Emotion Concepts in Context

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A Contrastive Analysis of English and German Discourse

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Affidavit

I hereby confirm that my thesis entitled *Emotion Concepts in Context — A Contrastive Analysis of English and German Discourse* is the result of my own work. All sources and/ or materials applied are listed and specified in the thesis. Furthermore, I confirm that this thesis has not yet been submitted as part of another examination process neither in identical nor in similar form.

Augsburg, 26 April 2019

Nina-Maria Fronhofer

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Contents

Zusammenfassung

Emotion Concepts in Context – A Contrastive Analysis of English and German Discourse untersucht Emotionskonzepte aus kontrastiver Perspektive unter expliziter Berücksichtigung ihres linguistischen und kognitiven Kontextes. Dies wird insbesondere durch den integrativen Charakter des vorliegenden theoretischen Ansatzes ermöglicht, der Ansätze der Kognitiven Korpuslinguistik, Pragmatik und Interaktionalen Soziolinguistik vereint und das aus der Kognitiven Korpuslinguistik stammende Emotionsereignis-Modell (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010) erweitert.

Basierend auf existierenden zwischensprachlichen Untersuchungen zu pragmatischen Unterschieden zwischen dem Englischen und Deutschen, sowie aufgrund von Studien zu Emotionsereignissen, werden Unterschiede in der sprachlichen Realisierung von Emotionsereignissen einschließlich deren kontextuellen Konfigurationen erwartet. Wie sich britische und deutsche Emotionsereignisse einschließlich ihres linguistischen und kognitiven Kontextes unterscheiden, wurde bisher jedoch noch nicht untersucht.

Die vorliegenden Arbeit basiert auf einem Korpus (114,024 Worte), welches in einem Experiment erstellt wurde. Britische (n=62) und deutsche (n=68) StudentInnen sollten darin persönliche Erzähltexte (n=260) zu den Themen 'unfaire Benotung' und 'Bestnote' verfassen. Das Korpus ist hinsichtlich positiver und negativer Texte sowie Geschlecht und Sprache ausbalanciert und wurde anhand von für die pragmatisch-kognitiven Analysen eigens entwickelten und daher kontextsensitiven Annotationsschemata kodiert. Die qualitativen und quantitativen Analysen umfassen gemischt generalisierte lineare statistische Modelle (generalized linear mixed models, GLMM), die es ermöglichen, abhängige Variablen (fixed effects) wie Sprache und Gender zu untersuchen und Störvariablen als Zufallseffekte (random effects) miteinzuberechnen.

Zwischensprachliche Unterschiede wurden im Einzelnen in der Frequenz von spezifischen Emotionskonzepten, im Gebrauch von Wortarten zur Realisierung von Emotionsereignissen, in Präsens- und Komparativformen von Emotionslexemen, sowie in der Realisierung von thematischen Rollen festgestellt (Emotionsereignis-Modell). Im britischen Datensatz wurde beispielsweise das Konzepte SADNESS häufiger realisiert als TRAUER im deutschen Datensatz. Das Emotionskonzept ÄRGER – ANGER hingegen wurde in höherer Frequenz in den deutschen Erzähltexten realisiert. Adjektive und Adverbien dienen häufiger zur Realisierung von Emotionen in britischen Emotionsereignissen, wohingegen in den deutschen Erzähltexten Verben häufiger auftreten. Präsens und Komparativformen von Emotionslexemen wurden ebenfalls häufiger im deutschen Datensatz identifiziert. In den deutschen Erzähltexten wurde die thematische Rolle des ERFAHRENDEN häufiger genannt als in den britischen, in denen die URSACHE der Emotion in höherer Frequenz realisiert wurde.

Des Weiteren wurden zwischensprachliche Unterschiede in der (subjektiven) Konstruk-

tion des Emotionsereignisses als positives oder negatives Ereignis in Form von sogenannten kongruenten bzw. inkongruenten kontextellen Konfigurationen (1. Erweiterung des Emotionsereignis-Modells) identifiziert. Zentral ist hierbei, dass inkongruente kontextuelle Konfigurationen in Emotionsereignissen erstmalig diskutiert werden und ihnen besondere Diskursfunktionen zugewiesen werden konnten. Abgesehen von der Diskursfunktion Intensivierung, die bereits bei kongruenten kontextuellen Konfigurationen, wie z.B. bei Klustern von äquivalenten Emotionskonzepten, in der Fachliteratur diskutiert wurde, führen inkongruente kontextuelle Konfigurationen zu spezifischen konversationellen Implikaturen und können Funktionen wie Abschwächung oder Perspektivierung erfüllen. Dies zeigte sich z.B. an der möglichen negativen Konstruktion des Emotionskonzeptes JOY – FREUDE, welches v.a. im britischen Datensatz negativ konstruiert wurde.

Schließlich fanden sich zwischensprachliche Unterschiede auch bezüglich der (adverbialen) Modifikation von Emotionsereignissen durch Gradadverbien und Marker epistemischer Modalität (2. Erweiterung des Emotionsereignis-Modells). Die deutschen StudienteilnehmerInnen gebrauchten mehr Gradadverbien in Kookkurrenz mit Emotionslexemen als die britischen, Frauen realisierten in höherer Frequenz kookkurrierende Gradadverbien als Männer und die deutschen männlichen Teilnehmer gebrauchten mehr abschwächende kookkurrierende Gradadverbien. Hinsichtlich der Marker epistemischer Modaliät in Kookkurrenz mit Emotionslexemen war ein Geschlechterunterschied zu verzeichnen. Die männlichen Teilnehmer gebrauchten häufiger kookkurierende epistemische Marker als die weiblichen. Darüberhinaus benutzten die britischen StudentInnen vorwiegend kookkurrierende Marker der 'geringen Wahrscheinlichkeit', während die deutschen StudentInnen kookkurrierende Marker der 'Sicherheit' gebrauchten. Als Neuerung wurden hierbei die modifizierenden Gradadverbien und epistemischen Marker erstmals im Rahmen von Emotionsereignissen als, aus dialogischer Perspektive, Mittel intersubjektiver Positionierung diskutiert, die entweder Raum für andere Sichtweisen einräumen (dialogic expansion) oder einschränken (dialogic contraction). Diese Diskursfunktionen traten besonders in der qualitativen Analyse von multiplen Modifikationen von Emotionslexemen hervor und es wurde gezeigt, dass modifizierende Gradadverbien und epistemische Marker als Kontextualisierungshinweise fungieren können.

Die Modellerweiterungen des Emotionsereignis-Modells integrieren daher erstmalig den linguistischen und kognitiven Kontext in ihre Betrachtung. In dieser Hinsicht ist das Erweiterte Emotionsereignis Modell ausdifferenzierter als bisherige Modelle, die versuchen Emotionen im Diskurs zu fassen (The Appraisal Framework, Martin & White 2005).

Part I. Introduction

General Interest and Scope of the Investigation

The study *Emotion Concepts in Context – A Contrastive Analysis of British English and German Discourse* investigates emotion concepts in their linguistic and cognitive context from a contrastive perspective. Linguistic and cognitive context are taken into account by the integrative approach of the present investigation that weds a cognitive corpus linguistic view with a pragmatic and interactional sociolinguistics perspective, and which extends the Emotion Event Model (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). Based on prior research on English and German pragmatic contrasts as well as contrastive studies on Emotion Events, Emotion Event displays including the linguistic and cognitive context are expected to differ qualitatively and quantitatively across languages. Differences in British English and German Emotion Events including their contextual configurations, which have not been studied so far, will be investigated in the empirical chapters of the present study.

The corpus study (114,024 words) reports on findings based on written personal narratives (n=260) experimentally elicited from British (n=62) and German (n=68) university students on the topics 'unfair grading' and 'best mark'. The corpus is balanced with respect to positive and negative topics, languages and genders.

The corpus was annotated following cognitive-pragmatic, context-sensitive annotation schemes that were developed for the purpose of this investigation. The qualitative and quantitative analyses comprise generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) that allow the investigation of dependent variables such as language, i.e. fixed effects, and which can rule out random effects.

In the following, an overview of the single chapters of this investigation is provided. The chapters are organized as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical approach to 'emotion', 'context' and 'contrastive analysis'. The integrated framework on which the empirical investigation is based is presented in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 and 4 summarize previous research on contrasts with respect to British English and German discourse and British English and German emotion concepts. Chapter 5 provides an overview of the data and methodology. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are the empirical chapters that zoom in on the Emotion Event Model and develop step by step the Extended Emotion Event Model (I & II). The empirical chapters identified important differences in British and German Emotion Events, captured by the Extended Emotion Event Model which takes, in contrast to former models such as the Appraisal Framework (Martin & White 2005), linguistic and cognitive context into account.

Outline of the Chapters

Chapter 1: Preliminaries (I)
This chapter provides an overview over linguistic approaches to emotion. Moreover, it introduces how 'emotion', 'context' and 'contrastive analysis' are conceived of in the present investigation. 'Emotion' is viewed in the cognitive linguistic framework of Emotion Events. 'Context' is approached in this investigation as dynamic construct and provides the basis for the integrated framework and methodological approach outlined in the subsequent chapters. The 'contrastive analysis' comprises both functional and cognitive tertia, and Emotion Events are viewed in British English and German. The Emotion Event model is hereby tested against not one but two languages, and the contrastive analysis is expected to provide insights into questions of universality vs. language-specificity of emotion concepts.

Chapter 2: Preliminaries (II)
In this chapter, the central theoretical premises of the integrated approach to emotion concepts in context, which has been adopted in this investigation, are outlined. The rationale and operationalization of each research perspective are discussed, in particular the question of how 'context' is conceived of in each theoretical framework. The integrated approach that is applied to the contrastive analysis of emotion concepts, involving British English and German, weds a cognitive corpus linguistic with a pragmatic and interactional sociolinguistics perspective. The combination of different approaches enables to conceive of context as dynamic construct, and allows for the contrastive analysis of emotion concepts in their linguistic and cognitive context, via the analysis of contextualization cues, for instance, that trigger inferential processes. The integration of linguistic and cognitive contexts in the analysis of emotion concepts can be regarded as an important extension to the Emotion Event Model (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010).

Chapter 3: Previous Research (I)
Previous research on English and German discourse is reviewed in this chapter, focusing generally on the Five Dimensions of Communicative Contrasts (e.g., House 2006a), and more specifically, on contrastive findings with respect to evaluation, hedging/ epistemic modality and intensification. It is outlined in how far these findings are related to the present investigation, i.e. the contrastive study of emotion concepts in context. Moreover, research gaps in previous investigations are identified, for example with respect to genres and modes investigated, or with respect to the operationalization of intensifiers or hedges/ epistemic markers. Furthermore, statistical modeling is expected to improve

the robustness of findings in the present study and future investigations.

Chapter 4: Previous Research (II)
In this chapter, previous findings on Emotion Events are reviewed, departing from contrastive studies explicitly involving English and German emotion concepts. As such studies are quite sparse in number, the chapter is extended and complemented by additionally reviewing studies involving emotion concepts in other languages than English and German, but which relate to the present investigation in so far as they partly consider epistemic modal marking[1] or intensification as contextual configurations of emotion lexemes. Moreover, research on clustering emotion concepts is reviewed. Goals for the present study are named and suggestions for future investigations are made. The chapter closes with summarizing research gaps that emerged from previous research (cf. Chapters 3 and 4) and hypotheses based on this body of research are formulated.

Chapter 5: Data and Methodology
This chapter provides an overview of the corpus design and compilation of the Augsburg Corpus of Written Emotion Narratives (AWE), on which the present investigation is based. The rationale for the choice of eliciting narratives is provided. After presenting the corpus statistics and briefly discussing relevant socio-cultural variables the overall methodology, including statistical analyses, is outlined. The present investigation can be seen as unifying characteristics of corpus-based and corpus-driven approaches. Corpus tools and annotation schemes used in the present investigation are provided and discussed. The conceptualization of 'context' as analyst construct, comprising linguistic context, cognitive context, social context and sociocultural context, is outlined in detail. It motivated the annotation procedures and overall methodology.

Chapter 6: Baseline to the Contextual Analysis
This chapter zooms in on Emotion Events and investigates the differences in their linguistic realization from a contrastive perspective, focusing on the British English and German AWE datasets. The first section summarizes the differential display identified with respect to emotion lexeme frequencies. Overall emotion lexeme display as well as the display of single emotion concepts across British English and German are modeled using inferential statistics (generalized linear mixed model, GLMM). The British English and German datasets differ with respect to the number of emotion lexemes of specific emotion concepts displayed. ANGER – ÄRGER, for instance, is displayed

[1] The role of epistemic modal marking in Emotion Events has not been explored before, but is, however, listed here, since it plays a decisive role in the Extended Emotion Event Model, cf. Chapters 7 and 8.

more frequently in the German data, SADNESS – TRAUER, for example, is more frequent in the British data. Gender differences were identified; FEAR –FURCHT lexemes were more frequent in the female narratives than in the male narratives. The descriptive overview over part-of-speech-membership (POS-membership) identified the more frequent use of emotion adjectives and adverbs in the British data and more emotion verbs in the German data. Moreover, conversational present and comparatives were more frequent in the German data. In the German narratives more impersonal experiencers were displayed and more first-person experiencers. Finally, the British participants provided more often the CAUSE in the Emotion Events than the Germans.

Chapter 7: Emotion Events and Context I

Chapter 7 investigates the linguistic and cognitive context of emotion concepts in form of their construal in congruent contextual configurations, i.e. positive contextual configurations in co-occurrence with positive emotion concepts or negative contextual configurations in co-occurrence with negative emotion concepts, and incongruent contextual configurations, i.e. negative contextual configurations in co-occurrence with positive emotion concepts or positive contextual configurations with negative emotion concepts, in Emotion Events. As congruent and incongruent contextual displays fulfill important functions in emotion discourse, such as intensification, subjective construal or perspectivization, they are integrated in the Emotion Event Model (Extended Emotion Event Model I). Furthermore, the qualitative analyses show that the British English and German Emotion Events vary with respect to congruent and incongruent contextual displays, for instance with respect to JOY – FREUDE which is often negatively construed in the British data. This incongruent contextual configuration in particular shows that the EE is subjectively construed and perspectivized.

Chapter 8: Emotion Events and Context II

This chapter zooms in on the linguistic and cognitive context of emotion concepts in form of (adverbial) modifiers in EE, i.e. markers of un-/ certainty and intensifiers in the immediate linguistic context of emotion lexemes. Since these modifiers can take important functions as contextualization cues, which fulfill functions such as foregrounding or backgrounding, and as markers of intersubjective positioning, i.e. dialogic contraction and dialogic expansion, which particularly emerge when several modifiers are at play (multiple modifier use), they are integrated in the EE model (Extended Emotion Event Model II). Moreover, the display of intensifiers and markers of un-/certainty in EE, and therefore intersubjective positioning, varies, as is shown in both qualitative and quantitative analyses, across the British English and German data and across genders. In German narratives, more intensifiers were used. Moreover, females used intensifiers

in higher frequencies. Downgraders were more often used by German males. Overall, males used more markers of epistemic modality than the females. In the British dataset, markers of 'low' probability were prevalent, in the German dataset markers of 'high' probability were more frequent.

The conclusion comprises a summary of the main findings, reviews the Extended Emotion Event Model and discusses the most prominent theoretical implications of the investigation.

Part II. Theoretical Approach

1

Preliminaries (I): Approaching 'Emotion', 'Context' and 'Contrastive Analysis'

In this chapter, the basic theoretical approach to 'emotion', 'context' and 'contrastive analysis' will be introduced. The conceptualization of 'emotion' and 'context' that is underlying this investigation motivates the integrated theoretical approach that will be outlined in the following chapter (cf. Chapter 2). Basic premises of 'contrastive analysis' are viewed from both a cognitive and functional prespective.

1.1 Emotion Language: A Complex Phenomenon

Emotions have long been (e.g., Oatley et al. 2006) a fascinating but often enigmatic (research) topic for both experts in the field and laypeople. The importance and centrality of emotions in language has recently been pointed out by Foolen (2015: 241), citing his colleague Van Berkum, who stated that "without emotion [there is; NMF] no language". Only recently, emotions have been given due credit in scientific investigations and also in linguistics the "emotional turn" (Lüdtke 2015: IX), the "emotional revolution" (Foolen 2012: 364) finally gained momentum. The most important key questions (cf., Bednarek 2008a; Dziwirek & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010; Ekman & Davidson 1994; Kövecses 2000) on which linguists, and researchers from various other research disciplines, are still working are the following[2]:

- How can emotion(s) be defined?
- What is the structure of emotions?
- Are there basic emotions?

[2] Aspects on which scientists, in particular psychologists, agree have been recently addressed and summarized in Ekman (2016).

- Are emotions human-specific or mammalian?
- Are there universal and/ or culture-specific emotions?
- What is the relation between emotional experience and the linguistic expression of emotion?
  and
- How is emotional meaning represented?

In linguistics, it has been acknowledged that emotion is a complex phenomenon, permeating all levels of linguistic analysis (Ochs & Schieffelin 1989; Wilce 2009). This complexity is also reflected in the multitude of linguistic approaches to emotion. Examples for the ways in which emotion is encoded on a morphological, phonological, syntactic, lexical, semantic and pragmatic level can be found in a various publications (e.g., Schnoebelen 2012; Majid 2012; Foolen 2016; Alba-Juez & Mackenzie 2016).
Different research paradigms emerged, depending on which research discipline they belong to, and depending on which aspect of emotion language they put their focus on. Linguistic approaches to emotion can be, therefore, categorized into the following (e.g., Kövecses 2000; Bednarek 2008a; Dziwirek & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010):

- cognitive approaches
- functional approaches
- systemic-functional approaches
- pragmatic and textlinguistic approaches
- syntactic approaches
- conversation-analytic approaches
- cross-linguistic approaches
- stylistic/ literary approaches
- psycholinguistic approaches
- diachronic approaches
- linguistic-anthropological approaches
  ...

Advanced studies with respect to emotion language can be found in two main strands: cognitive linguistics and functionalism, in particular systemic-functional linguistics. While cognitive linguists understand emotion as cognitive system of knowledge that interacts with language (e.g., Lüdtke 2015), systemic-functional linguists regard emotion as subsystem of language dependent on evaluation systems (e.g., Martin & White 2005).
Although having been often criticized, a distinction between "emotion talk" and "emotional talk" (Bednarek 2008a: 10), exemplified by utterances such as *I feel disgust* vs. *Yuk!*, prevails up to now in linguistics. Figure 1 taken from Bednarek (2008a: 10)

illustrates this dichotomy. Bednarek (2008a: 10) defines "emotion talk" as the descriptive use of linguistic expressions that denote (the speaker's and other's) emotions. "Emotional talk" (Bednarek 2008a: 10) is conceptualized as expressively signaling the speaker's emotions (e.g., Ochs & Schieffelin 1989). Bednarek acknowledges that there are approaches to emotion language which focus on both emotion talk and emotional talk (e.g., Harkins & Wierzbicka 2001).



Figure 1: Emotion Talk and Emotional Talk (Bednarek 2008a: 10).

The distinction of expressive vs. descriptive content with respect to emotion has been noted before by Kaplan (1999), for instance, who points this contrast out drawing on a formal, logico-semantic perspective. Kövecses (2000) comments as well on expressive and descriptive emotion terms and draws the analogy to assertive and expressive speech acts (Searle 1969). He states that descriptive terms often have an assertive function, expressive terms often an expressive function (Kövecses 2000: 3). However, the distinction drawn, i.e. the interjection *Yuk!* having expressive meaning/ function, while the clause containing an emotion noun *I feel disgust* having descriptive meaning/ function is not so clear-cut, and *I feel disgust/ am disgusted* can also have expressive content. This has been critisized by Kövecses (2000) pointing out that the exclamation *I love you!* can potentially be expressive. Along the same lines Thompson (2015) notes that both emotion talk and emotional talk can occur in utterances such as *I like/ love that!* where excitement could be encoded by the intonation (cf. emotional talk) and may be combined with the description of the speaker's feelings (cf. emotion talk, and cf. Figure 2 below).

Up to this point, this sort of complexity has not yet been systematically investigated and has neither been integrated in Bednarek (2008a) nor taken into account by the appraisal system (cf. Chapter 2.3.1 and Figure 5). Alba-Juez (2018) addresses, however, the possible overlay of emotion talk and emotional talk with the attitude system as

conceptualized by Thompson (2015) and further points out that some possible overlays such as the ones of emotion talk and emotional talk with engagement (e.g., *They say it's disgusting vs. I didn't say anything*, i.e. heteroglossic vs. monoglossic engagement) and graduation (e.g., *I am very sad about the news.*, i.e. graduation, force, intensification) have not yet been taken into account (Alba-Juez 2018). Figure 2 illustrates the overlays as conceptualized by Thompson (2015). Overlays comprise the overlay of emotion talk (e.g., *He loved it*) and emotional talk (e.g., *"Ouch!"*) invoking affect (*"I like that"*), the overlay of emotion talk and judgment, invoking judgment (*The teacher loves the kids he teaches*), the overlay of emotional talk and judgment (*"Him? A good actor???"*), and emotional talk and appreciation (*"Wow, it's an absolutely amazing film!"*), invoking appreciation of judgment.



Figure 2: The Appraisal System/ Attitude and Emotion/-al Talk (Thompson 2015: taken from Alba-Juez 2018).

As we will see in the following section, the complexity of emotion in discourse cannot be sufficiently captured by conceptualizing in terms of emotion talk vs. emotional talk (Bednarek 2008a) nor by applying the refined appraisal framework presented above (Thompson 2015). Therefore, the approach in the present investigation will be of different nature (cf. Chapter 2). While being a cognitive linguistic approach, a strong focus will be put on the contextual dimension of emotion, context being understood as dynamic construct (cf. Chapters 1.3, 2, 5.4.3). So far, only very few accounts on emotion from a language-in-use perspective with a strong focus on discourse have

been published (Lüdtke e.g., 2015; Mackenzie & Alba-Juez e.g., 2019; cf. Chapters 3, 4). Moreover, a cognitive linguistic perspective is taken, since there is profound evidence from work in cognitive science (e.g., Shaver et al. 2001; Niedenthal 2008; Park 2018) that cognitive models including prototype views have "the greatest explanatory power for many aspects of emotional meaning" (Kövecses 2000: 15). Finally, the relation of evaluation and emotion, i.e. the finding that emotion is understood as subsystem of language permeating all linguistic levels in systemic-functional linguistics, is not robust. Systemic-functional linguists acknowledge themselves that the close relationship of emotion and evaluation has to be investigated in cognitive linguistics and functional linguistics, and that "more research is needed to understand and clarify what exactly their common ground is" (Alba-Juez & Mackenzie 2019: 6). This suggests that emotion might not only be regarded as subsystem of language, and, therefore, this investigation will focus on emotion in the first place, and look upon evaluation as being an integral part of Emotion Event Structures (cf. Chapter 2.2.2). In the next section, the data will be introduced and the complexity of emotion discourse will be further exemplified.

1.2 'Emotion'

Introducing the Data

The following examples (cf. Examples 1[3]) provide first insights into Emotion Event structures analyzed in the Extended framework of Emotion Events (EE; cf. Chapter 2), i.e. the use of emotion lexemes and their contextual configurations in AWE (Augsburg Corpus of Written Emotion Narratives, cf. Chapter 5.1). The examples, taken from the British English subcorpus of the Augsburg Corpus of Written Emotion narratives (AWE), a contrastive corpus of written British English and German emotion narratives, elicited in an experimental setting (cf. Chapter 5), illustrate the complexity of emotion discourse, since they contain "overlays" that have been identified before (cf. discussion above). Moreover, they underline the importance of linguistic and cognitive context of emotion lexemes (cf. Chapters 1, 2, 5.4.3). Comparable examples of such complex emotion discourse have been equally identified for the German subcorpus (cf. Chapters 6, 7, 8).

As the complexity of emotion discourse cannot be captured by the mere conceptualization into emotion talk and emotional talk Bednarek (2008a) or the refined version of the Appraisal System presented above (e.g., Thompson 2015), as will be outlined in the

[3] Emotion lexemes are highlighted in bold, contextual cues that are co-occurring with those emotion lexemes and are of interest in this study are underlined.

following, instances of complex emotion discourse (cf. Examples 1) will be approached as Emotion Event Structures (cf. Chapters 2.1.2, 5.4.3, 6):

(1) a. *[...] I still feel* ***proud*** *of myself and* ***pleased*** *that I am capable of getting high grades, although a little* ***guilty*** *that my* ***joy*** *was* ***disappointment*** *and* ***sadness*** *for my friends on the same course, who didn't do as well.* (e_f_018_2)

b. *My* ***anger*** *was justified surely?* (e_m_029_1)

c. *I'm so* ***angry*** *[...]* (e_f_032_1)

d. *[...], I would be slightly* ***irritated*** *of sorts.* (e_f_038_1)

e. *I['m] just so* ***happy*** *[...]* (e_f_024_2)

The Emotion Event Structures contain emotion lexemes and their immediate linguistic context (co-text; cf. Chapter 5.4.3). Their co-occurrences comprise further emotion lexemes (*pleased*, cf. Example 1 a.), with which they form emotion concept clusters (*proud and pleased*) and further evaluative cues (cf. *who did not do as well* in Example 1 a., cf. Chapter 7). Furthermore, contextual configurations comprise one (cf. *a little*, *surely*, *so* in Examples 1 a., b. or c.) or even several (cf. *slightly...of sorts* and *just so* in Examples 1 d. and e.) adverbial modifiers, i.e. content disjuncts and markers of un-/certainty (cf. *surely* in Example 1 b.) and adverbial subjuncts and intensifiers (cf. *a little* and *so* in Example 1 a. and c. and cf. Chapter 8) of emotion lexemes (cf. Examples 1 b.–e.).

Returning again to Bednarek (2008a), one could analyze the examples presented above in terms of emotion talk AND emotional talk, since they contain emotion lexemes (emotion talk) and intensifiers and markers of un-/certainty (emotional talk). However, this classification is not precise enough.

One reason for this is that the conceptualization of emotion, the representational, experiental metafunction (Foolen 2015) can be regarded to overlay with the direct expression of emotion, with enacting emotion, the interpersonal (Foolen 2015). And this is not only the case with respect to the ATTITUDE system (cf. Figure above; Thompson 2015), but with respect to emotion, i.e. in appraisal-systemic terms AFFECT (e.g., *anger* or *irritated*), which overlays with GRADUATION (e.g., *slightly*) and ENGAGEMENT (e.g., *surely*) resources (cf. the Appraisal System, Chapter 2.3.1).

Another reason is that the emotion lexemes in the Example 1 can only be interpreted

in relation to the co-occurring items. I.e. to say that we cannot just leave out a co-occurring contextual cue without changing the meaning of the utterance (cf. *I'm angry* vs. *I'm so angry* or *I [...] feel proud and pleased* vs. *I [..] feel proud and please although a little guilty*). The functions of co-occurring contextual cues, interpreted as CCs and resources of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapter 2), will be explored in the research chapters of the present investigation from a contrastive perspective (cf. Chapters 6, 7, 8). Overall, when analyzing pragmatic meaning, refined results can be expected when taking context into account, i.e. the whole is more than the sum of its parts (cf. Chapters 1.3, 2, 5.4.3 on 'context' and the parts-whole-perspective).

Thus, emotion discourse does not involve either emotion language (Bednarek 2008a) such as *anger* to take again Example 1 b., which provides access to the emotion concept ANGER (Kövecses 2000; Lakoff 1987), or emotional language (Bednarek 2008a) such as *surely*, which can be considered to be a booster (Downing 2001) of polyfunctional and intersubjective nature here (Downing 2001; Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007), since it both signals the participant's opinion and the interrogative elicits a reply (Downing 2001).[4] Emotion discourse often involves both of them, and therefore, the distinction between emotion talk and emotional talk is indeed not as clear-cut as suggested. Moreover, overlays do seem to exist not only with respect to the ATTITUDE system (cf., Thompson 2015), but also with respect to ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION resources. This has been noted (e.g., Alba-Juez 2018), but has not been systematically investigated before. The functional contribution to emotion discourse of contextual cues such as the ones named above has only been studied to a limited extend with respect to coordinated emotion lexemes (e.g., *I am surprised and happy*, positive construal of SURPRISE) that have been viewed from a construal-of-context perspective as disambiguating devices (cf. for SURPRISE, which can be positively or negatively construed, Bednarek 2008a). Clustering emotion lexemes have only been taken into account as means of intensification (cf. intensifying triplets; Martin 2004).

The aim of the present investigation is, therefore, to fill this gap, to take the linguistic and cognitive context of emotion lexemes into account, and — in appraisal-theoretical terms (Martin & White 2005: 136) — to study instances of overlay between 1) emotion talk/ affect (cf. emotion lexeme in Example 1 c.) and graduation/ intensification (cf. intensifiers in Example 1 c.) and, respectively, 2) emotion talk/ affect (cf. emotion lex-

[4] Downing's systemic-functional study (Downing 2001: 256–257) on *surely* finds it also to be a means of "speaker self-validation", a marker of foreseen denial and a marker of mirativity. In the present investigation, mirativity will not be discussed, which is a category related to and sometimes overlapping with epistemicity and evidentiality. Mirative markers such as *surely* mark the information as being new or surprising and have been studied by Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer (e.g., 2007). A recent account on mirativity with respect to emotions with a slightly different focus has been published by Krawczak & Glynn (2015).

eme in Example 1 b.) and engagement (cf. Example 1 b.). The focus with respect to 2) lies on graduation of the engagement system (Martin & White 2005: 136), i.e. on the graduation of certainty and uncertainty by epistemic modal markers. Even instances of multiple overlays are studied (cf. e.g., the use of two intensifiers as in Example 1 d. and e.) as well as overlays of double affect in emotion concept clusters (as in Example 1 a., specifically the role of *proud ...guilty*) and affect with judgment resources (as in Example 1 a., *who didn't do do as well*).

However, the present approach is not a systemic-functional one, but an integrated one extending a cognitive (corpus) linguistic perspective, with a pragmatic, systemic-functional and interactional sociolinguistics perspective (cf. Chapter 2). Hereby, the complexity of emotion discourse in form of Emotion Event Structures, containing emotion lexemes as well as contextual cues, as viewed in the Examples 1 above, can be taken into account. Moreover, employing the Extended Emotion Event Model allows to investigate Emotion Events across the British and German subcorpus (cf. 'contrastive analysis', Chapters 1, 2.5).

In Chapter 6, LOVE — LIEBE[5], JOY — FREUDE, SURPRISE — ÜBERRASCHUNG, ANGER — ÄRGER, SADNESS — TRAUER and FEAR — FURCHT are viewed from a qualitative and quantitative perspective, taking linguistic and cognitive context into account, in particular EXPERIENCERS of Emotion Events, CAUSES of Emotion Events or comparatives (cf. Example 1 a., MY PRIDE vs. THEIR SADNESS, high grades as CAUSE). In Chapter 7, contextual construal via further emotion lexemes and positive or negative evaluative items is viewed (cf. Example 1 a.). Chapter 8 investigates the functional contribution of (multiple) modifiers such as epistemic markers or intensifiers in Emotion Events (cf. Examples 1 b.-e.). However, before turning to these research chapters, some terms used in this investigation need to be clarified. This is undertaken in the next section.

Emotion Language in this Study

There is no consensus among scholars from different research disciplines that work on emotion with respect to which terms to use (Alba-Juez & Mackenzie 2019: 13). We find terms such as 'affect', 'mood', 'emotion' and 'feeling' and there might be even several definitions for each of the terms (Damasio 2018; Tomkins 1982; Batson et al. 1992).

In this study, the focus will lie on emotion, which can be defined as "a complex internally represented knowledge system having primarily an evaluative function within the human organism" (Schwarz-Friesel 2015: 161). Moreover, this investigation is informed by a cognitive linguistic approach to emotion, i.e. emotion lexemes are regarded

[5] Emotion lexemes in capitals are used as is conventionally done in cognitive linguistics in order to refer to (emotion) concepts.

as opening up conceptualization (cf. the following section, Kövecses 1990; Dirven & Verspoor 2004; cf. Chapter 7.1). In particular, emotion concepts are viewed in the present study as part of larger structures, viz. Emotion Event Structures (cf. Chapters 2.1.2, 7.1, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). Emotion lexemes are considered as such, when they denote emotion (cf. Chapter 5.4.4, Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989). This approach entails, that emotion language is not understood as subsystem of language, or as function alongside the evaluative function, as it is in systemic-functional approaches (Alba-Juez & Mackenzie 2019). Evaluation is considered in the framework of EE structures, when evaluative items co-occur with emotion lexemes and contribute to the construal of the Emotion Event (Chapters 2.2.2, 7). Disentangling emotion and evaluation is not easy, and emotion and evaluation might often be expressed simultaneously, although not necessarily overtly (and vice versa); sometimes an emotion is made explicit, sometimes an evaluation (cf. the discussion on the emotive and evaluative function, Alba-Juez & Mackenzie 2019: 17–18). Finally, a cognitive approach to emotion entails that basic emotion categories are assumed (Kövecses 2000). Moreover, a basic emotion approach enables, in contrast to other, mostly psychological or psycholinguistic approaches to the meaning of emotion terms, to take context into account. This is outlined in the next section.

The Basic Emotion Approach

Three main strains of approaches to the meaning of emotion words emerge from psychological and psycholinguistic research, which, overall, can be classified into (1) dimensional approaches, (2) componential approaches and (3) basic emotion approaches (Fontaine 2013). However, only the basic emotion approach is taking context into account. In linguistics, as well, studies on emotion adopted up to now very often a semasiological approach (Constantinou 2014), and only very few accounts on emotion from a language-in-use perspective with a strong focus on discourse, i.e. context, have been published so far (cf. Chapter 1.1; Lüdtke 2015; Mackenzie & Alba-Juez 2019).
The dimensional approach goes far back to Aristotle (Rhetorica) and Spinosa (Spinosa 1677; Fontaine et al. 2013), and understands (emotion) words to have dimensions ranging from one (a certain valence or evaluation/ hedonic tone/ pleasantness/ pleasure) to four (comprising a certain potency or power/ control/ dominance and arousal or activation and unpredictability; Averill (e.g., 1975); Osgood et al. (e.g., 1957); Russell (e.g., 1980); Fontaine et al. (e.g., 2007) and can therefore be represented by a specific position within a continuous, affective space. However, investigations adopting a dimensional approach to the meaning of emotion words do not take their contextual realization into account, since they understand, to name but one example, words such

as *spider* as being, without any exception, of negative valence (cf. in contrast to this the utterance *I love spiders.*).

Componential approaches to emotion terms, one of the most recent ones is the GRID-approach (Fontaine et al. 2013), are based on a componential emotion framework, which understands emotions not to be a specific state or phenomenon, but a process in which distinct phenomena interact in coordinated fashion. Componential approaches rely on and are elaborated departing from a feature profile view of the meaning of emotion concepts and investigate their denotative meaning which is defined by the features (Tzeng et al. 1987; Fontaine et al. 2013). However, these approaches investigate also only the de-contextualized meaning of words, which has recently been pointed out by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. (2013a), for instance.

The basic emotion approach goes back to Darwin (Fontaine et al. 2013) and was elaborated by Tomkins (e.g., 1962); Izard (e.g., 1977); Ekman (e.g., 1999) and assumes the existence of a limited number of qualitatively different (i.e. discrete), internally coherent emotional processes which, however, have distinct universal signals, i.e. expressive behaviour or physiology (Fontaine et al. 2013). The basic emotion approach is compatible with a contextual view on emotion concepts, since it takes, apart from basic level concepts, emotion concepts into account that vary, when compared to basic level concepts, in three factors (Fontaine 2013): emotion concepts vary with respect to context (1), BLISS, for instance, is an intense emotion in a spiritual context, emotion concepts vary with respect to intensity (2), when one compares IRRITATION and RAGE for example, and, finally they vary in blending (3), DISTRESS, for instance, shares properties of SADNESS and FEAR (Fontaine et al. 2002; Plutchik 2001). Moreover, the basic emotion view has a categorical view on the meaning of emotion terms and is therefore compatible with the hierarchical organization of emotion concepts put forward by Kövecses (e.g., 1990) comprising basic level, subordinate and superordinate emotion concepts (cf. Chapter 2.1).

The basic emotion approach is, therefore, preferred in this investigation which adopts Kövecses' hierarchical view on emotion concepts and weds it with a psychological categorization, the tree structure of emotions (Parrott 2001), that comprises primary, secondary and tertiary affective states. The latter will be, however, discussed from a methodological point of view in a later chapter (cf. Chapter 5). The next section introduces the question of how 'context' is conceived of in this investigation. The operationalization of the contextual types (linguistic, cognitive, social and sociocultural context) will be outlined in Chapter 5.4.3.

1.3 'Context'

Emotion language has been investigated in various research disciplines, and it has been acknowledged that "Nearly every dimension of every language at least potentially encodes emotion" (Wilce 2009: 3). Only recently, the contextual dimension of emotion has been taken into account and "emotion processes in discourse" have been the focus of a series of discourse-pragmatic investigations (Alba-Juez & Mackenzie 2019: 3).
The concept of context itself, however, remains despite its increasing prominence in various research fields and paradigms an object of ongoing debate:

> The heterogeneous nature of context and the context-dependence of context itself have made it almost impossible for the scientific community to agree upon one commonly shared definition or one commonly accepted theoretical perspective, and frequently, only a minute aspect of context is described, analyzed or formalized. (Fetzer 2012: 105)

Therefore it is necessary to define and operationalize 'context' as it is conceived of in the present investigation.
I follow the typology of context that has been developed by Fetzer (e.g., 2012: 107f.), based on a series of works on context (e.g., Fetzer & Akman 2002; Fetzer 2010a,c, 2011a), and conceive therefore of context as (1) participant construct, while taking speaker- and hearer-centered construal into account. Moreover, context is conceptualized as (2) analyst construct that categorizes context into linguistic context, social and sociocultural context, and cognitive context (Fetzer 2012: 107f.). Conceiving of context as participant construct entails that "a – more or less – common context" (Fetzer 2012: 110) is interactively construed and negotiated by minimally three participants, i.e. speaker, hearer and audience, who "import[...]" context (Gumperz 2003: 119) and invoke context through their conversational contributions and the sequential organization of the latter (Fetzer 2012: 109f.). Moreover, context is regarded as social construct through the sociocognitive contextual construal interactionally negotiated (Gumperz 2003; Bakhtin 1935 [1981]; Fetzer 2012: 109f.). Conceiving of context as analyst construct entails to consider linguistic context, i.e. the "linguistic material referred to" and investigated (Fetzer 2012: 115). It entails to consider social and sociocultural material, i.e. for example "participants, the immediate physical sourroundings" including space and time (Fetzer 2012: 115). Sociocultural context can be regarded as "particularization of social context, colored by culture-specific variables" (Fetzer 2012: 115). Finally, analysts will have to deal with cognitive context, which is the "foundation on which inference and other forms of reasoning are based" (Fetzer 2012: 115). Cognitive context comprises for instance mental representations or contextual assumptions including

those on "multual cognitive environments" (Fetzer 2012: 115).
This conceptualization of context motivates the integrated approach to emotion concepts adopted in this investigation. Moreover, it links the single research paradigms that have been adopted and justifies the methodological approach chosen. In Chapters 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5, I will develop in more detail on context as participant construct, i.e. on contextual construal from a speaker-/ writer- and hearer-centered perspective, and how it is conceived of in the cognitive corpus linguistic (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011), pragmatic (Grice 1975), systemic-functional (White 2003), interactional sociolinguistics (e.g., Gumperz 2003), and contrastive perspective that is taken in the integrated approach of this investigation. In Chapter 5.4.3, I will specify "what that thing called 'context' contains" (Fetzer 2012: 115) and how it can be operationalized, i.e. I will focus in more detail on the different context types of linguistic, cognitive, social and sociocultural context and how they relate to the present study. However, before turning to the integrated approach adopted in this investigation, some basic notions with respect to contrastive analysis will be introduced.

1.4 'Contrastive Analysis'

In this investigation, 'emotion' in 'context' is not only viewed in one, but viewed and contrasted in two languages, namely British English and German. This enables to develop and test the Emotion Event Model in more than one language (cf. Chapters 6, 7, 8), and can shed light on the universality vs. culture-specificity of emotion in discourse (cf. Chapter 2.5.1).
The contrastive analysis undertaken in this study draws on two main contrastive methodologies stemming from two different research disciplines: a cognitive (corpus) linguistic (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2012) and a functional one (Chesterman 1998). The theoretical premises of these two methodologies relevant to the present study are introduced in the following paragraphs.

Parameters in Language Comparison

Languages can be compared along various qualitative and quantitative parameters (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2012: 32) such as:

1. frequencies: (i) in general language, (ii) in a context-specific language variety;
2. quantitative distributional facts;
3. sentence length;
4. type/token ratio;

5. lexical density (low frequency-high frequency);
6. naturalness (frequency and contextual preferences).

In this investigation, the parameters 'frequencies', 'distributional facts' and 'naturalness' are of particular importance. The frequencies and distributions of emotion concepts across the datasets (in forms and functions; cf. 2.5.2) are regarded to provide qualitative information, namely on the degree of 'naturalness' of emotion concepts including their contextual configurations. 'Naturalness' can be understood as a "system of the speaker's/ writer's preferences of the use of a language unit, which is expressed via the frequency of its occurrence in a well-defined context" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2012: 34). Higher frequencies in a given context point, therefore, at preferences and "more natural" units/ structures (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2012: 34).
The approach to contrastive analysis advocated in this study is usage-based (cf. Chapter 5.1), and therefore understands language usage to shape linguistic knowledge. A quantitative contrastive analysis (e.g., Krzeszowski 1981) involves, therefore, investigating prototypicality and entrenchment. Entrenchment refers in cognitive grammar to the degree of conventionalization of linguistic units and is dependent on the frequency of occurrence of such units (Langacker 1987 [1991]: 52). In Chapter 5.1, the relationship of frequency effects and conventionalization is discussed in more detail. Considering conventionalization and entrenchement includes taking low frequencies into account which show that linguistic units are not prototypical and are therefore "less likely to be part of linguistic convention and to be judged as linguistically possible" (Langacker 1987 [1991]: 52). Langacker (1987 [1991]) further points out that studies adopting such a theory should start with a "substantive characterization of prototypical linguistic structures" (Langacker 1987 [1991]: 53) and then go on and consider a possible falsification of this theory in cases when

> the widespread occurrence of structures extremely distant form the superposed prototype [would] constitute[...] evidence against it, as would a totally random distribution of linguistic traits, or any distribution where structures predicted to be marginal predominant over those nearer the prototype. (Langacker 1987 [1991]: 53)

The differential quantitative use of emotion concepts in context (cf. 2.5.2) across British English and German, and across individuals (cf. 5.4.5), might therefore point at different degrees of cognitive entrenchment (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2012: 36;cf. Chapter 5.1 for a further discussion of frequency effects, conventionalization and entrenchment), and differential language preferences (cf. Chapter 6.2.1). The differential quantitative use of emotion concepts in context is described, juxtaposed and compared in this in-

vestigation, following the classical steps of contrastive analysis (Krzeszowski 1989). In the next section, the prerequisites of such an analysis are discussed.

Equivalence and Tertium comparationis

The prerequisite of contrasting languages is that they be minimally comparable (Chesterman 1998: 29), i.e. that they have at least some "shared features" (Chesterman 1998: 29). Linguistic systems are, therefore, more or less comparable depending on the criterion chosen, i.e. the type of equivalence.
Possible equivalence types (Chesterman 1998: 31) are: statistical equivalence, translation equivalence, system equivalence, semanto-syntactic equivalence, rule equivalence, substantial (lexical) equivalence and pragmatic/ functional equivalence (Chesterman 1998: 31). Consequently, languages can be regarded to be more or less comparable, i.e. "matching" (Chesterman 1998: 35) on a scale stretching from maximally comparable, i.e. equivalent and completely overlapping, and conforming in all types, over partially comparable, i.e. partially equivalent and partially overlapping and meeting some of the types, to incomparable, i.e. non-equivalent and non-overlapping and satisfying none of the equivalent types cited above (cf. Figure 3).



Figure 3: Equivalence. Two languages (L1 and L2) are shown as being completely equivalent ("match"), partially overlapping ("partial match") and incomparable ("mismatch").

It is, therefore, crucial for contrastive studies to specify the "common ground on which to compare [...] systems" (Dziwirek & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010; Chesterman 1998: 7), the "common platform of reference" (Krzeszowski 1990: 15) i.e. the tertium comparationis.
In this study, the focus will be on pragmatic, i.e. functional equivalence, which is "a relation that holds between two texts in different languages such that" (Chesterman 1998: 35) "they evoke maximally similar cognitive reactions in the users of these texts" (Krzeszowski 1990: 30). The tertium comparationis across the British and German dataset is, therefore, the experimentally elicited (cf. Chapter 5) use of emotion concepts in the framework of Emotion Events. The tertium comparationis in this investigation is further laid out in section 2.5.2.
In line with this, the functional tertium comparationis of the present investigation

can at the same time be assumed to be of cognitive nature. Cognitive tertia cover human cognitive abilities including analogy or abstraction (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2012: 37–38). This involves humans to be able to categorize objects and phenomena according to main characteristics which can be assumed to be culture-dependent as well as context-dependent (e.g., image-schemata or Idealized Cognitive Models, Lakoff 1987). The cognitive tertium of this investigation are Emotion Event Structures (cf. 2.1.2, 2.5.2).

1.5 Summary

'Emotion' is a complex phenomenon. Up to now, only few studies exist that take such complexity into account, and investigate emotion in 'context'. The Extended Emotion Event Model (cf. Chapters 2, 6, 7.2, 8.2) strives to take emotion discourse in its complexity into account, and understands context as a dynamic construct. The conceptualization of context motivates the integrated framework of this investigation, which will be presented in the next chapter, and justifies the methodological approach. The contrastive analysis comprises cognitive and functional tertia comparationis, and views Emotion Events not only in one but two languages.

