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The Measurement of Voting Power**

Preprint Nr. 20/2011 — 12. Dezember 2011

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<http://www.math.uni-augsburg.de/>

Impressum:

Herausgeber:

Institut für Mathematik

Universität Augsburg

86135 Augsburg

<http://www.math.uni-augsburg.de/pages/de/forschung/preprints.shtml>

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A Probabilistic ‘Re-View’ on Felsenthal and Machover’s

The Measurement of Voting Power

OLGA BIRKMEIER and FRIEDRICH PUKELSHEIM

Felsenthal/Machover’s 1998 celebrated monograph on *The Measurement of Voting Power* set off a renewed impetus on the analysis of weighted voting systems. Their presentation strikes a balance between the game-theoretic and the probabilistic approaches to the subject. The present paper holds that the probabilistic view may be profitably extended even further, in providing helpful language as well as motivating new results.

1. The book. Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover’s (1998) monograph on *The Measurement of Voting Power* served a double purpose, of concisely presenting the state of the art of the theory of weighted voting systems, and of initiating novel strains of research in the area. The authors achieved these goals by carefully developing the mathematical background, game theory and probability theory. The mathematical frame was developed not in an ivory tower seclusion, but along pertinent applications such as US-American court cases, or the Council of Ministers of the European Union. The interplay of ideal theory and concrete applications proved most fertile.

In Augsburg we repeatedly worked through the book in the course of seminars for our students who have a strong background in probability theory and statistics. Therefore we paid particular attention to the book’s probabilistic language, and experimented with the technical vocabulary, in order to optimize communication with non-mathematical contemporaries. An instant stumbling stone was felt to be the phonetic closeness of two central notions of the subject, *voting weight* and *voting power*. In German they translate into *Stimmgewicht* and *Stimmkraft*. Since the German language puts a strong emphasis on the first syllable of a compound word, a negligent speaker may offer the audience an audible *Stimm...*, followed by a murmured *...something*, thus completely missing the point. For this reason we tried to separate the notions more clearly. We kept *voting weight*, but replaced *absolute voting power* by *influence probability*, and *relative voting power* by *power share*. The term *share* indicates that the ensemble of these indices totals unity, whence they form a *power distribution*.

In the present paper we explicate the probabilistic approach, in as far as we found it telling and conducive. The approach is by no means new. It dates back at least to Straffin (1978, 1988), and the Felsenthal/Machover (1998) monograph makes excellent use of it. Nevertheless we believe that a ‘re-view’ on its role may prove useful.

In their final Chapter 8, Felsenthal/Machover (1998) make a point to take abstentions seriously. We maintain that ternary voting profiles provide a sufficiently general reference set supporting both, ternary decision rules that permit abstentions, and binary decision rules that are restricted to Yea-Nay voting (Section 2). The ensuing development depends on the probability distribution adopted. A model is truly ternary when it assigns positive weights to voting profiles with at least one abstention. The case of abstention probability zero leads back to the binary setting. The Penrose/Banzhaf models (Section 3) and the Shapley/Shubik models (Section 4) come with abstention probabilities $t \in [0, 1)$ that afford a smooth transition between ternary and binary analyzes. We conclude with an outlook on bloc decision rules, a prime example being provided by the Council of Ministers of the European Union (Section 5).

2. Ternary voting profiles. Let N denote an *assembly* consisting of finitely many *agents* j . When a proposal is tabled and a vote is taken, the results are recorded as a vector $a = (a_j)_{j \in N}$, a *voting profile*. The vote of agent j is reported as $a_j = \text{yes}$ when j votes Yea, $a_j = \text{no}$ when j votes Nay, or $a_j = \text{abstain}$ when j abstains. The natural ordering among these values is $\text{no} \leq \text{abstain} \leq \text{yes}$. Felsenthal/Machover (1998, p. 282) use the coding $\text{no} = -1$, $\text{abstain} = 0$, and $\text{yes} = 1$.

The ensemble of all voting profiles constitutes the *ternary profile space*

$$\Omega_N = \left\{ (a_j)_{j \in N} \mid a_j \in \{\text{no}, \text{abstain}, \text{yes}\}, \text{ for all } j \in N \right\}.$$

Every profile $a \in \Omega_N$ induces a *region of growing acceptance* consisting of those profiles b that express at least as much acceptance as is reported in a ,

$$[a, \text{yes}] = \left\{ (b_j)_{j \in N} \in \Omega_N \mid a_j \leq b_j \leq \text{yes}, \text{ for all } j \in N \right\}.$$

A subset $W_N \subseteq \Omega_N$ is called a *decision rule* when it satisfies the three properties

- (1) $[a, \text{yes}] \subseteq W_N$, for all $a \in W_N$,
- (2) $(\text{yes}, \dots, \text{yes}) \in W_N$,
- (3) $(\text{abstain}, \dots, \text{abstain}) \notin W_N$.

