125) as the Anti-TTIP protests clearly represent only a peak in civic engagement. However, the findings show how the experiences of the Anti-TTIP protests created change in the political subjects by turning them into active, responsible and EU-critical European citizens. This research provides an important contribution to the field by shedding light on the enactment of European citizenship and its potential to reshape understandings of European citizenship through contentious action. Knowing about this potential can guide new ways of thinking as well as new ways of acting in European politics. In this sense, there is not much left to say but hoping that the 'Troublemakers' will make some more 'trouble' in the future.

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