2

Preliminaries (II): An Integrated Approach to Emotion Concepts in Context

Contents

The integrated approach to Emotion Concepts in Context weds a cognitive corpus linguistic with a pragmatic, a systemic-functional, an interactional sociolinguistics and a contrastive perspective. This integrated approach allows to take the complex nature of emotion in discourse into account, and to investigate emotion concepts in context. Context is hereby understood as dynamic participant construct (cf. Chapters 1.3, 2.2.3, 2.3.3, 2.4.3) and analyst construct, taking linguistic, cognitive, social and sociocultural context into account (cf. Chapter 5.4.3). In the following, the advantages of the integrated approach, and the synergies that arise from combining the different research perspectives, are outlined.

2.1 A Cognitive Corpus Linguistic Perspective

Adopting a corpus linguistic perspective allows the quantification of emotion concepts, and provides access to their contextual configurations. A cognitive perspective, more precisely the Emotion Event model, can be regarded as vantage point for an analysis of emotion concepts in context, and allows to conceive of context as interactively construed (participant and analyst construct), an aspect which has not been specified so far.

2.1.1 Intuitive vs. Corpus-Based Approaches to Emotion (Metaphors)

Cognitive approaches to emotion were, for a long time, dominated by the lexical approach which, subscribing to the idea that "language, particularly its lexicon is a reflection of our conceptual system" (Kövecses 1990: 41), consequently involved the study of conventional forms of language such as idioms, metaphors, metonymies, idioms, clichés, proverbs and collocations (Kövecses 1990: 43). This approach was often labeled and criticized as the "intuitive" , "subjective" or "eclectic" approach (as later refuted by Kövecses et al. 2019), since it relied "only" on data collected from thesauri or elicited from students (Oster 2010). Researchers using a corpus-based approach (e.g., Oster 2010; Stefanowitsch 2006; Deignan 2005) argued that their methodology was superior to the lexical approach, since it enabled to identify further emotion metaphors which otherwise would remain undetected, since it enabled including a pragmatic perspective, and finally, a corpus-based approach enabled the quantification of corpus data. Recently, the dichotomy between lexical vs. corpus-based approaches to emotion metaphors has been put into perspective and approaches that complement introspection with a corpus-based methodology emerged (Kövecses et al. 2019).
In this investigation, Kövecses' hierarchical perspective on emotion concepts into "basic level" (e.g., ANGER), "subordinate" (e.g., IRRITATION, RAGE) and "superordinate" (e.g., EMOTION) levels (Kövecses 2000: 3) is adopted, and combined with an overall

corpus-based approach. The corpus-based approach allows the quantification of the data and the accommodation of context as conceptualized above (cf. Chapter 1.3), i.e. as participant and analyst construct (cf. as well Chapter 5.4.3). In the following section, I will develop more on the cognitive corpus linguistic Emotion Event Model, which has been adopted and extended in the present investigation. I will further lay out in how far the conceptualization of context as participant and analyst construct is incorporated in a cognitive corpus linguistic research perspective, more precisely in the Emotion Event Model.

2.1.2 The Emotion Event Model

A cognitive linguistic approach to emotions, which will be extended for the purposes of this investigation and that is corpus-based, and therefore, allows for a quantification of the data, is the theory of Emotion Event Structures (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). Moreover, this model, although it has been mostly used in order to investigate emotion concepts from a cognitive semantic perspective (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010), can be modified and allows for a usage-perspective, i.e. allows to accommodate context (cf. Chapters 6.2, 7, 8).



Figure 4: The Canonical Event Model (Langacker 1987 [1991]: 282). This model captures prototypical actions, takes into account setting, semantic roles and a viewer. It is a "complex conceptualization representing the normal observation of a prototypical action" (Langacker 1987 [1991]: 286, taken from Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011).

The Emotion Event Model (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010) is based on

Langacker's seminal work, his cognitive grammar (Langacker 1987 [1991]), more specifically, the canonical event model (cf. Figure 4). Figure 4 shows the force-dynamics of Emotion Events (EE) viewed from an outside perspective and situated in a specific setting. A force is induced (arrow in the middle) from an Agent (AG) to a Patient (PAT), which leads to some consequences in the Patient (twisted arrow).

The structure of an Emotion Event (henceforth EE) is defined as the "immediate contextual use" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 322) of emotion lexemes and their sub-unit emotion parameters (cf. linguistic context, Chapter 5.4.3). Emotion lexemes are conceived of as providing access to prototypical emotion concepts and their radial categories and activating prototypical emotion scenarios[6] (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 322–323). The latter involve a display of certain temporal stages of an emotion, e.g., a five-stage scenario for ANGER including 1) the cause of ANGER, 2) the existence of ANGER, 3) an attempt at controlling ANGER, 4) the loss of control over ANGER and 5) an act of retribution (Lakoff 1987: 397–405). Lexical senses are conceived of as regions in the conceptual space of emotions and sense modulations might be the result of a particular figure-ground organization, i.e. profiles and focal entities, and a specific construal of a scene (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010, cf. cognitive context, Chapter 5.4.3). While each emotion covers its own space, it can overlap with other emotion regions. Individual senses are "construed on-line" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 322–323), constrained by a larger context, which includes spatio-temporal grounding, the speaker, the cause, an experiencer and possible reactions to an emotion (cf. social context, 5.4.3). In event model terminology, we can say that an EE comprises "role archetypes"[7] (Langacker 1987 [1991]) such as agents, experiencers, causes, appraisal (value judgments) and arousal (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). In Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk's and Wilson's approach (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010), semantically close senses, i.e. both more and less basic and prototypical senses are studied. For instance, when investigating the "basic level" (Kövecses 2000: 3) concept ANGER, IRRITATION and ANNOYANCE, "subordinate level" (Kövecses 2000: 3) concepts, should be included in the analysis. Dynamic processes occur in these concepts, i.e. prototypical senses employ a core part of the scenario of an EE and their extended meanings "utilized other properties of their sense Gestalt"(Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 322–323).

Sub-unit emotion parameters are sub-sense levels of analysis and are comparable to what Croft & Cruse (2004) call facets. They may operate on the linguistic "surface",

[6] The view that emotion concepts are structured as scenarios is supported by many researchers, such as Wierzbicka (1994) or Kövecses (1991).

[7] Role archetypes correspond roughly to thematic relations or theta roles (Fillmore 1968; Gruber 1965).

i.e. in discourse (cf. linguistic context, Chapter 5.4.3), in form of "modifiers" (e.g., *a surprise party* / the *unsurprising surprise*)[8] and "metaphoric and metonymic structures" (*taken/ caught by surprise*; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 333–335, 343). The meaning of emotion concepts, furthermore, emerges through the analysis of a "network of related senses"(Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 322), i.e. overlaps, synonyms, antonyms and clusters of other notions. *Astonishment* and *amazement*, for instance, express both unexpectedness and disbelief, but the corpus analysis of synonyms in context reveals that *amazement* additionally expresses appreciation and positive wonder (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 336-337). Moreover, it is more intense than surprise (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 336-337). Chains of senses and conceptual clusters (cf. linguistic context, Chapter 5.4.3) can indicate one complex feeling (e.g., *I was both annoyed and upset* [...]) or a blend of individual concepts (e.g., *bittersweet*, i.e. 'happy and sad at the same time' Fauconnier & Turner 1998; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010) (cf. 4.1.2 "Emotion Concept Clusters: Equivalents, Ambivalents and Blends").

The Emotion Event Model allows to investigate emotion concepts in context. Context as participant construct (cf. Chapter 1.3 and Fetzer 2012), i.e. the interactive construal of context is not further specified in this model, but implicit in the "interactional on-line meaning emergence perspective" as mentioned by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2011: 30), i.e. the view that events are constructed on-line, in an interaction depending on the participants of the action and its context (cf. as well Chapter 7.1). However, the conceptualization of context that is underlying the Emotion Event Model is rooted in psychology, and not in language-use anchored paradigms such as interactional sociolinguistics that explicitly focus on the dynamicity and social construction of context (e.g., Gumperz 1996, 2003). I.e. the Emotion Event Model relies on the figure-ground paradigm, which has been also adapted in cognitive pragmatics, more precisely, relevance-theoretical frameworks (e.g., Sperber et al. 1986). Context is hereby regarded as frame which has a delimiting function, i.e. context frames/ separates content from its surroundings. Content is hereby conceived of as 'figure', surrounding context is conceptualized as 'ground' (Bateson 1972). Therefore, the with respect to contextual construal rather psychology-anchored Emotion Event Model will be complemented and extended by language-use anchored paradigms, i.e. by an interactional sociolinguistics, pragmatic and systemic functional perspective (cf. Chapters 2.2, 2.3, 2.4).

From an analyst perspective, the Emotion Event Model investigates linguistic context, since it focuses on Emotion Events, i.e. the "immediate contextual use" of emotion

[8] The modifiers emerging in this study are intensifiers and markers of epistemic un-/ certainty displayed in the immediate context of the emotion lexemes. The EE model, as presented above, will therefore be extended in this respect, cf. Chapter 8.

lexemes, including modifiers and emotion concept clusters for instance (cf. above). Moreover, the accommodation of social context is inherent in the conceptualization of Emotion Events which are spatially and temporally grounded and which comprise role archetypes. Socio-cultural context can be regarded as accommodated, since sub-unit emotion parameters can be "different in different communities" (cf. Chapter 2.5, and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 324). Finally, cognitive context can be related to the figure-ground paradigm specified above.
In this study, the Emotion Event Model is used in order to investigate emotion lexeme frequencies in EE and emotion scenarios (cf. Chapter 6), contextual construal and emotion concept clusters (cf. Chapter 7), and modifiers (cf. Chapter 8). However, the Emotion Event Model is extended, since complementing it with a pragmatic (Grice 1975) and interactional sociolinguistic (e.g., Gumperz 1996, 2003) perspective allows to take more specifically the dynamic nature and the social construal of context into account: context is "negotiated and re-constructed in and through the process of communication" (Fetzer 2012: 109) and it is "indexical" (Fetzer 2012: 109). An interactional-sociolinguistics perspective puts therefore more focus on the interrelatedness of linguistic and social/ sociocultural context on the one hand, and linguistic, social/ sociocultural context and cognitive context on the other hand (Fetzer 2012: 122). This will be specified in the following sections that focus on the pragmatic perspective and interactional sociolinguistic perspective adopted in this investigation.

2.1.3 Summary

Adopting a corpus-based approach in this investigation allows for quantification and enables the accommodation of context. However, the cognitive corpus linguistic Emotion Event Model can only be regarded as vantage point and has to be complemented by language-use anchored paradigms, such as interactional sociolinguistic paradigms. The latter address more explicitly the dynamic nature and social construal of context (e.g., Gumperz 2003). Moreover, such paradigms explicitly link linguistic forms in context (linguistic context/ co-text) to social and sociocultural context, as well as to cognitive context (viz. inferences; Gumperz e.g., 2003).

2.2 A Pragmatic Perspective

Accessing cognitive context, i.e. inferencing, is regarded as necessary process since communication is never fully explicit and context-dependent (Grice 1975). Therefore, a pragmatic perspective, which will be specified in the following sections, is adopted in this investigation. The explicit and implicit dimension of emotion discourse (Schwarz-

Friesel 2015) will be explored more and the Gricean paradigm (Grice 1975) will be applied to emotion discourse. This will shed more light on the question of how context as participant construct (speaker-centered context) can be accommodated in this investigation which extends the Emotion Event Model with a pragmatic (Gricean) perspective.

2.2.1 The Cooperative Principle (Grice 1975)

An inherent characteristic of language is its underdeterminacy (e.g., Levinson 1995; Ariel 2008), and therefore, inferential processes are indispensable in communicative exchanges. Grice takes this into account when he differentiates between what is said and what is meant (Grice 1975). Hereby, "what is said" can be considered to be "closely related to the conventional meaning of (the sentence) [...] uttered" (Grice 1975: 44). "What is meant" is conceptualized as implicate/ implicature(s), i.e. implying, and implicatum, i.e. what is implied (Grice 1975: 44). Grice (1975) categorizes implicatures into two types: conventional implicatures and conversational implicatures. Conversational implicatures can be further subcategorized into generalized conversational implicatures (GCI) and particularized conversational implicatures (PCI). GCI involve preferred meanings or conventions of use, and PCI can be conceived of as meanings arising ad hoc, based on situational or contextual factors (Grice 1975: 50–52, cited in Levinson 1995: 92).
Explicit meanings are encoded in linguistic form (Grice 1975: 50–52, cited in Levinson 1995: 92). Linguistic forms can also trigger conventional implicatures, i.e. conventional meanings of words. Conversational implicatures can be related to certain discourse features, i.e. the Cooperative Principle (CP) and the four Gricean conversational maxims. The CP states that talk exchanges are characteristically cooperative efforts and participants are expected to "make [their] conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which [they] are engaged" (Grice 1975: 45). Grice (1975) goes on and specifies four maxims, the ones of quantity, quality, relation and manner. The maxim of quantity subsumes the following two maxims: "1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange)", and "2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required" (Grice 1975: 45). The maxim of quality refers to a supermaxim: "Try to make your contribution one that is true", involving two further maxims, i.e. "1. Do not say what you believe to be false and 2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence" (Grice 1975: 46). The maxim of relation comprises one supermaxim, i.e. "Be relevant" (Grice 1975: 46). Finally, the maxim of manner comprises the following maxims: 1. Avoid obscurity of expression, 2. Avoid

ambiguity, 3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity) and 4. Be orderly. (Grice 1975: 46).

Grice's CP and his work on implicatures/ implicatum provides a powerful framework for the analysis of contextual construal, notably the construal of linguistic and cognitive context from a participant (speaker-centered) perspective. The participants in this investigation are regarded to make their narrative as explicit as necessary, i.e. they "import the appropriate amount of context" (Fetzer 2012: 111), which is necessary to ensure a felicitous communication (Grice 1975). Grice's paradigm (Grice 1975) has, however, not been exploited so far in detail with respect to the analysis of emotion discourse, its explicitness and implicitness (Schwarz-Friesel 2015). The next section focuses on explicit and implicit emotion displays as observed and first approached by Schwarz-Friesel (2015). Moreover, one corpus example stemming from the AWE-corpus, on which this investigation is based, will be discussed. The following section will then specifically focus on contextual construal from a participant perspective (speaker-centered perspective) as it has been analyzed in the research chapters of this investigation (cf. Chapter 6, 7 and 8) by employing and exploiting Grice's paradigm (Grice 1975).

2.2.2 Explicit and Implicit Emotion Displays (Schwarz-Friesel 2015)

The "implicit emotional dimension of text and discourse" has been recently found to be "a realm of linguistics where a lot of research has to be done" (Schwarz-Friesel 2015: 168). As Schwarz-Friesel (2015: 168) states

> a distinction between the explicit content and the implicit meaning of an utterance as to the cognitive information level (Sperber et al. 1986; Levinson 2000; Carston 2002; Recanati 2002) [is widely accepted, but has not] been applied to emotive information, so far. As a result, there is hardly any precise answer to the question what the precise nature of the implicit emotive information is and how it interacts with the different levels of semantic and pragmatic meaning involved in utterance interpretation.

Schwarz-Friesel (2015) takes a first step approaching the question of explicit and implicit emotion displays when introducing the term "e-implicatures" (Schwarz-Friesel 2015: 186). She provides the example of *Just got back my linguistics test, I got an F.* (Schwarz-Friesel 2015: 186) and concludes that *disappointment* or *frustration* of the part of the speaker are implied. However, one could argue that neither *disappointment* nor *frustration* are somehow indexed by any linguistic cues, and therefore, the potential emotion-related inference to be drawn would rely merely on encyclopedic knowledge. Moreover, implicit emotion displays are not further discussed and specified in Schwarz-

Friesel's (2015) research and possible overlays between the explicit and implicit, i.e. their complex relationship and inter-relatedness, are not mentioned.
Altogether, one can say that the explicit and implicit dimension are not easy to tease apart in Emotion Event displays, but they are regarded to interact (Fronhofer 2019)[9]. This is the case when we consider the examples presented above (cf. Example 1 a.-e.) which all involve explicit emotion displays (e.g., emotion adjectives *proud/ pleased/ guilty* and emotion nouns *joy/ disappointment/ sadness* in Example 1 a., the emotion noun *anger*, the emotion adjective *angry/ irritated* in Examples 1 b., c., d., emotion adjective *happy* in Example 1 e.) and implicit emotion displays including contextual cues that contribute to overall EE display (e.g., the content disjunct and marker of uncertainty *surely* or the adverbial subjunct intensifier/ downgrader *slightly/ of sorts* in b. and d.). The inter-relatedness of explicit and implicit emotion displays becomes also particularly clear in Example 2[10]:

(2) *A mixture of confusion,* ***anger****, and* ***shame*** *overcame me when I received my Oxford LNAT result.[...] Perhaps, then, the thing that* ***irritates*** *me the most about the mark isn't the final verdict but the lack of justification and explanation for it. The lack of interest from the people who I needed the support from. [...] Perhaps the marker was in some way biased, or hadn't read the texts fully and didn't understand them and subsequently only searched for "buzz words" and stuck to a "generic mark scheme" when there was unorthodox but accurate and pertinent analysis.* (e_m_020_1)

Here, the EE comprises explicit emotion displays in form of the emotion noun *anger* and emotion verb *irritates*. Moreover, implicit emotion displays involve the CAUSES of the emotion (*the lack of justification and explanation for it* and *The lack of interest*), which are regarded to be integral parts of the EE (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). APPRAISAL, i.e. value judgments (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010) that do not explicitly index ANGER, but invoke it (negative evaluations such as the adjective *biased*, the clause *hadn't read the text fully* or *buzz* in the noun compound and the adjective *generic*) equally contribute to the overall EE[11]. Further implicit emotion displays in Example 2 can be assumed for the content disjunct and

[9] The following discussion involving Example 2 has been previously published in similar form in Fronhofer (2019).

[10] Emotion lexemes explicitly displayed are printed in bold. Items that can be said to represent implicit emotion displays are underlined.

[11] The fact that sometimes the emotion is made explicit, sometimes only the evaluation, makes the analysis less straightforward. In this investigation, the analyses focused, therefore, on Emotion Events, i.e. emotion concepts that were made explicit and co-occurring cues, including evaluations in the more local linguistic context (5L-5R), and the more global context, i.e. the emotion narrative.

marker of uncertainty *Perhaps*, and the superlative in intensifying function *most*, both in co-occurrence with the emotion verb (*irritates*). Finally the emotion concept cluster of the two nouns *anger, and shame* might from a functional point of view imply a more intense emotion (cf. intensifying doublets and triplets, Martin 2004)[12].

How can both explicit and implicit emotion displays then be approached? The next section provides answers to this question by relating Grice's paradigm and the construal of linguistic and cognitive context from a speaker-centered perspective to the research chapters of this investigation. Hereby, the participants have been assumed to be as explicit as necessary (Fetzer 2012: 111) in order to secure a felicitous communication (Grice 1975).

2.2.3 Importing Context (I): Implicit Emotion Discourse

In the present study, explicit and implicit emotion displays are investigated in the framework of EE, i.e. in form of emotion lexemes in their linguistic context(s) (co-text) and their cognitive context(s). By the display of such contextual configurations, participants are regarded to make their narrative as explicit as necessary, i.e. they "import the appropriate amount of context" (Fetzer 2012: 111) which is necessary to ensure a felicitous communication.

In this investigation, Grice's CP, the four maxims and the implicature are considered to be a basic premise of each communicative exchange, i.e. the writing of the narratives in the experiment. The Gricean paradigm will be exploited to explain certain characteristics of EE displays (cf. Chapters 6, 7, and 8).

In Chapter 6, the display of CAUSES will be discussed against the background of Grice's work. CAUSES have revealed to be more frequently provided in the British dataset, and the British participants can be therefore assumed to flout the Gricean maxims of quantity and manner, since the elicitation prompts already provide the CAUSE of the emotion (cf. Chapter 5.1). By naming nevertheless one or several CAUSES, the participants import context and trigger emotion-related implicatures in addition to the explicit emotion displays.

In Chapter 7, Grice's CP will be related to the notion of "prosodic clashes" (Morley & Partington 2009: 146) and "collocational inference" (Hunston 2007a: 259). Prosodic

[12] Hübler (1998: 11–14) discusses emotions and expressions, and concludes that the lexicon is restricted with respect to emotions. As a consequence, emotions might be expressed by a wide range of devices of the "mode vécu" (Hübler 1998: 13) such as paralinguistic signs, phonetic/ phonological means, morphological devices, interjections, syntactic devices such as subjective word order or certain sentence types to name but a few. Hübler (1998: 14) concedes, however, that these devices do not "regularly express" emotions, but do so "only occasionally". The wide range of devices that can be used for emotion expression becomes also clear in the example above which views them in the framework of Emotion Events (Example 2).

clashes or collocational inferences are triggered when collocations are "odd" (Hunston 2007a: 259) from an addressee's perspective. In Grice's paradigm one could argue that the maxim of manner is flouted by the addressor (Hunston 2007a). This is true for atypical/ "non-congruent" event construals (cf. Chapter 7.2), i.e. contextual construals that contradict or oppose the item's 'intuitive' meaning (Louw 1993: 172). This is for example the case in negative JOY construals (cf. Chapter 7.4.3), where particularized conversational implicatures are triggered and cognitive context is imported by the participants.
In Chapter 8, the use of modifiers in EE, in particular the use of multiple modifiers in EE, will be discussed and related to Grice's conversational maxims. By multiple instead of simple modifier use with respect to modifiers of intensification or un-/certainty in EE, the Gricean maxims of quantity and manner are flouted (cf. Chapter 8.4). Hereby, particularized implicatures are triggered, and again, cognitive context is imported.

2.3 A Systemic-Functional Perspective

The Appraisal System (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004; Martin 2000; Martin & White 2005), a systemic-functional approach to evaluation, will be discussed in detail and the complex relationship of the Appraisal subsystem of affect with emotion/-al talk (Bednarek 2008a) will be laid out (cf. Chapters 2.3.1 and 1.2). The rationale behind this is that the Appraisal System is up to date the only discursive model that somehow integrates emotion (in form of the affect subsystem, Martin & White 2005) and might therefore inform the present investigation. This is the case although emotion is treated quite differently in systemic-functional linguistics than in cognitive linguistics (cf. Chapter 1), i.e. it is treated as subsystem of language that is "completely attached to, and dependent on, evaluation systems" (Alba-Juez & Mackenzie 2019: 5). It will be outlined in how far the Appraisal System can be informative for the research perspectives adopted, and in how far the Emotion Event Model can be extended. Moreover, context as participant construct will be related to the systemic-functional perspective, and the linguistic and cognitive context of emotion lexemes, in particular modifiers of EE will be viewed from a dialogic perspective (White 2003, cf. as well Chapter 8.1).

2.3.1 The Appraisal System (Martin & White 2005)

The appraisal system is originally an approach to evaluation and is rooted in the systemic-functional tradition (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004; Martin 2000; Martin & White 2005). However, as has been pointed out recently, the phenomena of evaluation

and emotion are inherently connected (Alba-Juez 2018). As Martin (2000) summarizes, appraisal is "a set of resources used to negotiate emotions, judgments, and valuations, alongside resources for amplifying and engaging with those evaluations" (Taboada et al. 2014: 2). The appraisal system (Martin & White 2005), a system of its own within language, according to systemic-functional linguists, can be divided into three subsystems: Attitude, Engagement and Graduation. Figure 5 taken from Martin & White (2005: 38) provides an overview over the Appraisal System, its subsystems and various modes.



Figure 5: The Appraisal System (Martin & White 2005: 38). The Appraisal System comprises three main subsystems: Engagement, Attitude and Graduation. The subsystems can be further divided into different subsystems and modes, such as Affect or monoglossic and heteroglossic Engagment. The subsystems and modes are constantly refined on the basis of existing corpus data (e.g., Benítez-Castro & Hidalgo-Tenorio 2019).

Attitude can further be subdivided into Affect, Judgment and Appreciation. Affect, "registering [...] feelings" (Martin & White 2005: 42), can be conceptualized as quality (e.g., *a sad captain/ the captain left sadly*), as process (*the captain wept*) or as comment (e.g., *sadly, he had to go*; Martin & White 2005: 46). Normally, an emoter, i.e. an experiencer in EE terminology, and a trigger, i.e. a cause in EE terminology, are involved. Moreover, affect is organized in and classified according to six oppositions, among them the opposition of positive vs. negative affect (e.g., *happy* vs. *sad*), low vs. median vs. high affect (e.g., *dislike, hate, detest*) and a grouping of resources relating to un-/happiness, in-/security and dis-/satisfaction to name but three of the opposi-

tions (Martin & White 2005: 47–49). The affect subsystem, such as other appraisal subsystems, is constantly under revision and has been refined by e.g., Bednarek (2008a) or Benítez-Castro & Hidalgo-Tenorio (2019). Judgment concerns "moral evaluations of character about persons or, less commonly, non-human entities" (Taboada et al. 2014: 3), e.g., *cruel, perverse* and Appreciation is about aesthetics, evaluating text and process and natural phenomena (e.g., *pleasant, pretty, absorbing*; Martin 2004: 42–45).
The present investigation relates to the subsystem of affect in the way that emotion concepts are studied, which are assumed to be accessed via emotion lexemes. The classification of these emotion lexemes adopted in the present study differs, however, with respect to the systemic-functional approach. Instead of organizing the lexemes, and hence concepts, into oppositions, Parrott's tree structure of emotions (Parrott 2001) is used (cf. Chaper 5). Quite naturally, the concepts fall into the categories of positive vs. negative emotion concepts comparable to positive vs. negative affect; LOVE and JOY are hereby positive, ANGER, SADNESS, FEAR negative and SURPRISE positive or negative, depending on contextual construal (Bednarek 2008a). It is further investigated, when looking at EE scenarios if an emoter, in EE terminology an experiencer, is involved (1st person or 3rd person experiencer) or not (unemoted, "unexperienced", as termed here, extending EE terminology) as well as a trigger, i.e. a cause in EE terms. The question whether affect is used in realis or irrealis is excluded from the analysis (e.g., *I like something vs. I would like something*; Martin & White 2005: 48), since the experimental approach excludes this aspect[13]. Lastly, affect in terms of behavioral surge, i.e. emotion-related lexemes (Pavlenko 2008a), is not investigated, but the focus lies on emotion lexemes that denote emotion (Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989)[14].
Under the "heading of [heteroglossic (opposed to monoglossic); NMF] 'engagement' " the appraisal framework "groups together [...] all those locutions which provide the means for the authorial voice to position itself with respect to, and hence to 'engage' with, the other voices and alternative positions construed as being in play in the current communicative context" (Martin & White 2005: 94). Heteroglossic engagement can further be subdivided into "dialogic contraction" and "dialogic expansion" (White 2003: 268-275). Resources of dialogic contraction "disclaim", i.e. "deny"/ "counter" or "proclaim", i.e. present the proposition as "highly warrantable" (Martin & White 2005:

[13] Cf. Chapter 5.1 "The AWE-Corpus: Compilation and Experimental Design" on page 94. The elicitation prompts used are *1) You have just received and unfair mark* and *2) Imagine you receive the results of a very difficult exam which a lot of students normally don't pass and you got the highest mark possible.* So, looking at the realis/ irrealis opposition might yield biased results.

[14] Having reviewed a number of available lists of emotion lexemes for English (e.g., Wallace & Carson 1973; Ortony et al. 1987; Moore & Rusch 1999), the list provided by Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989) was chosen, since it is rooted in the basic emotion approach (Fontaine et al. 2013). It can, therefore, be combined with the nuanced classification of the tree structure of emotions (Parrott 2001) and is a suitable starting point for building up a first list of German emotion lexemes cf. Chapter 5.

98) via resources that can be categorized into "concur" (e.g., *naturally, of course, obviously*), "pronounce" (e.g., *there can be no doubt that*) or "endorse" (e.g., *X has shown/ demonstrated that*; White 2003: 268-275). By contrast, dialogically expansive resources present the proposition as "ground[ed] [...] in [...] contingent, individual subjecthood" (White 2003: 264) and the authorial voice represents the proposition as "but one of a range of possible positions" (Martin & White 2005: 98), i.e. it "entertains" dialogic alternatives. Subjectivity of an external voice can also be "attributed" to resources (e.g., "X said...", Martin & White 2005: 98).

The present study relates to the subsystem of engagement in that it investigates EE, i.e. emotion lexemes in their immediate linguistic context which includes engagement resources. The EE model is expanded and modifiers of emotion events are introduced (cf. Chapter 7 and 8). One group of those modifiers are epistemic modal markers of un-/certainty co-occurring with emotion lexemes that either, from a semantic point of view and referring to Halliday's probability scale, operate in the sphere of possibility, probability or certainty. They are regarded as being (inter-)subjective[15] devices that can be, from a discursive-functional and dialogic point of view, conceived of as either contractive or expansive resources (cf. Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007; White 2003). The systemic-functional subsystems specifically referred to and operationalized in the present investigation, based on the functions emerging from the corpus data, are the heteroglossic functions "proclaim", including "concur" and "pronounce" as well as "entertain" (cf. Chapter 8 and White 2003: 268–275).

Finally, the graduation subsystem is concerned with the upscaling or downscaling via resources falling into the categories of "force" and "focus" (Martin & White 2005: 137). Force is concerned with the intensification of qualities (e.g., *slightly/ very sad*) and processes (e.g., *slightly/ greatly disturb*, Martin & White 2005: 141–144). Intensification can be achieved either by isolated items such as adverbs, adjectives, verbs or comparatives (e.g., *very happy*) or by infusion, i.e. items in a sequence with different intensities (e.g., *contented, happy, joyous*, Martin & White 2005: 141–144). Repetition of same or distinct items can also result in intensification (e.g., *hot, hot, hot*, Martin & White 2005: 141–144). Moreover, the quantification, i.e. assessments of amount, number or mass of entities is also part of the force subsystem (Martin & White 2005: 148–152). These resources quantify concrete or abstract concepts with respect to amount and extent, i.e.

[15] There is much disagreement over the term (inter-)subjectivity (e.g., Nuyts 2001; Traugott 1989, 1995). It is used here and in the following in Traugott's sense (Traugott 1989, 1995; Traugott & Dasher 2002). Traugott & Dasher (2002: 94) define intersubjectification as the semantic process whereby "coded intersubjective meanings arise out of subjective ones". This is, according to Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer (2007: 36), a process whereby expressions acquire addressee-oriented meanings which have to do with "intersubjective 'image-saving' needs" (Traugott & Dasher 2002: 91).

time and space and proximity in time and space (Martin & White 2005: 148–152). The subsystem focus covers resources that scale with respect to prototypicality (Martin & White 2005: 137). That means that resources that "sharpen" or "soften" focus classify the items they refer to as more or less matching a prototype, i.e. they are situated at its core or periphery (Martin & White 2005: 137).

The present study investigates the intensification of emotion lexemes, i.e. in appraisal terms the graduation of affect. However, the graduation system is not completely followed. Maximizers in Quirk's sense (Quirk et al. 1985: 589, 591) are studied, but do not include "highest assessment for the modal value of usuality" (e.g., *always*, Martin & White 2005: 142). Moreover, the focus of this study lies on grammatical intensifiers[16], but cases of delexicalized items (e.g., *reasonably happy*, Martin & White 2005: 142–143) were included. As I have mentioned before (cf. page 37 of this section), infusion, the internal scaling of items in a sequence (e.g., *contented, happy, joyous*, Martin & White 2005: 144), was left to lexical semantic studies. However, repetition as form of intensification was included as long as it concerned the repetition of emotion lexemes (e.g., Chapter 5 and the discussion of emotion concept clusters *happy and relieved*). Resources that are discussed in Martin & White (2005: 145–148), i.e. the intensification viz. up- or downscaling of non-scalable items (lexical intensification), were not included and the notion of "vigor" (e.g., *the clowds drifted across the sky* is regarded to be equivalent to *the clouds moved slowly,* Martin & White 2005: 145–148) will not be discussed. "Intensification" can be achieved "via quantification" such as in e.g., *a slight concern* (Martin & White 2005: 150), but as quantification plays only a minor role in the corpus data of the present study, it was excluded from further analysis. When we follow Martin & White (2005: 138) who relates the resources of sharpen and soften to previous studies on "hedges" (Lakoff 1973a) or "vague language" (Channel 1994) and "intensifiers, boosters and amplifiers" (Hyland 2000; Labov 1984), it could be said that focus is also taken into account in this study, since the emotion event modifiers of intensification, i.e. mainly grammatical intensification (Martin & White 2005: 142–143) in Quirk's sense (Quirk et al. 1985: 589, 591) and the one of epistemic un-/certainty, i.e. epistemic modal markers, emerge from the corpus data. Both types of modifiers in EE overlap in a way with focus (cf. Chapter 5). However, cases such as "a true father" (Martin & White 2005: 138)[17] are not considered. From a dialogic perspective, the graduation resources signal maximal commitment of the writer and strong alignment of the reader (upscaling by force) or attenuate the affiliation with the value position referenced (downscaling by force, Martin & White 2005: 152–159). The sharpening

[16] The analysis focuses on grammatical intensifiers or constructions that function as such cf. Chapter 5.4.

[17] Such cases do not play a role in AWE.

within focus respectively signals maximal investment by the authorial voice, whereas softening signals being conciliatory and shows solidarity (Martin & White 2005: 139). Compatible with this view, upgraders and downgraders are considered as boosting or attenuating devices.

In the next sections, I will develop in more detail on the dialogic perspective (Bakhtin 1935 [1981]; Vološinov 1995) and on intersubjective positioning in White's sense (White 2003), as already mentioned above. These frameworks will be related to the construal of context from a participant view (speaker- and hearer-centered perspective). The subsystems of Engagement and Graduation have already been related to the present investigation (cf. above), and it has been stated that engagement resources, and graduation resources, have been analyzed as intersubjective resources and as modifiers in the framework of Emotion Events. I.e. the Emotion Event Model has been extended and complemented with White's framework of intersubjective positioning. The next section develops on the reasons for and the synergies that arise from such an extension.

2.3.2 Intersubjective Positioning (White 2003)

White (2003) provides a framework for analyzing linguistic resources of intersubjective positioning[18] (cf. as well Chapter 8.2), drawing on previous research on the Appraisal Subsystem of Engagement (Martin 1992, 1997). In particular, White (2003: 260) is interested in "the communicative and rhetorical functionality of those wordings by which speakers/ writers take a stance towards the various points-of-view and value positions being referenced by the text and thereby align themselves vis-à-vis those who hold, or are represented as holding, these positions". Furthermore, White (2003: 260) provides in his article a description and an account on the functionality of intersubjective resources and conceives of them as "fundamentally dialogic or interactive". White (2003: 260) goes on and argues that the use of resources such as *I think*, *perhaps* or *naturally*,

[18] Here (and henceforth), I refer to (inter-)subjective positioning as used and discussed by White (2003), i.e. in the framework of the systemic-functional Appraisal System. White's approach is inspired by the 'dialogic' nature of "all verbal communication" (Bakhtin 1935 [1981]; Vološinov 1995: 261), further discussed in Chapter 8.2. (Inter-)subjective positioning in White's sense has to be differentiated from positioning theory, i.e. a social constructionist approach (e.g., Harré & van Langenhove 1999), in which positioning is defined as "involving the process of ongoing construction of the self through talk, particularly through 'the discursive construction of personal stories that make a person's actions intelligible and relatively determinate as social acts and within which the members of conversations have specific locations' " (Tan & Moghaddam 1999: 183). Moreover, the notion of 'position' is crucial to such approaches which is regarded as "a cluster of rights and duties to perform certain actions with certain significance as acts, but which also may include prohibitions or denials of access to some of the local repertoire of meaningful acts" (Harré & Moghaddam 2003: 5f.). Moreover, "In a certain sense in each social milieu there is a kind of Platonic realm of positions, realized in current practices, which people can adopt, strive to locate themselves in, be pushed into, be displaced from or be refused access, recess themselves from and so in, in a highly mobile and dynamics [sic] way" (Harré & Moghaddam 2003: 5f.).

to name but three, are means of "[...] acknowledg[ing], [...] engag[ing] with or [...] align[ing] itself with respect to positions which are in some way alternatives to that being advanced by the text". The taxonomy of resources of intersubjective positioning that White (2003) develops is based on the premise of the heteroglossia of communicative contexts, and the resources comprise dialogically contractive or dialogically expansive resources (cf. above and Chapter 8.2). The former "act[..] to challenge, fend off or restrict the scope of" alternative positions and views, the latter "entertain[...]" such views and positions (cf. above and Chapter 8.2).
White (2003) bases his insights on Bakhtin (1935 [1981]) and Vološinov (1995), and their dialogic view of verbal communication. Vološinov (1995: 139) states the following (as also reported by White 2003: 261):

> The actual reality of language-speech is not the abstract system of linguistic forms, not the isolated monologic utterance, and not the psychological act of its implementation, but the **social event** of **verbal interaction implemented in an utterance or utterances**. Thus, verbal interaction is the basic reality of language. Dialogue . . . can also be understood in a broader sense, meaning not only direct, face-to-face, vocalised verbal communication between persons, but also verbal communication of any type whatsoever. A book, i.e., a verbal performance in print, is also an element of verbal communication. . . . [it] inevitably orients itself with respect to previous performances in the same sphere . . . Thus the printed verbal performance **engages**, as it were, in ideological colloquy of a large scale: it **responds** to something, **affirms** something, **anticipates** possible responses and objections, **seeks support**, and so on. **[emphasis NMF]**

The dynamic outlook on context and its social constructedness, which has also been adopted in this investigation (cf. context as participant construct and as analyst construct, Chapter 1.3; Fetzer 2012), is evident in White (2003) and Vološinov (1995). When White (2003: 260) writes, for instance, about speakers'/ writers' stance-taking "towards the various points-of-view and value positions [...] referenced by the text" and alignment in this respect, he foregrounds the conceptualization of context as participant construct, "as negotiated and reconstructed in and through the process of communication" (Fetzer 2012: 109). When Vološinov (1995) refers to "the social event of verbal interaction implemented in an utterance or in utterances", he foregrounds the "sociocognitive construal" of context and the "indexicality of social action" (Fetzer 2012: 107). So, White (2003), and Vološinov (1995), conceive of context as being construed by speakers/ writers and hearers/ readers. They also differentiate between the different types of context (Fetzer 2012), i.e. linguistic context ("wordings", "referenced by the text", "resources", "an utterance or utterances", cf. above), social/ sociocultural

context ("points-of-view", "value positions", "social event", cf. above) and cognitive context ("stance"-taking, alignment, cf. above).

2.3.3 Importing Context (II): Intersubjective Positioning in Emotion Events

White's systemic-functional approach to intersubjective positioning provides a powerful framework by which the Emotion Event Model can be extended. It provides a refined taxonomy of the functionality of resources of intersubjective positioning, and goes, according to White (2003: 261), hereby beyond previous modality and evidentiality literature and some of the hedging literature – White (2003) refers to Lyons (1977), Palmer (1986), Chafe (1986) and Markkanen & Schröder (1997) – who "often assume that the sole function of epistemic modals and similar resources [...] is to reveal the speaker/ writer's state of mind or knowledge, to indicate that the speaker/ writer is uncertain or tentative and is not committed to the truth value of the proposition". All in all, extending the Emotion Event Model by the systemic-functional approach to intersubjective positioning allows, while being compatible with a dynamic outlook on context, to take linguistic, cognitive and social/ sociocultural context into account. While the Gricean framework and his work on implicature and implicatum offers a speaker-centered outlook on linguistic and cognitive context, White's framework (2003) allows additionally to integrate a hearer/ reader-centered perspective.
From a construal-of-context perspective, the participants in this investigation are therefore conceived of as writers who import and invoke context (Gumperz 2003: 119) by recurring to resources of intersubjective positioning in the Emotion Events. Moreover, they are conceived of as writers who "respond[...]" to something, "affirm[...]" something, "anticipate[...] responses and objections" and "seek[...] support" (Vološinov 1995: 139). From a hearer-centered perspective, readers are expected to construe the context imported by the writers. More specifically, intensifiers as Modifiers in Emotion Events (cf. Example 1 c.) are regarded as intersubjective resources (cf. above and Chapters 8.2 and 8.3.2) that signal maximal commitment of the writer and strong alignment of the reader (upscaling by force), or attenuate the affiliation with the value position referenced (downscaling by force, Martin & White 2005: 152–159). Epistemic markers as Modifiers in Emotion Events (cf. Example 1 b.) are considered as resources of intersubjective positioning (cf. above and Chapters 8.2 and 8.3.1), i.e. as either dialogically contractive or expansive resources. The functions emerging from the corpus data (cf. above), are the heteroglossic functions "proclaim", including "concur" and "pronounce" as well as "entertain" (cf. Chapter 8 and White 2003: 268–275).
After having discussed the Appraisal system in detail, while reporting in how far it is in-

formative for the present approach and how the Emotion Event Model can be extended by a dialogic perspective, the focus will shift now to an interactional sociolinguistics perspective.

2.4 An Interactional Sociolinguistics' Perspective

By integrating an interactional sociolinguistics perspective, more precisely by employing Gumperz' original work on contextualization cues and contextualization (e.g., Gumperz 2003), into the Emotion Event Model, I take the dynamic nature of context into account, and that linguistic context and social/ sociocultural context are necessarily interrelated. Moreover, Gumperz' contribution provides the link between linguistic context and cognitive context via the notion of contextualization, closely related to conversational inferencing.

2.4.1 Contextualization Cues (CC)

It has been stated that context is conceived of in this investigation as dynamic, as interactively construed (cf. Chapter 1.3). Moreover, it has been argued that context is "imported" (Gumperz 2003: 119) by e.g., implicit emotion discourse and resources of intersubjective positioning in Emotion Events (cf. Chapters 2.2.3 and 2.3.3). However, it has not been laid out so far on which premises and on which theory this conception is built. This will be the focus of the present section.
The dynamic conceptualization of context is rooted in ethnomethodological research and interactional sociolinguistics (Gumperz 1977, 1982, 1992a; Gumperz & Levinson 1996; Gumperz 1996, 2003)[19], which conceive of context as interactional achievement and not in "extra-communicative terms" as critizised by Gumperz (2003: 119):

> With respect to context, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and many linguists who pay attention to context tend to define it almost entirely in extra-communicative terms. I argue that, while these factors are, of course, significant, contextual information **is imported** into the interpretative process primarily via indexical contextualization cues, in the form of presuppositions of what the activity is and what is communicatively intended. **[emphasis NMF]**

The conceptualization of context is therefore based on the premise of indexicality. Hereby, linguistic structures are understood to "index" social meanings in addition

[19] Auer & Di Luzio (1992), Eerdmans et al. (2003) and Selting (1995), for instance, provide further discussions on contextualization.

to referential or logical ones (Ochs 1992: 338)[20]. In contextualization theory, metalinguistic indexicals are referred to as contextualization cues (henceforth CC, cf. above, Gumperz 2003: 119). A CC is

> one of a cluster of indexical signs [...] produced in the act of speaking that jointly index, that is invoke, a frame of interpretation for the rest of the linguistic content of the utterance" (Gumperz & Levinson 1996: 379).

and CCs

> serve to highlight, foreground or make salient certain phonological or lexical strings vis-à-vis other similar units, that is they function relationally and cannot be assigned context-independent, stable, core lexical meanings. Foregrounding processes, moreover, do not rest on any single cue. (Gumperz 1992a: 232).

So, CCs are all verbal and non-verbal signs that "channel inferential processes" (Gumperz 1996: 383), they are "functional devices"(Fetzer 2011b: 260) and they are part of a "metasignalling system"[21] (Fetzer 2011b: 260). CCs can further be characterized as qualitatively non-discrete, i.e. they are gradual or scalar. Apart from this, CCs are "habitually used and perceived but rarely consciously noted and almost never talked about directly" (Gumperz 1982: 131–132).

From a speaker-centered perspective (Fetzer 2012), context can be regarded as being "imported" via contextualization cues (Gumperz 2003: 119). I.e. by using certain "phonological or lexical strings" (Gumperz 1992a: 232), such as intonational contours, stresses, pauses, particles or metacommunicative comments, speakers (or writers) provide cues to their communicative intention (Fetzer 2012: 112), i.e they channel "inferential processes that make available for interpretation knowledge of social and physical worlds" (Gumperz 1996: 383). The next section focuses on contextualization which is closely related to conversational inferencing, i.e. cognitive operations, hearers (or

[20] Various models of indexicality exit up to date (e.g., Schiffrin 1987; Ochs 1996; Östman 1985). Ochs (1996), for instance, postulates that socio-cultural factors are evoked when a linguistic form is used and focuses on situational dimensions: social identity, e.g., group identity, social act, e.g., a request, activity, e.g., a sequence of at least two acts such as an interview, affective stance, e.g., emotional intensity and epistemic stance, e.g., degrees of certainty of knowledge. Moreover, Ochs (1996) underlines the cultural determination, i.e. expectations, preferences and norms, with respect to the situational dimensions.

[21] I.e. language is reflexive, it has the potential "to be used to reflect upon itself" (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 49). According to Verschueren (2000) "metalinguistic processing takes place all the time to help structure ongoing linguistic activity" (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 49) and pragmatic and metapragmatic functioning go hand in hand (Verschueren 2000: 445). This means that speakers/ writers signal language organization in communications and hearers/ readers make inferences about conversational structure, illocutionary, perlocutionary or rhetorical effects (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 49).

readers) have to perform in order to take up the context import that has been intended by speakers/ writers.

2.4.2 Contextualization

CCs and Contextualization are closely related. While CCs can be regarded as inference triggering devices, i.e. construe context from a speaker-centered perspective, contextualization is concerned with conversational inferencing, i.e. cognitive operations by hearers/ readers, and is therefore concerned with the construal of context by hearers/ readers. Contextualization can be defined as

> speakers' and listeners' use of verbal and nonverbal signs to relate to what is said at any one time and in any one place to knowledge acquired through past experience, in order to retrieve the presupposition they must rely on to maintain conversational involvement and assess what is intended [...] (Gumperz 1992a: 230).