The profiles a that constitute the subset W_N are called *winning*, in the sense that a proposal is carried if and only if a belongs to W_N . Here we do not consider systems in which the final outcome might be a tie. The complement $W_N^C = \Omega_N \setminus W_N$ therefore comprises the profiles that are *loosing*. Thus a subset W_N is a decision rule if and only if (1) it is *acceptance monotone*: if a is winning and b reports at least as much acceptance as does a , then b is also winning, (2) unanimous acceptance is winning, and (3) unanimous abstention is losing.

Now we fix some decision rule W_N , and investigate its merits from the point of view of agent j . Two events transpire to be of particular interest. First, there is the set $A_j(W_N)$ of *agreeable profiles*, when j agrees with the final outcome. Second, there is the set $C_j(W_N)$ of *critical profiles*, when the vote of j is decisive to turn the profile winning or loosing. Let the notation $(a_i)_{i \neq j} \& (yes)_j$ represent the profile where the votes of the other agents $i \neq j$ are concatenated with a Yea from agent j . Similarly $(a_i)_{i \neq j} \& (no)_j$ is to indicate that the votes of the others is completed with j ’s Nay. The two events mentioned may then be described as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} A_j(W_N) &= \left\{ a \in W_N \mid a_j = yes \right\} \cup \left\{ a \in W_N^C \mid a_j = no \right\}, \\ C_j(W_N) &= \left\{ a \in \Omega_N \mid (a_i)_{i \neq j} \& (yes)_j \in W_N \text{ and } (a_i)_{i \neq j} \& (no)_j \in W_N^C \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

So far the exposition is descriptive and qualitative. It is only now that we consider quantitative indices. All of them originate from a probability measure P given on the ternary profile space Ω_N , with some of them being peculiar to an agent j :

$P[W_N]$	the <i>efficiency</i> of the decision rule W_N ,
$P[A_j(W_N)]$	the <i>success probability</i> of agent j ,
$P[C_j(W_N)]$	the <i>influence probability</i> of agent j ,
$P[C_j(W_N)]/\Sigma_P(W_N)$	the <i>power share</i> of agent j , utilizing
$\Sigma_P(W_N) = \sum_{i \in N} P[C_i(W_N)]$	the <i>influence sensitivity</i> of the decision rule W_N .

The indices coincide with those in the monograph Felsenthal and Machover (1998), except that there they are related to the Penrose/Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik distributions. Specifically, the Penrose/Banzhaf influence probability of agent j is the same as the Banzhaf power (or absolute Banzhaf index) of j , and the power share of j coincides with the Banzhaf index of voting power (or relative Banzhaf index) of j . Our motivation for not specializing too early is that there are results like Theorem 1 which hold quite generally. To this end we need to introduce some notation.

The *dual profile* $\text{dual}(a)$ of a ternary voting profile $a \in \Omega_N$ is defined by reversing the votes of all agents $j \in N$,

$$(\text{dual}(a))_j = \begin{cases} no & \text{in case } a_j = yes, \\ abstain & \text{in case } a_j = abstain, \\ yes & \text{in case } a_j = no. \end{cases}$$

A distribution P is said to be *selfdual* when a voting profile and its dual are assigned identical probabilities, $P[\{a\}] = P[\{\text{dual}(a)\}]$.

A distribution P is said to be *exchangeable* when it remains invariant under all permutations of the assembly N . In the presence of exchangeability, a maximal invariant statistic tallies Yeas, Nays, and abstentions of a voting profile $a \in \Omega_N$ into the three counts $\text{Yea}(a)$, $\text{Nay}(a)$, and $\text{Abs}(a)$, respectively.