In other words, contextualization theory is concerned with explaining processes of conversational inferencing involving the "situated or context-bound process of interpretation, by means of which participants in an exchange assess other's intentions, and on which they base their response" (Gumperz 1982: 153). That means that participants make sense of what is "going on in time beyond the machinery of turn-taking when engaging in social interaction" (Reber 2012: 21, citing Gumperz 1992a). Moreover, this entails that the unit of investigation in interactional sociolinguistics "goes beyond sentence, utterance or proposition" (Fetzer 2011b: 259) and involves speech activity instead (Gumperz & Levinson 1996: 383). In speech activity, Gumperz (2003: 14) distinguishes between local and global inferences:

> It is useful to distinguish between two levels of inference in analyses of interpretative processes: (a) global inferences of what the exchange is about and what mutual rights and obligations apply, what topics can be brought up, what is wanted by way of a reply, as well as what can be put into words and what is to be implied, and (b) local inferences concerning what is intended with my one move and what is required by way of a response.

In sum, contextualization focuses on a hearer-centered construal of local and global contexts. From a hearer-centered perspective, hearers/ readers engage in context-dependent cognitive operations (reasoning) that are triggered by CCs. In the next section, it will be laid out in how far an interactional sociolinguistics perspective has been adopted in the present investigation and provides reasons for the extension of the Emotion Event Model in this respect.

2.4.3 Importing Context (III): CC in Emotion Events

From a speaker-centered perspective of contextual construal, the participants of this experimental study are regarded as writers who import context via contextualization cues. Building on Grice's paradigm (Grice 1975), Gumperz takes into account that linguistic forms potentially trigger implicatures. Building on the principle of the indexicality of linguistic structures (e.g., Ochs 1992), Gumperz defines these linguistic inference triggering devices as CCs (e.g., Gumperz 1996). Therefore, Gumperz' contribution is original, since he is the first one to take the relatedness of linguistic context and social and sociocultural context into account, and to connect linguistic context with cognitive context.

Linguistic context in this investigation concerns British English and German emotion concepts in Emotion Events. Social and sociocultural context can be regarded as represented by the participants' membership to British and German speech communities. And finally, cognitive context has been taken into account by investigating British and German emotion concepts in the framework of Emotion Events, including emotion lexemes and their contextual configurations. Emotion lexemes and co-occurring contextual cues are hereby regarded as inference triggering devices, i.e. as CCs. From a hearer-centered perspective of contextual construal, contexualization is permanently taking place. In this investigation, contextualization is left to the researcher.

Integrating an interactional sociolinguistics perspective into the Emotion Event Model allows the accommodation of linguistic, cognitive, social and sociocultural context (cf. Chapter 5.4.3), operationalized via CCs. In this study, a number of linguistic devices can be regarded as CCs.

In Chapter 6, Emotion Events are approached via the frequencies of emotion lexemes, differentiating between different parts of speech and syntactic realizations, and via investigating Emotion Event Chains including experiencer types. With respect to Emotion Event Chains it is investigated if the participants of the British and German speech community provide the CAUSE of the emotion in similar ways. The explicit naming of the CAUSE is viewed as CC, since the CAUSE already having been provided in the experimental design, the explicit naming of CAUSES can be regarded, as is argued, as flouting several of the Gricean maxims (Grice 1975) and therefore trigger particularized conversational implicatures (cf. Chapter 6.3.6).

In Chapter 7, contextual construal of SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG, FEAR – FURCHT, JOY – FREUDE, SADNESS – TRAUER, ANGER – ÄRGER and LOVE – LIEBE are investigated. Contextual construal is categorized into congruent and non-congruent types (cf. Chapter 7.2). Congruent event construals contain CCs that confirm or reinforce the "intuitive" meaning (Louw 1993: 172) of emotion concepts while

triggering generalized conversational implicatures (GCI, Grice 1975). Non-congruent event construals contain CCs that counter or oppose the intuitive meaning while triggering particularized conversational implicatures (PCI, speaker-centered perspective, Grice 1975). From a hearer-centered perspective, collocational inferences are intended to be performed (Hunston 2007a). CCs can be further co-occurring emotion lexemes (e.g., *happy and relieved*) and positively or negatively loaded items, i.e. evaluations (e.g., *my joy [...] laboured*). Co-occurring intensifiers and markers of epistemic modality are taken into account, but are the focus of the subsequent research chapter (cf. Chapter 8).
In Chapter 8, intensifiers and epistemic markers are viewed as Modifiers in Emotion Events. As such, i.e. in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes, they can be regarded as CCs. They are viewed as resources of intersubjective positioning as well. The functions of intensifiers and markers of un-/certainty as CCs emerge in particular when investigating the multiple use of modifiers (cf. Chapter 8.4).
Finally, adopting an interactional sociolinguistics perspective allows to investigate the speech activity of Emotion Events from a local and more global perspective. Local inferences can be regarded to be drawn from the display of emotion lexemes in the immediate linguistic context (co-text, 5L-5R). Global inferences consider the wider context, i.e. the emotion narrative. Global inferences have, however, always been linked to more local ones and analyzed in this respect. In the next section, it will be outlined why a contrastive perspective is adopted in the investigation.

2.5 A Contrastive Perspective

Drawing on Gumperz' work, "contextualization conventions" (Gumperz 1992b: 51) can be assumed to be different in different speech communities. Therefore, adopting a contrastive perspective is expected to shed some light on such conventions and provide additional insights into the language-specificity or universality of Emotion Events across the British and German datasets.

2.5.1 The Language of Emotion: Universal or Culture-Specific?

The question of emotions being universal and/ or culture-specific is still under investigation in various research disciplines (e.g., Ekman 2016). Recent psychological research, for instance, proves that in contrast to previous claims (e.g., Ekman 1993; Darwin 1998), there is even cultural variation with respect to the facial expression of emotion (Jack et al. 2012).
In linguistics, the universality vs. culture-specificity has been extensively addressed by

Wierzbicka (e.g., 1992a,b, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2009), for instance, who describes emotion language across different languages and cultures. Wierzbicka bases her research on the framework of the natural semantic metalanguage (NSM, Wierzbicka 2009) and employs universal semantic primitives for the descriptions. The NSM has been developed in order to avoid anglocentricm in emotion research, which has been critizised by Wierzbicka (e.g., 2009: 4):

> Contemporary psychology, like present-day science in general, is dominated by English, and it is common practice for scholars to write about human emotions using English emotion terms, as if these English words could give us an accurate, objective and culture-independent perspective on human emotional experience in general. The justification usually offered for this practice is that English emotion terms can be used as "scientific concepts," independent of ordinary English usage. In fact [...], such "scientific" concepts, which Anglophone scholars derive, unwittingly, from their native language, preclude, rather than facilitate, a culture-independent perspective: in reality, any discussion of human emotions which relies on English emotion terms is necessarily Anglocentric.

The NSM can be understood to be a mini language deduced from the intersection of all languages empirically investigated. Universal human concepts comprise for instance the substantives I and YOU, mental predicates such as THINK or FEEL, evaluators such as GOOD or BAD, and intensifiers/ augmentors such as VERY to name but a few (Wierzbicka 2009). An overview over universal human concepts (English exponents) can be found in Wierzbicka (2009: 5; Table 1.).
Wierzbicka's intuitive, pragmatic analyses include the analysis of emotion scenarios that are more or less prototypical for the respective language and culture (Wierzbicka 2009). Emotion concepts differ in their meaning. *Happiness* and *joy*, for example, are often used interchangeably by psychologists, although they differ importantly, which can be drawn from the formulae of semantic primitives that Wierzbicka (1992b: 298) provides:

> joy (e.g. X feels joy)
> X feels something
> sometimes people think something like this:
> something very good is happening
> I want this
> because of this, they feel something good
> X feels like this
>
> in contrast to:

x is happy
X feels something
sometimes people think something like this:
something good happened to me
I wanted this
I don't want anything else [emphasis NMF]
because of this, they feel something good
X feels like this

So *happiness* implies in addition to some kind of *joy*, "contentedness", while being an emotion that has rather personal character (cf. *pursuit of happiness*, *personal happiness*, Wierzbicka 1992b: 298f.). Moreover, English *happy or happiness*, for example, are, according to Wierzbicka (2004: 37–38), less intense than German *glücklich or Glück*, and differ in their frequency of use in everyday language (Wierzbicka 1992b: 299). Similarly, to provide just another example, differences have also been identified by Wierzbicka (1992a: 303–307) between the English emotion concept *anger*, the related Ifaluk (i.e., a Micronesian language) emotion concept *song* (e.g., Lutz & White 1986), the Ilongot (i.e., an Austronesian language) emotion concept *liget* (Rosaldo 1980). Apart from this, some languages might choose not to lexically label parts of the "emotional spectrum" (Dziwirek & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010: 14). Wierzbicka (1992b: 135–174) provides a survey of "untranslatable emotions" across various languages and cultures. Moreover, with respect to German, *Schadenfreude*, 'the pleasure at the misfortune of other's', has been found to lack an English (lexicalized) counterpart (Dziwirek & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010: 14; cf. Chapter 7.4.3, Example 15). All in all, it can be assumed that some aspects of emotion concepts are universal, while others are elaborated in culture-specific ways (e.g., Dziwirek & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010; Bednarek 2008a; Kövecses 2000; Wierzbicka 1992b). In psychological terms, to take Frijda's words (Frijda et al. 1995: 121), one could refer to certain emotion domains as ranges, e.g. the happiness or joy range or the anger range etc., which should exist across all languages and cultures, i.e. they should be basic and universal. However, the members of these categories in different languages can be assumed to "differ from each other to varying degrees" (Kövecses 2000: 14f.).
This is also an underlying assumption in the cognitive linguistic framework of Emotion Events (cf. Chapter 2.1.2), where sub-unit emotion parameters are assumed to be "different in different communities" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 324). The rationale behind this is that, in analogy to the studies cited above, there is an underlying shared cognitive basis (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1998) and that most languages have emotion concepts that correspond to similar scenarios, but elaborate them in culture-specific ways (Wierzbicka 1999). These language-specificities emerge accord-

ing to Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson (2010) in discourse, i.e when we investigate emotion concepts in use.

In the interactional sociolinguistics-based framework (cf. Chapter 2.4), Gumperz addresses the question of universality and/ or culture-specificity in form of "contextualization conventions" (Gumperz 1992b: 51) that he assumes to be different in different speech communities. As Gumperz states, investigating contextualization conventions is of particular relevance to contrastive research and its applications, because differing conventions might result in "differing interpretations" (Gumperz 1982: 132) which tend to be seen by the participants in "attitudinal terms"(Gumperz 1982: 132). The misunderstandings might arise from inappropriate mappings of native conversational practices[22] onto foreign ones (Gumperz 1992b).

2.5.2 Contextualization Conventions: Emotion Events in Contrast

The tertium comparationis in this investigation are emotion concepts in context across the British and German dataset. Emotion concepts in context are investigated in an integrated approach (cf. previous sections of Chapter 2), that extends the cognitive corpus linguistic Emotion Event Model by a pragmatic, systemic-functional and interactional sociolinguistics perspective. The Extended Emotion Event Model (cf. Chapters 6, 7, 8) allows the investigation of emotion concepts in context, and across several languages (here: British English and German). 'Context', as has been stated above, is hereby taken into account as dynamic construct, and is viewed as participant and analyst construct (Fetzer 2012; cf. Chapters 1, 5.4.3). The linguistic and cognitive context of emotion lexemes is taken into account in the Emotion Events via contextual configurations co-occurring with emotion lexemes that are regarded as contextualization cues (speaker-centered construal) facilitating contextualization (hearer-centered construal; Gumperz e.g., 2003). Moreover, linguistic and cognitive context are accommodated in the Extended Emotion Event Model via implicatures (speaker-centered construal; Grice 1975) and via the systemic-functional framework-based resources of intersubjective positioning (speaker- and hearer-centered construal; White 2003).

This way, emotion concepts are investigated in a form-to function approach across two languages while taking context into account (cf. Chapter 1). One the one hand, a form-to-function approach allows and facilitates the integration of pragmatic, systemic-functional and interactional sociolinguistic frameworks into the cognitive-linguistic-anchored framework of Emotion Events (cf. Chapter 2.1.2), as grammatical structures

[22] Cf. as well Whetherell's concept of "affective practice[s]" (Whetherell 2012: 4) which is interesting in this respect and could inform further investigations.

(viz. forms) are assumed to provide access to conceptualization in cognitive frameworks (cf. Chapter 1). On the other hand, a form-to-function approach ensures comparability (cf. 'tertium comparationis', Chapter 1.4) in this contrastive study, and allows the investigation of emotion concepts across the British English and German dataset.
The potential results with respect to emotion concepts in context across more than one language are, from a theoretical point of view, important, as they test emotion models against not only one but two languages (cf. Chapter 8.6). I.e. emotion models applied and extended in a data-driven approach (cf. Chapter 5) involving several languages can be assumed to be more robust. Contextual effects identified in two languages should be included in emotion models. Investigating emotion concepts in context not only in one, but in two languages provides moreover deeper insights into universal and language-specific aspects (cf. this Chapter).
Similarities and differences in Emotion Event frequencies across the British and German dataset, taking different parts-of-speech and syntactic realizations into account, as well as similarities and differences in Emotion Event Chains including Experiencers and Causes are therefore regarded as providing insights into different degrees of prototypicality and cognitive entrenchment of Emotion Events (cf. Chapters 1, 5) in the study participants. Similarities and differences in the nature and frequency of contextualization cues, implicatures, and resources of intersubjective positioning are considered to shed light on contextualization conventions (Gumperz 1992b: 51) across British English and German and can help identify language-preferences (cf. also the notion of 'naturalness', Chapter 1) in Emotion Events displayed by the study participants.
In Chapter 6, for instance, differences have been identified with respect to the frequencies of ANGER – ÄRGER, SADNESS – TRAUER and FEAR – FURCHT across the datasets. From a construal of context perspective, contextual import is differently performed across the British and German datasets (cf. Chapter 2.2.3 and Chapter 6).
In Chapter 7, contextual construal of SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG, FEAR – FURCHT, JOY – FREUDE, SADNESS – TRAUER, ANGER – ÄRGER and LOVE – LIEBE are investigated (cf. Chapter 2.4.3) from a contrastive perspective. Language-specificities have been identified, to name but one example, for SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG for instance. While SURPRISE is most of the times positively construed via co-occurring positive evaluative items, ÜBERRASCHUNG is more often negatively construed via co-occurring negative items. Therefore, while SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG displays might not differ from a merely frequency-based perspective (cf. no language effects for SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG, Chapter 6), their contextual construal does, and the British and German participants in this study import context in different ways via positive or negative co-occurring evaluative items that are regarded as CCs.

In Chapter 8, adverbial modifiers in Emotion Events, intensifiers and markers of un-/certainty, including multiple modifier use are viewed as contextualization cues and resources of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapters 2.3.3 and 2.4.3). These modifiers exist in both the British and German Emotion Events. However, the frequency of forms and functions of the modifiers differs across the British and German data suggesting language preferences in the use of contextualization cues and resources of intersubjective positioning. To name but one example, the German participants recur rather to resources of dialogic contraction, the British participants to resources of dialogic expansion. The context that is imported by the British and German participants therefore differs in this respect.

In more general terms, similarities and differences in British English and German Emotion Events can be informative for a wide range of (applied) disciplines such as language pedagogy, intercultural communication, translation studies, investigations involving automatic inferencing or (discursive) psychology. Although, differences in contextualization conventions (Gumperz 1992b: 51) with respect to Emotion Event displays might not easily be taught, since they are so subtle (cf. Chapter 2.4.1 and the definition of CC: "not consciously used"), one might at least want to raise awareness (e.g., Gumperz 2003) in this respect.

Finally, the tertium comparationis (cf. Chapter 1) chosen motivated the experimental design of this study (cf. Chapter 5). More specifically, the experiment aimed at eliciting a comparable corpus, i.e. similar emotion concepts across British English and German, triggered by linguistic prompts (without naming specific emotion concepts and hence without biasing towards the extended use of some), while assuming language preferences in the use in forms and functions, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, of these emotion concepts across the language subcorpora.

2.6 Summary and Conclusions

The integrated approach to Emotion Concepts in Context weds a cognitive corpus linguistic, with a pragmatic and a systemic-functional, with an interactional sociolinguistics and a contrastive perspective. This integrated approach allows to investigate emotion concepts in context. 'Context' is hereby understood as dynamic participant construct (cf. Chapters 1.3, 2.2.3, 2.3.3, 2.4.3) and analyst construct (cf. Chapter 5), taking linguistic, cognitive, social and socio-cultural context into account (cf. Chapter 5.4.3). The cognitive linguistic Emotion Event Model has therefore been extended by Grice's influential work on implicatures (Grice 1975), by White's systemic-functional account on intersubjective positioning (White 2003) and by Gumperz' original contri-

bution in the field of interactional sociolinguistics (e.g., Gumperz 2003). In addition, the Extended Emotion Event Model has been used to analyze and has been tested against two languages, British English and German. The form-to-function based approach can yield insights, as will be shown in the research chapters (cf. Chapters 6, 7, 8), into universal aspects of Emotion Event displays, and can highlight some particularities, i.e. contextualization conventions and mismatches across British English and German.

3

Previous Research (I): Approaching English and German Discourse

Contents

In this chapter, the findings from contrastive studies on English and German discourse are summarized and related to the study of emotion concepts in context. In order to shed light on language preferences (cf. Chapters 1, 2.5) with respect to EE displays, the five dimensions of communicative contrasts (cf. Chapter 3.1) identified are reviewed first, followed by studies on English-German pragmatic contrasts (cf. Chapter 3.2). A focus is put on investigations involving evaluative practices (cf. Chapter 3.2.1), epistemic modal marking/ hedging (cf. Chapter 3.2.2) and intensification (cf. Chapter 3.2.3) across (British) English and German, since these areas of interest are regarded as being particularly informative for the study of emotion concepts in context (cf. Chapters 1, 2.1.2, 2.3.1) and of the data at hand (cf. Chapter 1.2, Examples 1). The chapter closes with setting goals for the present study and providing suggestions for future investigations, and relates the studies on evaluation, epistemic modal marking/ hedging and intensification reviewed to the study of emotion concepts in context.

3.1 The Five Dimensions of Communicative Contrasts

The research on English and German discourse with an explicit reference to emotion concepts, i.e. emotion discourse, is scarce (cf. Chapter 4). However, we find a wealth of studies on English and German discourse that focus on both stylistic contrasts, such as text organization and connectivity (e.g., Clyne 1987; Graefen 2000; Baumgarten 2007; Becher et al. 2009) or deixis (e.g., Becher 2010; Baumgarten 2008; Baumgarten & Özçetin 2008), and pragmatic contrasts such as pragmatic markers or speech acts (e.g., Blum-Kulka & Kasper 1989; House 1982a, 2006a). In the present investigation, a focus will lie only on general pragmatic contrasts identified (this section), and, on particular contrasts (evaluation, intensification and epistemic modal marking) that relate to the present investigation (cf. Chapter 3.2).

Most of the foundational studies have been conducted by House (House 1979, 1982a,b; House & Kasper 1981, 1987; House 1996, 2006a) and Kranich (Kranich 2011; Kranich et al. 2012; Kranich 2016). House bases her cross-linguistic results, namely the "five dimensions of communicative contrasts" (e.g., House 2006a), both on spoken and written discourse and has investigated various discourse types (House 1979, 1982a,b; House & Kasper 1981, 1987; House 1996, 2006a). More precisely, the data on which she bases her results comprise narrative interviews, simulated everyday interactions including introspective comments, self-reflective descriptions (diary-type), field notes, translations, open self-directed dyadic role plays comprising retrospective interviews, and finally, discourse completion tasks combined with meta-pragmatic assessment tests (House 1996, 1998, 2006a,b). All in all, she concludes that a more involved, interactive style of com-

munication is characteristic for English[23], whereas the German style of communicating is more detached and transactional (House 1979, 1982a,b; House & Kasper 1981, 1987; House 1996, 2006a). The five dimensions of communicative contrasts established by House (2006a) are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Dimensions of communicative contrasts between English and German (House 2006a: 252).

English shows a tendency towards...	**German shows a tendency towards...**
Indirectness	Directness
Orientation towards persons	Orientation towards content
Orientation towards addressees	Orientation towards self
Implicitness	Explicitness
Verbal routines - *more interactional* - *more involved*	Ad-hoc formulation - *more transactional* - *more detached*

The results obtained in the studies comprising oral and written data, which have been analyzed following categories developed in the "Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project" (Blum-Kulka & Kasper 1989), which have been modified and further developed in House (1981, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2003), focus on opening and closing discourse phases, discourse strategies, gambits, speech acts and speech act sequences (House 2006a). English and German differ with respect to these discourse phenomena and this has led to the formulation of the communicative contrasts, i.e. "habitually display[ed] different communicative preferences" (House 2006a: 249). Concrete examples that illustrate the five dimensions of communicative contrasts are 1) the preference for direct realizations in complaints and requests in German discourse in contrast to indirect realizations in English discourse (e.g., House & Kasper 1981, 1987; Blum-Kulka & Kasper 1989), 2) and 3) the preference for content-oriented and self-referenced "gambits", i.e. pragmatic markers and discourse markers, such as "starters" in German discourse in contrast to addressee-oriented and other-referenced ones such as "cajolers" in English discourse (e.g., House 1982a, 1996), which is paired with 4) a preference for more explicitness in German discourse vs. implicitness in English discourse, which can be drawn from more

[23] This seems to be true for British English as well as American English.

explicit self-references and explicit introductions of topics (e.g., House 1996, 2003), and finally, 5) a greater variety in the tokens in German such as in apologies or in expressions in which the interlocutors take responsibility for an offence (*Bitte entschuldigen Sie, Verzeihung, Pardon etc.*) that point at a preference of German discourse to be more verbose than English discourse (where we can only find the token *sorry* for instance, e.g., House & Kasper 1981, 1987; House 1996).

The English-German dimensions of communicative contrasts postulated by House (e.g., 2006a) have been lately corroborated by a large body of research (e.g., Becker 2009; Grieve 2010; Becher 2010; Baumgarten 2008; Graefen 2000; Baumgarten et al. 2004) of which a recent and comprehensive review and overview can be found in Kranich (2016: 29–46, and esp. Table 5, 46–50). Only some few studies (Clyne 1987, 1991; Markkanen & Schröder 1989; Grieve 2010; Baumgarten 2008; Teich 2003; Baumgarten & Özçetin 2008; Graefen 2000; Fandrych & Graefen 2002) can be found that contradict the five dimensions of communicative contrasts. I will discuss the corroborating and contradicting studies (Clyne 1991; Markkanen & Schröder 1989; Grieve 2010), as far as they relate to the present investigation, in the respective sections (cf. Chapters 3.2.2 and 3.2.3). Overall, one can conclude that "the results pointing in the direction of the existence of contrasts along the five parameters established by House (e.g., House 1996, 1997) are many more than those which cast doubt on their existence" (Kranich 2016: 50). Moreover, the differing results could be put down to the operationalization of the objects of study (i.e. the question of what is considered to be a hedge or an intensifier for instance, cf. Chapters 3.2.2 and 3.2.3) in the respective investigations.

In the next section, three pragmatic contrasts will be reviewed in detail which are particularly relevant to the present investigation: studies into 1) evaluative practices (cf. Chapter 3.2.1), 2) epistemic modal marking as hedging device (cf. Chapter 3.2.2), and 3) intensification (cf. Chapter 3.2.3). This chapter will conclude by summarizing the major caveats emerging from the findings reviewed and relate them to the present investigation, the study of *Emotion Concepts in Context – a Contrastive Analysis of English and German Discourse* (cf. Chapter 3.3) .

3.2 English – German Pragmatic Contrasts

3.2.1 Evaluation

Evaluation has been studied in a number of systemic-functional studies drawing on the framework of appraisal theory (e.g., Bednarek 2010; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004). Moreover, evaluative practice has recently been related to the English-German communicative contrasts (e.g., Kranich 2016) that have presented in the previous chapter.

Kranich investigates evaluative practices in form of evaluative adjectives (e.g., *very/ absolutely innovative*)[24]. Her study is part of a larger investigation of pragmatic contrasts between English and German and the potential "impact of source language conventions on English-German translations" (Kranich 2016: 20). She (Kranich 2016: 21) bases her study on a corpus of letters to shareholders (LeSh-Corpus) which comprises English and German originals as well as English-German translations. Kranich (2016: 68) states that evaluative practice always contains a subjective component[25], since evaluative expressions refer to a "specific individual's or a specific group's perception of things". However, as Kranich (2016: 68) states, there might be differential conventions, reflected in differential cross-linguistic practices, of "how firmly one's evaluation has to be based on verifiable facts". Kranich links this to the dimension of addressee- vs. content-orientation:

> A high degree of content-orientation will lead to a more fact-based evaluation, which will tend to make fine-grained distinctions in the attribution of more or less positive evaluation to an object, idea or event. A high degree of addressee-orientation, by contrast, will be more adjusted to creating a particular effect in the reader. (Kranich 2016: 68)

Kranich (2016: 68) provides the example of a *dish that was quite nice but nothing special* that is evaluated as *wonderful* vs. *quite nice*, providing either an addressee-oriented compliment (in the case of *wonderful*) or a more truthful evaluation (in the case of *quite nice*). Furthermore, Kranich postulates that the English-German contrast of routine formula and ad-hoc formulation will be reflected in English-German evaluative practice (Kranich 2016), i.e. in the fact that the Germans display a higher degree of lexical variation of evaluative lexis. Based on these assumptions, Kranich (2016: 70–71) formulates four hypothesis: (1) In English, the subjective component and addressee-orientation should be prevalent in form of "more emphatic positive evaluation" and "hedged negative evaluation" (Kranich 2016: 70), whereas in German evaluative practice should be more subtle, (2) This might be reflected in shining through effects (Teich 2003) in English-German translations (Kranich 2016: 71)[26], (3) English is expected to display less lexical variation than German, and finally (4) this may again have and impact on translations. With respect to hypotheses (1) and (3), Kranich found confirmatory evidence (although not statistically significant for hypothesis 3).
In Taboada et al. (2014), a systemic-functional study entitled "Loving and hating the

[24] Kranich restricts her analysis to positive adjectives, since negative adjectives seem not to be characteristic for the genre of letters to shareholders (Kranich 2016: 75,83–84).
[25] Kranich (2016) defines subjectivity in Traugott's sense (Traugott 1990: 500).
[26] "English-German translations exhibit some of the typical features of English texts and are therefore different from comparable non-translated German texts" (Kranich 2016: 17).

movies in English, German and Spanish", English and German differences in evaluation have been identified[27] with respect to the attitude subsystem of the Appraisal Framework (cf. Chapter 2.3.1). This study is based on a corpus of film reviews across the languages English, German and Spanish. In German, more appreciation spans were detected and fewer affect spans than in English and Spanish. No "positive-first, negative-mostly pattern"[28] (Taboada et al. 2014: 14), characteristic for English, was identified, but a balance of positive and negative comments. In the negative reviews, however, the authors detected a higher percentage of affect and judgment and explain this result by the Germans tending to be, in contrast to the English, negative towards the actors, script-writers and directors (Taboada et al. 2014: 16–18) instead of evaluating only the film, the idea or the acting (e.g., *The idea for the story is fundamentally really very interesting and could probably come across really well on screen. But director and script-writer George Nolfi unfortunately doesn't manage this*[29].)

So, all in all, the results of the studies cited cannot be easily unified and cannot be directly compared. Although both studies investigate forms of evaluation, their research foci differ importantly with respect to approach (contrastive pragmatics and translation vs. systemic-functional linguistics), research questions (investigation of English–German pragmatic contrasts and potential shining through effects in translation vs. differences in the attitude subsystem of the Appraisal System across English, German and Spanish) and data (letters to shareholders and translations vs. film reviews). Moreover, it has to be taken into account that evaluation and emotion (concepts) are not the same objects of study (cf. Chapters 1, 2.1.2, 2.3.1). Lately, the question has also been raised if emotion is always involved in evaluations and/ or vice versa, i.e. the question which is the superordinate concept (Alba-Juez 2018), and if "affect" is always implicitly coded in "judgment" (Benítez-Castro & Hidalgo-Tenorio 2019). Despite these points, the studies cited might lead to the formulation of the following hypotheses: Language preferences with respect to the display of emotion concepts should occur across the English and German narratives in AWE, more precisely, 1) more positive emotion concepts are expected to occur in English (cf., Kranich 2016: 70, on evaluation!), and 2) overall, fewer emotion concepts should occur in German, but not in negative narratives (cf., Taboada et al. 2014 and Chapter 4.2).

The ways in which the studies cited are informative for the present investigation will be further laid out in detail in the last section of this chapter (cf. Chapter 3.3). In the

[27] In this section, only the results relevant for evaluative practice, i.e. the results of the attitude system, are presented. The results reported on graduation will be discussed later.

[28] The "positive-first, negative-mostly pattern" is defined by the authors as a negative evaluation that is regarded to be "too blunt" and is therefore softened by a few introducing "words of praise" (Taboada et al. 2014: 13).

[29] The English translation of the example provided by the authors is given here (Taboada et al. 2014).

next section, the discursive differences identified for English and German with respect to hedging, and more specifically, with respect to epistemic modal marking will be summarized.

3.2.2 Hedging and Epistemic Modality

Lakoff was the first to introduce the term 'hedge/ hedging' in his non-contrastive study of oral and written standard English published in form of the article "Hedges: A Study in Meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts" (Lakoff 1973a). He took up ideas of fuzzy-set theory rooted in fuzzy mathematics (Zadeh 1965) and applied it to the study of the semantics of English predicates. Lakoff (1973a: 471) defined hedges as follows:

> For me, some of the most interesting questions are raised by the study of words whose meaning implicitly involves fuzziness – words whose job it is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy.

Since then, hedging or hedges have been the focus of a vast amount of investigations, focusing not only on English and German but also on other languages such as Dutch or French (Schröder & Zimmer 1997). Hedging has later often been restricted to mitigation or politeness strategies (e.g., Fraser 1980; Brown & Levinson 1987), to forms of understatement (Hübler 1983), to attenuating devices (e.g., Holmes 1990) or expressions that weaken the force of the proposition (Markkanen & Schröder 1997). I.e. the term 'hedge' has not been used in its originally larger sense as defined by Lakoff (1973a). Lately, however, hedges have been also acknowledged to be "ways of being more precise" (Salager-Meyer 1994: 151) and categorized into "more-fuzzy hedges" and "less-fuzzy hedges" (Fetzer 1994, 2004, 2010c; cf. the present investigation of markers of low probability AND medium AND high probability, Chapter 8.1.1).

Drawing on the dimensions of communicative contrasts (e.g., House 2006a), English discourse should contain more hedges (in the sense of attenuating devices) than German discourse, since it has been identified to be more indirect in contrast to German discourse which tends to be more direct. Moreover, hedging has been linked to more addressee-orientated discourse types (e.g., Kranich 2016) and should therefore be more often realized in English discourse. By hedging, authors might wish to weaken the force of the proposition and might hereby open up space for dialogic alternatives (e.g., White 2003).

Kranich (2016: 99)[30] postulates a lack of research in contrastive studies on hedging,

[30] In this paragraph, Kranich's argumentation is taken up (Kranich 2016: 95–97), since it shaped the present investigation to an important extent, especially with respect to the decision to focus on epistemic markers.

especially with respect to business communication and popular science texts. In her study on epistemic modal markers, conceptualized as hedging strategies in Talbot's sense[31], the author intends to fill this gap. Kranich (2016) restricts her work to epistemic modal markers[32], i.e. expressions that show the speaker's doubt with respect to the propositional content of the clause (Palmer 2001; Coates 1995), e.g., modal verbs (such as *may*) or modal adverbs (such as *probably*). She reports (Kranich 2016: 96) an important aspect with respect to the communicative discourse functions of epistemic modal marking, apart from expressing a doubt with respect to the truth value of a proposition, i.e. caution with respect to the content or the reader (Hyland 1996: 436). Epistemic modal markers might signal that there is room for another opinion (Kreutz & Harres 1997: 182) or signal in White's and Sano's terms "dialogic expansion" (White 2003; White & Sano 2006: 194), i.e. "the interpersonal cost to any who might advance alternative views is lowered as their position is recognized as a valid one in the current ongoing colloquy" (White 2003; White & Sano 2006: 194; cf. Chapter 2.3.2). Based on the communicative English-German contrasts (cf. Chapter 3.1) and Kreutz's and Harres' view that "hedging constructions have the functions of downtoning, mitigation, politeness" (Kreutz & Harres 1997: 184) and their culture-specificity (Kreutz & Harres 1997), Kranich (2016: 102) hypothesizes (1) that more epistemic modal markers should be used in English, since it is addressee-oriented, (2) that Germans should favor markers of high certainty over low probability markers[33], since German is rather content-oriented and has said to show an uncertainty avoidance tendency (Hofstede 1980, 2001)[34] and finally (3) that English modal verbs will be used more frequently than the German modal verbs[35], since they are more grammaticalized in English, and that first person mental verbs should be more frequent in English. Kranich's hypotheses were fully supported for popular science texts; for letters to shareholders, hypotheses number one and three were corroborated (Kranich 2016: 163).

Evidence for a differential use of epistemic modal markers in English and German can further be deduced from a series of corpus studies into political discourse. Fetzer

[31] Hegding is considered to be a strategy to weaken the force of the utterance (Talbot 2010: 37).

[32] Instead of investigating hedges as an umbrella term for a wide range of constructions, as discussed above, and since there seems to be no clear, feasible definition for hedges (Mauranen 1997: 116), Kranich focuses on epistemic modal markers (Kranich 2016). Kranich's (2016) operationalization will inform the present investigation with respect to markers of epistemic modality. However, markers of certainty will also be included (cf. Chapter 5).

[33] Epistemic modal markers are located at different points on the probability scale (Kratzer 1991; Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007; Declerck 2009) ranging from possibility over probability to certainty. The probability scale will inform the present investigation, cf. Chapter 5.

[34] As has also been cited by Kranich (2016: 27).

[35] Studies on linguistic realizations on modal meaning, e.g., Neumann (2014) to name but one study, suggest remarkable systemic linguistic differences in modal marking. So, lexico-grammatical categories should be considered particularly in contrastive analyses on epistemic modal markers. This finding will also be taken into account in the present investigation, cf. Chapter 5.

(1994) investigated negative interactions in English (face-to-face political interviews, "On the record" and "Question Time", stemming from BBC 1), non-acceptances, negative theme zones, non-alignment and challenges (all short dyadic interviews between journalists and losers of the general election in Britain 1997 and Germany 1998) across English and German (Fetzer 2005a,b, 2008, 2009) and argumentative discourse (English data stems from "On the record" and pre-election interviews in 1990, 1997, 2001 with political party leaders and French data consists of political interviews and debates in 1990, in 2002, 2003 and 2007 from "7 sur 7", "L'heure de vérité", "France 2 Elections" and "Question ouverte"), more precisely, cognitive-verb-based parentheticals and their patterned co-occurrences, in English and French (Fetzer & Johansson 2010). Fetzer's and Johansson's results are overall in line with House's dimensions of English-German communicative contrasts (cf. Chapter 3.1). More specifically, Fetzer finds that British English is more oriented towards the interpersonal domain of communication (Fetzer 1994, 2005b,a, 2008, 2009) manifest, for instance, in a higher frequency of cognitive verbs as epistemic parentheticals (Fetzer 2009) or interpersonal themes (Fetzer 2008), than German is, and that English interactions are more dynamic and process-oriented, allowing for a negotiation of meaning (Fetzer 2005a,b, 2008). In their cross-linguistic study involving English and French, Fetzer & Johansson (2010) analyze the pattern *and I think* consisting of the discourse connective *and* and the cognitive-verb-based parenthetical *I think* either as booster or attenuating device depending on its co-occurrences with expressions of certainty or probability, i.e. in a "certainty-coloured context" or a "context coloured by epistemic probability" (Fetzer & Johansson 2010: 251), whereas *I believe* is reported to only boost the pragmatic force of the argument. This is interesting in so far as it underlines the importance of contextual analyses in pinpointing certain discourse functions fulfilled by epistemics.

Another corpus-based study into political discourse has been conducted by Becker (2009) who analyses modality and engagement against the background of appraisal theory in English and German media interviews. The study is based on a corpus of political interviews stemming from election night broadcasts (general election in 1997 vs. Bundestagswahl in 1998) from the British public channel BBC (*British Broadcasting Channel*) and the German public channel ARD (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bunderespublik Deutschland*). Becker's results support House's dimensions of communicative contrasts (cf. Chapter 3.1). More specifically, as reported as well by Kranich (2016: 47–49), "German interviewers use more unmitigated declaratives than British counterparts in political interviews on TV" and "German political interviewers use the category proclaim (linguistic expressions underlining the validity of a statement) more often when referring to claims made by themselves. British interviewers used more expressions that open up room for the ad-

dressee (e.g., *How do you feel about X?*)." Becker's results (2009) contradict, however, the dimensions of communicative contrasts in some minor points, i.e. ARD interviewers were slightly more tentative than BBC interviewers. These inconsistencies were explained by genre- and discourse-specificities (Becker 2009: 19).

There are only very few studies that contradict the dimensions of communicative contrasts (cf. Chapter 3.1) and which identify a lower frequency of hedges in German than in English discourse (e.g., Clyne 1991 or Markkanen & Schröder 1989). In the following, I will review Clyne (1991) in detail, whose approach, findings and criticisms are similar to Markkanen & Schröder (1989).

Clyne's corpus-based study of overall 52 academic texts (26 texts written by German natives in German or English, and 26 text written by English, American or Australian) stemming from the field of Linguistics and Sociology investigated the frequency of hedges, apart from other "discourse patterns" (Clyne 1991: 49) such as linearity, symmetry or functional sentence types, across English and German texts. Clyne (1991: 57) attributes a hedging function to agentless passives, to impersonal and reflexive constructions, to hedged performatives including *kann*, *muss*, *darf* and to passive infinitives. He identifies a fewer number of hedges (averaged) in the English texts (he investigates here only a randomized sample of 5 texts from the English corpus) than in the German ones (a randomized sample of 7 texts from the German corpus). In the mean, 6.25 hedges were used in the English texts by English natives vs. 24.0 hedges in the German texts and 28.5 in the English texts written by Germans. This result has to be critically viewed, since it is only based on a very small corpus (overall 12 texts). Moreover, apart from the descriptive statistics, no statements were made with respect to overall statistical inference, i.e. whether the differences observed in the mean number of hedges in the texts per groups were statistically significant. Moreover, individual variation (e.g., the author) within the groups has not been taken into account. Apart from these critical points with respect to quantification and generalizations made, the operationalization of hedging is a very broad one. This point has also been criticized by Kranich (2016: 33)[36] who explains Clyne's findings mainly by this differing operationalization: often the term "hedge" is used as an umbrella term for a wide range of constructions including, for instance, impersonal constructions, which are quite frequent in German. Kranich (2016: 34) further notes that another factor might have skewed the results, namely that the passive is a characteristic construction of the German language (Clyne 1991)[37]. Altogether, this would, according to Kranich (2016: 34) also explain the higher number of modals in German texts than in English ones identified by Clyne (1991), since modals often occur in constructions such as "Es

[36] This point is supported by Kreutz & Harres (1997: 189f.).
[37] Teich's results on passives contradict this view (Teich 2003).

muss vermutet werden" ("It must be assumed", Kranich 2016: 34)[38].
Overall, it has to be taken into account that the studies cited differ again importantly, as it was the case for the studies cited regarding evaluation (cf. Chapter 3.2.1), with respect to theoretical frameworks (e.g., Contrastive Pragmatics and Translation, Appraisal Framework), research questions and (written or oral) data basis (e.g., frequency of hedges in native and non-native academic texts vs. frequency of high vs. low probability markers, i.e. epistemic modal markers, in English and German popular science texts and letters to shareholders vs. frequency of modality markers and Engagement resources across British and German political interviews). However, the review of those studies is informative for the present investigation in so far as the contrasts in communicative preferences across British English and German discourse can be regarded to be a fruitful vantage point, since they have been corroborated with very few exceptions across different discourse types and modes. It will be interesting to look at the question of genre-specificity, i.e. the question whether the contrasts observed, for instance in political interviews (e.g., Becker 2009) or written academic texts (e.g., Clyne 1991), also hold for the corpus of written (emotion) narratives which have been experimentally elicited in this investigation (AWE-Corpus). Moreover, the operationalization of 'hedges' or epistemic modal markers revealed to be a key issue that has to be further addressed.
In this investigation (cf. Chapter 8.1.1), I will not investigate hedges, but epistemic markers in the immediate linguistic context of emotion lexemes, i.e. as modifiers of Emotion Events. I restrict my focus to epistemic markers, since their operationalization is more straightforward than the operationalization of hedges (e.g., Kranich 2016; Clyne 1991). Moreover, the focus on epistemic markers allows to take up Lakoff's original, larger definition of hedges and the idea of more or less fuzziness, and apply it to the communication or non-communication of un-/certainty (Bognelli & Zuczkowski 2008), an approach which adapts from a psychological point of view Watzlawick & Jackson (1967) and their interactional view rooted in cybernetics (cf. Chapter 8.1.1). Moreover, the idea of making words/ meanings "more or less fuzzy" can be regarded as being reflected by the scalar conceptualization of un/-certainty. The latter can be captured on the probability scale (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004; Huddleston & Pullum 2002; cf. Chapter 8.1.1, Figure 20). Finally, the integration of a clearly defined set of grammatical structures (modal adverbs, modal verbs, cognitive verbs), instead of an open set of linguistic devices including also lexical devices for instance, allows the integration of epistemic markers into the cognitive linguistic Emotion Event Model as Modifiers of Emotion Events (cf. Chapters 2.1.2,

[38] This is supported by Graefen's study (Graefen 2000) and Fandrych's and Graefen's work (Fandrych & Graefen 2002).

8.2).

Overall, the studies cited lead to the formulation of the following hypotheses: Language preferences emerge in the AWE-Corpus with respect to epistemic modal markers as Modifiers of Emotion Events. More precisely, 1) more epistemic modal markers should co-occur with British English emotion concepts than with German emotion concepts (cf., Kranich 2016; Fetzer 2009; Becker 2009; Taboada et al. 2014), 2) more high probability markers co-occur with German emotion concepts, more low probability markers with British English emotion concepts (cf., Kranich 2016), and finally 3) epistemic modal markers in English and German EE play an important role in intersubjective positioning, namely in form of dialogic contraction or expansion (White 2003; cf. Chapter 2.3.2).

The last section on pragmatic contrasts between English and German, will focus on intensification. Intensification, especially grammatical intensification (by adverbial subjuncts, Quirk et al. 1985: 589), on which the focus is put in the present study, which strives to integrate intensifiers, viz. adverbial subjuncts, as grammatical structures into the cognitive-linguistics-anchored Emotion Event Model (cf. Chapters 1, 2.1.2, 8.2), has only been covered by few English-German contrastive studies so far, however, it is a subject worth exploring.

3.2.3 Intensification

In contrast to the relatively large number of studies cited above involving hedges or epistemic modal marking across English and German, studies with respect to English-German intensification seem to be rather rare. Grammatical intensification, i.e. the scalar concept covering both increase or decrease "on an abstractly conceived intensity scale" (Bolinger 1972: 17) by adverbs of degree and applying to a predicate or some part of a predicate in Quirk's sense (Quirk et al. 1985; cf. Chapter 8.1.2), can, however be linked to some few (in the largest sense) related contrastive studies, three of which are quite recent. These studies do not only investigate grammatical intensification, but also pragmatic intensification on the speech act level. Pragmatic intensification, or intensity, has often been referred to as modifications of the illocutionary force of speech acts in communicative exchanges (e.g., Labov 1984; Holmes 1990; Blum-Kulka & Kasper 1989). It is, therefore, a wider term than grammatical intensification (by adverbial subjuncts such as *very* or *a little*), and can comprise as well lexical means of intensification such as repetition (e.g. *a dull dull movie*, Taboada et al. 2014: 10) or swear words (e.g. *That's bloody mean of you*, House & Kasper 1981).