The *success margin* $\sigma(W_N)(a)$ is defined to be the difference between the number of those who vote in favor of the final outcome, and those who vote against it,

$$\sigma(W_N)(a) = \begin{cases} \text{Yea}(a) - \text{Nay}(a) & \text{in case } a \in W_N, \\ \text{Nay}(a) - \text{Yea}(a) & \text{in case } a \in W_N^C. \end{cases}$$

Two decision rules deserve special attention. The first is the *unanimity rule* U_N , signaling acceptance when nobody is objecting, and the second is the *straight majority rule* M_N , requiring the Yeas to outnumber the Nays,

$$\begin{aligned} U_N &= \left\{ (a_j)_{j \in N} \in \Omega_N \mid \text{Yea}(a) > 0 = \text{Nay}(a) \right\}, \\ M_N &= \left\{ (a_j)_{j \in N} \in \Omega_N \mid \text{Yea}(a) > \text{Nay}(a) \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

THEOREM 1. *Let the ternary profile space Ω_N be equipped with be a selfdual and exchangeable probability distribution P , and let W_N be an arbitrary decision rule.*

Then the expected success margin of W_N lies between the expected success margins of the unanimity rule and of the straight majority rule,

$$\mathbb{E}_P[\sigma(U_N)] \leq \mathbb{E}_P[\sigma(W_N)] \leq \mathbb{E}_P[\sigma(M_N)].$$

PROOF. See Proposition 4.1 in Birkmeier/Käuffl/Pukelsheim (2011). □

The unanimity rule and the straight majority rule are two instances of the wider class of *weighted decision rules* $W_N[q; (w_j)_{j \in N}]$, determined by the *quota* $q \in [0, 1)$ and the *voting weights* $w_j > 0$ of the agents $j \in N$. Let $\text{YCW}(a) = \sum_{j \in N: a_j = \text{yes}} w_j$ denote the *Yea-voters' cumulative weight*, and $\text{NCW}(a) = \sum_{j \in N: a_j = \text{no}} w_j$ the *Nay-voters' cumulative weight*. A ternary voting profile a is defined to be winning, $a \in W_N[q; (w_j)_{j \in N}]$, when the Yea-voters' cumulative weight exceeds the fraction q of the cumulative weight of all non-abstainers, $\text{YCW}(a) > q \cdot (\text{YCW}(a) + \text{NCW}(a))$.

3. The Penrose/Banzhaf model. The *Penrose/Banzhaf distribution* P_N^t assumes that all agents act independently, abstain with a common *abstention probability* $t \in [0, 1)$, and divide the remaining likelihood $1 - t$ equally between a Yea and a Nay. In this model, a ternary voting profile $a \in \Omega_N$ carries the probability

$$P_N^t[\{a\}] = \frac{1}{2^{\text{Yea}(a)+\text{Nay}(a)}} (1-t)^{\text{Yea}(a)+\text{Nay}(a)} t^{\text{Abs}(a)}.$$

When the ternary parameter t vanishes, voting profiles that contain an abstention are assigned zero probability. Thus a profile carries positive mass only when every agent votes Yea or Nay. That is, with $t = 0$ the ternary Penrose/Banzhaf model reduces to the familiar binary Penrose/Banzhaf model. The ternary Penrose/Banzhaf model thus embraces the binary Penrose/Banzhaf model as a degenerate case. A sample result is provided by Theorem 2.

THEOREM 2. *Let the ternary profile space Ω_N be equipped with the Penrose/Banzhaf distribution P_N^t , with abstention probability $t \in [0, 1)$, and let W_N be an arbitrary decision rule.*

(i) *For all agents $j \in N$, success and influence probabilities are related through*

$$P_N^t[A_j(W_N)] = \frac{1-t}{2} + \frac{1-t}{2} P_N^t[C_j(W_N)].$$

(ii) *The influence sensitivity and the expected success margin of W_N fulfill*

$$\Sigma_{P_N^t}(W_N) = \frac{1}{1-t} E_{P_N^t}[\sigma(W_N)].$$

PROOF. See Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 in Birkmeier/Käufel/Pukelsheim (2011). \square

With $t = 0$, this coincides with the results in Theorems 3.2.16 and 3.3.5 in Felsenthal/Machover (1998), see also Ruff/Pukelsheim (2010). Birkmeier (2011, Satz 2.3.4) presents a version of part (i) dealing with a slightly larger set of profiles that are considered a success for agent j , namely those that are agreeable to agent j combined with those wherein j abstains (and which might be considered ‘weakly agreeable’).