In House's and Kasper's corpus-based study of politeness markers in English and German (House & Kasper 1981) the directness levels (ranging from 1-8) of speech acts,

complaints and requests, are investigated, and the use of "modality markers", i.e. "upgraders" and "downgraders" (House & Kasper 1981: 166–169) on these directness levels in a corpus of English-German native speaker interactions, which have been experimentally elicited in roleplays (House & Kasper 1981). The directness levels range from '1 to 8', '1' standing for more indirect complaints or requests (e.g., an indirect complaint, *Odd, my blouse was perfectly clean last night*, implying a bad action and implying that the addressee is responsible for it), '6' for more direct ones (e.g., a more direct complaint, *You have ruined my blouse*, expliciting the responsibility of the agent for the bad action) and '8' for the most direct complaints or requests (e.g., the most direct complaint, *You are really mean*, which explicitly states the addressee to be bad). "Modality markers" (House & Kasper 1981: 166–169) that are realized on these directness levels, and contribute on top of the directness level realized to overall politeness, comprise 11 types of "Downgraders" and 6 types of "Upgraders". Downgraders comprise "politeness markers" (e.g., *please*), "play downs" (e.g., *Mightn't, I wondered*), "consultative devices" (e.g., *Would you mind if...?*), "hedges" (e.g., *kind of, sort of*), "understaters" (e.g., *a little bit*), "downtowners" (e.g., sentence modifiers such as *simply, possibly*), "minus committers" (e.g., *I think, I suppose*), "forewarn" (e.g., *You are a nice guy, Jim, but...*), "hesitators" (e.g., *erm*), "scope staters" (e.g., *I am not happy about the fact that you did ...*) and "agent avoiders" (e.g., such as in passive or impersonal constructions, *One/ you* or *This is just not done,* House & Kasper 1981: 166–168). Upgraders consist of "overstaters" (e.g., *purely, absolutely*), "intensifiers" (e.g., *very, so*), "plus committers" (e.g., *I'm sure, certainly, obviously*), "lexical intensifiers" (e.g., *That's bloody mean of you.*), "aggressive interrogative" (e.g., *Why haven't you told me before?*) and "rhetorical appeal" (e.g., *You must understand that this is public property,* House & Kasper 1981: 169f.). House and Kasper find, apart from the fact that Germans are more direct in complaints and requests and that there is variation in the use of the modality markers depending on the speech act category and directness level, that "Germans show a stronger tendency to intensify the force of their speech acts in actual or potential conflict situations" (House & Kasper 1981: 182)[39]. For English, House and Kasper state that the use of lower directness levels is characteristic as well as downgraders are more frequent (House & Kasper 1981). With respect to requests, generally lower directness levels are chosen in English and, additionally, downgraders. For complaints, the English make use of all directness levels, whereas the Germans use frequently the three highest ones. However, the English prefer upgraders with the low directness levels of complaints. House and Kasper interpret these results first against

[39] Lorenz (1999: 169) identified an overuse of intensifiers in learners of English and hypothesizes that this, among other reasons, might be explained by cultural stereotype, i.e. the Germans' tendency to hyperbole and the British's to understatement.

politeness theory, specify later their "emic" perspective (House & Kasper 1981: 184), and link them to differential social practices: it might be possible to attack the other's identity in German complaints but not in English and the use of low directness levels and downgraders may be a way of playing "it doubly safe" (House & Kasper 1981: 182). These results can be informative for studies on (grammatical) intensification across English and German discourse, and hence, differential discursive practices as such. This is even more true in so far as grammatical intensifiers, amplifiers and downgraders in Quirk's sense (Quirk et al. 1985), which are important for the present study (cf. Chapters 4 and 8.1.2), are included in the categories upgraders (cf. overstaters and intensifiers) and downgraders (cf. understaters and downtoners), quantified in House's and Kasper's approach across English and German roleplays. The categories of hedges, minus committers and plus committers can be related to epistemic modal marking that has been discussed in the previous section (cf. Chapter 3.2.2) and will be taken up in a later research chapter (Chapter 8.1.1).

Grieve's recent study (Grieve 2010) which is based on a corpus of Australian-German telephone conversation at the workplace, and which consists of simulated role plays, seems to contradict House's and Kasper's statement (House & Kasper 1981: 182) that Germans tend to intensify more the force of their speech acts. In this study, participants (Germans, Australians and interlanguage groups) were asked to interact via telephone and converse about face-threatening (i.e. the failure of the callee to finish his/ her part of a company presentation) or less face-threatening (i.e. the organization of an office Christmas celebration) authentic business scenarios (Grieve 2010: 195–196). In the face-threatening scenarios, German participants were identified to be more truthful, to express more readily their disappointment and to chastise their interlocutors more often (Grieve 2010: 190), i.e. produce overall more face-threatening acts in conflicts. However, they mitigated the force of the illocutionary act with politeness strategies (Grieve 2010: 210). This is an important finding and might be indicative for recent changes in discourse conventions (Kranich 2016: 188–189). With respect to the present investigation, however, one has to take into account that Grieve (2010: 216) investigates also intensification on the speech act level (apologies), and not, as it is done in the present study, only grammatical intensification by adverbial subjuncts (Quirk et al. 1985: 589ff.) that are regarded to be modifiers in Emotion Events (cf. Chapter 8.1.2). Grieve (2010: 196f.) analyses apologies following Olshtain & Cohen (1983) and House (1989), and categorizes according to whether the apologies contain illocutionary force indicating devices, expressions of responsibility (Owen 1983, ranging from direct to indirect ones, including for example explicit self-blames such as *It's my fault entirely*, or implicit expressions of responsibility such as *It's a madhouse here and I've just not gotten around to looking at it*), explanations or accounts (that point at external forces

responsible for the offence), offers of repair and promises (which offer compensation for the offence) of forbearance (which indicate that the offence is not typical and won't happen again). Grieve (2010: 216) also refers in her study to politeness strategies (cf., House & Kasper 1981), including "understaters" such as *a bit*, which are included in the present study of intensifiers (cf. Chapter 8.1.2), and "downtoners" Grieve (2010: 216) such as *vielleicht*, which are investigated in the present investigation as epistemic markers (and not as intensifiers!), as modifiers in Emotion Events (cf. Chapter 8.1.1). So the operationalization of intensifiers/ intensification in the present investigation differs from Grieve's. All in all, however, the findings of the present investigation on intensifiers (cf. Chapter 8.3.2) do not contradict Grieve's results. Finally, both studies, the present one and Grieve's draw on elicited data (simulated roleplays and elicited narratives), however, genre-specificities (workplace telephone conversation vs. personal narratives) as well as the mode (spoken telephone conversation vs. written narratives) might play an important role in the display of intensification and should be taken into account when interpreting the results.

Taboada's study (Taboada et al. 2014), as already reviewed in Chapter 3.2.1, also investigate the appraisal categories of Attitude and Graduation in their corpus of written film reviews. The Attitude system in the Appraisal Framework (cf. Chapter 2.3.1) can be divided into resources of Affect (such as *happy*), resources of Judgment (such as *tragic*) and resources of Appreciation (such as *lovely*, Taboada et al. 2014). Graduation resources comprise the two submodes Force and Focus (Taboada et al. 2014). Force comprises resources that intensify or downtone gradable words (such as *a litte bit sad*, i.e. a downtowner, and *very interesting*, i.e. an emphasizers), and Focus comprises resources that intensify or downtone non-gradable words (such as in *true friend* that sharpens and *kind of friend* that softens, Taboada et al. 2014: 4).[40] The present study does not investigate Focus (cf. Chapter 4), neither means of lexical intensification such as repetitions (e.g., *a dull dull movie*, Taboada et al. 2014: 10), since its focus is a cognitive linguistic one, i.e. it focuses on grammatical structures in Emotion Events that give access to conceptualizations (cf. Chapters 1, 2.1.2). With respect to Graduation[41], cross-linguistic differences between English and German have been identified (Taboada et al. 2014). In German, the Graduation system revealed to be highly complex, i.e. in terms of Graduation types, and in general the categories Force and Intensification were prevalent. Overall, emphasizing, mostly by (creative) adverbs[42], was found to be more

[40] The graduation system was modified by Taboada et al. (2014: 8) in so far as they split the category Force into intensification and quantification, either of which categories contain emphasizers and downtoners.

[41] I will only refer here to the results with respect to graduation, since they are relevant for intensification.

[42] Taboada et al. (2014) include also *never* here.

frequent than downtoning, Focus was more often sharpened than softened. In English, 42 per cent of Attitude spans contained Graduation, mostly the categories Force and Intensification had to be coded and Graduation was similar in positive and negative reviews. Overall, more emphasizers than downtoners were used in English while negative reviews contained more softeners than positive reviews.

These results are important for the present investigation, since the communicative contrasts (e.g., House 2006a) seem to be corroborated in the genre of film reviews. Of course, it has to be taken into account that the categories of the Appraisal Framework, in particular the Graduation System, do not completely match the categories of previous studies on pragmatic (and partly grammatical) intensification (e.g., ones into Politeness Markers, cf. House & Kasper 1981, or into Pragmatic Contrasts, cf. Grieve 2010). Moreover, the genre of online film reviews (Taboada et al. 2014) is quite different from elicited roleplays (House & Kasper 1981) and workplace telephone conversation (Gries 2009). However, more emphasizers and sharpeners than other categories have been detected in the German reviews (Taboada et al. 2014), which seems to corroborate that the German reviews are more intense, and therefore rather direct and content-oriented (House 2006a). Moreover, more softeners have been identified in English negative reviews than in positive ones (Taboada et al. 2014), pointing at English film reviews being more indirect and addressee-oriented (House 2006a). And finally, the Graduation system that has been identified as a very complex one in Taboada et al. (2014), including creative emphasizers, indicates that German film reviews are more creative in this respect, creativity and ad-hoc formulations having been detected as being characteristic of German discourse in contrast to English discourse that employs more often routine formulas (e.g., House 2006a).

Consequently, the studies cited lead to the formulation of the following hypotheses: Language preferences with respect to the intensification of Emotion Events in form of intensifiers as Modifiers of Emotion Events will emerge in the AWE-Corpus. In particular, 1) the type and token frequency of (grammatical) intensifiers in EE differs across the corpus data (House & Kasper 1981; Taboada et al. 2014), 2) the frequency of intensifiers in EE with respect to their function (upgraders/ downgraders) differs across the corpus data, i.e. in the German EE, more upgraders (Taboada et al. 2014) but also more downgraders might be used (Grieve 2010), and finally 3) intensifiers in English and German EE play an important role in an (inter-)subjective positioning, namely in form of dialogic contraction or expansion (White 2003).

3.3 Summary and Conclusions

Goals for the Present Study and Suggestions for Future Investigations

In light of the studies reviewed, a number of questions arise with respect to evaluation, epistemic modal marking and intensification. The latter are summarized in the following, have been taken into account by the present investigation[43] and might reveal to be informative for future investigations.

The contrastive investigation on evaluation, more specifically the fact that the English use more positive emphatic adjective evaluation than the Germans (Kranich 2016) should be extended, and negative evaluation should also be viewed in this respect. The role of downgraders in evaluations has often been ignored and future investigations on British English and German discourse should include this aspect because of their important functional contribution to discourse. Apart from this, other lexico-grammatical categories than evaluative adjectives should be included in systematic investigations. Lastly, studies on evaluation should be extended to other genres and modes and should not only focus on letters to shareholders (e.g., Kranich 2016) or film reviews (e.g., Taboada et al. 2014), for instance, or written language.

As has been reported, the operationalization of hedges is problematic, and future investigations should focus on epistemic modal markers instead, such as Kranich (2016). High probability markers have been found to be prevalent in German discourse, while English discourse contained more low probability markers (Kranich 2016). This aspect as well as the question which lexico-grammatical categories are involved in this kind of marking, should be further explored. The functions of epistemic modal marking have been found to depend on certainty-coloured and probability-coloured contexts (Fetzer & Johansson 2010; Fetzer 2014). This should be taken into account in future analyses. Lastly, other genres than political interviews (e.g., Becker 2009), letters to shareholders and popular science texts (e.g., Kranich 2016), for instance, should be investigated with respect to epistemic marking.

Studies into pragmatical intensification (e.g., House & Kasper 1981) might be fruitfully extended by studies into grammatical intensification (i.e. the study of degree adverbs, more precisely adverbial subjuncts, Quirk et al. 1985). And again, it would be interesting to view type and token frequencies of upgraders and downgraders (Quirk et al. 1985) in British English and German discourse. As has been already stated for evaluation and epistemic modal marking, studies on intensification could involve other genres than roleplays (e.g., House & Kasper 1981), letters to shareholders (e.g., Kranich 2016), telephone conversations (e.g., Grieve 2010) and online film reviews (e.g., Taboada et al.

[43] The concrete hypotheses of this study can be found in Chapter 4.2. Moreover, it is specified which research gaps that have been identified will be investigated in the present study.

2014), for instance. Lastly, the quantification of the results involving inferential statistical models could shed light on sometimes conflicting results (e.g., Clyne 1991; Kranich 2016).
The empirical chapters (cf. Chapter 6, 7 and 8) of this investigation will take these suggestions into account and integrate them in the investigation of EE, i.e. emotion lexemes and their contextual configurations, drawing on an extended framework, the Extended Model of Emotion Events (cf. Chapters 2, 7 and 8). The next section relates the findings on pragmatic contrasts of English and German discourse explicitly to the study of emotion concepts before reviewing relevant literature in this respect (cf. Chapter 4).

Relevance of Pragmatic Contrasts for Emotion Discourse

Evaluative practices have been found to differ across English and German discourse (cf. Chapter 3.2.1). Firstly, Kranich (2016) relates evaluation to two dimensions of communicative contrasts, i.e. content-orientation vs. addressee-orientation and ad hoc formulations vs. routines. She finds more emphatic positive evaluation in English and less lexical variation (Kranich 2016). The potential link of the study of evaluation to emotion concepts is obvious in so far as (positive as in Kranich 2016) evaluation **can**[44] also be realized by (positive) emotion lexemes (adjectives as in Kranich 2016). Moreover, to paraphrase what Aijmer (2008: 11), referring to Nuyts (2001: 40), pointed out in a study on pragmatic markers[45], when speakers or writers attend to their emotions which are mostly reactions to events (e.g., unexpected ones), then they evaluate[46]. So, based on Kranich (2016), English positive emotion concepts, especially those opened up by adjectives, could be hypothesized to be more frequent than German ones. However, one has to take into account that the functional domain of evaluation investigated with the help of LeSh is not directly related to emotions but to judgments with respect to financial gain or loss (Kranich 2016: 72, 79).
The link of the present investigation that focuses on emotion concepts to Taboada et al. (2014), which has been referred to before (cf. Chapter 3.2.1 and 4.1.1), in which the authors find that German film reviews contain fewer affect spans, but that affect spans in German negative reviews are more frequent, is quite clear. Affect covers "emotion responses about the speaker or somebody else's reactions" ("e.g., *happiness*, *sadness*, *fear*", Taboada et al. 2014: 3), i.e. emotion lexemes and in Bednarek's terms (Bednarek

[44] The relation of evaluation and emotion is, however, by no means straightforward, which has been discussed before (cf. Chapter 1.2).
[45] In this study, Aijmer (2008: 11) investigates evaluative markers such as *surprisingly* or *sadly* and links emotion to evaluation and/ or vice versa.
[46] Evaluation is then metarepresentative (Aijmer 2008: 11).

2008a), emotion talk, which open up emotion concepts and are part of EE. Based on this reflection, an overall smaller number of emotion concepts is expected to occur in German, however, a greater number in negative narratives.
The cross-linguistic results on English and German hedging or epistemic modal marking have been reported in Chapter 3.2.2 and are in line with the dimension of communicative contrasts of addressee-orientation vs. content-orientation (Kranich 2016). The contrasts should also hold with respect to emotion discourse and epistemic modal markers should frequently co-occur with emotion lexemes. Furthermore, it can be hypothesized here, based on Kranich (2016), Fetzer (2009), Becker (2009), Taboada et al. (2014), that more epistemic modal markers, including cognitive-verb based parentheticals, should occur with English emotion concepts and that German emotion concepts should co-occur with more markers of high probability. Moreover, negative emotion concepts should be softened more often than positive ones in English.
The findings on intensification (House & Kasper 1981; Grieve 2010; Taboada et al. 2014) lead, despite their heterogeneous nature with respect to approaches and results, to the tentative hypothesis that German emotion concepts might be intensified more, i.e. both upgraded and downgraded more, than English emotion concepts. Moreover, a higher number of intensifier types in German is expected and more upgraders for positive emotion concepts in English. Overall, the pragmatic contrasts with respect to English and German discourse, namely the one of evaluation, hedging/ epistemic modality and intensification, relate quite well to the discursive study of emotion concepts and EE.

4

Previous Research (II): Approaching English and German Emotion Concepts

Contents

In this chapter, previous findings on EE (cf. Chapter 2.1.2) are reviewed, departing from contrastive studies explicitly involving English and/ or German emotion concepts. As such studies are quite sparse in number, the chapter is extended and complemented by reviewing studies involving also emotion concepts in other languages (than English and German), but which relate to the present investigation in so far as they consider contextual configurations of emotion lexemes relevant to this investigation and the data at hand (cf. Chapters 1, 2) such as epistemic modal marking[47] or intensification (cf. Chapters 3, 1.2). Moreover, research on clustering emotion concepts is reviewed (cf. Chapter 2.1.2). Some suggestions for the present and future investigations are made. The chapter closes with summarizing the research gaps identified from viewing previous research (cf. Chapters 3 and 4), and the hypotheses for the present investigation are formulated.

4.1 Findings from (English – German) Contrastive Studies

4.1.1 Emotion Events

EE (cf. Chapter 2.1.2) have been studied only by few researchers; some recent approaches are corpus-based and prefer investigating contextualized over decontextualized meaning or combine both approaches (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013a). Moreover, "the immediate contextual use" of emotion lexemes (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 322) has only been made relevant from and for a cognitive semantics perspective, i.e. single emotion concepts such as SURPRISE (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010) or HAPPINESS (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013b) have been viewed in order to gain insights into their cognitive semantics. Although this is, of course, highly relevant research, the present investigation focuses on a usage perspective, i.e. on how emotion lexemes are used in context (cf. Chapters 1, 2, 5.4.3), involving contextual configurations comprising evaluative cues, further emotion lexemes and modifiers of epistemic un-/certainty and intensification and their respective functions in discourse (cf. Introducing the Data, Chapter 1). The results obtained in the cognitive-semantic-oriented studies, however, are regarded to be vantage points for the present investigation, i.e. the analysis of EE in an extended framework (cf. Chapters 7 and 8). The contrastive literature and results available on (English – German) EE are summarized in the following.

[47] The role of epistemic modal marking in Emotion Events has not been explored before, but is, however, listed here, since it plays a decisive role in the Extended Emotion Event Model, cf. Chapters 7 and 8.

In Dem'jankov et al. (2004), a contrastive-semantic analysis of "Joy, Astonishment and Fear in English, German and Russian", EE and emotion scenarios are investigated, drawing on a a corpus of 19th/ 20th century English, German and Russian "classical fictional literature" (Dem'jankov et al. 2004). The authors claim that basing their study on this corpus enables them to "document non-professional psychological usage of the concepts in question" and they claim further that their data basis "may demonstrate to what extent the terms in question are essential to everyday language" (Dem'jankov et al. 2004: 163). Although a corpus-based approach might have advantages over studies that merely rely on evidence gathered from dictionaries (such as in Weigand 2004), the results of this study have to be critically viewed and should not be overestimated. On the one hand, the databasis consists only of fictional texts by three authors, namely E.T.A Hoffmann, N. Gogol and C. Dickens. Moreover, the question whether and in how far the results on the use of emotion concepts in fictional texts might be extrapolated to "everyday language" (Dem'jankov et al. 2004: 163), i.e. other genres and modes, is questionable. Furthermore, the precise corpus size is not provided and only raw frequency data is indicated with respect to emotion concept clusters and emotion scenario types. Therefore, no statements with respect to statistical significance can be made. However, what can be deduced from the results presented is the general finding that the authors' use of emotion scenarios potentially differs in how far elements of "basic causal chains" (Dem'jankov et al. 2004: 168) are displayed and combined. In the German-Russian comparison, the authors find evidence for different frequencies of the overall four types of "emotional scenarios", i.e. links in causal connections or causal chains such as (1) emotion-causing event, (2) the emotion and (3) result of the emotional reaction. In the German texts by E.T.A. Hoffmann, for example, the scenario emotion – reaction was encountered more frequently than in the Russian counterpart's writings (N. Gogol). The English and Russian texts are, unfortunately, not directly juxtaposed with respect to emotion scenarios and the differing types (in the German/ Russian comparison) are not analyzed from a functional perspective.

In Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. (2013a), the emotion concept FEAR and its Polish equivalent STRACH are investigated employing the questionnaire-based GRID-approach[48] (Fontaine et al. 2013) as well as a cognitive corpus linguistic methodology[49], including emotion event scenarios. Event scenarios of *fright* and *fight* are viewed and related to low-power features, such as *felt weak*, and high-power features, such as *felt dominant*, rated in the GRID[50]. The corpus findings suggest that fright scenarios

[48] The participants were British and Polish native speakers.

[49] Samples were taken from the BNC (the British National Corpus), NKJP (National Corpus of Polish) and PELCRA (Polish reference corpus).

[50] I will only report here on the corpus findings and not the GRID results due to spatial issues. The results emerging from the GRID investigation and the corpus findings are considered to be

are more frequent and conceptually salient in Polish than fight scenarios, which is not true for English (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013a). Moreover, a prototypical reaction to a threat stimulus in Polish is a fright response in Polish (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013a). Fight scenarios, however, are found to be significantly more frequent in the English data than in the Polish data (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013a). Furthermore, the authors report on language-differential uses of collocational patterns, clusters[51] and metaphors (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013a). All in all, they conclude and hypothesize that FEAR is a weaker emotion than STRACH (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013a).

In another EE-study, which combines as well the GRID-approach with a cognitive corpus linguistic methodology, SURPRISE and its Polish equivalents are investigated (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). The corpus findings[52] show that *surprise* is the most frequent emotion noun and together with *astonishment* and *amazement* more frequent than the corresponding Polish SURPRISE cluster (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). The Polish *surprise* terms are overall less frequent than SURPRISE, but more frequent than the emotion concepts ASTONISHMENT and AMAZEMENT (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). Overall SURPRISE is more complex in English, polysemous, and has a number of equivalents in Polish (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). Viewing clusters, canonical surprise events, event elaborations, modifiers, phrasal verbs and metaphors, the authors find[53], among other results, of course, such as a differential semantic prosody[54] for AMAZEMENT and ASTONISHMENT[55], that surprise is "a matter of degree" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 335) and that the concept has fuzzy boundaries such as in *slight surprise*. Intensification is also regarded to be an important sub-unit parameter of AMAZEMENT (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010).[56]

Two other studies that can be related to sub-unit emotion parameters in EE, more precisely intensification, are Weigand (1998) and Taboada et al. (2014); the latter, only implicitly relating to EE and the sub-unit emotion parameter of intensification and taking a systemic-functional perspective, has been discussed already in a previous

complementary by the authors.

[51] Most interestingly, a higher incidence of positive emotions co-occurs with STRACH.

[52] Again, I only report the corpus findings and not the GRID findings due to spatial constraints.

[53] I only report here the results on English SURPRISE relevant to my work.

[54] Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1996), for instance, employs the term semantic prosody or semantic harmony for positive or negative evaluative items co-occurring with emotion lexemes which spread their "aura of meaning" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996: 153) over the senses of their neighbors. She bases her terminology on Sinclair (1992).

[55] For ASTONISHMENT a negative semantic prosody is characteristic, for AMAZEMENT a more positive one in spite of its dual character.

[56] Intensification is regarded here to be realized by modifiers, i.e. externally, or to be inherent in lexemes, i.e. AMAZEMENT is more intense than SURPRISE.

section (cf. Chapter 3.2.3) and will therefore not be further mentioned here. Weigand (1998) looks at emotion vocabulary, more precisely at the predicative field of ANGER in English, German and Italian, against the background of her contrastive pragmatic model of lexical semantics. Assuming a universal structure of emotions, she further categorizes lexis into subtypes according to different criteria that she claims to be constant across languages, among them "[intensification]" and "[minimization]"(Weigand 1998: 50). That means that, from a lexical semantic perspective, there might be stronger versions of ANGER such as *fury*, *rage* or *Wut* ('*rage*'), *Zorn* ('*fury*') to name but two cross-linguistic examples, and versions of mild ANGER such as *annoyance*, *frustration* or *Verärgerung* ('*annoyance*') and *Frustration* ('*frustration*') to name some possible counterparts. Weigand (1998: 50) further claims that the "ways of use" of these terms should play a major role and lists, based, however, only on lexicographic research or native speaker competence, ANGER expressions ordered according to subtypes and the basic universal structure she claims for emotions. Unfortunately, she leaves the "verification and completion" (Weigand 1998: 54) through corpora to future research. The universal structure of emotions, Weigand states, consists of the components EMOTION + BE (e.g., *to be annoyed*)/ BECOME (e.g., *to get annoyed*), LOSE (e.g., *anger passes*)/ CAUSE (e.g., *to annoy*), EMOTION AS MOTIVATING CONCEPT (e.g., *to my annoyance*) and GRADING EMOTIONS (e.g., *to get extremely annoyed*, Weigand 1998: 52). So, implicitly, while, of course, adopting a different approach, Weigand (1998) addresses the sub-unit emotion parameter of intensification in terms of lexically inherent intensification (which corresponds to "[intensification]", one of her ANGER subtype categories) and grammatical intensification e.g., by adverbs of degree (which corresponds to GRADING EMOTIONS, one of her universal emotion components).

All in all, several vantage points for the investigation of emotion lexemes and their contextual configurations emerge out of the contrastive, mostly lexical and cognitive semantic studies discussed above. Overall frequencies of emotion concepts that are part of the same emotion concept cluster across English and German could be viewed (cf. 'Contrastive Analysis', Chapters 1, 2.5). Moreover, the study of emotion scenarios in form of event chains and their frequencies across English and German could be informative for the present investigation. Apart from emotion scenarios, (positive or negative) evaluative items or emotion concepts clustering with emotion concepts across English and German, i.e. contextual construal, could be investigated, alongside the use of modifiers of epistemic un/-certainty (cf. Chapter 8) and intensification in EE, hereby adopting a usage perspective (cf. Chapters 1, 2, 5.4.3). Lastly, the study of English and German emotion concept clusters and emotion metaphors might be a fruitful vantage point.

In the empirical chapters (cf. Chapters 6, 7 and 8) these vantage points that might

provide insights into British English and German EE, i.e. language preferences with respect to the use of emotion lexemes and their contextual configurations, will be explored[57]. More precisely, the following hypotheses on potential language preferences with respect to the display of Emotion Events in British English and German that emerge from the studies cited will be tested: 1) There are language preferences in the display of emotion concepts (type and token frequencies) across English and German (cf., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010), and, 2) these language preferences depend on the type of the emotion concept, positive/ negative and specific, i.e. ANGER vs. SURPRISE for instance (cf., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013b). It can be further hypothesized that 3) there are language preferences in the minimal emotion scenarios involving cause, emotion and experiencer across British English and German (cf., Dem'jankov et al. 2004). Finally, 4) language preferences with respect to positive or negative construal of emotion concepts, i.e. differential displays of co-occurring positive or negative evaluative items, are expected to occur, which is closely related to H2 (cf., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013b). The next section focuses on previous research on the contextual configuration of co-occurring emotion lexemes, i.e. emotion concept clusters.

4.1.2 Emotion Concept Clusters: Equivalents, Ambivalents and Blends

Emotion concepts come often in clusters (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010)[58]. Such emotion concept clusters can consist of either two conjoined emotion concepts that are equivalent[59], i.e. being either positive or negative, ambivalent[60], i.e. of conflicting valence or might results in a blended emotion concept, i.e. a new, emergent emotion concept different from the "input" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010: 346) emotion concepts. These emotion clusters, no matter whether equivalent, ambivalent or of a blended nature, might differ across languages (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013a; Dem'jankov et al. 2004). Moreover, the clustering might have important functions in discourse that go beyond the ones reported so far (cf. this section below) and which cannot be captured by referring to emotion talk or emotional talk (cf. Figure 1).

[57] This study does not focus on emotion metaphors, since they have been and are extensively investigated (e.g., Kövecses 2000; Kövecses 2008), also with respect to English and German (e.g., Oster 2014).

[58] One assumption made by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. (2013a: 432) is that this is the case because "meanings of emotion words are very difficult, if not impossible, to discretely dissect into crisp notions. Instead [...] such meanings overlap in some of their aspects and dimensions. Therefore, when people use language, they will have a tendency to mention a number of emotions in a row to convey a richer and fuller description of the feelings to the interlocutor. Alternatively, some emotions appear as [...] blended concept [...].

[59] "Equivalent" is used here in the sense of "having the same valence".

[60] In the literature, we also often find the terms "dual" or "mixed" emotions (Bamberg 1997: 319), or "conflicting" emotions (Stamenov 2004).

In Dem'jankov et al. (2004), that has been referred to in the previous section (cf. Chapter 4.1.1) with respect to emotion scenarios, investigates also coordinated emotion concepts. Although English and German are again not directly juxtaposed, one could suggest from the results presented that emotion clusters might differ also across these languages. In the German-Russian comparison, the authors find evidence for different types of clustering. While *astonishment* and *fear* as well as *astonishment* and *joy* seem to frequently co-occur in both E.T.A. Hoffmann's texts and N. Gogol's texts which are under investigation, the German writer uses *astonishment* very often in "paradoxical combinations" such as in *freudiger Schreck* (Dem'jankov et al. 2004: 167). In the Russian-English comparison, i.e. comparison of C. Dickens and F. Dostojevsky's texts, English *joy* is combined with various emotion concepts such as *gratitude, ecstasy, pride, love, sorrow, hope and disappointment*, whereas the Russian counterpart's clustering is characterized as being "rather unusual" (Dem'jankov et al. 2004: 174).
From a (systemic-)functional point of view, clustering emotion concepts, doublets or triplets, especially equivalent ones, have been found to serve the rhetoric function of "reinforc[ing] themselves" (Teubert 2004b: 124), i.e. pragmatic intensification (Bednarek 2008a; Martin 2004)[61]. Moreover, Bednarek (2008a) reports for British English a tendency of positive emotion terms to co-occur with positive ones and negative emotion terms with negative ones. However, she mentions that this might not always be the case and gives *surprise* as an example (Bednarek 2008a). Bednarek (2008a) argues, in line with Bamberg's argumentation (Bamberg 1997: 318) that conjoined emotions "allow [...] to construe events from different emotional perspectives" (and hereby parallely index stance), that *surprise* can be either positively or negatively construed, e.g., as in *a lovely surprise* or *surprise attack* (Bednarek 2008a: 164). Hereby, context plays a decisive role in so far as it helps to disambiguate, i.e. to construe this emotion positively or negatively[62], by providing further positive or negative evaluations (Bednarek 2008a). In her study on emotion terms, Bednarek (2008a) focuses on emotion terms conjoined with "and".
In a developmental study on the discursive construction of "double emotions", Bamberg et al. (1995) investigates ambivalent emotions, often also linguistically indexed by "but" (Bamberg et al. 1995: 13) and focuses on developmental effects, i.e. age effects[63]. Furthermore, Bamberg (1997) mentions that English does not have a class of lexical items

[61] Cf. as well Prior (2016: 209) who views, from an interactional sociolinguistics' perspective, "emotional clustering", which is located high on an intensity scale.
[62] Martin & White (2005: 61) suggest that negative surprise might be construed by the use of *shock*, a rather negative emotion term.
[63] Older children and adults do not have problems in discursively constructing the same event from different perspectives, but younger children do. Moreover, interestingly, older children and adults have difficulties in coordinating anger and fear (Bamberg et al. 1995).

that capture mixed emotions and points hereby at potential cross-linguistic differences (cf. Chapter 2.5). Stamenov (2004: 184) summarizes in his article on ambivalence[64] as linguistic and psychological concept the matter in the following way:

> In studying different European languages it may turn out that some of them are more flexible and permissive in mixing and reversing the relationships between antonymous emotions compared to English. And that may matter for the way one experiences and conceptualies emotions in different cultures.

Stamenov (2004) also mentions German *Hassliebe* or *Schadenfreude* as examples of ambivalent emotions[65]. Apart from being ambivalent, the latter can be considered to be blends.

With respect to emotion concepts, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. (2013b), basing their work on (Langacker 1987 [1991]; Lakoff 1987), i.e. the assumption that linguistic meaning is conceptualization, investigates also chains of senses and conceptual cluster indicating "one complex feeling or a blend of individual concepts" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013b: 10)[66]. Blending is conceptualized in her work in Fauconnier's and Turner's sense, i.e. conceptual integration (Fauconnier & Turner 1998: 133):

> [...] structure from input mental spaces is projected to a separate, "blended" mental space. The projection is selective. Through completion and elaboration, the blend develops structure not provided by the inputs. Inferences, arguments, and ideas developed in the blend can have effect in cognition, leading us to modify the initial inputs and to change our view of the corresponding situations."

Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. (2013b: 10)[67] relate the process of conceptual integration to emotion concepts and concludes that

> [w]hen two or more emotions are blended to describe an emotional experience (e.g., *[...] I am in a great state of excitement, happiness, indecision, worry and despair [...]*) or when an emotion term is accompanied by a modifier (*easy contentment*), the complex phrase evokes a new conceptual

[64] Stamenov (2004) investigates the psychological concept of ambivalence and the linguistic one of antonymy in Turkish loan words in Bulgarian.

[65] *Hassliebe* is indeed a blend of the conflicting concepts HATE and LOVE, but I am not convinced that *Schadenfreude* is an ambivalent concept. It can be defined as "pleasure at the misfortunes of other people" (van Dijk & Ouwerkerk 2014: 1) and can hence be regarded to be a specific type of JOY. The cause for such kind of JOY is, of course, an event that is negative for somebody else.

[66] This passage has been taken from an earlier unpublished manuscript version, now published as Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. (2013b).

[67] This passage has been taken from an earlier unpublished manuscript version, now published as Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. (2013b).

> space that is a combination of the input emotions, together with an emergent conceptual structure of new value that does not seem as a whole to belong to any of the independent input domains.

The authors further point at possible cross-linguistic differences consisting of languages providing labels for such blends versus languages that do not[68] (cf. Chapter 2.5).
Based on the studies cited on Emotion Concept Clusters one can overall hypothesize that 1) in German, the co-occurrences of emotion concepts are expected to be of a more creative type than in British English (cf. Dem'jankov et al. 2004), which is related to the dimension of communicative contrasts that states German discourse to be more creative (House e.g., 2006a; cf. Chapter 3). Moreover, one can hypothesize that 2) the frequencies of the discourse functions of equivalent, ambivalent and blended emotion concepts differ across British English and German datasets, and involve further functions than only reinforcing/ intensification (cf. Bamberg et al. 1995; Teubert 2004b; Martin 2004; Stamenov 2004). Finally, the research cited leads to hypothesize that 3) the study of emotion concept clusters, will shed light on how emotion concepts are positively or negatively construed (cf., Bednarek 2008a), i.e. via co-occurrences of further emotion lexemes, across English and German (cf. as well, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013b).

4.2 Summary and Conclusions

Goals for the Present Study and Suggestions for Future Investigations

Having reviewed the literature focusing on English and German EE (cf. Chapter 4.1.1), and having summarized the findings on emotion concept clusters in more detail (cf. Chapter 4.1.2), the attention will be drawn to some largely underinvestigated areas of research.
An investigation on English and German EE should encompass the qualitative and quantitative analysis of emotion lexemes, i.e. their forms and functions as well as their contextual configurations (co-occurring emotion lexemes, evaluative items and modifiers of un-/certainty[69] and intensification; cf. as well Chapter 3). Moreover, one focus should lie on the qualitative and quantitative cross-linguistic differences with respect to the forms and functions of emotion concept clusters, including not only equivalent,

[68] Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. (2013b: 11) provide, in the unpublished earlier version of the manuscript, the example of English and Polish *anger/ gniew*, i.e. anger typically directed at people and juxtaposes Polish *zlosc*, i.e. *anger* about something and which is more externalized, blended with *wrath* and less socially accepted. In Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. (2013a: 430) mention *fear and repulsion* resulting in a complex emotion but lacking a lexical label both in Polish and English.

[69] The role of epistemic modal marking in EE has not been explored before, but is, however, listed here, since it plays a decisive role in the extended model on EE, cf. Chapters 7 and 8.

but also ambivalent and blended emotion concepts. With respect to the Appraisal System some of such complexities of emotion discourse involving equivalent emotion concept clusters have been viewed before (Bednarek 2008a; Martin 2004) and the discourse function of intensification has been assigned (cf. Chapters 1.2, 4.1.2). However, the question arises which functional contribution ambivalent emotion concept clusters provide (cf. Chapter 1, Example 1 a., *[...] I still feel **proud** of myself and **pleased** that I am capable of getting high grades, although a little **guilty** that my **joy** was **disappointment** and **sadness** for my friends on the same course, who didn't do as well.*). The same question arises with respect to evaluative cues in co-occurrence with emotion concepts of opposing valence (*who didn't do as well* in the same Chapter 1, Example 1 a.). It can be hypothesized that the functional contribution of such contextual configurations is not the one of intensification.

Filling Research Gaps

Although English and German discourse has been the focus of some investigations (cf. Chapter 3), there are no studies explicitly relating the cross-linguistic results identified to emotion in language or emotion concepts (cf. Chapter 4). Moreover, the few cross-linguistic studies on English and German emotion (concepts) that exist take either a lexical semantics perspective (e.g., Weigand 1998), i.e. study de-contextualized meaning, or a cognitive-semantic perspective (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013a) and take context in some ways into account, but in order to inform a cognitive semantics perspective (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). Other approaches use a completely different theoretical framework (cf. Chapter 1 for the differentiation between a 'cognitive' and 'systemic-functional' perspective), e.g., the appraisal system, which is rooted in systemic-functional linguistics, in which emotion, in appraisal terminology, "affect", is part of "attitude" and in even broader terms of "appraisal" (e.g., Taboada et al. 2014)[70]. Moreover, most of the existing studies involving emotion concepts focus on single, often only noun concepts or clusters of related concepts (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013b) instead of investigating a wider emotional spectrum. Up to this point, no English-German contrastive studies exist that are both corpus-based, allowing for quantification, and take linguistic and cognitive context into account in order to enrich a usage perspective (cf. Chapter 2). Weigand (1998: 54), for instance, leaves the "verification and completion" through corpora to future research (cf. Chapter 4.1.1). Finally, the genre of English and German narratives (cf. Chapter

[70] Up to date, it is not yet clear whether emotion or evaluation has to be conceptualized as superordinate concept (Alba-Juez 2018) or if "affect" is always implicitly coded in "judgment" (e.g., Bednarek 2009; Benítez-Castro & Hidalgo-Tenorio 2019).

5.2) has not yet been investigated with respect to emotion concepts.
Exploring the research areas highlighted above and filling some of the gaps identified will shed light on the use of emotion lexemes in context, i.e. in EE, involving further emotion lexemes, evaluative cues and modifiers of un-/certainty and intensification in an extended model of EE (cf. Chapters 1, 2, 6, 7 8). The cognitive-semantic and lexical semantic perspectives of previous studies will be complemented and enriched by such a usage perspective. In the next section, the general hypotheses that can be deduced from previous studies and that underlie the overall investigation will be presented.

Hypotheses of the Present Investigation

In the following, the hypotheses underlying this investigation are summarized and listed starting with hypotheses that relate to EE (**H1**), emotion concept clusters (**H2**) followed by hypotheses on modifiers of epistemic modality (**H3**) and intensification (**H4**) in EE.

Emotion Events

H1 The display of British English and German Emotion Events differs.

a) There are language preferences in the display of emotion concepts (type and token frequencies) across English and German (cf., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010; House 2006a; Kranich 2016; Taboada et al. 2014). In English, for example, more positive emotion concepts are expected to occur (cf., Kranich 2016: 70, on evaluation!); overall, fewer emotion concepts should occur in German, but not in negative narratives (cf., Taboada et al. 2014).

b) These language preferences depend on the type of the emotion concept, positive/ negative and specific, i.e. ANGER vs. SURPRISE for instance (cf., Taboada et al. 2014; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013b).

c) There are language preferences in the minimal emotion scenarios involving cause, emotion and experiencer across British English and German (cf., Dem'jankov et al. 2004).

d) There are language preferences with respect to positive or negative construal of emotion concepts, i.e. differential displays of co-occurring positive or negative evaluative items, which is closely related to H2 (cf., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013b).

H2 British English and German Emotion Concept Clusters differ in type and token frequency, including a complete lack of certain types.

a) In German, the co-occurrences are expected to be of a more creative type than in British English (cf., House 2006a; Dem'jankov et al. 2004).

b) The frequencies of the discourse functions of equivalent, ambivalent and blended emotion concepts differ across British English and German, involving further functions than only reinforcing/ intensification (Bamberg et al. 1995; Teubert 2004b; Martin 2004; Stamenov 2004).

c) The study of emotion concept clusters, will shed light on how emotion concepts are positively or negatively construed, i.e. via co-occurrences of further emotion lexemes, across English and German (Bednarek 2008a).

Epistemic Modality

H3 Language-preferential displays can be found in British English and German EE, more specifically in the EE modifiers of epistemic modality.

a) More epistemic modal markers co-occur with British English emotion concepts than with German emotion concepts (cf., Kranich 2016; Fetzer 2009; Becker 2009; Taboada et al. 2014).

b) More high probability markers co-occur with German emotion concepts, more low probability markers with British English emotion concepts (cf., Kranich 2016).

c) Epistemic modal markers in English and German EE play an important role in (inter-)subjective positioning, namely in form of dialogic contraction or expansion (cf., Kranich 2016; White 2003).

Intensification

H4 Language-preferential displays can be found in English and German EE, more specifically in the EE modifiers of intensification.

a) The type and token frequency of (grammatical) intensifiers in EE differs across the corpus data (House & Kasper 1981; Taboada et al. 2014).

b) The frequency of intensifiers in EE with respect to their function (upgraders/ downgraders) differs across the corpus data. In the German EE, more upgraders (Taboada et al. 2014) but also more downgraders might be used (Grieve 2010).

c) Intensifiers in English and German EE play an important role in an (inter-)-subjective positioning, namely in form of dialogic contraction or expansion (cf., White 2003).

Part III. Analysis

5

Data and Methodology[71]

Contents

[71] Parts of this chapter have been recently published or accepted for publication, cf. Fronhofer (2015, 2019, accepted).

This chapter provides an overview over the corpus design and compilation of the Augsburg Corpus of Written Emotion Narratives (AWE), on which the present investigation is based (cf. Chapter 5.1). The rationale for the choice of eliciting narratives is provided (cf. Chapter 5.2). After presenting the corpus statistics and briefly discussing relevant socio-cultural variables (cf. Chapter 5.3), the statistical analysis is presented in Chapter 5.4.5, and the overall methodology is outlined (cf. Chapter 5.4). The present investigation is regarded as unifying characteristics of corpus-based and corpus-driven approaches (cf. Chapter 5.4.1). Corpus tools and annotation schemes used in the present investigation are provided and discussed (Chapters 5.4.2 and 5.4.4). The corpus design and methodology, including context-sensitive annotation procedures, are motivated by the conceptualization of 'emotion', 'context' and 'contrastive analysis' (cf. Chapter 1), and the integrated approach of this investigation (cf. Chapter 2). The foci of the annotation arise from previous research results (cf. Chapters 3, 4).

5.1 The AWE-Corpus: Compilation and Experimental Design

The Augsburg Corpus of Written Emotion Narratives (henceforth AWE), a synchronous near-to-real-time corpus, was specifically compiled (2012–2013) to serve the research purpose of investigating emotion concepts in their linguistic context across British English and German discourse. In an experiment, British and German university students were asked to write two personal narratives of about 500 words each in length in their native language in response to two possible, close to daily life scenarios: 1) You have just received an unfair mark and 2) Imagine you receive the results of a very difficult exam which a lot of students normally don't pass and you got the highest mark possible[72]. As the same sampling frames have been set for the British and German data, the corpus can be considered to be both **contrastive** and **comparable** (Tognini-Bonelli 2001). Moreover, AWE is balanced with respect to languages, gender, positive and negative topics. The latter were elicited in a **counterbalanced** design (Levshina 2015) to exclude the possibility of the order of the elicitations influencing the writings, for example, in length. The experimental settings were group assignments or individual assignments.

Most of the students participated on a voluntary basis, some few received course credit or payment for their participation depending on the conventions of their home univer-

[72] This second elicitation prompt is more complex than the first one, and therefore, might have biased the results towards more complex emotion displays in these narratives (cf. the relatively high number of SADNESS/ TRAUER events in positive narratives, Chapter 7.3.1, Table 26). However, as a preceeding piloting study showed, this kind of prompting was necessary in order to trigger positive emotions at all.

sities and departments. Participants' privacy was respected by anonymizing the narratives and keeping the names separately from the linguistic and questionnaire data. The participants signed consent forms agreeing to the scientific use, the linguistic analysis and subsequent publishing of their writings by the researcher. In this respect, this study follows the guidelines provided by the DFG (2019, 2012) on the compilation, digital archiving and use of corpus data.

Although this study is still a small-scale corpus study (Bednarek 2008a), which allows to perform qualitative analyses and follows Hunston (2007b) and her premise "quantitative does not mean huge" (Hunston 2007b: 28), in the sense that quantification enables to include " '[...] demonstrably typical occurrence[s]' " (Hunston 2007b: 28), it is at the same time reasonably large enough to quantify the results, i.e. to provide, in Sinclair's words "hard, measurable evidence" (Sinclair 1987: XV–XXI) for conventional uses (cf. Chapter 1.4). In this, the present investigation subscribes to the "quantitative turn" as described by Levshina (2015: 2) and is in line with a usage-based perspective on language (Langacker 1987 [1991]), i.e. the idea that "linguistic knowledge is shaped by language usage" (Levshina 2015: 2; cf. Chapter 1.4). Speakers are understood to act as 'intuitive statisticians', a term used by Ellis (2006: 1), who "subconsciously analyse and store a vast amount of information about co-occurrence frequencies of words and constructions" (Levshina 2015: 3). As a consequence, a usage-based perspective ascribes much importance to frequency effects (cf. Chapter 1.4) that

> play a crucial role in language use, acquisition and change. They are rooted in fundamental cognitive and social mechanisms. On the cognitive side, there is massive evidence that human categories have probabilistic structure and fuzzy boundaries, as shown by postclassical theories of categorization, such as Prototype and Exemplar Theories [...]. From the social perspective, common linguistic categories (as well as shared conceptual structures) emerge as a result of linguistic alignment of speakers and hearers, which results in incremental strengthening of some representations and weakening of others over time. This process is the driving force of language evolution (Steels 2012). Obviously, the resulting inter– and intraspeaker variation can only be modelled statistically. (Levshina 2015: 3)

Frequency therefore plays a crucial role and leads to conventionalization (Bybee 2008: 218). One has to note, however, that, although high token frequency is often associated with a high degree of conventionalization, that there are still some conventionalized expressions that do not have a high token frequency such as pure idioms (e.g., *kick the bucket*, Gustafsson et al. 2012) or even two word collocations such as *experience delays* (Bybee 2008: 231). This might be explained by the token frequency of an expression being related to the frequency of the notion in question (Gustafsson et al. 2012), the

less frequent the notion is, the less frequent will be its conventionalized expression. All in all, token frequency can nevertheless be assumed to be a strong indicator for identifying conventionalized expressions out of a set of possible ones, because it will likely be the most frequent one (Gustafsson et al. 2012).
In this investigation, frequency information that has been derived from the corpus is therefore regarded as a reflection of how linguistic forms are being used by language users (i.e. the participants); conventionalized expressions are regarded as shared in a speech community (i.e. British English and German) and the creators of conventionalization are the participants themselves (cf. Chapters 1.4, 2.5).
The statistical modeling of the corpus data (cf. Chapter 5.4.5) was enabled by the overall experimental design that allows for both descriptive and inferential techniques (Levshina 2015). In the following section, the rationale of choosing 'narrative' as text type for AWE is provided before turning to the corpus statistics and sociocultural variables that have been taken into account.

5.2 Analyzing Narrative(s)

The decision to elicit written narratives in order to build the AWE-corpus was taken deliberately in this investigation. This text type is particularly suitable for the (contrastive) discourse[73] analysis of emotion concepts, since (written) narratives, are necessarily linked to the private sphere (e.g., Fetzer 2010b), where the display of emotion concepts plays a major role. Moreover, stories are reported to have an affective impact in common (Tan 1994).
Importantly, by investigating narratives, one goes beyond the lexical level of analysis and one can accommodate context (cf. the present approach to context, Chapters 1.3, 2.2.3, 2.3.3, 2.4.3, and its operationalization, Chapter 5.4.3). Analyzing discourse is necessary, since according to Majid (2012: 439), commenting on sound symbolism, "[...]it is not a single sound that gives rise to an emotional effect, but rather a sound in the context of a stretch of discourse" (cf. as well Chapter 5.4.3 on linguistic context and the parts-whole perspective). Apart from this, studies have demonstrated that emotion events in narratives play an important role "for understanding characters and motivations, and can help explain key plot moments" (Oatley 1992). Moreover, as Majid (2012) reports "in written texts we can get into the minds of characters, allow-

[73] In this investigation 'narrative' is conceptualized as subcategory of 'discourse' (e.g., Fetzer 2010b), 'discourse' is conceived of as composed by 'text' and embedded in socio-cultural and socio-historic context entailing intertextual references (e.g., Fetzer 2010b). 'Discourse' might be categorized into institutional and non-institutional, spoken and written types. 'Text' is understood in the present investigation as being "a bounded linguistic or other semiotics-based surface" (Fetzer 2010b: 164), which can be easily delimited.

ing us to overhear thought processes, which may align readers with protagonists and evoke empathy" (cf., Burke 2010). This necessitates that emotions can be inferred from discourse, and emotion displays in discourse have also been shown to impact language processing (Sanford & Emmott 2012; Gernsbacher et al. 1992).
Another reason why narratives are most suitable for the investigation of Emotion Events lies in their sequential organization (Labov 1972). Narratives contain, among other components such as an orientation or the story itself, an evaluation of the narrated events (Labov 1972). This necessarily includes local and more global (cf. the speech activity of Emotion Events, Chapters 2.4.2 and 2.4.3) linguistic devices realizing evaluations, including emotion concepts[74].
Finally, narratives can be categorized, along quantitative lines, into longer narratives and small stories (Fetzer 2010b). Necessary components of stretches of discourse that make them count as (small) narrative comprise, following Labov's original definition (Labov 1972), (1) a reference to a single past event, which is introduced by a verbal phrase (realized in past tense), (2) a *raison d'être*, (3) the recount of a personal experience, which is reportable and tellable, and lastly, (4) at least two narrative clauses which establish the temporal sequence of events (Labov 1972; Fetzer 2010b). These necessary components of (small) narratives, elicited by the prompts (cf. Chapter 5.1) can be said to be present in the AWE corpus and are regarded to unify the data in this respect. In the next section, the corpus statistics and relevant socio-cultural variables are presented before laying out overall principles, tools, annotation schemes (cf. Chapter 5.4.1) and the statistical modeling (cf. Chapter 5.4.5) of the corpus data.

5.3 Corpus Statistics and Sociocultural Variables

In this section, the corpus statistics of AWE are summarized (cf. Table 2). On av-

Table 2: Overview of the AWE datasets. P stands for 'Participants', N for 'Narratives', f for 'female', m for 'male'.

AWE	No./P (f)	No./P (m)	No./N	No./Words
BrE	34	28	124	53,130
Ger	34	34	136	60,894

erage, the British participants were 20 years old (mean=20.1), the Germans 22 years (mean=21.8), i.e. the Germans were slightly older than the British. This is due to the fact that German students start their university studies later, since they pass their

[74] The complex relationship of evaluation in appraisal-theoretical terms (Martin & White 2005) and emotion/-al talk (Bednarek 2008a) is discussed in Chapter 1.2.

A-levels later. However, it can be said that the students were approximately at the same stages of their university careers, i.e. mostly beginners.
The British data has been collected at 12 universities including the Universities of Exeter, Dundee, Lancaster, Bristol, York, London Middlesex, London, Plymouth, St. Andrews (Scotland), Swansea, Portsmouth and at the London SAE-Institute. The German students were from 3 universities, the Universities of Augsburg, Würzburg and Erlangen. In order to take inter-individual variation into account, especially since each participant wrote overall two texts, one positive and one negative, the participant has been included as random effect in the statistical analysis (cf. Chapter 5.4.5).
In the next section, the principles (cf. Chapter 5.4.1), tools (cf. Chapter 5.4.2) and annotation schemes (cf. Chapter 5.4.4) underlying this investigation are summarized. The annotation schemes focus on, relying on the data at hand (cf. 'Introducing the Data', Chapter 1), and the results of previous research (cf. Chapters 3, 4), emotion lexemes, emotion event scenarios, emotion concept clusters, the construal of emotion concepts by co-occurring evaluative cues, experiencers of EE, markers of epistemic un-/certainty and intensifiers in EE. The statistical model that has been applied is explained in the following subsection (cf. Chapter 5.4.5).

5.4 Methodology

5.4.1 Corpus-based or Corpus-driven?

Before turning to a detailed description of the data exploration and the statistical analyses of the corpus data, the present investigation will be situated with respect to the question whether it is rather a corpus-based or corpus-driven investigation. Moreover, the representativeness of the corpus data will be briefly discussed.
Departing from the definition of corpus-based vs. corpus-driven investigations provided by Tognini-Bonelli (2001), the present study can be said to be both, as will be laid out in the following paragraphs. As Tognini-Bonelli (2001) defines, corpus-based linguists

> bring with them models of language and descriptions which they believe to be fundamentally adequate, they perceive and analyse the corpus through these categories and sieve the data accordingly. The corpus is considered to be useful because, on occasions, it indicates where minor corrections and adjustments can be made to the model adopted and, of course, it can also be valuable as a source of quantitative evidence. In this case, however, corpus evidence is brought in as an extra bonus rather than as determining factor with respect to the analysis which is still carried out according to pre–existing categories; although it is used to refine such categories, it is

> never in a position to challenge them as there is no claim made that they arise directly form the data. (Tognini-Bonelli 2001: 66)

In this, the investigation, the Emotion Event Model has been adopted as working model and is refined and compared to other existing models and theories of emotion in language (cf. Chapter 1), such as the classical distinction between emotion language and emotional language (Bednarek 2008a) or the Appraisal Framework[75] (Martin & White 2005; cf. Chapters 2, 6, 7, 8). The corpus has, as well, been used to identify where "minor corrections" or "adjustments" have to be made in the previous models on emotion discourse. Moreover, quantification, as discussed above, is possible because of the corpus size on the one hand, and, the experimental design of the study, on the other. However, corpus evidence is by no means understood to be an "extra bonus" but has been used to refine and reconsider, even "challenge" "pre–existing categories" (e.g., overlays of the affect system with graduation and/or engagement resources have been mentioned, cf. Chapter 1.2) and new categories that have not been taken into account so far have been established (e.g., the role of modifiers in Emotion Events, cf. Chapters 7 and 8). The corpus data have been sieved several times after multiple adjustments with respect to categories have been made. Taking all this into consideration, the investigation is rather in line with a moderate corpus-driven approach, in which

> the commitment of the linguist is to the integrity of the data as a whole, and descriptions aim to be comprehensive with respect to corpus evidence. The corpus, therefore, is seen as more than a repository of examples to back pre-existing theories or a probabilistic extension to an already well-defined system. The theoretical statements are fully consistent with, and reflect directly, the evidence provided by the corpus. Indeed, many of the statements are of a kind that are not usually accessible by any other means than the inspection of corpus evidence. Examples are normally taken verbatim, in other words, they are not adjusted in any way to fit the predefined categories of the analyst; recurrent patterns and frequency distributions are expected to form the basic evidence for linguistic categories; the absence of a pattern is considered potentially meaningful. (Tognini-Bonelli 2001: 84)

In order to give the evidence provided by the corpus more weight, it should, of course, be as representative as possible. With respect to representativeness, i.e. the question to which extent the corpus "contents can be generalized to a larger hypothetical corpus" (Leech 1991: 27), one can postulate that the corpus represents how British English and German students of a certain age write about positive and negative emotional experiences, and even, considering the statistic modeling of the data, which takes both

[75] The Appraisal Framework is, to be precise a framework on evaluative language, but is, as has been shown above, in many ways related to the investigation of emotion concepts in discourse.

inter-individual as well as inter-group differences into account, more cautiously and tentatively, that this might be an indicator for greater tendencies with respect to the languages British English and German. This, however, would of course have to be corroborated in larger scale studies, taking for example different age groups into account. All in all, the study can be said to unify aspects of corpus-based and corpus-driven investigations, it is representative for the sample described above. In the next section, the tools which have been used to analyze the corpus will be presented followed by a detailed account on the annotation schemes employed in the analyses (cf. Chapter 5.4.4).

5.4.2 Tools

AWE has been analyzed and manually coded with the help of Webanno, a web-based annotation tool provided within the CLARIN-D infrastructure[76] (Yimam et al. 2014; Eckart de Castilho et al. 2016). Manual analyses are often more subjective and more time-consuming than (semi-)automated analyses. However, the latter would not have been suitable for the endeavor of this study, i.e. *Emotion Concepts in **Context** – A Contrastive Analysis of English and German Discourse.* Manual analyses allow e.g., for a lexical-sense-sensitive analysis, i.e. to code, for example, polysemous lexical items only when they occur in their "emotion meaning" (Bednarek 2008a). To cite Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. (2013a: 343), "when it comes to semantic and pragmatic annotations of meanings in use, particularly in large corpora, adequate corpus tools are practically in *statu nascendi*", i.e. for the time being automated analyses that take context, as conceptualized in this study (cf. Chapters 1, 2, 5.4.3), into account are still impossible. Moreover, in the scope of this study, it was not possible to involve further annotators in order to arrive at an inter-rater agreement. However, critical analytical cases have been reviewed and discussed during multiple data sessions with native speaker researchers and with associate researchers. Overall, the analyses rely on grammars and contextual criteria (cf. Chapters 5.4.3, 5.4.4).

The annotation tool Webanno allows to build various custom layers and therefore enables, apart from semantic and syntactic annotations or already built-in layers (e.g., part of speech tagging, POS), a pragmatic annotation tailored to the needs of the present investigation, i.e. a contextual analysis of emotion lexemes as well as co-occurring items. Webanno can potentially be used by multiple users in different roles,

[76] The CLARIN-D infrastructure, the German partner of the Common Language Resources and Technology Infrastructure, provides researchers (Humanities, Cultural and Social Sciences) with resources to access, prepare and analyze data. It is organized in a network of CLARIN-D centres that provide expertise in various disciplines, comprising scientists from different humanities and social sciences, software-engineers and archive managers.

such as annotator, curator or project manager and inter-annotator agreement can constantly be measured (Yimam et al. 2014; Eckart de Castilho et al. 2016). The software tools can be used in an annotation mode as well as an automation mode (Yimam et al. 2014; Eckart de Castilho et al. 2016). Most importantly, however, Webanno allows for an export of annotated data in various formats, such as plain text files, which facilitates subsequent data exploration and statistical analysis, for example with the free software tool R, the R Language and Environment for Statistical Computing (version 3.4.1; R Development Core Team 2017).

The next section summarizes how the data was coded, i.e. provides the annotation schemes employed in the cognitive–pragmatic annotations. It focuses on the coding of EE, i.e. emotion lexemes in their immediate linguistic context (cf. Chapter 2). This includes the coding of emotion concept clusters, positive or negative construal of emotion lexemes by co-occurring evaluative cues as well as emotion scenarios and experiencer types. Markers of epistemic un–/certainty (henceforth EM) and intensifers modifying the emotion lexemes have been taken into account as modifiers of EE (cf. Chapters 6, 7, 8).

5.4.3 Operationalizing 'Context'

Context has been operationalized in this study as participant construct and has motivated the integrated approach to emotion concepts (cf. Chapters 1.3, 2.2.3, 2.3.3, 2.4.3). Context is also understood in terms of an analyst construct in this investigation (Fetzer 2012). This aspect has not been developed so far. The following sections will lay out, what an analyst has to deal with, i.e. "what that thing called 'context' contains" (Fetzer 2012: 115), relying on the conceptualization of context as viewed by Fetzer (e.g., 2012) and Fetzer & Oishi (e.g., 2011). Altogether, the conceptualization of context as participant and analyst construct has motivated the present integrated approach to emotion concepts (cf. Chapter 2), as well as the methodology adopted in this investigation.

Linguistic Context

Simply speaking, linguistic context is the "linguistic material" (Fetzer 2015: 17) that surrounds the linguistic unit under investigation. More precisely, linguistic context is conceived of in this investigation as "the actual language use delimited by a clause, sentence, turn or text" (Fetzer 2012). It is further conceived of as co-text (de Beaugrande & Dressler 1981) and, most importantly as "relational construct composed of local and not so local adjacency relations" (Fetzer 2012: 115). Linguistic context is looked upon in this investigation from a parts-whole perspective, which understands grammatical

constructions, i.e. "parts", to be connected to other grammatical constructions constituting a text, i.e. "the whole" (Fetzer & Oishi 2011). The rule-governed realization of grammatical constructions in context is conceived of as utterance act constrained by the rules of grammar (Fetzer 2012: 115).

A context-anchored parts-whole perspective has been shown to provide exciting results in the domains of syntax, morphology, phonology, semantics and pragmatics (Fetzer 2012: 116-118). It is also expected to provide refined insights into the conceptualization of emotion in the present investigation. Understood against the framework of Emotion Events that has been extended by a pragmatic, systemic-functional, and interactional sociolinguistics perspective (cf. Chapter 2), this entails investigating emotion lexemes in their immediate linguistic context, i.e. from a parts-whole perspective (cf. Chapter 2.1.2). Only by looking at context-dependent meanings, we can expect refined results with respect to the question of how emotion is conceptualized in discourse (cf. Examples 1), which goes well beyond a lexical semantics perspective, for instance (i.e. considering only "parts"; cf. Chapter 4).

In the Extended Emotion Event Model, grammatical structures are conceived of as providing access to conceptualizations (cf. Chapter 2). Moreover, they can be regarded to potentially trigger implicatures, i.e. cognitive context, and have been linked to social and sociocultural context as well (cf. Chapter 5.4.3). This is achieved by the integration of the interactional sociolinguistics and systemic-functional perspective into the Emotion Event Model, employing CCs and resources of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapter 2). More precisely, we will investigate in the framework of the extended Emotion Event Model emotion lexemes (all parts-of-speech), emotion scenarios and experiencer types, emotion concept clusters, i.e. coordinated emotion lexemes, the construal of Emotion Events via co-occurring emotion lexemes or evaluative items, adverbial modifiers of un-/certainty, and adverbial modifiers of intensification co-occurring with emotion lexemes (cf. Chapter 5.4.4).

In order to illustrate the added value of a parts-whole perspective, I will take up three examples already discussed previously (cf. Chapter 1). In Example 1 b. from above (*My anger was justified surely?*), for instance, the Emotion Event *anger* can only be appropriately interpreted by taking the co-occurring and modifying content disjunct *surely* and its positioning (i.e. final position, wide scope) into account (cf. Chapters 8.1.1, 8.3.1). *Surely* has been viewed as resource of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapter 8.2), its discursive function emerging not only from its status as grammatical construction, but from its relatedness to, i.e. co-occurrence with, the emotion lexeme *anger* as well as previous and upcoming sequences in the emotion narrative. The same is true for Emotion Events modified by co-occurring intensifiers (e.g., *I'm so angry*), i.e. adverbial subjuncts (mid position, narrow scope; cf. Examples 1c., d., e., and Chapters

8.2, 8.1.2, 8.3.2). Intensifiers co-occurring with emotion lexemes have also been viewed as resources of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapter 8.3.2). Along the same lines, the emotion(-al) meaning emerging from a parts-whole-anchored perspective in emotion concept clusters, i.e. in coordinated emotion lexemes, can be assumed to be richer than that emerging from considering isolated parts, e.g. only lexical items (cf. Example 1 a., *proud [...] and pleased, [...] guilty* in contrast to *proud* and Chapter 7). The emotion concept JOY (cf. *proud/ pleased*) can be regarded as subjectively construed and attenuated by co-occurring GUILT (cf. *guilty*). The functional contributions of contextual construal in emotion concept clusters are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. In sum, linguistic context, i.e. grammatical constructions and their co-occurrences are regarded to provide access to conceptualizations, and to potentially trigger inferences, i.e cognitive context. Cognitive context is viewed in more detail in the next section.

Cognitive Context

In psychology of communication-anchored paradigms (Bateson 1972) cognitive context has been referred to along the lines of figure-ground distinctions. In language processing and inference processing theories, e.g. Relevance Theory (Sperber et al. 1986), cognitive context has been conceptualized as a set of premises, true or possibly true mental presentations, propositions and assumptions and has been contrasted with cognitive environments, i.e. a set of facts. In functional grammar, cognitive context is viewed as psychological construct (Givón 2005).
In this investigation, the original conceptualization of cognitive context in the Emotion Events (cf. Chapter 2.1.2), i.e. a gestalt-psychology-anchored one (figure – ground), is complemented by a pragmatic and an interactional-sociolinguistics outlook on cognitive context (cf. Chapter 2). Taking up Grice (1975) and his work on implicatures, Gumperz (e.g., 2003) conceives of context in terms of contextualization (e.g., Gumperz 2003), i.e. local and global cognitive operations (Gumperz 2003: 14) which are part of conversational inferencing (cf. Chapters 2.2.1 and 2.4). Cognitive context is interconnected with linguistic context. The import of contextual information is achieved by indexical contextualization cues (Gumperz 2003: 119). CCs in Emotion Events are for instance co-occurring emotion lexemes, positive/ negative evaluative items co-occurring with emotion lexemes, modifiers in EEs, i.e. intensifiers and epistemic markers (cf. Chapter 2.4.3).

Social and Sociocultural Context

Social context is defined as the context of the communicative exchange. Components of social context include participants or concrete, physical surroundings, time and place,

and institutional and non-institutional domains (Fetzer 2012: 120). Socio-cultural context is defined as particularized social context "colored by cultural variables" (Fetzer 2012: 115–122).

In this investigation, the conceptualization of socio-cultural context is based on ethnographic and interactional sociolinguistics studies (Gumperz 1992a). Conversation is regarded as sociocultural speech activity, where social knowledge is closely connected with linguistic form, i.e. linguistic context and cognitive context, via the cognitive operations (inferences) triggered by linguistic material in context. Hereby, Gumperz (1992a) refines the ethnographic concept of 'speaking grid' (Hymes 1974). 'Speaking grid' is an acronym that systematically captures the components of embedded communications: hereby 's' stands for situation (the physical setting and the psychological scene), 'p' stands for participants (speaker, hearer, audience who have a certain status in the participant framework, Goffman 1981) , 'e' stands for ends (the objective of a speech event from a sociocultural perspective), 'a' stand for act sequence (how something is said and what is said), 'k' stands for key (mock or serious), 'i' refers to instrumentalities (i.e. modes, spoken/ written etc.). 'n' norms of interpreation and forms of speech (e.g. vernacular, standard), and 'g' stands for genre. The participants are regarded to take in addition to interactional roles, social roles and identities (e.g., Harré & van Langenhove 1999; Harré 2012) such as 'mother/ father', 'woman/ man', 'boss/ employee', 'Afro-Americain/ Hispanic etc.' as well. Moreover, ethnographic research is based on the premise of indexicality of social action and is concerned about how a common context is negotiated and co-constructed (Ochs e.g., 1992; Schegloff e.g., 1987; cf. as well Chapter 2.3.2).

The main objects of analysis in the present study are the linguistic context of emotion lexemes and the cognitive context accessible through the study of EE (cf. Chapter 2), while experimentally manipulating and controlling for social- and socio-cultural context (cf. Chapter 5.1). Both linguistic and cognitive context are accommodated and operationalized in the integrated approach to emotion in language of this investigation through its methodology, and in particular the annotation procedures, which will be specified in the following sections.

5.4.4 Annotation Schemes

The annotation was overall based on contextual criteria and performed by referring to available information in grammars (e.g., Quirk et al. 1985; Huddleston & Pullum 2002; Givón 1993). Basing the annotation on grammatical structures, e.g. adverbial subjuncts/ content disjuncts co-occurring with emotion lexemes, allowed their integration into the cognitive-linguistics-anchored Emotion Event Model where structures

are regarded as providing access to conceptualization (cf. Chapter 2.1). Taking co-occurrences of emotion lexemes into account allowed, moreover, to investigate emotion concepts in context, i.e. from a parts-whole perspective (cf. Chapter 5.4.3). While information on grammatical structures (i.e. "parts", Fetzer e.g., 2012) and therefore relevant information for the coding of such structures can easily be retrieved from grammars, the coding of more complex structures, especially co-occurrence patterns including inferences triggered, is more complicated and can only be achieved by taking not only the local but the global context of Emotion Events into account (cf. parts-whole perspective). Therefore, the following sections focus in detail on the coding procedures of the present investigation.

Emotion Lexemes

Emotion lexemes were manually coded based on contextual criteria (cf. Table 4, page 109), i.e. in affirmative and non-affirmative contexts (tag: NAF) and only in their emotion meaning (Bednarek 2008a)[77], on the basis of Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989), which provide a list of English lexemes that denote[78] emotions.

This list was chosen, after reviewing various existing lists on emotion terms (e.g., Wallace & Carson 1973; Ortony et al. 1987; Storm & Storm 1987; Biber & Finegan 1989; Janney 1996; Moore & Rusch 1999; Fontaine et al. 2013), since it is quite comprehensive, and, more importantly, compatible with Kövecses (2000) and Lakoff (1987), who assume a complex hierarchical structure of emotion terms (cf. Chapter 2.1), and with Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson (2010) who study more or less prototypical and basic senses in the framework of Emotion Events. Emotion-related lexemes (e.g., *rant*),

[77] Bednarek (2008a: 23), for instance, provides the example of *afterglow* that can be displayed either in an "emotion meaning", i.e. in the meaning of 'a pleasant feeling after a good experience' or in the meaning of 'the light that is left in the sky after the sun has set' (Hornby 1995: Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary). The former would have been coded as emotion lexeme, the latter would not.

[78] In the Appraisal Framework (Martin & White 2005), this would correspond to the mode affect: denote, with affect regarding the self, i.e. first person, and other, i.e. second and third person. Bednarek (2008a) provides a list of emotion terms included in her corpus analyses that is only slightly different from the one used in this study. However, Bednarek (2008a: 22) included, for instance, *positive impatience, alertness, loss of composure, impress* (the verb), *goodwill, value* (the noun and the verb), *foregiveness* and *want* (as adjective, noun, adverb and verb), which were either not to be found in AWE, which was built with a different research purpose than Bednarek's much larger corpus, refer to bodily symptoms or do not, following Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989) and Parrott (2001), denote emotions at all, and were consequently excluded from this investigation. Furthermore, *confuse/ confusion* was not included, since, according to Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989: 88), it refers to a "state of mind associated with emotions" and can, apart from this not be categorized in terms of primary emotions, or rather, one primary emotion, as, often, a complex of emotions is involved. *Want* was not included in the present analysis, since it can be regarded to be "bleached" (Martin & White 2005: 85), i.e. it is rather conventionally used to talk or write about offers, invitations or demands (Hornby 1995) and it is often difficult to determine whether it is used in its emotion meaning (Bednarek 2008a: 32).

emotion-laden lexemes (e.g., *shit*), figurative expressions (e.g., *hot under the collar*) and facial-bodily expressions (e.g., *cry*; Pavlenko 2008b; Dziwirek & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010) were excluded, since they are highly context-dependent and can potentially be attributed to distinct emotion concepts. One can, for instance, *cry* and be *happy* or *cry* and be *sad*. Part of speech tagging (henceforth POS) for the emotion lexemes was established using the Penn Treebank tagset (Marcus et al. 1993).

Table 3: The tree structure of emotions taken from Parrott (2001).

Primary emotion	Secondary emotion	Tertiary emotions
Love	Affection	Adoration, affection, love, fondness, liking, attraction, caring, tenderness, compassion, sentimentality
	Lust	Arousal, desire, lust, passion, infatuation
	Longing	Longing
Joy	Cheerfulness	Amusement, bliss, cheerfulness, gaiety, glee, jolliness, joviality, joy, delight, enjoyment, gladness, happiness, jubilation, elation, satisfaction, ecstasy, euphoria
	Zest	Enthusiasm, zeal, zest, excitement, thrill, exhilaration
	Contentment	Contentment, pleasure
	Pride	Pride, triumph
	Optimism	Eagerness, hope, optimism
	Enthrallment	Enthrallment, rapture
	Relief	Relief
Surprise	Surprise	Amazement, surprise, astonishment
Anger	Irritation	Aggravation, irritation, agitation, annoyance, grouchiness, grumpiness
	Exasperation	Exasperation, frustration
	Rage	Anger, rage, outrage, fury, wrath, hostility, ferocity, bitterness, hate, loathing, scorn, spite, vengefulness, dislike, resentment
	Disgust	Disgust, revulsion, contempt
	Envy	Envy, jealousy
	Torment	Torment
Sadness	Suffering	Agony, suffering, hurt, anguish
	Sadness	Depression, despair, hopelessness, gloom, glumness, sadness, unhappiness, grief, sorrow, woe, misery, melancholy
	Disappointment	Dismay, disappointment, displeasure
	Shame	Guilt, shame, regret, remorse
	Neglect	Alienation, isolation, neglect, loneliness, rejection, homesickness, defeat, dejection, insecurity, embarrassment, humiliation, insult
	Sympathy	Pity, sympathy
Fear	Horror	Alarm, shock, fear, fright, horror, terror, panic, hysteria, mortification
	Nervousness	Anxiety, nervousness, tenseness, uneasiness, apprehension, worry, distress, dread

In order to avoid any leakages, the tree structure of emotions (cf. Table 3), a categorization of emotions into primary (e.g., ANGER), secondary (e.g., IRRITATION)

and tertiary (e.g., JEALOUSY) affective states widely used in social psychology (Lampropoulou 2014; Parrott 2001) was used in addition to Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989). The tree structure was chosen, since it constitutes a very nuanced classification of affective states. Parrott (2001) identified more than 100 emotions, and in this, the tree structure is even more nuanced than the "wheel of emotions" provided by Plutchik (1980). Moreover, the classification provided by Parrott (2001), being part of basic emotion approaches, is one that considers that emotion lexemes could "imply information about the specific context in which the emotion is experienced", e.g., *bliss* can be regarded as "intense joy in a spiritual context" (Fontaine et al. 2013: 39). The list proposed by Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989) was then reorganized and completed following the categorization provided by Parrott (2001) which differs in its basic emotions[79] with respect to Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989).[80] The German emotion lexemes were identified following the same logic, departing from the English list, while taking language-specificities of the German dataset into account, for example concepts that only exist in German in a lexicalized form such as *Schadenfreude*.

All in all, Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989) and Parrott (2001) formed the basis of the identification of emotion lexemes in AWE, however, the pre-established list of emotion lexemes was considered to be open, since the corpus data provided sometimes also items that clearly denoted emotions but were neither captured by the basic list, such as *chuffed*, in the sense of 'happy', for instance, which was consequently included in the analysis. A list of the emotion lexemes included in the analysis is provided in the Appendix (cf. Tables A2, A3).

Some lexical items, potential emotion lexemes, were, after reflection and consultation of dictionaries and of the previous mentioned lists, excluded from the analysis such as

[79] Whether basic emotions really exist and which ones to include as basic emotions is still an unresolved question in psychology. Numerous scientists (e.g., Plutchik 1980; Ekman 1993; Frijda 1986; Gray 1985; Izard 1977) have studied and identified basic emotions ranging from lists comprising only two basic emotions, i.e. happiness and sadness (Weiner & Graham 1984) to ones that include even 10 basic emotions, anger, interest, contempt, disgust, distress, fear, joy, shame, surprise (Tomkins 1984). Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989) categorize into the basic emotions anger, disgust, anxiety, happiness and sadness, whereas Parrott (2001) assumes love, joy, surprise, anger, sadness and fear to be basic emotions.

[80] It was also taken into account that Parrott (2001) is in the first place a categorization of **affective states** and originally **not of labels or emotion lexemes** for emotions. However, this nuanced classification facilitated the identification of emotion lexemes on the level of linguistic representations. Vice versa, if a emotion lexeme occurred in AWE that was not easily categorized in terms of the tree structure (Parrott 2001), it was coded as being part of the most fitting primary, secondary and tertiary affectives states, while most of the time, only the tertiary states were not as nuanced as the linguistic representation was. This did not pose problems for the further analysis, since it was based on the categorization into the primary affective states, i.e. LOVE, JOY, SURPRISE, ANGER, SADNESS and FEAR and all the subordinated affective states labeled by the respective emotion lexemes. All in all, one has surely to be critical about assuming a perfect match between categorizations of emotions grounded in (social) psychology and ones rooted in linguistics.

buzz, *confusion/ Verwirrung* and *catharsis*. The British lexeme *buzz* can be used in an emotion meaning ('a feeling of pleasure or excitement', Hornby 1995), but in the corpus data this emotion meaning was not prevalent. *Confusion/ Verwirrung* does not, as is argued in the present study and according to Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989: 88;122), denote an emotion, but a "state of mind" associated with emotions ("that might create anxiety"). Finally, *catharsis*, however emotion-related, denotes 'the process of releasing strong feelings' (Hornby 1995), and does not figure on the list by Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989). It was consequently excluded from further analysis.

Want (cf. German *wollen*), a specific case discussed and included by Bednarek (2008a) in her list of emotion terms, was excluded, following the argumentation that Bednarek later provides (Bednarek 2008a), basing her reflections on Martin & White (2005: 85). According to these authors *want* is 'bleached' and not really (primarily) used to talk about emotions.

Following the rationale provided by Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989), *confidence/ Zuversicht* and *relax/ entspannen* were included in the list of emotion lexemes, *confidence* denoting a 'mild happiness as a result of evaluating that one can cope with a situation' (Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989: 111) which was consequently categorized under the emotion concept JOY (with the corresponding primary affective state JOY, secondary affective state CHEERFULNESS, and tertiary affective state HAPPINESS). *Relax* means according to Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989) 'to cause to cease being tense' and was, following the meaning provided by dictionaries ('to rest after work or effort, e.g., by doing something enjoyable', Hornby 1995) also categorized under the emotion concept JOY.

Table 4 provides examples and tags for the coding applied. Emotion lexemes (EL, e.g., *worriedly*) were coded as such. Additionally, the corresponding primary, secondary and tertiary affective states were tagged (fear, nervousness and worry in the case of *worriedly*), while bearing in mind that psychological categories and linguistic categories do not necessarily match, especially with respect to secondary or tertiary affective states. Therefore, the subsequent analysis focused on primary affective states only. The POS-tag was added (*worriedly* was tagged as adverb, RB). In cases of non-affirmative use (*nothing ... to be scared about*), the EL (here the adjective, JJ, *scared*) was additionally tagged by NAF (non-affirmative). Emotion lexeme frequencies, including different POS and syntactic realizations, are summarized in Chapters 6.2.1 and 6.2.2.

Table 4: Annotation Scheme: Emotion Lexemes.

Code	Example
emotion lexeme: EL	*[...] I reply,* ***worriedly****.* (e_f_002_1)
primary state: FEAR	
secondary state: NERVOUSNESS	
tertiary state: WORRY	
POS-tag: RB	
emotion lexeme: EL	*[...] I have* ***nothing*** *to be [...]* ***scared about*** *[...]* (e_f_004_1)
primary state: FEAR	
secondary state: NERVOUSNESS	
tertiary state: ANXIETY	
POS-tag: JJ	
non-affirmative: NAF	

Emotion Scenarios and Experiencer Types

AWE was also annotated with respect to emotion scenario types and experiencer types (cf. Table 5). The former were coded and categorized into three different types including EE that comprise only the emotion (e.g., Em), i.e. the emotion lexeme, into types that capture the experiencer AND the emotion (e.g., Ex_Em), and, finally, into types that additionally give the cause of the emotion (e.g., Ex_Em_C)[81]. The order of the experiencer, the emotion and the cause was coded but the resulting types were subsequently subsumed under the three main scenario types given above, since the analysis had a cognitive-pragmatic focus, following Dem'jankov et al. (2004) and his work on causal connections or chains, i.e. the question whether the experiencer and the cause of the emotion was provided at all in the narrative, which, as hypothesized, could be subject to cross-linguistic differences (cf. Hypothesis 1c, Chapter 4.2). The cognitive-pragmatic coding did not code agents separate from experiencers, since, in most cases, agents and experiencers did not differ or were not explicitly named in the AWE corpus, which is due to the experimental design of the study. Moreover, the focus lied more on the naming or omitting of an experiencer than on an agent. The latter

[81] This scenario type might be regarded to be compatible with "directed vs. undirected" affect (Bednarek 2008a: 95), which specifies the presence or absence of a trigger.

play, of course, an important role in overall construal (cf. Chapter 8.1.2) and future analyses should take agents more into account. In cases where several experiencers were involved, only the existence of an experiencer was noted (e.g., *[...] leaving **me and Mrs Carberg [AGENTs]** alone to discuss **my [EXPERIENCER]** disappointing results*, e_m_008_1. Moreover, only the cause and not the direction of the emotion was tagged (e.g., *The first response might be anger **at the person [DIRECTION] who gave you the mark [CAUSE]**, [...]*, e_f_030_1). Apart from this, the coding did not, as it was focusing on experiencers, emotion and causes, differentiate between "overt vs. covert affect" (Bednarek 2008a: 95), i.e. patterns that indicate whether an emotional response is "implied or directly expressed" Bednarek (e.g., *His axing is a surprise*; surprise is regarded to be something that causes surprise by 2008a: 95).

Table 5: Annotation Scheme: Emotion Scenarios.

Code	**Example**
Em	*[...] as well as feeling **ire*** [Em] *there is [...]* (e_f_002_1)
Ex_Em (or Em_Ex)	***I*** [Ex] *[...] but would feel not only **angry*** [Em] *[...]* (e_f_001_1)
Em_C (or C_Em)	*There's a rather overwhelming sense of **gratification***[Em] *[...] **when passing an obviously difficult exam*** [C], *[...]* (e_m_020_2)
Ex_Em_C	***It*** [C] *would certainly make **me***[Ex] ***unhappy*** [Em] ***because***[C] *[...]* (e_m_002_1)
(or C_Em_Ex	
C_Ex_Em	
Em_Ex_C	
Ex_C_Em	
Em_C_Ex)	

Table 5 provides an overview over the tags for the emotion event chains applied. Em refers to the emotion (lexeme) displayed (***ire***) and C for the cause of emotion (***when***

passing an obviously difficult exam and ***it*** *would certainly make me unhappy* ***because***). The coding therefore includes integrative constituents of the Emotion Event in the linguistic context of the emotion lexemes. It distinguishes between no reference to the Experiencer vs. reference to the Experiencer of the emotion, and no reference to vs. reference to the CAUSE of the emotion. Hereby, relevant contextual effects across the British and German data can be assessed, i.e. linguistic context of the emotion lexemes (co-occurrences) that potentially give rise to implicatures and import cognitive contexts from a parts-whole perspective (cf. Chapters 2.2.3, 2.3.3, 2.4.3, and 6.2.3).
Table 6 lists the codings for the different experiencer types. All in all, five experiencer types where coded including 1st, 2nd and 3rd person experiencers, impersonal experiencers and unexperienced EE, the terminology of the latter two types has been established for this investigation (cf. Table 6). 1st, 2nd and 3rd person experiencers as well as the unexperienced EE type were coded following Martin & White (2005) and Bednarek (2008a). The unexperienced type is compatible with the notion of "unemoted" affect, i.e. an "absent emoter"(parts-whole perspective) (Bednarek 2008a: 95). The impersonal experiencer types include impersonal subjects such as *it* and *you* in English or *es* and *man* in German. By taking different experiencer types as integral part of Emotion Events (parts-whole perspective) into account potential differences in contextual effects across the dataset can be taken into account, which can be linked to British and German language preferences with respect to implicitness/ explicitness or personal/ impersonal constructions for instance, and contextual import (cf. Chapters 2.2.3, 3, 6.2.3).

Table 6: Annotation Scheme: Experiencer Types.

Code	**Example**
experiencer: 1st person	***I*** *was very nervous and very scared [...]* (e_f_006_2)
experiencer: second person	*[...]* ***don't*** *worry [...]* (e_f_034_1)
experiencer: third person	*Judgeing by the looks of burgeoning horror and trepidation on* ***their*** *faces, [...]* (e_f_002_2)
experiencer: impersonal	***It*** *can almost be embarrassing sometimes, [...]* (e_f_002_2)
experiencer: unexperienced	*Looking round at all the sad and worried* ***faces*** (e_f_002_2)

Emotion Concept Clusters

AWE was further annotated for emotion concept clusters (cf. Chapter 4.1.2), i.e. emotion lexemes that co-occur with other emotion lexemes (5L–5R, departing from the first occurring emotion lexeme)[82]. Emotion lexemes that were coordinated or "conjoined" (Bednarek 2008a: 163) with *and*, *or*[83] and *but also*[84] were coded and included in the subsequent analysis. Asyndetic elements, linked together in a list, were included (Martin 2004). Furthermore, the length of the emotion concept cluster was noted, i.e. whether the emotion concept cluster contained two, three, four or even more emotion lexemes.[85] The emotion concept clusters were, moreover, categorized into 'equivalent', 'ambivalent' or 'complex' clusters. 'Equivalent' concept clusters contain emotion lexemes that stem from the same basic emotion or affective state, taking Parrott (2001) as basis, 'ambivalent' concept clusters comprise emotion lexemes with differing valence, i.e. the co-occurring emotion lexemes are positively and negatively loaded lexemes giving access to positive and negative emotion concepts, and 'complex' emotion concept clusters subsume emotion lexemes that stem from different basic emotion concepts of the same, or at least of not opposing valence. Blends (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010) were coded separately. Mixed emotions, Bamberg (1997: 318–320) uses the term "double" or "simultaneous" emotions, were consequently taken into account in the analysis and could be analysed by viewing blends and ambivalent emotion concept clusters. The terminology of equivalent, ambivalent and complex clusters was established for this study, since no suitable categorizations existed so far, neither to be found in approaches informed by the appraisal framework (e.g., Bednarek 2008a) nor in cognitive–linguistic investigations (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010), that take both the forms and conceptual meaning of emotion concept clusters into account. Apart from this, the co-occurring cluster lexemes were noted in order to be able to view all cluster combinations occurring in AWE.

Problematic cases include emotion concept clusters comprising two different experiencers (cf. Example 3 a.); as those emotion concepts/ Emotion Events were completely unrelated (emotions experienced by those that failed vs. by those that succeeded),

[82] Emotion lexemes were analyzed in their immediate linguistic context, i.e. 5L–5R. However, sometimes, it was necessary to extend the linguistic co-text analyzed, since the coordinated elements were spread slightly wider than 5L–5R and separated by stretches of discourse irrelevant to the focus of emotion concept clusters. However, only elements that had the same experiencer and were really conjoined were taken into account. The analysis was not extended to the most global context, i.e. the whole emotion narrative.

[83] 'Or' in its contrastive meaning was excluded (Hornby 1995).

[84] 'But (also)' in the meaning of 'and at the same time' was coded, 'but' in its contrastive meaning (Hornby 1995), however, was excluded.

[85] Martin (2004), however, does only focus on triplets and their intensifying function. In the present analysis, not only rhetorical triplets, but also asyndetic elements that contain more than three lexemes were included.

they were not coded as emotion concept cluster. Emotion lexemes in emotion concept clusters denoting subsequent emotions (cf. *dann/ then*), i.e. non-simultaneous ones, were also excluded from cluster analysis (cf. Example 3 b.). Apart from this, the two emotion concepts in Example 3 could be argued not to be, in a strict sense, in the immediate local context (5L–5R) of each other.

Table 7 provides the tags applied for the emotion concept clusters in AWE. The numbers in cluster1, cluster2 etc. are assigned to the emotion lexemes involved in the cluster (e.g., *happy* is tagged with Cluster1, *proud* with Cluster2). Code 2 refers to the emotion concept cluster type (equivalent, complex, ambivalent and blend) as defined above. An explanation for the cluster types coded has been provided below each example, i.e. the categorization of emotion lexemes with respect to emotion concepts based on affective states.

The coding therefore takes the immediate linguistic context of emotion lexemes in form of further co-occurring emotion lexemes into account. Hereby, contextual effects in emotion concept clusters across the British and German data, i.e. the potential triggering of inferences (cognitive contexts) via co-occurring emotion lexemes (linguistic context), can be assessed from a parts-whole perspective. Accordingly, the potential inferences to be drawn and functions in emotion discourse are the one of intensification (equivalent and complex clusters in the Examples in Table 7) and will be explored in more detail in Chapter 7, especially the functions of ambivalent clusters and blends (Examples in Table 7) that cannot be reduced to the one of intensification.

Table 7: Annotation Scheme: Emotion Concept Clusters.

Code 1	**Code 2**	**Example**
cluster1–cluster2	equivalent	*I don't think I have ever felt so* ***happy and*** *so* ***proud*** *of myself.* (e_f_029_2)
		primary affective state JOY: tertiary affective states HAPPINESS + PRIDE
cluster1–cluster3	complex	[...] [I] would feel not only **angry and frustrated but upset**. (e_f_001_1)
		primary affective states ANGER/ SADNESS: tertiary affective states ANGER + FRUSTRATION + SADNESS
cluster1–cluster4	equivalent	*Ich bin* ***überrascht, erleichtert, stolz und überaus glücklich*** *zugleich.*
		'I am surprised, relieved, proud and exceedingly happy.' (g_f_024_2)
		primary affective state JOY ('FREUDE'): tertiary affective states ÜBERRASCHUNG ('SURPRISE') + ERLEICHTERUNG ('RELIEF') + STOLZ ('PRIDE') + GLÜCK ('HAPPINESS')
cluster1–cluster5		no occurrences
cluster1–cluster6	ambivalent	*There was* ***anger****, confusion,* ***despair, pride, guilt, joyousness, and surprise [...]*** (e_m_006_2)
		primary affective states ANGER + SADNESS + JOY + SURPRISE: tertiary affective states ANGER, DESPAIR, PRIDE, GUILT, JOYOUSNESS, SURPRISE
cluster1–cluster2	blend	*The* ***bittersweet*** *feeling really hit home when I came across my friend crying on her way home.* (e_m_006_2)
		primary affective states SADNESS + JOY: tertiary affective states SADNESS + JOY

(3) a. *Nachdem sich die erste* ***Ernüchterung*** [of those that failed, NMF] ***oder auch Freude*** [of those that succeeded, NMF] *zerstreut hat, wird die Klausur Schritt um Schritt durchgegangen.*

'After the first ***disappointment or joy*** *having dissipated, the exam is examined step by step.'* (g_f_11_2)

b. *In diesem Fall hätte ich mich kurz über mich selber* ***geärgert****, meine Fehler analysiert* ***und dann gehofft*** *nicht die gleichen beim nächsten Test zu begehen.* (g_f_023_2)

'In this case I would have been briefly ***angry*** *at myself, I would have analyzed my mistakes* ***and then*** *I would have* ***hoped*** *not to make the same ones in the next examination.'*

Positive and Negative Construal of Emotion Lexemes

Every emotion lexeme was, apart from the coding as such as well as its categorization into affective states and the potential cluster coding, also annotated whether it was positively or negatively construed (cf. Chapter 7.1). Positive and negative construal of the emotion lexemes and hence emotion concept is understood and operationalized in this investigation, following Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1996: 160) and her methodology developed for the coding of the semantic prosody, a term going back to Sinclair (1994) and (Louw 1993). In Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1996), the researcher investigates semantic prosodies of conceptual negatives from a cognitive and cross–linguistic perspective involving the languages English and Polish. Semantic prosody implies that any item has an 'intuitive' meaning (Louw 1993: 172), which can only be deduced from the linguistic context in which the item is displayed. Louw (1993: 165) provides the example of *bent on* which has negative semantic prosody in the context provided (*bent on the same routine/ destroying British Leyland*). Moreover, Louw (1993: 172) claims that often "semantic prosodies 'hunt in packs' ", i.e. negative or positive construal does not rely on only one cue but often on several ones (cf. the definition of 'contextualization cue', Chapter 2.4.1).