4. The Shapley/Shubik model. The *Shapley/Shubik distribution* S_N^t on Ω_N is built up in three stages. The first stage, dealing with abstentions, is new. We propose to assume all agents to abstain independently, with a common abstention probability $t \in [0, 1)$. Under this assumption the number ℓ of those who abstain follows a binomial distribution, $\frac{n!}{\ell!(n-\ell)!} t^\ell (1-t)^{n-\ell}$. The second and third stages are standard. The number of Yea-voters k is taken to attain each of its possible values $0, \dots, n - \ell$ with the same probability, $1/(n - \ell + 1)$. Third, each of the $\frac{n!}{k!\ell!(n-k-\ell)!}$ profiles with k Yeas, ℓ abstentions, and $n - k - \ell$ Nays is considered equally likely. Thus, with some of the factorial terms canceling out and after re-substituting $\text{Yea}(a)$ for k and $\text{Yea}(a) + \text{Nay}(a)$ for $n - \ell$, the total probability of a ternary voting profile $a \in \Omega_N$ becomes

$$S_N^t[\{a\}] = \frac{\text{Yea}(a)! \text{Nay}(a)!}{(\text{Yea}(a) + \text{Nay}(a) + 1)!} (1-t)^{\text{Yea}(a) + \text{Nay}(a)} t^{\text{Abs}(a)}.$$

In binary models, it is well-known that every decision rule W_N has Shapley/Shubik influence sensitivity equal to unity. This entails two intriguing consequences, that the Shapley/Shubik sensitivity is insensitive to the specific decision rule W_N , and that the Shapley/Shubik influence probability of an agent j coincides with her or his power share. In ternary Shapley/Shubik models, the first conclusion persists, the second does not.

THEOREM 3. *Let the ternary profile space Ω_N be equipped with the Shapley/Shubik distribution S_N^t , with abstention probability $t \in [0, 1)$, and let n be the cardinality of the assembly N .*

Then all decision rules W_N share an identical influence sensitivity,

$$\Sigma_{S_N^t}(W_N) = \frac{1 - t^n}{1 - t}.$$

PROOF. See Satz 2.3.9 in Birkmeier (2011). □

The right hand side is the same as $1 + t + \dots + t^{n-1}$. Hence its limit equals n , the number of agents, as the abstention probability t tends to unity. This is quite plausible since, with the likelihood of abstention growing, each of the n agents is getting to be more and more critical when casting a clear Yea- or Nay-vote, and in the end acquires an influence probability equal to unity.

5. The EU Council of Ministers. In some applications the grand assembly N is partitioned into disjoint subsets, called *blocs*. The associated compound decision rule on N is composed of internal decision rules within blocs, and a second-level decision rule among bloc delegates. An example is the Council of Ministers of the European Union, where the entirety of the Union citizens, N , is partitioned into the 27 blocs of its Member States’ citizenries that are represented by their Ministers.

In the binary Penrose/Banzhaf bloc model, a compound influence probability of citizen $j \in N$ typically factorizes into the product of the internal influence probability of j in her or his bloc B , times the second-level influence probability of bloc B relative to the partitioning specified, see Straffin (1978), Felsenthal/Machover (2002), Laruelle/Valenciano (2004), or Ruff/Pukelsheim (2010). These product formulas generalize to carry over to ternary Penrose/Banzhaf bloc models, see Birkmeier (2011) for a *bottom up* construction (Satz 5.1.3) as well as for a *top down* construction (Satz 5.1.6).

The analysis may be employed to design bloc decision rules that permit abstentions. The underlying notion of optimality is based on a weighted average, of the diplomatic *one state, one vote* principle that underlies international relations among Member States, and of the democratic *one person, one vote* principle that would apply to the Union citizens, see Laruelle/Widgrén (1998) and Satz 5.3.3 in Birkmeier (2011). However, it is by no means evident whether the Treaty of Lisbon (2010) would support the two equality principles and, if so, whether they may be mixed into a single optimality criterion.

Nevertheless, a statistical evaluation of previous decision rules used in the EU Council of Ministers leads to the estimates reported in Section 6.1 of Birkmeier (2011). They suggest that, in the past, the Union functioned with a mixture of about a ten percent weighting on the diplomatic equality principle, and a complementary ninety percent weighting on the democratic equality principle. With these weightings, the optimal quota is found to be 60.98 percent, see Birkmeier (2011, page 117). This is slightly below the quota of 61.6 percent proposed in the Jagiellonian Compromise of Słomczyński/Życzkowski (2010).

The mixture criterion is roughly in line with the composition of the European Parliament where each Member State is guaranteed six seats out of a total of 751 seats. That is, twenty percent of the seats are preassigned to the Member States obeying the diplomatic equality principle of *one state, one vote*. The remaining eighty percent then might be allocated via a proportional representation apportionment method to honor the democratic equality principle of *one person, one vote*, as proposed in the Cambridge Compromise of Grimmett et al. (2011).

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