Semantic prosody has been linked to emotion discourse before, by Bednarek (2008a) for instance. She finds that emotion lexemes can be regarded to be positively or negatively construed, i.e. the positivity or negativity of a lexeme can be "contextually implied" (Bednarek 2008a: 164) via evaluations, i.e. positively or negatively loaded lexemes, more or less explicit in the immediate linguistic context of the emotion lexemes, as has been found for *surprise*, for instance (Bednarek 2008a: 163–165). Moreover, semantic prosody plays also an important role in overall sense–construal, as has been discussed

earlier (cf. Chapter 4.1.1 and the discussion of AMAZEMENT vs. ASTONISHMENT and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011). So, all in all, construal is operationalized in this study by taking evaluative items in the context of emotion concepts into account.
The methodology employed by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1996) for the coding of semantic prosody was consequently adopted for the contextual analysis of the emotion lexemes coded so far (cf. Chapter 5.4.4). It was regarded to be suitable, since it is based on the cognitive concepts of "trigger" and "target" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996: 157), i.e. it is "cognitively anchored and realized syntactically" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996: 158) avoiding a drift into subjective analysis and coding. The relevant points of Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1996), adopted for the present investigation[86], are cited in the following:

> (a) the trigger of a semantic prosody partly coincides with an utterance lexical topic — the entity most salient in an utterance,
> (b) the search of the target(s) start from the immediate context of a trigger with gradual spreading of the search area to more and more distant phrases, sentences and paragraphs,
> (b)[idem] the immediate context for verbs are their objects and adjuncts, next the adverbs modifying them,
> (c) the immediate context for the nominals are:
> (i) for basic nouns – adjectival and participal modifiers
> (ii) for deverbal nouns – first, noun complement introduced by prepositions, next, as in (i)
> (iii) for all nominals — verbs introducing them as objects or verbs for which they function as subjects,
> (d) the immediate context for lexical items which are part of a (prepositional) phrase are the head items immediately preceding and modifiers immediately following them,
> (e) the immediate context of all dependent items are their governors, thus — nominals — for adjective and verbs — for adverbs,
> (f) the immediate context of all lexical items are other lexical items that *immediately precede* and those that *immediately follow* them in syndetic or asyndetic coodinating structures.
> (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996: 160–161)

Emotion lexemes are regarded to be either positively or negatively construed, i.e. the

[86] In the following, the term semantic prosody is avoided on purpose since the concept is in itself problematic and controversially discussed (e.g., Morley & Partington 2009; Hunston 2007a; Bednarek 2008b). Instead, the terms "positive/ negative evaluative items/ cues" in the context of the emotion lexemes will be used.

targets, by other positively or negatively loaded lexical items, i.e. triggers, in the immediate linguistic context (as precised above (a)–(e)) of the emotion lexeme. Moreover, positive or negative construal is achieved by positive or negative emotion lexemes, syndetically or asyndetically coordinated (f), i.e. as part of emotion concept clusters (cf. Chapter 4.1.2 and Chapter 5.4.4).

Table 8: Annotation Scheme: Positive and Negative Construal.

Code	Example
positive	*Ultimately I would feel* ***happy*** *about* ***doing well*** *within the exam and would be* ***pleased*** *that it reflected my work and* ***commitment*** *of achieving the* ***best*** *that I possibly could.* (e_f_035_2)
	syndetic construction *happy and pleased*, trigger: *happy*, one target: *pleased*; further targets: complements of the deverbal adjective phrases, i.e. *about doing well* and *pleased that it reflected my work and commitment ...*
negative	*The high levels of* ***jubilation*** *that one would expect from such an event did* ***not*** *occur in the way one would expect it to happen, my* ***joy*** *was somewhat* ***laboured****, [...]* (e_m_016_2)
	trigger *jubilation* in non-affirmative use, cf. *not* (target), followed by another trigger (*joy*) and its target, i.e. the adjective modifier *laboured*.

Table 8 provides examples, here for JOY, of the coding applied in the present investigation, i.e. the coding of positive or negative construal of emotion concepts (triggers, bold face and underlined) and their evaluative targets (bold face) following the syntactic criteria established by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1996) and cited above. This coding enabled the researcher to investigate from a cognitive linguistic perspective Emotion Events opened up by grammatical/ syntactical structures, and to view contextual construal from a parts-whole perspective (cf. Chapter 5.4.3). In general, as many contextually realized evaluative items as possible have been taken into account in order to determine whether a typically positive (LOVE, JOY), negative (ANGER, SADNESS, FEAR) and positive or negative (SURPRISE) emotion concept was overall rather positively or negatively construed. With 'typical', I refer (here and henceforth)

to contextual construal that contextually confirms what Louw (1993) calls the item's 'intuitive' meaning (Louw 1993: 172). With 'atypical' construal, I refer (here and henceforth) to contextual construals that contradict or oppose the item's 'intuitive' meaning (Louw 1993: 172). Atypical construals have been viewed as inference triggers and means of context import (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). If no indicators for an atypical construal, i.e. a non-congruent evaluation, could be identified, positive emotion concepts were coded as positively, negative emotion concepts as negatively construed. Vice versa, positive concepts were coded as being negatively construed, if the immediate linguistic context triggered negativity by negative cues, and, negative concepts were coded as being positively construed, when, in analogy, positive evaluative cues where to be found in the immediate linguistic context. This way and with the help of the previous analysis and coding of primary affective states, it was possible to identify congruent and non-congruent evaluations, i.e. typical or atypical construals of the emotion concepts. The latter construal was subject to further qualitative analyses. The coordination of two non-congruent emotion concepts and the resulting construal as mixed emotion has already been mentioned in the previous chapter (cf. Chapter 5.4.4) and has been taken into account via the notion of ambivalent emotion concept clusters and blends. From a functional point of view, positive and negative construal, typical and atypical construal will be discussed in Chapter 7 in more detail. In the Examples in Table 8, the function of positive construal can be regarded as means of intensification (the positive cues *doing well*, *committment* and *best* reinforce the positivity of the equivalent emotion concept cluster *happy [...] and [...] pleased*), the function of negative construal can be regarded as means of attenuation (the emotion concept JUBLIATION is negated, JOY is "*laboured*").

Markers of Un-/certainty

The corpus was further annotated (cf. Table 9) for markers of un-/ certainty (EM; cf. Chapter 8)[87] co-occurring in the immediate linguistic context (5L-5R) of emotion lexemes, tagging the former with respect to their conceptual meaning, i.e. 'high', 'medium' or 'low' certainty (Code 1 in Table 9 refers to coded degrees of probability, cf. Chapter 8.1.1 and the probability scale), and their discourse functions, i.e. boosting and attenuating[88], or respectively with their intersubjective meaning (Code 2 in Table 9 refers to intersubjective positioning, cf. Chapters 2.3.2, 8.2), i.e. "entertain", "concur", "pronounce" (White 2003), "counter-expectancy" (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007:

[87] A detailed discussion of un/-certainty in an extended EE-model can be found in Chapter 8, comprising also discussions on the probability scale, evidentiality and intersubjective positioning.

[88] For *I think* the respective textual configurations that render it either a boosting or attenuating device have been taken into account (cf. Fetzer & Johansson 2010; Fetzer 2014).

280). Part of speech (henceforth POS) membership was also established. Hereby, the various lexical devices emerging in AWE have been included — nouns, adverbs, verbs, adjectives, modal auxiliaries and prepositional phrases (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 180,771) — since the linguistic expression of epistemicity or evidentiality might be realized by different POS across languages. Every item in the immediate linguistic context and under the scope (cf. scope adverbials, Ungerer 1988) of the emotion lexemes that attributed high, medium or low probability to the emotional utterance and could be paraphrased by "It is/ was possible that..." (epistemic modality) in contrast to "It was possible for him/ her..." (deontic modality/ dynamic modality; Huddleston & Pullum 2002) was coded. Ungerer (1988) distinguished between propositional adverbials and scope adverbials. Only the latter are metalinguistic, while the former are integral elements of the proposition and truth-conditional (Ungerer 1988). Furthermore, scope adverbials can have wide or narrow scope, which is determined by their position in the sentence (Ungerer 1988). Moreover, Givón's detailed account (Givón 1993: 244) on the distinction between "epistemic" and "deontic" (propositional) modality (Givón 1993: 169–187) was followed. Furthermore, Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 767–771) were consulted for the classification of epistemic modal adjuncts into four groups of differing modal strength (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 769): the "certainly group", "apparently group", "probably group" and "possibly group". In analogy to the probability scale (Chapter 8.1.1), groups 1 and 2 were merged into one group of strong epistemic modality, since *apparently*, meaning 'judging by appearances', or *evidently*, meaning 'clearly', are potential candidates for group one (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 769). Cases of "double modality" (e.g., *It is certainly possible that he told her*; Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 769–771) were included (cf. also Chapter 8.4.2). In particular with respect to multiple epistemic markers, the coding and interpretation with respect to overall inference was problematic. Therefore, multiple epistemic marker use in AWE has been treated in a separate research chapter (cf. Chapter 8.4). Overall, multiple modification by markers of un-/certainty was not frequent in AWE.

Table 9: Annotation Scheme: Markers of Un-/certainty.

Code 1	Code 2	Example
high	counter-expectancy	*My anger was justified* ***surely****?* (e_m_029_1)
		EM high certainty, content disjunct (Quirk et al. 1985) *surely* as polyfunctional booster + ANGER;
high	contractive:concur	*[...] it was* ***clearly visible*** *that he was angry [...]* (e_f_016_1)
		EM of high certainty, evidential + ANGER
medium	expansive:entertain	*[...] and I think* ***probably*** *a bit jealous [...]* (e_f_33_2)
		EM medium certainty + JEALOUSY, detailed discussion on multiple modifiers in Chapters 8.4, 8.4.2
low	expansive:entertain	***Perhaps*** *[...] the thing that irritates me most [...]* (e_m_020_2)
		EM of low certainty + IRRITATION (+ intensifier)
high	contractive:pronounce	***Ich weiß****, dass er mich nicht leiden kann, aber dieser Blick... und mein Herz rutschte in meine Hose.*
		*'****I know*** *that he does not like me, but this look in his eyes...and I was shaking in my shoes.'* (g_f_029_2)
		EM of certainty + DISLIKE
hightened		*[...] it was clearly visible that he was* ***angry*** *[...]* (e_f_016_1)
		see above, here: emotion lexeme were tagged
lowered		*Perhaps [...] the thing that* ***irritates*** *me most [...]* (e_m_020_2)
		see above, here: emotion lexemes were tagged
mediumized		*[...] and I think probably a bit* ***jealous*** *[...]* (e_f_33_2)
		see above, here: emotion lexemes were tagged

In addition to that, the emotion lexemes involved in the analysis of EM were tagged as being hightened, mediumized or lowered, depending on their modification by the markers of un-/ certainty (cf. Table 9). This way the modified emotion lexemes could be separately accessed and analysed.
I think had to be coded either as attenuation device or booster, which, at first sight could be problematic if contextual configurations were ambiguous. However, only two instances of *I think* as booster could be identified in AWE (in the British corpus data). Example 4 illustrates this use where the boosting function of *(but) I think* is indexed by the contextual configuration comprising another booster, i.e. *honestly*.[89]

(4) *Some may call it apathy, others laziness but I honestly* ***think*** *it was an outlet for my* ***depression***.

The coding of markers of un-/certainty in the immediate linguistic context of emotion lexemes allowed the investigation of them as Modifiers in Emotion Events. As has been argued above, these modifiers contribute substantially to the display of the Emotion Events (parts-whole perspective), since in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes they give rise to implicatures, can be regarded as CCs and resources of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapters 2.2.3, 2.3.3, 2.4.3).

Intensifiers

In AWE, intensifiers play and important role as modifiers of EE (cf. Chapter 8)[90] and were consequently included in the cognitive-pragmatic coding (cf. INT for intensifier in Table 10). The main criterion, apart from some minor exceptions (see the following discussion), was that the item in question should grammatically intensify (cf. Chapter 5.4.3), i.e. upgrade or downgrade (Quirk et al. 1985) the co-occurring emotion lexeme(s) (cf. upgrader, downgrader in Table 10). Intensifiers are adverbial subjuncts (Quirk et al. 1985) with narrow scope, i.e. they have a subordinate role compared to adjuncts (Quirk et al. 1985: 176). In cases where adverbial subjuncts could potentially be either upgraders or downgraders (e.g., *quite*), the linguistic co-text was taken into account to disambiguate (e.g., *This is quite ridiculous* v.s. *quite sad*.[91]). Included were adverbial subjuncts (Quirk et al. 1985), e.g., *extremely angry*, exclamatory *how* (Quirk et al. 1985: 591), e.g., *how frustrating*, reduplicated intensifiers (Quirk et al. 1985: 447), e.g., *very, very pleased* emphasizers which clearly have a grading function (Quirk et al. 1985: 583), e.g., *really enraged*, correlatives (Quirk et al. 1985: 194, 1000), e.g., *not*

[89] Strictly speaking, *but I honestly think* has scope over *outlet*; but the sentence can clearly be rephrased and analyzed as *but I honestly think (my apathy/ laziness showed that) I was depressed.*
[90] A detailed discussion of intensification and an extension of the EE model can be found in Chapter 8.
[91] *Quite* as upgrader was, however, not displayed in the datasets.

only/ just ...but, *the...the*, coordinated, asyndetic elements and ellipsis (Quirk et al. 1985: 942), e.g., *I was so happy and [so] excited*, comparatives (Quirk et al. 1985: 467), e.g., *more than satisfied*[92], focusing subjuncts functioning as boosters (Lorenz 1999: 115–116), e.g., *particularly annoying* and the German stylistic variation of *sogar* (Zifonun et al. 1997: 882) which functions as intensifier, e.g., *gar unverschämte Behandlung*. The German intensifier (not the modal particle) *einfach* (Zifonun et al. 1997: 988), e.g., *einfach frustrierend*, was included as were intensifiers that were not under the scope of the negation (Tagliamonte & Ito 2003: 264) as in the following hypothetical sentence, e.g., *If it was the case of losing marks but still passing, I wouldn't have been so annoyed.* Double intensification (cf. Table 10, DINT_1 tagging the first intensifier, DINT_2 the second intensifiers, DINT_type tagging the functions of the intensifiers such as DIUD, i.e. "**d**ouble **i**ntensification including and **u**pgrader and **d**owngrader") by two types of intensifiers (Stenström et al. 2002: 149), e.g., *I'[m] just so happy [...]* (Taboada et al. 2014: 21–22) was also coded (cf. the discussion of multiple marking in Chapter 8.4.2). In particular with respect to multiple intensifiers, the coding and interpretation with respect to overall inference was problematic. Therefore, multiple intensifier use in AWE has been treated in a separate research chapter (cf. Chapter 8.4). Overall, multiple intensification was not frequent in AWE.

[92] Comparatives/ superlatives not inherent in lexemes (*more/ most*) were coded as such and integrated in the analysis of intensifiers as modifiers of EE. Emotion lexemes such as *happier* or *glücklicher* that are inherently comparatives are analyzed and discussed in Chapter 6. Integrating the latter in the statistical model of intensifiers as modifiers in Chapter 8 did not change the overall results.

Table 10: Annotation Scheme: Intensifiers.

Code	Example
INT:upgrader	*[...] I would be* ***very*** *angry [...]* (e_f_006_1)
	upgrader + ANGER
INT:downgrader	*I am* ***quite*** *a shy person [...]* (e_f_012_2)
	downgrader + SHYNESS
DINT_1:upgrader	*[...] which in a way is* ***actually*** *quite sad.* (e_f_001_2)
	upgrader in double intensification + SADNESS
DINT_2:downgrader	*[...] which in a way is actually* ***quite*** *sad.* (e_f_001_2)
	downgrader in double intensification + SADNESS
DINT_type: DIUD	*[...] which in a way is* ***actually quite*** *sad.* (e_f_001_2)
	upgrader + downgrader + SADNESS
upgraded	*[...] I would be very* ***angry*** *[...]* (e_f_006_1)
	see above, here: emotion lexemes were tagged
downgraded	*I am quite a* ***shy*** *person [...]* (e_f_012_2)
	see above, here: emotion lexemes were tagged
upgraded_downgraded	*[...] which in a way is* ***actually quite sad****.* (e_f_001_2)
	see above, here: emotion lexemes were tagged

Excluded were focusing subjuncts (Quirk et al. 1985: 604), e.g., *even*, German modal particles (Zifonun et al. 1997: 1209), e.g., *doch, einfach*, comparatives in the sense of 'it is more accurate to say' (Quirk et al. 1985: 476), e.g., *I would be more angry than upset*, content disjuncts[93] (Quirk et al. 1985: 622), e.g., *natürlich ärgerte ich mich*, additive conjuncts (Quirk et al. 1985: 635), e.g., *vor allem etwas wütend*, repeated items that can be considered to be emphasized (Taboada et al. 2014: 10), e.g., *quälen und quälen*. Which items were included or excluded was motivated by the focus on grammatical intensification by adverbial subjuncts following Quirk et al. (1985: 589). This way, grammatical intensifiers in the immediate linguistic context of the emotion lexemes could be easily integrated into the cognitive linguistic model of Emotion Events as grammatical structures that give access to conceptualization (cf. Chapters

[93] Content disjuncts were included in the study on EM, cf. previous section and Chapter 8.

1, 2.1.2). Other forms of intensification, e.g. by repetition (*quälen und quälen*) or lexical intensification, were therefore excluded, although they are included in systemic-functional-based frameworks (e.g., Taboada et al. 2014: 10). Content disjuncts are not considered as forms of intensification here, but are taken into account as Modifiers of Un-/certainty in Emotion Events in Chapter 8.2 . Similar to the coding of markers of un-/ certainty (cf. Table 9), the intensified emotion lexemes involved in the analysis were tagged as being upgraded or downgraded or both in order to make them separately accessible and analyzable (cf. Table 10). The coding of intensifiers in the immediate linguistic context of emotion lexemes allowed the investigation of them as Modifiers in Emotion Events. As has been argued above, these modifiers contribute substantially to the display of the Emotion Events (parts-whole perspective; cf. Chapter 5.4.3), since in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes they give rise to implicatures, can be regarded as CCs and resources of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapters 2.2.3, 2.3.3, 2.4.3).

5.4.5 Statistical Modeling

Emotion Scenarios, Experiencer Types, Emotion Concept Clusters and Construal

Emotion Scenarios, Experiencer Types (cf. Chapter 6), Emotion Event Construal including Emotion Concept Clusters (cf. Chapter 7) have been chosen to be investigated by descriptive statistics only and the focus lies on qualitative analyses. At some stages in the qualitative analysis (e.g., when raw frequencies were also reported such as with respect to part-of-speech realizations or experiencer types), the χ^2-test (or for low frequencies the Fisher's Exact Test) was used to test for potential associations between categorical variables investigated across the language groups, i.e. the British English and German subcorpus (Levshina 2015: 199–222). The effect size was indicated via Cramér's V (Levshina 2015: 199–222).

However, it must be kept in mind that two assumptions must be met for performing χ^2-tests: 1) The sample must be randomly selected and the observations have to be independent, and 2) Every observation can be classified into one category (Levshina 2015: 199–222). Strictly speaking, the independence of observations is not met in this experimentally elicited corpus, since the participants wrote two texts each. For corpus-linguistic purposes, however, this assumption is often "relaxed" (Levshina 2015: 212), and it can therefore be argued that the use of association measures such as the χ^2-test can be justified in studies that have a qualitative focus to provide at least an idea of potential language preferences. In the quantitative analyses (cf. the next section), however, a more powerful statistical model was chosen, i.e. a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM), that allows to test group differences while taking individual variation

into account. More importantly, GLMMs are suitable for experimental studies with a nested design and repeated measures (e.g., the fact that the participants wrote two texts) to name but two advantages (Levshina 2015: 189–197). Lastly, GLMMs are far more informative with respect to statistical inference than association measures (Levshina 2015: 189–197).

Emotion Lexemes, Markers of Un-/certainty and Intensifiers

Frequency data of both emotion lexemes (cf. Chapter 6) and modifiers (cf. Chapter 8), i.e. EM and intensifiers, were analysed statistically using regression models that allow to take into account data-specific error structures and the hierarchical organization of the data (generalized linear mixed models, GLMM; Baayen 2008; Gries 2013; Levshina 2015) in the R Language and Environment for Statistical Computing (version 3.4.1; R Core Team 2017) with the 'lme4' package (Bates et al. 2015; version 1.1-13; function 'glmer' with the 'bobyqa' optimizer). In analogy to Study 1 (cf. Chapter 6) the frequency of emotion lexemes relative to the number of words per text), the frequency of emotion lexemes with EM or intensifiers relative to the total number of emotion lexemes was examined, using binomial GLMMs with language and gender as interacting fixed effects in the full model and the participant as a random effect[94]. The same general model structure was used to analyze the effect of high, medium and low EM, and, upgraders and downgraders, in which case the probability of EM and the upgrading/ downgrading of the intensifier was included as a fixed effect besides language and gender. In addition, overdispersion (i.e. more variation in the data than expected) was taken into account via an observation-level random effect, if required. Model selection based on metrics was used which balance the explanatory power of a model with the number of model parameters (Akaike Information Criterion corrected, henceforth AICc and AICc weights; Burnham and Anderson 2002) including all possible models from the full model (all relevant explanatory variables included) to the null model (only the intercept model) to determine the best fitting model.

[94] In all models authenticity was added as a random effect, since the self-ratings revealed a tendency for German participants to be more fictional in their writings (cf. Table A1; $\chi^2(3)=11.07$, $p<0.05$, Cramer's V=0.208, i.e. a small effect). Authenticity ratings were included in the questionnaires and authenticity was controlled for in the first place, since it was judged to be relevant by some researches (pers. communication Montague). Moreover, integrating authenticity as random effect in the statistical model allowed to take more fictional and essayistic writing styles (cf. Example 12) into account.

5.5 Summary

The corpus design and the methodology adopted in this investigation are motivated by the integrated approach to Emotion Concepts in Context (cf. Chapter 2), and by the conceptualizations of 'emotion', 'context' and 'contrastive analysis' as outlined previously (cf. Chapter 1). More precisely, a corpus-based (and corpus-driven) approach is chosen, since it enables to investigate Emotion Events from a contrastive perspective, and allows for qualitative and quantitative analyses in order to detect frequency effects, understood as indicator of differential entrenchment and language preferences across two languages (cf. Chapter 1). Narratives have been chosen, since emotion events play an important role in narrations, and explicit and implicit emotion discourse can be investigated. The foci of the annotation schemes are derived from previous research results (cf. Chapters 3, 4). The precise annotation procedures are motivated by the overall approach of the investigation, and importantly, the conceptualization of 'emotion' in 'context' (cf. Chapters 1, 2). Emotion is regarded as interactively construed, as participant construct, and all types of context (linguistic, social, socio-cultural and cognitive) have been taken into account in the analysis (cf. Chapter 5.4.3). The annotation schemes capture the linguistic context of emotion lexemes, i.e. co-occurring grammatical structures, that open up cognitive context (via inferencing), and, from a context-anchored parts-whole perspective, provide refined results into the conceptualization of emotion in discourse. The data (cf. Chapters 1, 5.1) is analyzed in the framework of the Extended Emotion Event Model (cf. Chapters 2, 6, 7, 8), in which (the co-occurring) grammatical structures are understood as providing access to conceptualization (cf. Chapter 5.4.3).

6

Baseline of the Contextual Analysis[95]

Contents

[95] Parts of this chapter have been recently published or accepted for publication, cf. Fronhofer (2015, 2019, accepted).

This chapter zooms in on Emotion Events (cf. Chapter 6.1) and investigates the differences in their linguistic realization from a contrastive perspective (cf. Chapters 1, 2.5), focusing on the British English and German AWE datasets (cf. Chapter 5.1). Section 6.2.1 summarizes the language-preferential displays identified with respect to emotion lexeme frequencies, pointing at differential cognitive entrenchment (cf. Chapters 1, 2.5, 5.1). Overall emotion lexeme display as well as the display of single emotion concepts across British English and German is modeled using inferential statistics (GLMM; cf. Chapter 5.4.5). A descriptive overview over POS-membership and syntactic realizations, experiencers and event chains is provided in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. The last section (cf. Chapter 6.3) takes up the descriptive findings and discusses prominent results in a qualitative analysis. Comparatives are, for instance, identified as context-construing devices (cf. Chapter 2.2.3), and emotion adverbs as resources of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapter 2.4.3). Context can equally be regarded as being imported by the British participants who name more often the CAUSE of the EE (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). At the same time, the results are discussed against the background of previous research on British English and German discourse and British English and German emotion concepts (cf. Chapter 3, 4). The hypotheses that have been formulated drawing on this body of research are reviewed.

6.1 Zooming in on Emotion Events

Figure 6 presents a possible illustration of the EE model (cf. Chapter 2.1.2) that has been developed in the present study on the basis of Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (e.g., 2011). In Figure 6, the prototypical EE, here ANGER, a basic level concept, is drawn. The prototypicality is represented by the round space including a core and the peripheral area. The emotion concept IRRITATION next to ANGER suggests the hierarchical organization of emotion concepts into basic level, subordinated and superordinate categories (Kövecses 1990; Kövecses 2000). Emotion concepts are part of an Emotion Event (EE) which is grounded in space and time (cf. bounded box). Integral parts of the EE are agents, experiencers, causes and appraisal. The EE is viewed and construed from an outside perspective (cf. Chapter 2.1.2).

The present empirical chapter will zoom in on specific constitutive parts of the EE model (cf. bordered notions in Figure 6) and EE in the AWE dataset will be explored from a contrastive perspective (cf. Chapters 1, 2.5). The focus will lie on the frequencies of emotion lexemes (without co-occurrences), while taking POS frequencies into account. Emotion adjectives vs. verbs and emotion adverbs will be discussed in more detail. Moreover, syntactic realizations are considered, specifically present tense and comparative use. Finally, the last focus will lie on Experiencers and Causes in the AWE

dataset.



Figure 6: The Emotion Event Model (based on e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). The model comprises prototypical emotion concepts (cf. ANGER) hierarchically organized (ANGER is superordinate, IRRITATION subordinate). EE are grounded in space and time and comprise experiencer, agent, appraisal (value judgments), cause and arousal. Further event-intrinsic properties are viewing arrangement and linguistic construal (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011).

6.2 Emotion Events: An Overview

6.2.1 Frequencies

Table 11 provides the frequencies of the emotion lexemes (all POS) that give access to the EE of LOVE – LIEBE, JOY – FREUDE, SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG, ANGER – ÄRGER, SADNESS – TRAUER and FEAR – FURCHT displayed by the British English and German participants in AWE (cf. Appendix 8.6, Tables A2 and A3 for emotion lexeme types).

Examples paired with a qualitative analysis with respect to each emotion concept and a detailed discussion thereof follow in Chapter 7 and in particular in Chapter 7.4, i.e. with respect to the linguistic context in which they are displayed[96]. Frequencies of emotion concepts and language preferences in this respect provide the baseline for the subsequent contextual analysis, i.e. for the construal of EE (cf. Chapters 6.3.4, 6.3.5, 6.3.6, 7) and their modification by intensifiers or epistemic markers (cf. Chapter 8).

[96] It is argued here that an analysis of emotion lexemes is only sensible while taking their linguistic context into account (cf. Chapter 5.4.3), and, that their display always involves a perspectivization of the EE. Therefore, examples will be discussed in the respective research chapter on construal, i.e. Chapter 7.

Differences between the British English and German dataset already emerge in the baseline data which will be detailed in the following paragraphs.

Table 11: Emotion Event frequencies in AWE. The percentages indicate the number of lexemes of a certain emotion concept relative to the total number of emotion lexemes of a given language. The percentage with respect to the total number of lexemes refers to the number of overall emotion lexemes relative to the overall number of words in the British and German subcorpora.

EE	**BrE**	%	**Ger**	%
LOVE – LIEBE	31	3.1	45	4.7
JOY – FREUDE	423	42.3	441	46
SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG	63	6.3	65	6.7
ANGER – ÄRGER	134	13.4	189	19.7
SADNESS – TRAUER	191	19.1	106	11
FEAR – FURCHT	157	15.7	111	11.5
total	999	1.88	957	1.57

The raw frequencies and percentages show tendencies, e.g., language preferences in the display with respect to ANGER – ÄRGER, FEAR – FURCHT, SADNESS – TRAUER and LOVE – LIEBE, but not with respect to the overall number of emotion lexemes displayed, not with respect to JOY – FREUDE and SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG. These tendencies were also corroborated by subsequent statistical modeling (cf. Figure 7). In the model (cf. Chapter 5.4.5), gender effects are also taken into account.
Overall, AICc-based model selection on binomial GLMMs suggested that British narratives (N=120) displayed slightly more emotion lexemes relative to the respective narrative's total word count in comparison to German narratives (N=136) potentially with a weak gender effect (gender shown as round and triangular point characters, respectively; see legend). All relative occurrences are reported, their distribution (grey boxplot[97]) as well as the best model fit[98] (black horizontal line) with confidence intervals[99] (grey shaded area). Overall statistical inference was, nevertheless, not conclusive

[97] The boxplots show here and in the following the distribution of the data. The boundaries of the box, i.e. the hinges, mark the first and third quartile of the data, i.e. the lower boundary marks the first 25% of the data, the upper boundary marks the cutpoint at 75% of the data. The interquartile range is marked by the size of the box. The whiskers are never longer than 1.5 times the interquartile range and the data points outside of the whiskers' range are outliers (Levshina 2015: 44, 57).

[98] The 'best model fit' is the model selected by the AICcs that explains the distribution of the data best.

[99] "A 95% confidence interval means that if we repeated the estimation process again and again on different samples from the population, there would be 95% probability that the given confidence interval is one containing the true parameter value [...] of all constructed confidence intervals" (Levshina 2015: 98). There are three important facts to note about confidence intervals: 1) The smaller the confidence interval, the less the error margin, 2) Non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals signal significant differences ($p<0.05$), and 3) Overlapping confidence intervals signal most probably not

as all models, including the null model[100], had roughly similar AICc[101] weights (cf. Table 12), which is also reflected in the overlapping confidence intervals.

Table 12: Model selection based on AICc and AICc weights with respect to relative occurrences of emotion lexemes across British English and German. 'Model' provides here and in the following tables the models, named after the fixed effects, i.e. the explanatory variables, i.e. language, language and (+) gender, gender and the language-gender interaction (*). The model/fixed effect named at the top of the table is the one that has been selected by the AICc in the model selection process, which can be drawn from AICs deltas and AICc weights. The larger the difference between the AICc weights, e.g. between the first and the second model, the better the first model fits. If the difference between the AICc weights is not very pronounced, statistical inference can be assumed to be non-conclusive, as it is the case here. 'df' provides the degrees of freedom.

model	**df**	**ΔAICc**	$\mathbf{W_{AICc}}$
language	5	0.00	0.251
language + gender	6	0.17	0.231
gender	5	0.44	0.201
null model	4	0.52	0.194
language*gender	7	1.44	0.123

significant differences (Levshina 2015: 103).

[100] The null model is the model chosen if the null hypothesis is true, i.e. if there is no effect (Levshina 2015).

[101] The AICc is a goodness-of-fit-measure for the comparison of models with different numbers of parameters. It penalizes models with too many predictors and the smaller the AICc, the better (Levshina 2015: 149–152). The AICc weights provide information about the best model, i.e. the model selected (Levshina 2015: 149–152).



Figure 7: Relative occurrences of emotion lexemes across British English and German. Gender is shown as round and triangular point characters (cf. legend). The distribution of all relative occurrences is reported (grey boxplot) as well as the best model fit (black horizontal line) with confidence intervals (grey shaded area).



Figure 8: Relative occurrences of JOY – FREUDE lexemes across British English and German. Gender is shown as round and triangular point characters (cf. legend). The distribution of all relative occurrences is reported (grey boxplot). No significant language or gender effects have been detected.



Figure 9: Relative occurrences of SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG lexemes across British English and German. Gender is shown as round and triangular point characters (cf. legend). The distribution of all relative occurrences is reported (grey boxplot). No significant language or gender effects have been detected.

Table 13: Model selection based on AICc and AICc weights with respect to relative occurrences of JOY and SURPRISE lexemes across British English and German.

JOY			
model	**df**	**ΔAICc**	**W_{AICc}**
null model	4	0.00	0.46
language	5	1.21	0.25
gender	5	2.08	0.16
language + gender	6	3.31	0.09
language*gender	7	4.48	0.05
SURPRISE			
model	**df**	**ΔAICc**	**W_{AICc}**
null model	4	0.00	0.52
language	5	2.02	0.19
gender	5	2.08	0.19
language + gender	6	4.11	0.07
language*gender	7	5.59	0.03

AICc-based model selection on binomial GLMMs with respect to single emotion concepts equally suggested no language differences with respect to the concepts JOY –

FREUDE and SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG (cf. Figures 8 and 9). For JOY and SURPRISE the null models were selected (cf. AICc weights in Table 13). All relative occurrences are reported for each concept across the British and German data and their distribution (grey boxplot). Gender is shown as round and triangular point characters (cf. legend).

The model selection suggested for LOVE – LIEBE a language*gender effect (cf. Figure 10, Table 14), the Germans using more lexemes than the British, the males using more than the females. The distribution of all relative occurrences is reported (grey boxplot) as well as the best model fit (blue/ red horizontal lines for male and female) with confidence intervals (blue/ red shaded area for male and female). Gender is shown as round and triangular point characters (cf. legend). However, statistical inference can be said to be non-conclusive with respect to LOVE – LIEBE, since the confidence intervals are largely overlapping and the AICc weights of the first and second model selected do not differ much. Moreover, when looking at the raw frequency data (cf. Table 11), we find that LOVE – LIEBE lexemes are not that frequent in AWE, and therefore, the results obtained, i.e. the language*gender effect should be viewed with caution and not be overestimated.



Figure 10: Relative occurrences of LOVE – LIEBE lexemes across British English and German. Gender is shown as round and triangular point characters (cf. legend). The distribution of all relative occurrences is reported (grey boxplot) as well as the best model fit (blue/ red horizontal lines for male and female) with confidence intervals (blue/ red shaded area for male and female).

With respect to ANGER – ÄRGER, SADNESS – TRAUER and FEAR – FURCHT

AICc-based model selection on binomial GLMMs suggested, however, differences between British English and German as well as gender effects. German narratives (N=136) displayed more ANGER lexemes relative to the respective narrative's total emotion lexeme count in comparison to British narratives (N=120) (cf. Figure 11; All relative occurrences are reported, their distribution is shown as grey boxplot as well as the best model fit as a black horizontal line). A slight gender effect could also be detected (high AICc weight of the second ranked model, cf. Table 15), the males using more ANGER lexemes than the females (gender shown as round and triangular point characters; see legend).

Table 14: Model selection based on AICc and AICc weights with respect to relative occurrences of LOVE – LIEBE across British English and German.

LOVE			
model	**df**	**ΔAICc**	**W_{AICc}**
language*gender	7	0.00	0.30
language + gender	6	0.34	0.25
gender	5	1.13	0.17
language	5	1.22	0.16
null model	4	2.08	0.11

AICc-based model selection on binominal GLMMs suggested a language effect for SADNESS – TRAUER, the British using more SADNESS lexemes than the German TRAUER lexemes. The second best model chosen suggested a language and gender effect (cf. Figure 12 and Table 16), i.e. the females used more SADNESS/ TRAUER lexemes than the males (the gender effect is not shown in Figure 12).



Figure 11: Relative occurrences of ANGER – ÄRGER lexemes across British English and German. Gender is shown as round and triangular point characters (cf. legend). The distribution of all relative occurrences is reported (grey boxplot) as well as the best model fit (black horizontal line) with confidence intervals (grey shaded area).

The best model selected with respect to FEAR – FURCHT was the language and gender model (cf. Figure 13 and Table 16). In the British narratives, more FEAR lexemes relative to the respective narrative's total emotion lexeme count were displayed than FURCHT in the German narratives, the females used more FEAR/ FURCHT lexemes than the males.

Table 15: Model selection based on AICc and AICc weights with respect to relative occurrences of ANGER – ÄRGER across British English and German.

model	**df**	**ΔAICc**	$\mathbf{W_{AICc}}$
language	6	0.00	0.591
language + gender	6	1.82	0.238
language*gender	7	3.72	0.092
null model	4	4.77	0.054
gender	5	6.41	0.024



Figure 12: Relative occurrences of SADNESS – TRAUER lexemes across British English and German. Gender is shown as round and triangular point characters (cf. legend). The distribution of all relative occurrences is reported (grey boxplot) as well as the best model fit (black horizontal line) with confidence intervals (grey shaded area).



Figure 13: Relative occurrences of FEAR – FURCHT lexemes across British English and German. Gender is shown as round and triangular point characters (cf. legend). The distribution of all relative occurrences is reported (grey boxplot) as well as the best model fit (blue/ red horizontal lines for male and female) with confidence intervals (blue/ red shaded area for male and female).

Table 16: Model selection based on AICc and AICc weights with respect to relative occurrences of SADNESS – TRAUER and FEAR – FURCHT lexemes across British English and German.

SADNESS			
model	**df**	**ΔAICc**	**W_{AICc}**
language	5	0.00	0.63
language + gender	6	2.04	0.23
language*gender	7	3.06	0.14
null model	4	14.56	0.00
gender	5	16.64	0.00
FEAR			
model	**df**	**ΔAICc**	**W_{AICc}**
language + gender	6	0.00	0.50
language*gender	7	2.11	0.17
language	5	2.16	0.17
gender	5	2.85	0.12
null model	4	5.47	0.03

All in all, the analysis of the frequency data provided insights into differences between British English and German displays of emotion lexemes in AWE that can be interpreted as language preferences and signs of differential cognitive entrenchment (cf. Chapters 1, 2.5, and the dicussion in 6.3). Differences were detected with respect to single emotion concepts, ANGER – ÄRGER, SADNESS – TRAUER, FEAR – FURCHT and LOVE – LIEBE, but not with respect to overall emotion lexeme displays and the emotion concepts JOY – FREUDE and SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG.
On top of these differences across the British English and German dataset, Chapters 7 and 8 will take the investigation of 'emotion' in 'context' as step further, and view in how far the use of the emotion lexemes discussed so far varies with respect to the contextual configurations, i.e. occurrences, in which they are displayed (cf. Chapters 1, 2, 5.4.3). However, before turning to such contextual effects, POS-frequencies and syntactic realizations of the emotion lexemes in AWE are viewed in the next section.

6.2.2 POS Frequencies and Syntactic Realizations

Table 17 provides the frequencies of EE in AWE across the different POS. A slightly higher number of emotion adjectives and emotion adverbs is displayed in the British English data than in the German data (47.7% vs. 44.2%), whereas the German narratives contain slightly more verb-based EE than the British narratives (23.7% vs. 18.1%). The association between British English and German Emotion Events and

different POS was statistically significant ($\chi^2(3)=17.85$, $p<0.001$); the effect size (Levshina 2015: 209) was however small (Cramér's $V<0.1$), pointing at a weak association.

Table 17: POS frequencies of Emotion Events in AWE. ADJ stands for adjectives, V for verbs, N for nouns and ADV for adverbs. Percentages indicate the number per POS relative to the total number of EE.

POS	**BrE**	%	**Ger**	%
ADJ	477	47.7	423	44.2
N	306	30.6	294	30.7
V	181	18.1	227	23.7
ADV	35	3.5	13	1.3
total	999	100	957	100

Table 18 refers to the syntactic realization of emotion adjectives (e.g., *angry – wütend*), emotion nouns (e.g., *anger – Ärger*), emotion verbs (e.g., *to irritate – verär-gern*) and emotion adverbs (e.g., *angrily – wütend*) in AWE. Adjectives comprise the categories attributives (e.g., *joyful (song)*; *(ein) freudig (erwartend erscheinendes Lächeln)*), positives (e.g., *happy – glücklich*), comparatives (e.g., *happier – glücklicher*) and superlatives (e.g., *happiest – glücklichste*). Nouns unify emotion nouns in singular (e.g., *fear – Angst*) and plural use (e.g., *fears – Ängste*). The category of verbs is split into subcategories according to the use of the verb in base form (e.g., *to hope – hoffen*), present tense (e.g., *I hate – ich hasse*), third person present tense (e.g., *irritates – ärgert*), imperative (e.g., *Geben Sie sich zufrieden mit dem, was Sie haben!*, 'Be satisfied with what [the mark] you got!'[102]), past tense (e.g., *hoped – hoffte*), gerund (e.g., *worrying*[103]), past-participle (e.g., *hoped – gehofft*) or non-affirmative use (e.g., *not happy – nicht glücklich*). The position of adverbs, i.e. initial (e.g., *Surprisingly, [...] – Überraschenderweise [...]*), mid (e.g., *I [...] began to frantically read the feedback given to me [...] – [Ich werde] dann hoffentlich heute Abend feiern gehen*, 'I will hopefully go and celebrate this evening'.) and final position (*I reply worriedly – [...] ich esse genüsslich*, '[...] I eat pleasurably/ with relish') as well as parenthetical (e.g., *My only form of consolation was the knowledge that my ill-prepared classmates had struggled enough to (hopefully) put them on a similar level*[104]) use, has been considered.
Except for the syntactic realization of verbs ($\chi^2(6)=56.23$, $p<0.05$, Cramér's $V=0.321$, moderate effect), no significant associations could be noted with respect to the adjective, noun or adverb categories. The association observed for the syntactic realizations

[102] Imperative was only used once in the German corpus data.
[103] Only one instance could be noted in German where a gerund was involved in an emotion expression, but was not an emotion lexeme itself, i.e. *(vor Wut) schäumend*. Therefore, it is not included in Table 18.
[104] There was not instance of parenthetical use of emotion lexemes in the German subcorpus.

of verbs has however to be interpreted with caution, since (British) English and German do not match in their realization of tense and aspect (e.g., Hawkins 1986, 1992; König 1996; Fischer 1997; Kortmann 1999).

Table 18: Syntactic realization of POS in AWE. The percentages indicate the number of the different realizations relative to the total number of the respective POS.

Syntax	**BrE**	%	**Ger**	%
ADJ				
attributive	48	10	48	11.3
positives	416	87.2	352	83.2
comparatives	11	2.3	21	4.9
superlatives	2	0.4	2	0.4
N				
singular	296	96.7	278	94.5
plural	10	3.2	16	5.4
V				
base form	61	33.7	70	30.8
present tense	36	19.8	69	30.3
3rd person present	8	4.4	40	17.6
imperative	0	0	1	0.4
past tense	30	16.5	27	11.8
gerund	26	14.3	0	0
past participle	20	11	20	8.8
non-affirmative	72	–	66	–
ADV				
initial position	9	25.7	5	38.4
mid position	17	48.5	7	53.8
final position	8	22.8	1	7.6
parenthetical	1	2.8	0	0

The most prominent difference (cf. Table 18) between the language subcorpora of AWE is the relatively high frequency of verbs in the German dataset, more specifically verbs in present tense EE (30.3% for German vs. 19.8% for British English); minor slight differences have been identified in comparative use (about twice as many comparatives in German; 2.3% for British English vs. 4.9% for German) and positioning of EE adverbs (fewer adverbs for German, mid position and initial position for British English). These differences are discussed from a qualitative perspective in Chapter 6.3. All in all,

in addition to the differences in frequency displays across British English and German, which have been identified in the previous section (cf. Chapter 6.2.1), relevant differences in the display of emotion lexemes with respect to POS-membership and syntactic realization have been detected in the AWE datasets. The next section summarizes the results regarding Experiencers and Emotion Event Chains.

6.2.3 Experiencers and Emotion Event Chains

Table 19 provides the raw frequencies of EE experiencers in AWE, which are one of the potential role archetypes[105] (Langacker 1987 [1991]) apart from agents or causes (cf. Chapter 2.1), and which have been identified to be potential loci where language preferences in emotion displays become manifest (cf. Chapter 4.1.1). Overall, all experiencer types were identified in the British English and German datasets with 1st person experiencers being the most frequent experiencer type (66.8% for British English and 62.5% for German) and the 2nd person experiencers the least frequent one (less than 1%). The British data contains slightly more 1st person experiencers (about 4% more) and unexperienced EE (about 5% more) than the German dataset, whereas the German participants have displayed more often 3rd person (nearly twice as many, 11.2% vs. 19.6%) and impersonal experiencers (slight difference of 1%).
Table 20 provides the most prominent Emotion Event chains in AWE. The experiencer is more frequently named in the German narratives (cf. Ex_Em and Em_Ex and Ex_Em_C and its positional variations, i.e. overall 88.3% for German experiencer display vs. 81.4% for British English), whereas the British data comprises more often the cause of the emotion (C) as can be deduced from the C_Em/ Em_C scenario frequencies and the Ex_Em_C (including all alternatives) scenario types (overall 52.3% for British English vs. only 38.7% for German). The results with respect to experiencer types and emotion event chains are discussed from a qualitative view in Chapter 6.3. The naming or omitting of experiencers and/ or causes in emotion displays might point at differences in how emotion is discursively construed across the British English and German dataset (cf. Chapters 2.2.3).
Overall, the association measures (χ^2-test) yielded significant associations ($p<0.05$), but only small effect sizes for the experiencer types ($\chi^2(3)=34.61$, Cramér's V=0.136) and emotion event chains ($\chi^2(3)=75.194$, Cramér's V=0.196) across the British English and German corpus data. In the next section, the results presented so far will be discussed step by step and viewed against previous research and the hypotheses of this investigation (cf. Chapters 3 4).

[105] Experiencers are "emoters" in Bednarek (2008a: 70), they are "the one to whom an emotional response is assigned", "who is said to 'feel' an emotion".

Table 19: Experiencer type frequencies in AWE. Percentages refer to the number of experiencer types relative to the overall number of EE of the language subcorpora. The overall number of 998 experiencers instead of 999 is due to a methodological procedure, where in one instance only one experiencer had to be coded, but two emotion lexemes have been taken into account (*stress relief*).

experiencer	**BrE**	%	**Ger**	%
1st person	668	66.8	599	62.5
2nd person	2	0.2	5	0.5
3rd person	112	11.2	188	19.6
impersonal	48	4.8	55	5.7
unexperienced	168	16.8	110	11.4
total	998	100	957	100

Table 20: Emotion event chain frequencies in AWE. The overall number of 998 experiencers instead of 999 is due to a methodological procedure, where in one instance only one experiencer had to be coded, but two emotion lexemes have been taken into account (*stress relief*).

experiencer	**BrE**	%	**Ger**	%
Em	95	9.5	96	10
Ex_Em (or Em_Ex)	380	38	490	51
C_Em (orEm_C)	89	8.9	14	1.4
Ex_Em_C (or Em_Ex_C Em_C_Ex Ex_C_Em C_Em_Ex C_Ex_Em)	434	43.4	357	37.3
total	998	100	957	100

6.3 Contrastive Analysis and Discussion

6.3.1 Emotion Lexemes

Emotion Events have been found to differ across the British and German AWE datasets with respect to emotion concept frequencies (specific concepts), POS- and syntactic realizations, experiencers and event chains (cf. Chapter 6.2). However, differences with respect to the overall frequency of emotion lexemes have not been corroborated by statistical analyses across the British and German narratives (cf. Chapter 5.4.4). This might be due to a shared cognitive basis (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1998) that has been activated during the experiment, i.e. the participants displayed in response to the elicitation prompts triggering emotional experiences with the same frequency. This

corroborates the logic of the overall experimentation (cf. Chapters 1, 1.4, 5.1).
Furthermore, no quantitative differences with respect to the positive emotion concept JOY – FREUDE and the both positive and negative emotion concept SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG across the British and German datasets have been identified. The British-German differences with respect to the positive emotion concept LOVE – LIEBE should not be overrated in light of the overall low frequency of LOVE – LIEBE lexemes. The fact that no differences could be detected in the positive emotion concepts, apart from LOVE – LIEBE, points at an actual similarity in positive emotion frequency displays, and therefore cognitive entrenchment, across these two languages. Alternatively, it might be explained by the fact that differences, if there are any, are more pronounced and can more easily be detected with respect to negative emotion concepts. The latter hypothesis is informed by information-theoretical investigations into affective processing which state that the "working emotion vocabulary" shows a "preponderance" for negative words over positive and neutral ones (Schrauf & Sanchez 2004: 266) because individuals tend to interpret and reason more about negative experiences than positive or neutral ones. This seems to remain a robust result across generations and languages (Schrauf & Sanchez 2004). Therefore, hypotheses H1 a) and partly b) (cf. Chapter 4.2) were refuted. Moreover, the results are contradictory to prior investigations (e.g., Taboada et al. 2014), namely that more (positive) emotion concepts should occur in the English narratives and fewer emotion concepts in the German dataset (but not in negative narratives). The differing results might be partly explained by genre-specificities, Taboada et al. (2014) focusing on film reviews, this study on elicited narratives.
Differences with respect to negative emotion concepts, more precisely that German ÄRGER is more frequent than ANGER, and British FEAR is more frequent than FURCHT, have been identified in AWE and, therefore H1 b) is partly corroborated in form of frequency effects with respect to specific emotion concepts (cf. Chapter 4.2). Such frequency effects might be discussed against the dimensions of cross-cultural differences established by House (2006a), where English discourse is characterized by more implicitness than German discourse which is reported to be more explicit (cf. Chapter 3). Following this logic, a higher frequency of emotion lexemes would be detected in discourse that is typically more explicit, i.e. for example German discourse. This, however, seems to contradict another dimension identified by House (2006a), namely the one that postulates more content-orientation for German discourse. Moreover, British FEAR is also more often displayed than the German FURCHT, and not the other way around, and the reason for a frequent display in the British narratives may lie in its cognitive semantics. FEAR might possibly be a weaker emotion concept than FURCHT. This could be deduced from the English – Polish comparison of FEAR vs.

STRACH (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2013a) where STRACH revealed to be the stronger emotion concept (cf. Chapter 4.1.1). Overall, one could hypothesize that the dimensions of communicative contrasts, more precisely the ones of explicitness vs. implicitness and content-orientation vs. addressee-orientation depend on the emotion concept displayed.

Gender differences have been identified for ANGER – ÄRGER and FEAR – FURCHT and can to a certain extend be explained by a differential cognitive entrenchment (cf. Chapters 1, 2.5), "frequency of occurrence of such units" (Langacker 1987 [1991]: 52), which has been initiated from the very beginning of (affective) language socialization (Oatley et al. 2006; Planalp 1999). The differential use of emotion concepts might be due to underlying gender stereotypes, although the latter have to be interpreted with caution, since they have often been investigated out of linguistic, situational or cultural context or without taking modalities into account (Brody & Hall 2008). Gender stereotypes are regarded to modulate interactional expectations and "display rules", i.e. "cultural norms about how, when and where emotions can be expressed by males and females in any particular culture" (Brody & Hall 2008: 396). Overall, women have been found to talk or write more often about positive and negative emotions (Brody & Hall 2008; Mulac et al. 1990; Thomson & Murachver 2001: 398–399). However this strain of research has been contradicted by Mulac et al. (2000) and has been modified by Mehl & Pennebaker (2003) who found women to use more positive emotion words, but men referring more often to ANGER. Gender differences with respect to linguistic expression where completely refuted by Bradley (1981) and Weatherall (2005), for instance, who argue against "any meaningful differences in men's and women's language" (Newman 2008: 212). The latter strain of research would explain why gender differences with respect to overall emotion lexeme frequencies could not be detected in AWE. The former strain of research would explain gender differences with respect to ANGER – ÄRGER, the males using more ANGER – ÄRGER lexemes than the females. Gender differences with respect to FEAR – FURCHT, the females using more FEAR/ FURCHT lexemes than the males might be explained by a male desire to display fearlessness (Diener & Lucas 2004), referring again to studies into cultural stereotypes (Brody & Hall 2008). Moreover, a relatively recent study on gender differences drawing on a database of 14,000 written and spoken texts (Newman 2008) identified gender differences, using the analysis tool LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count; Pennebaker et al. 2015)[106], with respect to the use of emotion words, the females using more positive

[106] This analysis tool is regularly used in global "linguistic" analyses by social scientists and psychologists. However, it does not allow for a context-sensitive analysis of emotion lexemes and is limited with respect to which emotion lexemes are investigated. All in all, findings relying on LIWC text analyses only should be viewed with caution.

and negative emotion words but not ANGER words. This corroborates the findings of the present study with respect to ANGER – ÄRGER, but contradicts the results on overall emotion lexeme frequencies. All these results on a gender differential display of emotion lexemes/ emotion concepts with its underlying categorization into "male" and "female" might, however, be taken up and re-evaluated in the light of recent, more inclusive research on gendered identities (e.g., Litosseliti & Sunderland 2002) and/ or transgender studies (e.g., Zimman 2017), for instance.
The differences between the frequencies of British English and German SADNESS – TRAUER lexemes, i.e. the fact that in the British data more SADNESS lexemes were displayed has not been reported before. It is hypothesized here, that the British concept SADNESS is closely related to the one of JOY in so far as the display of JOY engenders necessarily the display of SADNESS lexemes in the British dataset. This is further explored in Chapter 7, and particularly 7.4, where the role of SADNESS – TRAUER in JOY – FREUDE displays is discussed from a qualitative perspective. The display of own JOY is perceived as a potential source of others' SADNESS and therefore involves a shift in perspectives. This might be linked to House (2006a: 252) and the dimension of "orientation towards the other" that is according to House characteristic of British English discourse (cf. Chapter 3).

6.3.2 Adjectives vs. Verbs

With respect to POS frequencies across the AWE datasets, a higher frequency of emotion adjectives and adverbs was found for the British narratives, while the German participants displayed more emotion verbs. A differential use of POS with respect to emotion displays has been reported before by Wierzbicka (1995) who investigated Russian emotion displays, where emotions are often designated by verbs, and English ones, which uses rather adjectives to designate the same emotions. Wierzbicka (1995) argues that the differential POS use points at a differential conceptualization of emotions, different "cognitive styles" (Wierzbicka 1995: 224), based on her thesis of total iconicity, i.e. "similarity of form reflects similarity of meaning, and difference of form, reflects difference of meaning" (Wierzbicka 1995: 224), that rejects all arbitrariness of the linguistic sign. While an extreme version of this theory, i.e. differences in form (POS membership) entails a difference in meaning, might be rejected and while numerous linguists have criticized the idea and judged it to be groundless (e.g., Palmer 1984: 55–56), Wierzbicka (1995) points at an important formal characteristic, and therefore conceptualization, of English emotional expression, namely the fact that it employs mostly adjectives and pseudo-participles such as in *Mary was sad/ pleased/[...]/ glad* (Wierzbicka 1995: 226), i.e. passive states, and not so frequently emotion verbs, i.e.

actions, such as *worry, grieve, rejoice, pine* (Wierzbicka 1995: 226), some of them being used ironically or archaically (Wierzbicka 1995: 227).

In the AWE corpus data, a difference in the use of adjectives vs. verbs is manifest across all emotion concepts, also for example in the display of JOY – FREUDE (cf. Table 21; $\chi^2(1)=18.14$, $p<0.05$, Cramér's V=0.18, i.e. a small effect size). While in the German corpus data, verbs make 30.8% of all FREUDE lexemes[107], verbs in the British dataset make only 16.8% off all JOY lexemes. The language preferences in the use of JOY/ FREUDE adjectives is, by contrast, not that important, but still statistically significant; in the British dataset 47.5% of all JOY lexemes are adjectives and in the German dataset a slightly lower percentage of FREUDE adjectives (40.3%) can be detected.

Table 21: JOY – FREUDE and POS realizations.

JOY/ FREUDE	BrE	%	Ger	%
ADJ	201	47.5	178	40.3
V	71	16.8	136	30.8

[107] The percentages indicate the number of JOY/ FREUDE verbs or adjectives relative to the overall number of emotion verbs or emotion adjectives in the respective language.

Table 22: Most frequent JOY adjectives, nouns and verbs.

ADJ	**fq**	**N/fq**
happy	56	10.5
proud	38	7.1
confident	16	3.0
pleased	16	3.0
excited	8	1.5
N	**fq**	**N/fq**
confidence	24	4.5
hope	19	3.5
relief	16	3.0
pride	15	2.8
excitement	12	2.2
joy	12	2.2
happiness	10	1.8
V	**fq**	**N/fq**
hope	19	3.5
calm	8	1.5
enjoy	6	1.1
relax	4	0.7
reassure	2	0.3

However, the mere comparison of the frequency data (cf. Tables 22 and 23) of the adjective *happy* vs. *glücklich* in AWE, to choose but one prominent and representative example, shows that it is used most frequently in the British subcorpus (56 instances), whereas only displayed twelve times in the German narratives, pointing at German participants employing rather nouns (*Freude* and rarely *Glück*[108]) and verbs (*freuen*; cf. as well Chapter 2.5.1).

[108] Only the emotion meaning of *Glück*, i.e. 'happiness', and not the meaning of 'luck' has been taken into account.

Table 23: Most frequent FREUDE adjectives, nouns and verbs.

ADJ	**fq**	**N/fq**
stolz ('proud')	27	4.4
zufrieden ('satisfied')	23	3.7
froh ('glad')	16	2.6
glücklich ('happy')	**12**	1.9
erleichtert ('relieved')	10	1.6
	...	
N	**fq**	**N/fq**
Freude ('joy')	50	8.2
Hoffnung ('hope')	9	1.4
Erleichterung ('relief')	8	1.3
Zufriedenheit ('satisfaction')	6	0.9
Glück ('happiness')	5	0.8
Stolz ('pride')	5	0.8
	...	
V	**fq**	**N/fq**
freuen ('rejoice')	26	4.2
beruhigen ('reassure')	8	1.3
genießen ('enjoy')	5	0.8
hoffen ('hope')	3	0.4
erhoffen ('hope')	1	0.1
	...	

Wierzbicka's cultural interpretation of the fact that in English mostly adjectives and pseudo-particles are used for emotional expression, is, however, to take with caution, since Wierzbicka (1995) brings forward no further proof for her hypothesis of these formal characteristics not being "accidental". She only concludes that the English POS-use would reflect

> an important feature of Anglo-Saxon culture – a culture which tends to view behavior described disapprovingly as 'emotional' with suspicion and embarrassment.[...] It is uncharacteristic of Anglo-Saxons to "give themselves" to emotions. Their culture encourages them to be *to be glad* rather than to *rejoice*, to be *sad* rather than *to pine*, to be *angry* rather than to *fume* or *rage*, and so on. (Wierzbicka 1995: 227)

In the British AWE dataset, several examples (cf. Examples 5) could be identified, from a mere content-analytical point of view, where participants wrote about holding

back their emotions[109], i.e. in Wierzbicka's words not "giv[ing] themselves" to emotions (e.g., *I could..., But I doubt..., contain my excitement, Yet, I was reluctant to share*). In the examples provided, the reasons for holding back are, however, different ones than those provided by Wierzbicka (1995: 227). In the AWE data, reasons for holding back emotions comprise taking 'others that do not have succeeded' into account, i.e. participants show a certain other-orientedness (cf. dimensions of communicative contrasts, Chapter 3.1). Wierzbicka (1995) provides, however, 'suspicion or embarrassment towards emotional behavior' as reasons. Examples 5 a. and b. will be taken up and further linguistically analysed and discussed in Chapter 7 on the language preferences in the construal of emotions. Consequently, the cultural differences pointed out by Wierzbicka (1995) might not only be reflected in a differential use of POS with respect to emotion displays but also with respect to how emotions are construed in context, i.e. positively or negatively (cf. Chapters 3 and 7) in British English and German.

(5) a. *I am so happy that I* ***could*** *scream and dance with joy in the middle of everyone.* ***But I doubt that would go down very well****. Most of my fellow students have not even passed the exam.* ***So I just had to contain my excitement*** *whilst I was in front of everyone.* (e_f_024_2)

b. ***I couldn't contain my excitement*** *or wait to tell those closest to me who were so proud of me, telling me how well I had done.* ***Yet*** *when I went back into class and saw the other students* ***I was reluctant to share my good news and joy****.* (e_f_030_2)

The idea of a differential underlying cognitive basis of different POS-realizations and syntactic realizations has been explored by Dziwirek & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2010), for instance, who identify POS-mismatches and differential conceptualizations of emotions between English and Polish. With respect to (British) English and German such investigations of a syntactic nature, which take the present results even a step further, remain to be undertaken.

6.3.3 Present Tense

Although one has to be cautious not to over-interpret the language preferences with respect to the syntactic realizations (cf. Chapter 6.2.2), since tense and aspect systems

[109] Content that is relevant from a content-analytical point of view is printed in bold in Examples 5 a. and b.

across English and German do not match (e.g., Hawkins 1986, 1992; König 1996; Fischer 1997; Kortmann 1999), and a form-based analysis does not suffice to arrive at sound conclusions, the higher number of German EE in present tense in contrast to British narratives has to be discussed (although the effect size for the association was rather small, cf. Chapter 6.2.2). Drawing on narrative-analytical approaches, a differential number of Emotion Events in present might be related to differential "'animated' storytelling styles" (De Fina & Georgakopoulou 2012: 64), i.e. a differential performance of narrative (Wolfson 1982) by the "performance key" (De Fina & Georgakopoulou 2012: 64) conversational present. Moreover, Bauman (1986, 2004: in De Fina & Georgakopoulou 2012) stresses that performance keys vary cross-culturally which remains to be empirically investigated with respect to British English and German.
When sieving the AWE narratives, we find that conversational present is frequently used in the German data. Although conversational present does also exist in the British dataset (cf. Example 11 a.), the present tense can often be linked to the expression of "general truths" (cf. Example 6 a., *frustrates/ is* in 3rd person present tense), while in the German narratives the use of present tense is often indeed conversational present (*jubelt* 'rejoices' in present tense, instead of the past tense form *jubelte* 'rejoiced'), sometimes in combination with reported speech and/ or spoken to be written language (cf. *"Annie? Was gibt es? [...]", 'Annie? What's up? [...]'* and the frequent exclamation marks), rendering the narrative more vivid (cf. Examples 6 b.[110]).
However, this preliminary analysis would have to be refined and would have to be followed-up by investigations into conversational story-telling styles across British English and German that approach "performance keys" from a functional perspective. This could shed more light on the question of language preferences with respect to performative styles across British English and German. In the next section, the results on comparatives, in particular their role in Emotion Event construal (cf. Chapters 1, 2.2.3, 5.4.3) are discussed, and language preferences are related to previous research (cf. Chapter 3).

(6) a. *What* ***frustrates*** *me more* ***is when*** *people who spend a couple of days or even just one night on an essay and they get the same mark as me even though I have spent about two weeks on it!* (e_f_008_1)

b. *Ich* ***habe*** *die Horrorklausur mit 1,0* ***bestanden****. [...] Ich* ***rufe*** *sofort meine Mama an, die genauso wie ich seit Wochen dem Ergebnis der Klausur entgegenfiebert. "Annie? Was gibt es?" meldet sich meine*

[110] The bold print indicates proof for present tense, the additional underlining stands for emotion verbs in present tense.

Mama. "Mama, halte dich fest, ich habe doch heute das Ergebnis von der Allgemeinen Pädagogik Klausur erhalten, du erinnerst dich, die Horror-Klausur, die kaum einer besteht?" "Ja, ich weiß welche du meinst. Und hast du sie bestanden?" fragt meine Mama neugierig. "Ja, und jetzt halte dich fest. Mit einer glatten 1,0!!" ***schreie ich überglücklich*** *ins Telefon. "Nein!? Ja Wahnsinn! [...] Das muss gefeiert werden, wenn du zu Hause bist"* ***jubelt*** *meine Mama* ***stolz****.* (g_f_031_2)

'I have passed this horror exam with A[111]. I phone my mum right away who has been same as me feverishly looking forward to receiving the results of this exam for weeks. "Annie? What's up?" my mum answers. "Mum, hang on, as you know I have received the results of the general education exam today, you remember, the horror exam, that hardly anybody passes?" "Yes, I know which one you mean. And have you passed it?" my mum asks with curiosity. "Yes, and now hold on. I received an A*!!" I* ***scream more than happily*** *into the phone. "No!? Wicked! [...] This has to be celebrated when you are home" my mum* ***rejoices proudly****.'*

6.3.4 Comparatives

In the British dataset, comparatives (cf. Table 24) are mostly ones of positive emotion concepts and in particular the form *happier* (e.g., *I couldn't be happier*), whereas the German dataset includes a greater variety of positive (e.g., *fröhlicher, glücklicher*) and negative (e.g., *deprimierter, wütender*) emotion adjectives in comparative.

This result is in line with House's findings (e.g., House 2006a), more precisely the dimension of ad-hoc formulation vs. verbal routines, the former being characteristic of German discourse, the latter of English discourse (cf. Chapter 3). The German's tendency to be more ad-hoc in their formulation would therefore explain the greater variety and creativity of comparative types identified in AWE.

As has been pointed out before (cf. Chapter 4), comparatives can also function as intensifiers (Quirk et al. 1985). The fact that overall, the German subcorpus tends to comprise more comparatives (although this is only a tendency and has not been confirmed by inferential statistics, since the data was too scarce) is compatible with previous research that reports the Germans to intensify more often (cf. Chapter 3.2.3; e.g., *Das machte mich zuerst noch glücklicher über meine Note*, 'Initially, this made me

[111] Literally: 'with 1,0', i.e. the best grade.

even happier about my mark'.). Language preferences in displays with respect to intensifier use will be further investigated in Chapter 8, which discusses the modification of EE by intensifiers.

Comparatives have also to be viewed from a parts-whole perspective as context-construing device (cf., Fetzer 2012: 116, on inflection as context-construing device). By using the comparative form, i.e. connecting the inflectional morpheme [er] to the word form [[happi][er]] (e.g., happier) or [er] in [wütend[er]], the grammatical status of the lexeme is made explicit as well as its status in the Emotion Event (cf. linguistic context as relational construct, Chapter 5.4.3). Moreover, implicatures are triggered and cognitive context is imported via linguistic form (Grice 1975), viz. the comparative (cf. Chapters 1, 2.2.3, 5.4.3).

The dynamic nature of context (Gumperz e.g., 1992b, 2003; cf. Chapter 1, 2.4), i.e. the negotiation and co-construction of context via comparatives becomes clear against the background of the experimental approach in the present study (cf. Chapter 5.1). The participants received elicitation prompts providing a common ground, i.e background information (*unfair mark/ highest mark possible*), providing the CAUSE for potential emotion display in the narratives (cf. Chapter 6.3.6). In their emotion narratives they take up this context in the process of contextualization (cf. Chapter 2.4.2), "shift[...] contextual presuppositions" (Gumperz & Levinson 1996: 403) and hereby enrich conversational contributions. I.e., the prompts implicitly target at triggering JOY/ FREUDE or ANGER/ ÄRGER, which are displayed by the participants as the positives (e.g., *happy or wütend*), but also as comparatives (e.g., *happier or wütender*), hereby re-constructing context. As the frequency data suggest (cf. Table 24), this is done differently across the British and German subcorpora (cf. as well 'Contextualization Conventions', Chapter 2.5).

Table 24: Comparative Types in AWE. Raw frequencies (fq) and normalized values per 10,000 words (N/fq) are provided.

BrE	fq	N/fq	Ger	fq	N/fq
happier	7	1.3	nervöser ('more nervous')	2	0.3
more relieved	1	0.1	entspannter ('more relaxed')	2	0.3
more elated	1	0.1	sicherer ('more secure')	2	0.3
more frustrating	1	0.1	glücklicher ('happier')	2	0.3
more pleasant	1	0.1	stolzer ('prouder')	1	0.1
			wütender ('angrier')	1	0.1
			überraschender ('more surprising')	1	0.1
			beschämender ('more embarrassing')	1	0.1
			erfreuter ('more pleased')	1	0.1
			erleichterter ('more relieved')	1	0.1
			optimistischer ('more optimistic')	1	0.1
			deprimierter ('more depressed')	1	0.1
			schockierter ('more shocked')	1	0.1
			fassungsloser ('more stunned')	1	0.1
			fröhlicher ('more cheerful')	1	0.1
			unsicherer ('more unsecure')	1	0.1
			ärgerlicher ('more annoying')	1	0.1

6.3.5 Adverbs

Table 25 provides the emotion adverb frequencies and types detected in AWE in initial position (I), mid-position (M), final position (F) and parenthetical position (P; Quirk et al. 1985). Emotion adverbs are more frequent and more varied in the British English dataset.

Apart from this, Table 25 provides the position of the emotion adverbs identified in AWE, since from a discourse-strategic point of view, adverb positions in general, and in particular those of emotion adverbs, can be decisive (e.g., Aijmer 2008). Adverbs, such as adverbial disjuncts (Quirk et al. 1985), that are not well integrated into the utterance and placed at the "pre-front field" are intended to "frame the subsequent utterance" and to "provide some information which is important for understanding" (Auer 1996: 310).

In this, the initial position (and also parenthetical position) is appropriate, apart from textual functions, for rhetorical functions such as commenting (Aijmer 2008). This is illustrated in Examples 7 a.-c.[112], where the adverbial disjunct (Quirk et al. 1985)

[112] Emotion adverbs are printed in bold, relevant lexemes and constructions discussed are underlined.

hopefully (a.) is in parenthetical position, the adverbial disjunct *worriedly* (b.) in final position and the adverbial disjunct *Self-consciously* (c.), which is not marked as such by a separating comma, is in initial position.

Table 25: Comparative Types in AWE. Emotion adverb frequencies and types detected in AWE in initial position (I), mid-position (M), final position (F) and parenthetical position (P; Quirk et al. 1985).

BrE	**fq**	**N/fq**	**Ger**	**fq**	**N/fq**
hopefully (3x I, 3x M, 1x P)	7	1.3	hoffentlich	5	0.8
nervously (1x I, 3x F, 1x M)	5	0.9	(3x I, 2x M, 'hopefully')		
amazingly (1x I, 1xF, 1xM)	3	0.5	überraschend/-erweise	4	0.6
frantically (1x M, 1x I)	2	0.3	(2x I, 2x M 'surprisingly')		
pleasantly (2x M)	2	0.3	ungern	2	0.3
desperately (2x M)	2	0.3	(2x M, 'reluctantly')		
happily (2x M)	2	0.3	genüsslich (1x M, 1xF,	2	0.3
tant[i]lisingly (M)	1	0.1	'pleasurably/ with relish')		
anxiously (F)	1	0.1	erschreckend	1	0.1
self-consciously (I)	1	0.1	(M, 'shockingly')		
worriedly (F)	1	0.1	erstaunlicherweise	1	0.1
worryingly (M)	1	0.1	(M, 'astonishingly')		
shockingly (F)	1	0.1			
angrily (F)	1	0.1			
surprisingly (I)	1	0.1			
sadly (M)	1	0.1			
lovingly (M)	1	0.1			
regrettably (I)	1	0.1			
furiously (M)	1	0.1			

While in all three examples, the participants display first-person experiencer emotions, the emotion adverbs might at the same time be regarded to be evaluative comments (cf. Aijmer 2008). In Example 7 a., the evaluative comment is additionally marked by parentheses and further negative evaluative items such as *ill-prepared* or *struggled*. *[W]orriedly* represents an afterthought (cf. Aijmer 2008) and *Self-consciously* is used descriptively (cf. Aijmer 2008) which is additionally contextually indexed by the description of the first-person experiencer's outward appearance (e.g., *preen my hair and face*) which is at the same time negatively evaluated (e.g., *making them worse and making me look even more like a wreck*).

(7) a. *My only form of consolation was the knowledge that my ill-prepared classmates had struggled enough to (**hopefully**) put them on a similar*

level. (e_m_010_1)

b. *I reply,* ***worriedly****.* (e_f_002_1)

c. ***Self-consciously*** *I fiddle with my clothes and attempt to preen my face and hair, almost certainly succeeding only in making them worse and making me look even more like a wreck.* (e_f_002_1)

In Examples 8 a. and b.[113], *surprisingly* and *Überraschenderweise* evaluate (cf. Aijmer 2008), apart from being lexemes displaying first-person experiencer's SURPRISE, the emotion event (*excited*; *Wow, ich habe wirklich eine 1,0!* 'Wow, I really got an A*', giving implicitly access to SURPRISE and JOY), i.e. disagree with expectations made in previous stretches of discourse (e.g., *crying*, *I did not revise as hard as the others*; *Tippfehler* 'typing error', *raten* 'guess'). From a dialogic perspective, *surprisingly* and *Überraschenderweise* can be considered to be resources that allow the writer to adopt an intersubjective stance (White 2003), i.e. position them intersubjectively (cf. Chapters 2.3.2, 8). Moreover, the adverbs can be regarded to establish "evaluative coherence" (cf. *and surprisingly* and *Überraschenderweise aber*; Thompson & Zhou 2000: 39), provide insights into the writers' thoughts and to construct a dialogue between writer and reader (Thompson & Zhou 2000).

(8) a. *I am so excited that I received the results of that exam, I remember crying so much afterwards since I know that exam was the one exam I did not revise as hard as the others and* ***surprisingly,*** *it had the best mark out of all the other courses.* (e_m_007_2)

b. *Note 1.00. Das muss doch eigentlich ein Tippfehler sein. [...] Am Ende ging mir dann fast die Zeit aus und ich musste oft die richtige Antwort raten (bei Multiple-Choice-Fragen ist das glücklicherweise ja möglich).* ***Überraschenderweise*** *habe ich aber die Bestnote erreicht. [...] Wow, ich habe wirklich eine 1,0!* (g_f_032_2)

'A*. This has to be a typing error. [...] At the end I nearly ran out of time then and I had to guess the right answer (this is fortunately possible with multiple-choice questions). **Surprisingly** I got, however, the best mark. [...] Wow, I really got an A*!'

All in all, the analysis of the emotion adverbs in AWE underlines that these parts-of-

[113] Emotion adverbs are printed in bold, relevant lexemes and constructions discussed are underlined.

speech can be used to display emotions and/ or at the same time serve to evaluate utterances. This is done more frequently in the British dataset.

6.3.6 Experiencers and Causes

The distribution of experiencers in AWE, notably the high frequency of 1st person experiencers can be explained by the experimental setting, i.e. the prompt that triggered first person experiences ("write about your personal experience", cf. Chapter 5.1). The Germans naming more often the experiencer(s) might point at the German narratives being more explicit in this respect, drawing again on one characteristic of German discourse (House 2006a; cf. Chapter 3). The slightly higher frequency of German impersonal experiencers (e.g., *Wenn **man** da ganz alleine vorne steht, total aufgeregt ist [...]*, 'When **one** stands in front [of everybody] and is totally nervous [...]', g_f_002_1) might be explained by a general characteristic of German texts, i.e. a higher "impersonality" (e.g., Kranich 2016: 127). Third-person experiencers in German might have been displayed more frequently, since German participants might be more ready to respond creatively (House 2006a) to the task given (cf. the dimension of communicative contrasts with respect to ad-hoc formulations, Chapter 3.1). I.e. German participants tended to include more often others' emotions (cf. third-person experiencers) although the elicitation prompt targeted the participants' own emotions (cf. Chapter 5), resulting at the same time in quite different narratives/ text types (cf. as well Example 12, page 174). In this respect, the German narratives were not more ego-oriented (only 62.5% first-person experiencers in the German data vs. 66.8% first-person experiencers in the English data) as could have been expected from the dimensions of communicative contrasts (House 2006a). The high frequency of British first person experiencers would then, following the same logic, mean that the British participants stuck more to the task given (cf. the dimension of communicative contrasts with respect to verbal routines, Chapter 3.1). The higher number of unexperienced EE (cf. *relief, frustration, worry, anger* in Example 9) in the British English narratives, leaving the experiencer implicit, could be explained by a general characteristic of (British) English discourse to be more implicit (House 2006a).

With respect to emotion event scenarios, the British participants seem to provide more often the CAUSE of the emotional experience, although the CAUSE was given by the elicitation prompts, i.e. *an unfair mark* or *the highest mark possible* (cf. Chapter 5). The fact that in the British narratives, the cause was however (again or differently) explicitly provided might point at the fact that the participants wanted to be precise about what really caused the emotional reaction, e.g., gave more often a detailed account on their evaluation/ appraisal of the situation, and justified their emotions –

comparable to the results with respect to the emotion adverbs, which are more frequent in the British dataset. This is the case in Example 9 were FRUSTRATION (*frustrating, frustration*), WORRY (*worry*) and ANGER (*upset, anger*) are justified (*because I had to fight to get the grade I deserved*, *ordeal*) by the unfairness of the marking process that has been confirmed by third persons (two relatives, the participant's father being a university professor himself, which cannot be drawn from the extract provided, but from the complete narrative) and finally resulted in a remark (*better mark*). From a dialogic perspective (White 2003; cf. Chapter 2.3.2), the naming of the causes as justifications of the emotions displayed makes sense in so far as a general characteristic of the British narratives might be that they are more open to dialogic alternatives (cf. as well Chapter 8) which are weighed and discussed against the position(s) taken by the participant.

(9) *The whole experience* ***upset*** *me because I had to fight to get the grade I deserved when really it is what I should have been given to begin with. [...] It is* ***frustrating*** *when I think that I am paying £9000 a year to have my work undervalued. [...] The* ***relief*** *of getting the better mark does not override the* ***frustration*** *and* ***worry*** *and to an extent the* ***anger*** *which the whole ordeal has caused.* (e_f_007_1)

In the German corpus data, the CAUSE is not so often provided. Instead of displaying the cause of the emotional experience again or in different form, the German participants assume the CAUSE as something known to everybody, as common ground (the participants and the researcher(s), i.e the reader/s), and the resulting emotions as natural responses to such CAUSES. In Chapter 8 on epistemic markers in EE, drawing on the framework of intersubjective positioning (White 2003; cf. Chapter 2.3.2), it will be further developed that in the German narratives less room is left for dialogic alternatives (cf. the high frequency of contractive resources such as *natürlich*, 'naturally'; cf. Table 34).

Drawing on the Gricean CP (Grice 1975; cf. Chapter 2.2.1), one could argue that the explicit display of CAUSES in the British dataset is a means of triggering particularized conversational implicatures. In Example 9, the implicatures are anger-related ones, since they can be linked to the immediate linguistic context of the anger lexemes displayed (*upset*, *frustrating*). As CAUSES are actually provided in the experimental design (i.e. *an unfair mark* or *the highest mark possible*), British participants could be regarded to flout the maxims of quantity and manner (cf. Chapter 2.2.1) more often than the German participants. The maxim of quantity can be regarded as flouted, since the participants are "more informative than is required" (Grice 1975: 45) by

providing additional CAUSES of the EE. The maxim of manner can be regarded as flouted, since the participants are not as "brief" as they could have been (Grice 1975: 46). In Example 9, the CAUSES provided in the immediate linguistic contexts of the explicited emotion lexemes *upset* and *frustrating*, i.e. *because I had to fight* and *when I think that I am paying*, trigger particularized implicatures. Not only the unfair mark is therefore causing distress, but the fact that the student had to fight, and in addition to that, had to pay tuition fees. 'Fighting' and 'paying tuition fees' in order to obtain fair marks are not conventional contexts, but particularized ones which trigger ANGER. These anger-related implicatures triggered by explicitly providing the CAUSES import cognitive contexts and are integral parts of the overall anger EE display (cf. Chapter 2.2.3).

All in all, it was not possible to draw further conclusions from the qualitative analysis of the AWE corpus data with respect to the naming or omitting of the CAUSES in EE and respective discourse functions across British English and German. This should, however, be investigated in follow-up studies, since "causal antecedents" (Pavlenko 2008a) are known to differ across languages. Only experiments that are tailored to specifically (and uniquely)[114] investigate CAUSES of EE (across languages) can provide insights into language preferences in displays of causes in emotion discourse and their discursive functions.

6.4 Summary and Conclusions

This chapter presented the contrastive findings on emotion lexemes frequencies, POS-membership and syntactic realizations of British English and German EE in AWE. Moreover, experiencers and emotion event chains were investigated across the datasets. The findings summarized provide the baseline for the subsequent analysis that will continue to focus on the linguistic and cognitive context of emotion lexemes in the framework of EE, and will comprise studies on emotion concept clusters, co-occurring evaluative cues and modifiers of un-/certainty and intensification in EE (cf. Chapters 7 and 8).

It has been shown that the frequency of the EE displays is, with respect to certain emotion concepts, language- and gender-specific (e.g., more ÄRGER lexemes in German than ANGER lexemes in the British narratives or more FEAR – FURCHT lexemes in female than in male narratives, cf. Chapter 5.4.4), pointing at differential cognitive entrenchment and language preferences (cf. Chapters 1, 2). The corpus data proves that

[114] Potential experiments could comprise free writing tasks with elicitation prompts that only provide one emotion lexeme as stimulus, but which do not name any causes or evaluations beforehand. Such research paradigms would provide insights into the quality of CAUSES provided for similar EE across languages.

EE might be conceptualized across different languages by different POS (eg. adjectives vs. verbs) and certain syntactic realizations (e.g., the present tense) might be more frequent than others (cf. Chapter 6.2.2). Comparatives have been viewed as context-construing devices (cf. Chapters 2.2.3, 5.4.3), and emotion adverbs as resources of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapters 2.3.3, 5.4.3). Moreover, minimal EE scenarios might differ with respect to the display of archetypical roles (e.g., impersonal experiencers in the German data vs. 1st-person-experiencers in the British dataset) and the constitutive parts of the emotion scenarios (e.g., the British participants provided more often the CAUSE in the EE than the Germans, and herby imported context; cf. Chapter 6.2.3, and Chapter 2.2.3, 5.4.3).

Overall, the findings corroborated the hypotheses formulated, H1 a)-c) (cf. Chapter 4), namely that differences in type and token frequencies of emotion lexemes and hence emotion concepts across the English and German dataset exist. Moreover, these differences were expected to depend on the type of the emotion concept. Finally, differences across British English and German with respect to minimal emotion scenarios, involving cause, emotion and experiencer, were predicted. Moreover, this chapter named some possible starting points for future investigations on emotion concepts across British English and German, such as follow-up studies on differential use of different POS in emotion display, narrative styles or causal antecedents in EE to name but three.

7

Emotion Events and Context I[115]

Contents

[115] Parts of this chapter have been recently published or accepted for publication, cf. Fronhofer (2015, 2019, accepted).

In this chapter, emotion concepts are investigated in their linguistic and cognitive context drawing on an extended model of EE (cf. Chapters 2.1.2, 2.2.3). The extended model is presented in detail in the first sections of this chapter (cf. 7.1, 7.2), and provides the background to the subsequent analyses.
The analyses fall into two parts: The first part views the occurrences of specific British and German concepts from a quantitative perspective, drawing on descriptive statistics. It views the emotion concepts in more global linguistic contexts on the one hand, understood in this investigation as positive and negative narratives, and investigates, on the other hand, more local linguistic contexts, such as EE construal through positive/ negative evaluative cues and in form of emotion concept clusters in the immediate linguistic context. The second part discusses the quantitative results from a qualitative perspective and zooms in on single emotion concepts (LOVE – LIEBE, JOY – FREUDE, SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG, ANGER – ÄRGER, SADNESS – TRAUER, FEAR – FURCHT) with a specific focus on their construal, i.e. congruent and non-congruent contextual configurations that give rise to generalized and particularized conversational implicatures (Grice 1975; cf. Chapters 2.2.1, 2.2.3) via congruent or non-congruent evaluative cues or in form of equivalent or ambivalent emotion concept clusters (cf. Chapter 5.4.4). This chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings against previous research (cf. Chapters 3, 4) and existing emotion models (Bednarek 2008a; Martin & White 2005; cf. Chapters 1, 2.3).

7.1 Background: Construing Emotion Events

"Events as they are" — "Events as we see them"

In this section, the theory of events is reviewed in more detail in order to lay out where the mostly syntactic and semantic model (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011: 29) adopted so far can be extended and implemented in order to include a usage perspective (cf. Chapter 2.1.2). A discursive reading of the model, more specifically a "cognitive-interactional perspective" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011: 34), has been introduced in current theoretical descriptions, but, has neither been explicitly explored nor implemented in recent investigations that take linguistic and cognitive context into account (cf. Chapter 5.4.3). In her theoretical paper "Events as they are", Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2011: 29) defines events as "mental and linguistic [i.e. syntactic, semantic, **discursive** [emphasis by NMF] concept" and states, in line with Siewert (1998), that "any human experience can be considered an event provided a language user perceives it as such and imposes a relevant structure on it" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011: 33). This view, i.e. "Events as we see them" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011:

30), goes hand in hand with an "interactional on-line meaning emergence perspective" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011: 30), i.e. the view that events are constructed on-line, in an interaction depending on the participants of the action and its context. In other words, the "[p]erception of what is going on in the outside world as events is a matter of the imposition of an event structure, i.e. retaining their spatio-temporal characteristics and providing bounding in their [cognitive-interactional, NMF] construal" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011: 33).[116]

Therefore, cognitive-interactional event construal is necessarily "biased" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011: 35), i.e. subjective, and one of the construal parameters of events, along "EVENT-EXTRINSIC", "EVENT-INTRINSIC PROPERTIES" and "WIDE-BACKGROUND", are "CONSTITUTIVE SENTIMENTS and EMOTIONS". The latter influence "language choices" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011: 35). To provide some examples, it is fully up to the conceptualizer of events if a *bottle* is *half full* or *half empty* (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011: 35) or if a person is perceived as *stingy* or *thrifty* (Langacker 1987 [1991]: cited by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011). How events are perceived is "conditioned by sentiments and emotions" which can also be seen from examples such as *half of the American people are sad* vs. *half of American population is happy* found in some Republican media reactions to Barack Obama winning the 2008 Presidential elections in the United States (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011: 35).

The same is true, as is argued in this investigation, for EE, i.e. "experiencing" schemas (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011: 39) — one of the seven basic and universal conceptual schemas (Dirven & Verspoor 2004) with the proposition (Langacker 1987 [1991]) or predication (Hangeveld 1992) type *What does someone feel, [...]?* — where we can conceptualize, i.e. (intersubjectively) construe for example ANGER (cf. Chapter 8.2), in terms of *I am very angry* or *I am slightly irritated*, i.e. subjectively perceived strong and mild versions of ANGER, or in terms of *I am certainly angry* or *I am probably angry* or *I am perhaps angry*, i.e. modulating the probability of the ANGER event. Moreover, an emotion might be positively or negatively (functionally) construed (cf. Example 1 a. and Chapters 5.4.4, 7.2). Construal, then, refers, in social psychological terms (Aronson et al. 2007), to the perception, comprehension and interpretation of the world. In cognitive linguistic terms (Langacker 1987 [1991]) construal refers to various "lexical and syntactic operations language users employ to portray the same

[116] The term 'construal' is used differently by Langacker (1987 [1991]), Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2011) and Bednarek (2008a) or Bamberg (1997), it will be specified as 'cognitive linguistic construal' in cognitive linguistic terms (Langacker 1987 [1991]), as 'cognitive-interactional construal' in cognitive-interactional terms proposed by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2011), as 'functional construal' in discourse-functional terms (Bednarek 2008a; Bamberg 1997), as 'intersubjective construal' in terms of theories on intersubjectivity (White 2003), and as 'psychological construal' in psychological terms (Aronson et al. 2007).

scene in the objective world" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011: 36). In this investigation, functional construal, and more precisely subjective construal, is not understood in cognitive linguistic terms, i.e. it is not used in Langacker's sense (Langacker 1987 [1991]), but viewed from a systemic-functional (Bednarek 2008a), narrative-analytical (Bamberg et al. 1995) and intersubjective (White 2003) perspective (cf. Chapter 2).[117] In the next section, it will be laid out how the cognitive linguistic model of EE is extended taking contextual configurations of emotion lexemes in form of further emotion lexemes (in emotion concept clusters) and co-occurring evaluative cues and their functional contribution to the EE into account (cf. as well Chapters 2.2.1, 2.2.3, 5.4.4).

7.2 Extending the Emotion Event Model (I)

Emotion Concept Clusters and Evaluative Cues as Means of Subjective Event Construal

It is argued here that further emotion concepts (operationalized by equivalent, ambivalent and complex emotion concept clusters as well as blends) and evaluative cues (operationalized via the notion of semantic prosody, cf. Chapter 5.4.4) co-occurring with emotion lexemes provide insights into the participant's subjective construal of the EE. Subjective construal is hereby conceived of as positive or negative construal of the EE in form of positive or negative co-occurring evaluative items or emotion concepts drawing on Bednarek (2008a: 63–65) who attributed a disambiguating function to evaluative items in the linguistic context of the emotion concept SURPRISE, which can be either positive or negative. However, the notion of subjective construal is applied to further emotion concepts in this investigation. Consequently, as is argued here, every concept might potentially be positively or negatively construed, regardless of their inherent valence. JOY – FREUDE, for instance, might be negatively construed (cf. Example 1 a.), although it is in general positive emotion concept and its 'intuitive' meaning is positive (Louw 1993: 172). Other studies report on the discursive construction of the same events by dual or mixed emotions and conclude that participants are linguistically able to take different perspectives on the same event for discursive purposes, i.e. the indexing of stance (Bamberg et al. 1995; Bamberg 1997).
Construal might be regarded as congruent and as giving rise to generalized conversational implicatures (Grice 1975; cf. Chapters 2.2.1, 2.2.3). Non-congruent construals, as they are called in this study, involve non-congruent evaluative cues or ambivalent

[117] However, interestingly, a cognitive linguistic perspective on subjective (cognitive linguistic) construal (Langacker 1987 [1991]) has recently been claimed by Krawczak (2016) to be compatible with a functional (Traugott 1995; Traugott & Dasher 2002) and an interactional one (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011).

emotion concept clusters or blends and trigger, in anology, particularized conversational implicatures. The latter might be perceived as "prosodic clashes" (Morley & Partington 2009: 146), or discursive prosodic clashes, and give rise to "collocational inference[s]" (Hunston 2007a: 259). Hunston (2007a: 259) links collocational inference to Grice (1975). She provides the example of *Thank you for your characteristically helpful [message]* for an unusal collocation (*characteristically helpful* is a low frequent collocation in the Bank of English Corpus) by which Grice's maxim of manner can be regarded as flouted (Hunston 2007a: 259). The message would then, in Grice's theoretical framework, give rise to the implicature *'you are being unhelpful, and typically so'*. Following Hunston (2007a: 259), collocational inference focuses on the interpretation of the addressee, Grice's theory (Grice 1975; cf. Chapter 2.2.1), on the contrary, focuses on what the message implies, i.e. the intention of the addressor (Hunston 2007a: 259). The oddness of the collocation would, as Hunston (2007a) concludes, explain the inference to be drawn. This can be related to non-congruent event construals where the subjective perspectivization and import of cognitive contexts (cf. Chapter 2.2.3) by the participant might be more easily detected, i.e. when evaluative harmony is "missing" (Morley & Partington 2009: 147).

Although subjective construal is not understood in cognitive linguistic terms (Langacker 1987 [1991]) in this investigation, a perspectivization of events from a functional perspective (Bednarek 2008a; Bamberg et al. 1995; Bamberg 1997) seems to be compatible with or at least not contradicting or opposing the examples (*stingy* or *thrifty* or *a bottle* being *half full* or *half empty* or *half of the American people are sad* vs. *half of the American population is happy*, cf. Chapter 7.1) provided by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2011) and Langacker (1987 [1991]). While the cognitive linguistic/ cognitive-interactional notion of subjective construal draws on lexical and syntactic means while integrating an interactional perspective (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011) on event construals, subjective (functional) construal as referred to in this investigation comprises a perspectivization of EE, i.e. perceiving an EE as being positive or negative, via discursive construction, i.e. co-occurring emotion lexemes in emotion concept clusters and positive/ negative evaluative cues in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes (cf. Chapter 2). With respect to appraisal-theoretical terms (cf. Chapter 1.2), overlays of affect (emotion concept clusters) and overlays of affect with judgment (emotion lexemes with co-occurring cues) and their functional contribution to discourse are investigated. Figures 14, 15 and 16 illustrate in how far the EE could be extended taking congruent and incongruent contextual configurations into account.



Figure 14: The Emotion Event Model and Clusters (based on e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). The emotion concept JOY clusters with further positive emotion concepts resulting in a congruent EE display. Possible functions of this congruent display remain to be explored. Congruent contextual configurations might, instead of or in addition to further emotion concepts, comprise further positive evaluative items (not shown here).



Figure 15: The Emotion Event Model and Clusters (based on e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). The emotion concept JOY cluster with positive but also negative emotion concepts resulting in a non-congruent EE display. Possible functions of this incongruent display remain to be explored. Incongruent contextual configurations might, instead of or in addition to further emotion concepts, comprise further negative evaluative items (not shown here).



Figure 16: The Emotion Event Model and Blends (based on e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). The emotion concept BITTERSWEET represents a blended EE. The lexeme-inherent display of BITTERSWEET comprises both a positive (JOY) and negative (SADNESS) emotion concept, giving rise to a blended EE. Possible functions of this lexeme-inherent incongruent display remain to be explored.

Figure 14 provides, based on an example taken from AWE which will be discussed at length in the subsequent qualitative analysis, an instance of positive construal of the emotion concept JOY by further congruent (cf. Chapter 5.4.4), positive emotion concepts (RELIEF, PRIDE, HAPPINESS), resulting in an emotion concept cluster. Figure 15 provides an example for an incongruent contextual configuration (cf. Chapter 5.4.4), where JOY co-occurs and clusters also (apart from a congruent one, i.e. PRIDE) with further incongruent, i.e. negative emotion concepts (GUILT, SADNESS). Figure 16 illustrates a display of a both positive and negative experience (BITTERSWEET), emerging from the blending of JOY with SADNESS. Possible functions, namely a subjective construal of the EE by the contextual configurations illustrated above, will be explored in the qualitative analyses (cf. Chapter 7.4).

The next sections provide first a descriptive overview over the occurrences of specific emotion concepts in global contexts, i.e. across positive and negative narratives, and an overview over the construal of positive and negative emotion concepts in their immediate linguistic context. The inspection of these results helps to identify congruent and non-congruent contextual configurations (cf. Chapters 5.4.4, 7.1) which are subject to subsequent qualitative analyses. The latter are expected to provide insights into potential discourse functions of congruent and non-congruent contextual configurations in EE (cf. Chapters 2.2.1, 2.2.3).

7.3 Emotion Event Construals: An Overview

7.3.1 Positive and Negative Narratives

Tables 26 and 27 provide the distribution of EE concepts across positive and negative narratives (cf. elicitation prompts, Chapter 5.1), which are understood to be more global contexts in which EE in AWE are displayed.

Table 26: Emotion Events in positive narratives. Percentages refer to the number of EE in positive narratives relative to the overall number of EE of one emotion concept.

EE	**BrE**	%	**Ger**	%
LOVE – LIEBE	18	58	20	44.4
JOY – FREUDE	321	76	341	77
SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG	47	75	38	58
ANGER – ÄRGER	29	22	38	20
SADNESS – TRAUER	76	40	54	51
FEAR – FURCHT	89	57	75	68
total	580	58	566	59

Table 27: Emotion Events in negative narratives. Percentages refer to the number of EE in negative narratives relative to the overall number of EE of one emotion concept.

EE	**BrE**	%	**Ger**	%
LOVE – LIEBE	13	42	25	56
JOY – FREUDE	102	24	100	23
SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG	16	25	27	42
ANGER – ÄRGER	105	78	151	80
SADNESS – TRAUER	115	60	52	49
FEAR – FURCHT	68	43	36	32
total	419	42	391	41

Based on the preliminary assumption made that emotion concepts displayed in the positive narratives should (largely) be positive emotion concepts (i.e. LOVE, JOY and perhaps SURPRISE), whereas emotion concepts realized in the negative narratives should (mostly) be negative emotion concepts (i.e. ANGER, SADNESS, FEAR), one finds that SURPRISE is mainly displayed in the positive British narratives (75%), whereas the German participants display ÜBERRASCHUNG both in positive and negative narratives (nearly equally distributed 58% in positive and 42% in negative narratives). Equally unexpected is the relatively high frequency of SADNESS – TRAUER (40% for British English and 51% for German) and FEAR – FURCHT (57% and 68%)

displayed in both German and British positive narratives. The language preferences with respect to the distribution of emotion concepts across positive and negative narratives such as in the case of SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG as well as the display of negative emotion concepts in globally positive contexts (i.e. positive narratives) such as SADNESS – TRAUER and FEAR – FURCHT will be taken up and will be further discussed in qualitative analyses with respect to the positive or negative construal of emotion concepts in Chapter 7.4. The χ^2-test with respect to the language-preferential display of emotion concepts across the British and German positive and negative narratives yielded only significant results for emotion concept display in negative narratives ($\chi^2(5)=47.59$, $p<0.05$, small effect with Cramér's $V=0.242$). This seems to point at the fact that language preferences are more pronounced in negative narratives. This is compatible with the view that if differences exist, they emerge in particular in negative contexts and with respect to negative emotion concepts (cf. Chapter 6.3).

7.3.2 Emotion Event Construal

Tables 28 and 29 provide the frequencies of positively and negatively construed (cf. Chapter 7.1) emotion concepts, i.e. emotion concepts with co-occurring positive and negative evaluative cues. The χ^2-statistic finds significant associations between the positive construal of emotion concepts across the British and German dataset on the one hand ($\chi^2(4)=22.93$, $p<0.05$, Cramér's $V=0.156$, i.e. a small effect), and, between the negative construal of emotion concepts in AWE on the other hand ($\chi^2(5)=58.58$, $p<0.05$, Cramér's $V=0.241$, i.e. a small effect). LOVE is mostly positively construed both in the British and German data (90% and 91%). ANGER has only been negatively construed in AWE (100% negative construal for both the British and German subcorpus). SURPRISE is an emotion concept that can be equally construed positively and negatively (cf. Chapter 4), however it was more frequently construed positively in the British dataset (67%), whereas the German participants construed it equally positively and negatively (52% and 48%), but more frequently negatively than in the British dataset (cf. Chapter 7.3.1). SADNESS and FEAR are more often positively construed[118] in British English (9% and 4%) than in German (1% and 2%). JOY can be negatively construed and is more often in co-occurrence with negative cues in the British dataset (17%) than the German FREUDE (4%). These results with respect to local linguistic contexts and the construal of emotion concepts that corroborated the tendencies detected in the previous section from a more global perspective (i.e. the occurrence of positive and negative emotion concepts in positive or negative narratives)

[118] The question whether SADNESS – TRAUER and FEAR – FURCHT are really positively construed or whether they have to be regarded as being displayed in the context of JOY – FREUDE events, and as rather contributing to a negative construal of JOY – FREUDE, will be addressed later.

will be taken up and will be further discussed in qualitative analyses with respect to the positive or negative construal of emotion concepts by positive or negative evaluative cues and/ or further positive or negative emotion concepts in Chapter 7.4.

Table 28: Positive construal of Emotion Events. The overall frequencies do not include three instances (in the British subcorpus) of emotion lexeme display where both negative and positive construal would have been possible. The percentages indicate the number of positive construal of emotion events relative to the overall number of emotion events of each concept.

positive construal	**BrE**	%	**Ger**	%
LOVE – LIEBE	28	90	41	91
JOY – FREUDE	350	83	423	96
SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG	42	67	34	52
ANGER – ÄRGER	0	–	0	–
SADNESS – TRAUER	17	9	1	1
FEAR – FURCHT	6	4	2	2
total	443	44	501	52

Table 29: Negative construal of Emotion Events. The overall frequencies do not include three instances (in the British subcorpus) of emotion lexeme display where both negative and positive construal would have been possible. The percentages indicate the number of negative construal of emotion events relative to the overall number of emotion events of each concept.

negative construal	**BrE**	%	**Ger**	%
LOVE – LIEBE	3	10	4	9
JOY – FREUDE	73	17	18	4
SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG	21	33	31	48
ANGER – ÄRGER	134	100	189	100
SADNESS – TRAUER	172	91	105	99
FEAR – FURCHT	150	96	109	98
total	553	55	456	48

7.3.3 Emotion Concept Clusters

Table 30 summarizes the occurrences of emotion concept clusters categorized according to the number of lexemes being part of the cluster. Overall, clusters comprising up to 6 emotion lexemes are displayed in AWE. The most common clusters in both languages comprise two (86% for British English and 85% for German) or three emotion lexemes (11% in each dataset). The German dataset comprises clusters encompassing up to 4 emotion lexemes (only one occurrence), the BrE dataset clusters up to 6 lexemes (only one occurrence). Blends (cf. Chapter 4.1.2) are displayed in both languages with equal numbers (only two occurrences each), *bittersweet* in the British English narratives and

schadenfroh/ Schadenfreude in the German data. Tables A4 and A5 (cf. Appendix 8.6) lists all emotion concept cluster lexemes that have been displayed in AWE.

Table 30: Frequencies of lexemes comprised in Emotion Event Clusters. Percentages refer to the number of the cluster lexeme type relative to the overall number of emotion concept clusters of one language.

cluster	**BrE**	%	**Ger**	%
two lexemes	84	86	68	85
three lexemes	11	11	9	11
four lexemes	0	–	1	1
five lexemes	0	–	0	–
six lexemes	1	1	0	–
blends	2	2	2	3
total	98	100	80	100

Table 31 provides the frequency of cluster types in AWE (cf. Chapters 4.1.2, 5.4.4). The most frequent cluster type across both British English and German narratives is the equivalent emotion concept cluster (59% and 59%), followed by complex clusters (31% for each dataset), ambivalent ones (9% for the British narratives, 8% for the German narratives) and finally blends (only 2% for each dataset). Ambivalent cluster types and blends have been used equally rarely in both datasets. The quantitative results illustrate the frequent use of similar emotion concept cluster combinations and types across the British English and German dataset (no significant differences for emotion concept cluster and types, χ^2-statistic, $p>0.05$).

Table 31: Emotion Event Cluster Types. The percentages show the occurrence of each cluster type in relation to the overall number of clusters in each language.

cluster type	**BrE**	%	**Ger**	%
equivalent	56	58	47	59
complex	30	31	25	31
ambivalent	9	9	6	8
blends	2	2	2	2
total	98	100	80	100

In the following (cf. Chapter 7.4), qualitative analyses will zoom in on the construal of single emotion concepts through contextual cues including emotion concept clusters, and discuss their functional contribution to the overall construal of the EE across the British English and German dataset.

7.4 Contrastive Analysis and Discussion

7.4.1 SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG

SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG can be positively and negatively construed in British English and German and are displayed accordingly in the German and British AWE narratives. The following examples (cf. Examples 10[119]) illustrate this construal.

(10) a. *If I had a grade that was the highest possible I would be very **surprised** but very happy.* (e_f_022_1)

b. *Die Glückshormone gehen mit mir durch und zaubern mir ein Lächeln ins Gesicht. [...] Ich bin **überrascht**, erleichtert, stolz, überaus glücklich zugleich. Als wäre ich in dieser Minute der glücklichste Mensch auf Erden.* (g_f_024_2)

'*The hormones of **happiness** run wild and conjure a smile into my face. [...] I am surprised, relieved, proud, at the same time overjoyed. As if I were in this very minute the happiest human being on earth.*'

c. *I was in so much **shock** and couldn't help but feel proud of my achievements.* (e_f_018_2)

d. *I have just received an unfair mark [...] **Shock** is my main emotion, if anyone deserved it, it would be myself. Yet, I have received an unfair, and in my opinion, wrong mark.* (e_f_025_1)

e. *Und dann kam der **Schock**. Ich war durch das Seminar gefallen.* (g_f_014_1)

'*And then I was **shocked***[120]*. I failed the exam.*'

In Examples 10 a.-c. SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG (targets are the emotion lexemes *surprised, überrascht 'surprised', shock*) is positively construed by positive evaluative items, i.e. triggers in the immediate linguistic context of the emotion lexeme (i.e. *the highest possible* and *happy* in Example 10 a., *Glückshormone 'hormones of happiness', Lächeln 'smile', erleichtert 'relieved', stolz 'proud', glücklich 'happy', glücklichste 'happiest'* in Example 10 b., *proud* and *achievements* in 10 c.). These triggers in the

[119] Emotion lexemes, i.e. targets, under discussion are printed in bold. Evaluative cues, i.e. triggers are underlined.
[120] Literally: 'the shock came'.

immediate linguistic context of the targets fulfill the function of disambiguating the valence of the emotion concept. The **disambiguating function** of context has been pointed out before by (Bednarek 2008a; cf. Chapter 4.1.2) and becomes particularly clear in Example 10 a., where SURPRISE is conjoined to HAPPINESS by contrastive *but* pointing at a potential first negative reading of SURPRISE which is turned into a positive construal by *happy*, i.e. in the meaning of 'it was not a negative, but positive surprise'. Negative construal is illustrated in Examples 10 d. and e. where the emotion concept SHOCK – SCHOCK, i.e. the target, is negatively construed by the triggers *unfair mark*, *unfair*, *wrong* and *durch das Seminar gefallen* 'fail/ not pass'.
The possibility of SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG to be construed as positive and negative emotion concept explains its frequent occurrences in both positive and negative narratives (cf. Chapter 7.3.1). The fact that British English SURPRISE is more often positively construed than German ÜBERRASCHUNG is equally true when looking at the emotion concept clusters containing SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG. The British emotion concept clusters with respect to SURPRISE are uniquely positively construed (5 occurrences), the German emotion concepts clusters with respect to ÜBERRASCHUNG contain however 5 instances of negative construal (out of 11 occurrences). The language preferences with respect to the construal with respect to SURPRISE – ÜBER-RASCHUNG, i.e. the mostly positive construal in the British data and the nearly equally distributed positive and negative construal in the German data, is also achieved by the British emotion concept SHOCK, which can be used as positive and negative concept, and by the German concept SCHOCK, which is a mostly negative concept.
All in all, with respect to SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG, the function of disambiguation has been corroborated for both congruent and incongruent contextual configurations both in British English and German narratives.

7.4.2 FEAR – FURCHT

The relatively high frequency of negative emotion concepts such as SADNESS – TRAUER and FEAR – FURCHT in positive narratives can be explained by looking at the construal of those prototypically negative emotion concepts. FEAR – FURCHT is often involved in JOY – FREUDE events (cf. Chapter 7.4.3) and precedes the joyful event. More precisely, when reporting on the highest mark possible, the participants wrote about their FEAR – FURCHT[121] preceding the exam and also before they finally

[121] *Stress* is regarded as a form of *anxiety*, and is therefore categorized under the primary emotion concept FEAR – FURCHT (Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989; Parrott 2001).

received their grade (cf. Example 11[122]).

(11) a. *I stare at the results paper, a grin creeping unto my face as it registers – I have first aced the exam. [...] I walk outside to be greeted by my teacher who showers me with praise. Moments like this almost seem to make exam/ revision* ***stress*** *worthwhile.* (e_m_008_2)

b. *Ich öffnete meinen Browser und scrollte langsam herunter zu der gewissen Stelle. Ich war sehr* ***angespannt*** *und* ***nervös****. Ich hatte Herzklopfen. Als ich dann den grünen Haken sah, fiel mir ein Stein vom Herzen [...]. Ich war überglücklich.* (g_f_001_2)

'*I opened the browser and scrolled slowly to the relevant position. I was very* ***tense and nervous****. I heard my heart beat* [123]*. When I saw the green tick, I was very relieved*[124]*. [...] I was overjoyed.* '

In this example (cf. Example 11 a. and b.) the negative emotion concepts/ targets *stress*, *angespannt* ('tense') and *nervös* ('nervous') are displayed in mostly positive contexts triggered by *grin*, *showers me with praise*, *worthwhile* and *grüner Haken* ('green tick'), *fiel mir ein Stein vom Herzen* ('I was relieved') and *überglücklich* ('overjoyed'). The incongruity (cf. Chapters 5.4.4, 7.1, 7.2) of negative emotion concepts with positive contextual cues, such as in *stress* vs. *worthwhile* or *angespannt* ('tense') and *nervös* ('nervous') vs. *überglücklich* ('overjoyed'), fulfils the **function of increasing the positivity** of the EE, which can be also drawn, as could be argued, from the expression *shower with praise*, the use of the intensifier *very* in *very relieved* and the lexeme-inherent intensification by *over-* in *overjoyed*.
Moreover, as the following example (cf. Example 12[125]) illustrates, the negative emotion concepts FEAR – FURCHT (triggers) can be regarded to function as non-congruent evaluative cues in positive JOY –FREUDE events (targets), and can, as is argued here, provide insights into a **subjective emotion event construal** (cf. Chapter 2.2.3 and the discussion below). JOY – FREUDE EE are then subjectively displayed as something negative. Moreover, the present example provides further proof for one of the communicative contrasts identified between English and German discourse, namely the creativity and verbosity of German discourse (cf. Chapter 3.1).

[122] Target emotion concepts are printed in bold. Evaluative cues in the immediate linguistic context, i.e. triggers, are underlined.
[123] Literally: 'I had palpitations of the heart.'
[124] Metaphor literally translated: 'A stone fell from my heart.'
[125] Incongruent emotion lexemes are printed in bold. Evaluative cues are underlined.

(12) *Woran erkennt man den Stempel einer Gesellschaft, deren Erfolgsrezept im Schüren von* ***Existenzangst*** *auf der Grundlage von fortwährendem Konkurrenzdenken (verharmlost als soziologisches Konzept des "lebenslangen Lernens") und Leistungsdruck liegt, auf das zunächst unvoreingenommene kindliche Gemüt und den später vollends nach den besagten Prämissen strukturierten "Hamster" im sich fortlaufend drehenden Ra[t] dieses gesellschaftlichen Uhrwerks in einer seiner unverkennbarsten Formen? Vielleicht in der Tatsache, dass man sich über eine vom System verliehene (wohl eher herausgewürgte), als "sehr gut" kategorisierte Leistungsbeurteilung signifikant mehr* ***freut****, als über die Tatsache, dass man ein geschätzter Freund, ein geliebter Ehemann oder motivierter Mitarbeiter ist? Für mich steht fest: Über die herausragende, für mich kaum mit Rationalität fassbare Note 1 in der Veranstaltung von Prof. Faust in seiner ach so wertvollen Vorlesung zum Leben des Bärtierchens (ich bin gespannt in welcher lebensbedrohlichen Situation ich von den 1000 Seiten Vorlesungsskript noch zehren werde) habe ich mich um gefühlte mehrere Zehnerpotenzen mehr* ***gefreut****, als über das ein oder andere "Ohne dich hätt' ich's nicht geschafft!", "Gute Arbeit!" oder "Ich liebe dich!".*

'*How does one recognize society's print* [126]*, whose formula of success is to incite* ***existential fears***[127]*, based on continuous competitive thinking (played down as the sociological concept of "lifelong learning") and the pressure to perform, on in the beginning still unprejudiced children's minds and the later according to the aforesaid premises completely structured "hamster" in his continuously turning hamster wheel of this society's clockwork in one of its most distinctive forms? Perhaps from the fact that one is happier about a (rather regurgitated) grade categorized as being a "very good" performance rating accorded by the system than about the fact that one is a valued friend, beloved husband or motivated colleague? I am sure: I was about several several powers of ten* ***happier*** *about the excellent, for me nearly not rationally graspable grade A in Prof. Faust's course, in his so*[128] *valuable lecture on the life of the tardigrade (I am excited to find out when I will feed again on the 1000-page-long lecture script) than about the one or the other "I wouldn't have made it without you!", "Good job!" or "I love you!". '*

[126] Literally: 'seal'
[127] Literally: 'fear'
[128] Ironic.

The overall narrative is a highly reflective (cf. the use of rhetorical questions such as *Woran erkennt man [...]?* 'How does one recognize [...]' and potential responses such as *Vielleicht in der Tatsache, dass [...]* 'Perhaps from the fact that [...]') and subjective (cf. the first-person subjects *Für mich steht fest* 'I'm sure', *für mich kaum mit Rationalität fassbar* 'for me nearly not rationally graspable', *ich bin gespannt* 'I'm excited to find out') account on the emotion event, including social criticism (cf. the lexical choices e.g., *Stempel der Gesellschaft* 'society's print', *verharmlost als soziologisches Konzept* 'played down as sociological concept', *ach so wertvolle Vorlesung* 'so valuable (ironic) lecture', *Prof. Faust* [129], *Vorlesung zum Leben des Bärtierchens* 'lecture on the life of the tardigrade', *wohl eher herausgewürgt* 'regurgitated[130] grade') construing the positive FREUDE event (*freut, gefreut*), from the participant's perspective, as something negative.

Moreover, negative evaluative cues can be regarded to be non-congruent, since the participant was expected to report on a positive event resulting in a positive emotion narrative. This non-congruency of evaluative cues with the expected EE can be regarded to give rise to particularized conversational implicatures (Grice 1975), to "collocational inference" (Hunston 2007a: 259) in a larger sense (cf. Chapters 2.2.1, 2.2.3). The cues might as well be regarded to create a "prosodic clash" (Morley & Partington 2009: 146), drawing on terminology used in semantic prosody accounts, where items are considered to create certain expectations, i.e. for instance with which other items they co-occur or form collocations. In prosodic clashes, these expectations are "overturned" (Morley & Partington 2009: 146). This, as is argued here, is, not only an indicator for figures of speech such as irony or paradox (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996: 153), but an indicator for a subjective construal of the emotion concept and even the whole emotion narrative, for an import of cognitive contexts (cf. Chapter 2.2.3), and provides therefore insights into the "opinions or beliefs of the text producer" (Morley & Partington 2009: 149).

Finally, Example 12 can be viewed against House (2006a) who finds German discourse to be more creative (cf. metaphors such as *Hamster* 'hamster' or *gesellschaftliches Uhrwerk* 'society's clockwork', unusual formulations such as *um gefühlt mehrere Zehnerpotenzen mehr gefreut* 'about several powers of ten happier'), more verbose (cf. the length and complexity of the syntactic constructions) than British discourse (cf. Chapter 3). This qualitative finding could be corroborated from a quantitative perspective by looking at the relative length of the narratives, i.e. the number of words per text, across the British English and German subcorpora. The British participants wrote

[129] Allusion to J.W. von Goethe's Faustus, where the bored scholar bargains with the devil. This constitutes criticism in so far as the lecturers are characterized as being like Faustus.

[130] Literally in the meaning of 'simply reproduced knowledge learned by heart'.

in the mean 479 words per text, whereas the German participants wrote 545 words. The difference between the groups was statistically significant (in order to compare the two medians of the groups, the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank test, two-tailed without continuity correction, was performed[131], W=5305.5, p<0.001), which confirmed that the Germans in AWE wrote more, and were more verbose than the British.
With respect to construal of FEAR – FURCHT by emotion concept clusters, the conjoined emotion concepts differ qualitatively in types and valence across the British and German data. British FEAR (target) co-occurs often with negative concepts (triggers) such as FEAR, SADNESS, EMBARRASSMENT and WORRY, but also with the positive emotion concept EXCITEMENT. German FURCHT 'FEAR' (target) co-occurs often with the negative emotion concept ANSPANNUNG 'TENSION' (trigger; cf. Appendix A4 and A5). The congruent emotion concept clusters in both the British and German narratives point at the **function of intensifying** the overall negative EE. The one instance of FEAR (target) in co-occurrence with EXCITEMENT (trigger) again suggests the possibility of FEAR increasing the positivity of the subsequent EE (cf. above, Examples 11).
Overall, FEAR – FURCHT can serve the function of intensifying negative EE in congruent contextual configurations (cf. emotion concept clusters). In non-congruent contextual configurations, it has been identified to potentially intensify subsequent positive EE. Finally, FEAR – FURCHT can be employed to subjectively, i.e. in this case negatively, construe JOY. The construal of JOY – FREUDE and SADNESS – TRAUER will be viewed in more detail in the next section.

7.4.3 JOY – FREUDE and SADNESS – TRAUER

Overall, JOY – FREUDE is prototypically a positive emotion concept (cf. Louw 1993). Examples 13 a. and b.[132] provide prototypical positive JOY – FREUDE event construals which can be found both in the British and German narratives:

(13) a. *Once I received my grades I couldn't believe it! Not only had I got the A* I had wanted so badly, but I had got the highest mark possible. 100%! I didn't think for a moment that I could have achieved this great. The exam was so difficult. I would have been surprised if I had achieved a B. But I got an A*! I am so* ***happy*** *that I could scream and dance with* ***joy*** *in the middle of everyone. But I doubt that would go*

[131] I decided here to ignore that the two texts were actually dependent observations, i.e. were written by one author, as has been proposed as valid procedure in corpus linguistics by Levshina (2015).
[132] Emotion concepts that are targets are printed in bold. Further emotion concepts and evaluative cues are underlined.

down very well. Most of my fellow students have not even passed the exam. So I just had to contain my excitement whilst I was in front of everyone. I don't want to be that kind of a girl that rubs her amazing grades in everyone's face and everyone hates. (e_f_024_2)

b. *JA! Bestanden! Das war das Erste, was ich meiner besten Freundin ins Ohr brüllte, nachdem sie auf mich vor dem Hörsaal gewartet hatte. Ich tanzte wie wild um sie herum, umarmte sie und sang dabei immer wieder wie eine Verrückte: "Bestanden, bestanden. Ich habe bestanden!" [...] Ich war mir sicher, ich hätte die letzte Aufgabe nicht und die erste Aufgabe falsch verstanden. Und nun das! Ich hatte bestanden und das mit einer Eins vor dem Komma. Ich war so* ***glücklich****. [...] Endlich hatte ich es geschafft.* (g_f_018_2)

'YES! Passed! This was the first thing I yelled into my best friend's ear, after she had waited for me in front of the lecture theatre. I danced around her in a wild manner, I hugged her and sang again and again as if I was crazy: "Passed, passed. I have passed!" [...] I was sure that I did not answer to the last question and that I did not understand the first question correctly. And now this! I had passed with an A[133]*. I was so* ***happy****. Finally, I had made it.'*

In both the British and German extracts, the existence of exuberant HAPPINESS, JOY (*happy, joy*) and GLÜCK (*glücklich*), all targets, after having achieved something unexpected (cf. Example 13 a. *I couldn't believe it!* and b. *Und nun das!* 'And now this!'), something someone wants very badly (cf. Example 13 a. *I had wanted so badly* and b. *Endlich hatte ich es geschafft* 'Finally, I had made it.') can be deduced from the expressive and behavioural responses displayed, i.e. *screaming/ brüllen* ('yelling') and *dancing/ tanzen* ('dancing'), *umarmen* ('hugging') and *singen* ('singing'), which can be conceived of as triggers. From a functional point of view, these overall positive evaluative cues (triggers) in the linguistic context of JOY – FREUDE (target) can be regarded to intensify the positivity of the EE (cf. the construal of FEAR – FURCHT, Chapter 7.4.2).

However, slight differences in the linguistic realization of British English JOY vs. German FREUDE can be noted in the datasets. While in the German narratives, it is more acceptable to show and to share one's FREUDE, British JOY is, however, generally more contained (cf. Examples 5, Chapter 6.3.2), which is indicated by negative evalu-

[133] Literally: "I had passed with a one in front of the comma", i.e. the grade 1,1 or 1,2 etc., which corresponds to A or even A*.

ative cues (triggers) following the JOY event (target), triggering a negative construal, and from a functional perspective, **attenuating** the emotion (cf. Example 13 a. *I **could** scream and dance with joy, **I doubt** that would go down very well* and ***contain** my excitement*) because one does not want to be *hated* (cf. Example 13 a.) but liked. SADNESS – TRAUER events (triggers) are also quite frequent in positive narratives and play an important role in JOY – FREUDE construals (targets) as negative evaluative cues (triggers). Moreover they also point at the **complexity of emotional experiences** linguistically realized by blends (e.g., *bittersweet*) or emotion concept clusters of ambivalent nature (e.g., *happy and sad*). The non-congruent construal of JOY – FREUDE as something negative does exist across the British and German narratives, but is characteristic of the British dataset (although the raw frequencies and the percentages of SADNESS, 40%, vs. TRAUER, 51%, in positive narratives might suggest that TRAUER is more frequent in German, the χ^2-test did not find any statistically significant association, $p>0.05$, between the emotion concepts across the two language groups in positive narratives, cf. Chapter 7.3.1, page 168, and the GLMM suggested that SADNESS is more often displayed in the British dataset, cf. Chapter 6.2.1, page 129). This is illustrated in Examples 14 a.-c.[134], where the negative construal of JOY – FREUDE (target) is mostly achieved by further co-occurring emotion concepts (triggers) that cluster with JOY – FREUDE (*not shocked, bittersweet, humbly proud, Mitleid/ Freude* 'sympathy/ joy'), but also other negative evaluative items (triggers) that are no emotion lexemes (e.g., *laboured, didn't do as well*):

(14) a. *I knew how hard I had worked to get the grade I was given, so I was **not shocked** to have received it, although I was **sad** for my peers. The moment was somewhat **bittersweet** [...] I did not feel uncomfortable about being openly **pleased** with my grade; this did not lead to **gloating** though, [...]. The high levels of **jubilation** that one would expect from such an event did not occur in the way one would expect it to happen, my **joy** was somewhat laboured as it took some time for it to actually sink in, which was why my initial reaction was '**not shocked**', then it grew to '**humbly proud**', growing further into more conventional forms of **happiness** over the coming days.* (e_m_016_2)

b. *[...] I still feel **proud** of myself and **pleased** that I am capable of getting high grades, although a little **guilty** that my **joy** was **disappointment** and **sadness** for my friends on the same course, who*

[134] JOY – FREUDE emotion lexemes are printed in bold and are underlined. Clustering emotion concepts are printed in bold and further co-occurring evaluative items are underlined.

didn't do as well. (e_f_018_2)

c. *[...] so dass mein* ***Mitleid*** *für sie meine* ***Freude*** *etwas trübt [...]* (g_m_034_2)
'[...] that my ***sympathy*** *with them overshadows my* ***joy****.'*

British JOY (target) is often construed as a mixed emotion, here in form of ambivalent emotion concept clusters, involving SADNESS (trigger) for the *peers* who did not achieve as highly (cf. Example 14 a., the emotion adjective *sad* and the blend *bittersweet*), even GUILT (trigger; cf. Example 14 b., the emotion adjective *guilty*) for the own joy that may entail DISAPPOINTMENT (trigger) and SADNESS (trigger) of the other (*my joy was disappointment and sadness for my friends*). The German FREUDE cluster construal does not go that far and only comprises, in cases of negative construal of FREUDE, MITLEID, i.e. 'PITY' or 'SYMPATHY' (triggers; cf. Example 14 c., *mein Mitleid für sie meine Freude etwas trübt*). Interestingly, the scenario displayed in the British narratives could be summarized by 'GUILT because of own JOY which CAUSES others' DISAPPOINTMENT and SADNESS', whereas the German scenario display puts forward another emotion event chain (cf. Chapter 4), namely 'SYMPATHY for others which CAUSES overshadowed own JOY'. In the first scenario, detected in the British narratives, JOY causes other emotions in others, while in the second scenario, taken from the German data, the own FREUDE is mixed with MITLEID which causes as a result a change in the quality of overall FREUDE.
Again, one could argue, as has been done before (cf. Example 12, Chapter 7.4.2), that the incongruent evaluative cues, i.e. the negative cues (triggers) in co-occurrence with the positive emotion concept JOY – FREUDE (target), create a kind of discursive prosodic clash (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). Functionally, the emotion concept is subjectively construed, involving a **perspectivization of the EE**. In the British data, JOY is presented as a bittersweet experience for the experiencer, perhaps even blended with GUILT (for simultaneously experienced emotions cf. Bamberg et al. 1995; Bamberg 1997), and includes the orientation towards others. For the others the very same JOY means DISAPPOINTMENT and/ or SADNESS. This perspectivization of the EE relates well to House (2006a) and the dimension of "orientation towards others" characteristic for (British) English discourse (cf. Chapter 3). In the German dataset, however, this perspectivization can be linked to a certain ego-orientation (House 2006a; cf. Chapter 3), since the MITLEID 'SYMPATHY' displayed for others is presented as changing in a negative way (*trübt* 'overshadows') the FREUDE event in the first-person experiencer (*meine* 'my').
Another difference between the British and German narratives with respect to JOY –

FREUDE construals lies in the construal of SCHADENFREUDE which was, as could be predictable (cf. Chapter 2.5.1), absent from the British narratives. Example 15[135] provides a German SCHADENFREUDE display, which comprises negative evaluative cues (triggers) with respect to others (e.g., *hochnäsige Zicke*) in the linguistic context of the positive FREUDE event (target) that are typical for SCHADENFREUDE displays, and provides further proof of the lack of other-orientedness of German discourse (House 2006a; cf. Chapter 3):

(15) *Ich **freu mich** so unglaublich. [...] Ich bin echt **begeistert** von mir, dass ich es geschafft habe so gut zu sein und mein gelerntes Wissen dann auch zur rechten Zeit wieder abzurufen. Ich muss das tolle Ergebnis aber auch noch jemandem auf die Nase binden. ... Diese hochnäsige Zicke von Heidi*[136] *muss unbedingt wissen, dass ich besser bin als sie. Ich habe ihre Note zwar nicht gesehen, dafür aber ihr Gesicht und sie sah nicht besonders **glücklich** aus. Immer hat sie herumgestichelt, dass sie ja schon alles weiß und warum ich mich so anstrengen muss, es wäre doch so einfach! [...] (g_f_026_2)*

*'I am so incredibly **happy**. [...] I am really **delighted** with myself, that I have managed to be that good and to reproduce what I had learned at the right time. But I still have to rub that into someone's face. ... This arrogant bitch* [137] *Heidi absolutely has to know, that I was better than her. Although I did not see her grade, I saw her face and she did not look particularly **happy**. She was always teasing, that she knew already everything and why I had to make any effort, since it was that easy! [...]'*

SCHADENFREUDE is implicitly displayed[138] by co-occurring negative evaluative cues (triggers) such as *auf die Nase binden* 'to rub into someone's face', *hochnäsige Zicke* 'arrogant bitch' or *herumgestichelt* 'teasing' following the display of FREUDE 'JOY' and BEGEISTERUNG 'ENTHUSIASM' (targets). SCHADENFREUDE can only be accessed by inferencing, the process of contextualization, triggered by the non-congruent co-occurring cues (cf. Chapters 2.2.1, 2.2.3, 2.4.2, 5.4.3).

Displaying SCHADENFREUDE, i.e. the "pleasure at the misfortune of others" (van Dijk & Ouwerkerk 2014), seems to be acceptable in the construal of German FREUDE (cf. Example 15), which contrasts with Example 13 a. from above (*I don't want to*

[135] FREUDE lexemes are printed in bold. Evaluative cues and implicit SCHADENFREUDE displays are underlined.

[136] The name was changed in order to maintain anonymity.

[137] Literal: *Zicke*, i.e. 'goat'.

[138] In AWE, SCHADENFREUDE was also explicitly displayed in the German dataset (two occurrences).

be that kind of a girl that rubs her amazing grades in everyone's face and everyone hates). This results has, however, to be confirmed in another investigation drawing on more data on SCHADENFREUDE displays, since only 3 instances of SCHADENFREUDE could be identified in the German dataset in contrast to no explicit references to SCHADENFREUDE in the British subcorpus. Although there is no lexical label for SCHADENFREUDE in British English (cf. Chapter 2.5.1), it can be, however, assumed that SCHADENFREUDE is displayed via implicit cues in British discourse. Follow-up studies should qualitatively and quantitatively analyze SCHADENFREUDE displays across British and German datasets. All in all, one could hypothesize that SCHADENFREUDE displays should be less frequent in British English discourse which is more other-oriented than German discourse (House e.g., 2006a; cf. Chapter 3). In particular it would be interesting to investigate the functional contribution of both explicit and implicit SCHADENFREUDE displays to emotion discourse, going beyond the one of 'bettering oneself' identified by Feyaerts & Oben (2014)[139], across different discourse types and modes and to identify language-preferential displays in this respect.
In sum, positive construal via congruent evaluative cues in JOY – FREUDE events fulfils the function of intensifying the overall positivity of the EE. British JOY is, however, attenuated in the British narratives in negative construals via co-occurring negative evaluative items. A specific form of negative construal, i.e. SCHADENFREUDE displays, seem to be acceptable in the German narratives, but absent from the British ones. Finally, general characteristics of (British) English discourse and German discourse, i.e. other-orientation vs. ego-orientation (House e.g., 2006a; cf. 3), clearly influence the ways in which emotions, more specifically JOY – FREUDE events, are displayed in the AWE narratives. This can be drawn from a differential subjective construal and perspectivization of the JOY – FREUDE events across the British and German narratives. In the next section, the construal of ANGER – ÄRGER events is investigated.

7.4.4 ANGER – ÄRGER

ANGER – ÄRGER can be considered to be, in general[140], a negative emotion concept (Constantinou 2014) and it is also construed accordingly in AWE. It occurred only at relatively low frequencies in positive narratives in both the British and German narratives (cf. Chapter 7.3.1), where it either described ANGER – ÄRGER that would

[139] There is not much (contrastive) research on SCHADENFREUDE that relates its display to certain functions in discourse. One main function has been reported so far in a study of SCHADENFREUDE from an interactional perspective for instance (Feyaerts & Oben 2014), namely the function of 'bettering oneself' by SCHADENFREUDE display.

[140] Approaches by psychotherapists that focus on the "pure, positive and constructive" (as mentioned in e.g., Constantinou 2014: 162) nature of ANGER are left aside here.

be caused by the others' exuberant JOY – FREUDE or was ANGER – ÄRGER at other people or institutions because of one's own (assumed) failure (cf. Examples 16[141]). The following examples, one taken from the British subcorpus, another from the German subcorpus, illustrate these ANGER – ÄRGER displays:

(16) a. *However, I have also received my fair share of unfair grades and so know how* ***frustrating*** *and de-motivating it can be to hear/ see people boast about their marks.* (e_f_004_2)

b. *Ich* ***ärgerte*** *mich sehr über mich selber, aber auch über die Uni im Allgemeinen. [...] Als ich dann hinsah [die Ergebnisse ansah, NMF], konnte ich meinen Augen nicht trauen. Ich hatte bestanden und dazu auch noch ganz gut.* ***Überglücklich*** *fiel ich meiner Mutter um den Hals.* (g_f_006_2)

'*I was very* ***angry*** *at myself, but also at the university in general. [...] But when I looked [at the results, NMF], I couldn't believe my eyes. I had passed and in addition to this quite well.* ***Overjoyed*** *I flung my arms around my mother's neck.*'

In Example 16 a. FRUSTRATION (*frustrating*) is displayed and explained: the CAUSE of this EE (*to hear/ see people boast about their marks*) is provided. In Example 16 b. ÄRGER directed at oneself and an institution is explained (CAUSE) but resolved through the positive outcome of events, i.e. the positive EE (*überglücklich* 'overjoyed').

Differences across the British and German narratives could be identified with respect to the negative construal of ANGER – ÄRGER (target) by evaluative cues (triggers) in the immediate and more global linguistic context of the ANGER – ÄRGER lexemes. As the following Examples[142] (cf. Examples 17 a. and b.) show, the evaluative cues that trigger negative event construal differ qualitatively across the British English and German datasets:

(17) a. *I have just received the essay that I redid back and yet again I feel I have been marked too harshly and that my mark is not a true reflection of the amount of work that I have put into the essay. So I have come to the conclusion that the teacher must not like my arguments in my essays so I am going to speak to the head of department about how unfairly I am being treated. I'm so* ***annoyed*** *right now and cannot*

[141] Emotion lexemes are printed in bold. CAUSES of ANGER – ÄRGER are underlined.
[142] Negative evaluative cues are underlined, emotion concepts are printed in bold print.

believe how mean this teacher is being for no reason. I know my essays are better than the mark he's given me so it's not fair at all for him to give me such a mean and harsh mark. When I go to speak to the head of department I shall tell him ***how unfair*** *this whole situation is.* (e_f_033_1)

b. *Das darf doch wohl nicht wahr sein...was für ein Arschloch! Ich bin so unglaublich* ***enttäuscht****! Was für ein Bockmist...[...]. Echt, wofür streng ich mich eigentlich an, wenn er mir so eine schlechte Note gibt, bloß weil er mich einfach* ***nicht leiden kann****. [...] Ich bin echt* ***sauer****, [...]. Genau das hab ich dann auch getan du Depp![...] Das ist so unfair, ich muss mich jetzt dann ein bisschen abreagieren, ich bin so* ***genervt*** *von dem. Ich werd nie wieder einen Kurs bei dem belegen, echt, das ist so ein Witz! Bin sowas von* ***gefrustet****, so ein Scheiss,[...] Ich w[e]rd ihn in Zukunft einfach ignorieren, ihn nicht mehr im Gang grüßen und nie wieder irgendwas bei ihm besuchen, obwohl er mich kennt. Das ist mir jetzt echt egal, wenn er meint, dass er seine Machtposition so ausspielen kann, dann bitte! Da spiel ich aber nicht mit, du kannst mir echt gestohlen bleiben![...]* (g_f_026_1)

'*This just can't be true...what an asshole! I am so incredibly* ***disappointed****! Such a bullshit [...] Really, why do I even make an effort, when he gives me such a bad grade, only because he does not like me. [...] I am really* ***angry****, [...]. This was exactly what I did then, you idiot! [...] That's so unfair, I have to let off steam a bit now, I am so* ***annoyed*** *by him. I will never take a course with him again, really, that's a joke. I am so* ***frustrated****, such shit, [...] I will just ignore him in the future, I won't say hello in the hallway and I will never take a course with him again, although he knows me. I really don't care now, when he thinks, he can exploit his position of power in this way, then please! But I won't play the game, you can go jump in the lake! [...]*'

Negative evaluative cues in Example 17 a. (triggers), taken from the British subcorpus, such as the lexical items (*too harshly*, *not a true reflection*, *not like*, *how unfair(ly)/ not fair at all*, *how mean/ mean and harsh*) support the overall negative construal of ANGER (target), more precisely ANNOYANCE, which is itself upgraded by the booster *so* (cf. the role of intensifiers in EE, Chapters 2.3.3, 2.4.3, 8). Moreover, the participant presents herself as being in the archetypical role (Langacker 1987 [1991]) of

a patient (if one considers the passives *I have been marked* and *I am being treated*) who has been treated unfairly (cf. Chapter 2.1.2). However, the negativity of the ANGER event is right from the beginning perspectivized (cf. as well the construal of JOY, Chapter 7.4.3) by the cognitive-verb-based subjective evaluation (*I feel*) (cf. the role of markers of epistemicity, Chapters 2.3.3, 2.4.3, 8) and the negative emotional experience is subsumed and rationalized by *unfair situation*, *not a true reflection of the amount of work that I have put into the essay* and a concluding (*So I have come to the conclusion*) rational explanation (*the teacher must not like my arguments in my essays*).

In Example 17 b., a comparable German ÄRGER event, ÄRGER (target) is negatively construed by a qualitatively different set of negative evaluative cues (triggers) including swearwords such as *Scheiss* ('shit') and *Bockmist* ('bullshit'), insults like *Arschloch* ('asshole') and evaluative vocatives such as *du Depp* ('you idiot') directed at the lecturer who is addressed with *du* ('you'[143]). Moreover, the reason for ANNOYANCE felt by the student is not rationalized, i.e. described as being the result of the unfair marking process and the fact that the lecturer does not "like the arguments" (cf. Example 17 a.) brought forward, as it is the case in the British EE discussed above. By contrast, it is assumed that the lecturer personally dislikes the student (*bloß weil er mich einfach nicht leiden kann*, 'only because he does not like me') and that he allegedly uses his position to take this out on the student (*seine Machtposition [...] ausspielen*, 'to exploit his position of power'). This culminates in a series of propositions such as *das ist so ein Witz* ('that's a joke') and *du kannst mir echt gestohlen bleiben* ('you can go jump in the lake') that give rise to negative evaluative implicatures (Grice 1975; cf. Chapters 2.2.1, 2.2.3). Moreover, the student actively plans (role archetype of an agent) the breakdown of contact and communication with the lecturer (*Ich werd ihn in Zukunft einfach ignorieren, ihn nicht mehr im Gang grüßen und nie wieder irgendetwas bei ihm besuchen*, 'In the future, I will ignore him, I won't say hello in the hallway and never again take one of his courses'). These qualitative differences between the negative evaluative cues (in negative ANGER – ÄRGER construals) across the British and German examples identified above would, of course, have to be quantified in follow-up studies via the frequencies of swear words and/ or active vs. passive sentences, for instance, in the immediate linguistic context of the emotion lexemes in question in order to pinpoint the differences and corroborate them as language preferences.

Negative construal of the emotion concept ANGER – ÄRGER (target) by other negative emotion concepts (triggers), i.e. in negative emotion concept clusters, did not differ quantitatively and qualitatively across the British English and German narratives (cf. Appendix 8.6). The fact that also positive emotion concepts occurred once

[143] 'You', i.e. the more informal German personal pronoun used with friends and family. Here its use signals disrespect for the lecturer.

with ANGER (PRIDE, JOYOUSNESS and SURPRISE) does not point at a positive construal of ANGER, but at the complexity of emotional experiences displayed (cf. the construal of JOY – FREUDE, Chapter 7.4.3). Comparable to Example 16 a., a student comments in Example 18[144] on a friend's complex emotions after not having passed an exam, while he himself succeeded and achieved very highly:

(18) *There was **anger**, confusion, **despair, pride, guilt, joyousness, and surprise** to name but a few.* (e_m_006_2)

The emotion cluster comprises the negative emotions ANGER, DESPAIR and GUILT, and the positive emotions JOYOUSNESS and SURPRISE (all emotion nouns); the experiencer remains implicit (unexperienced).
All in all, congruent evaluative cues, here negative evaluative cues in the linguistic context of ANGER – ÄRGER, have been associated with the function of construing a more intense EE. However, such congruent cues might, as has been shown for the British and German AWE narratives, differ qualitatively across languages, and give rise to qualitatively different conventionalized and particularized ANGER – ÄRGER related implicatures.

7.4.5 LOVE – LIEBE

LOVE – LIEBE (target), a positive emotion per se, is mostly positively construed by evaluative cues (triggers) as well as other emotion concepts (triggers) in emotion concept clusters in AWE (cf. Examples 19 a. and b. and Appendix A4 and A5) that render, from a functional point of view, the EE even more positive. However, it is equally displayed in negative narratives. This can be explained by the fact that the students write about study subjects they generally like, which is contextually supported by positive evaluative cues such as *appropriate*, *allow* or *Liebe* ('love') and *Interesse* ('interest'), no matter whether the overall narrative is positive or negative. This is exemplified in Examples 19 a. and b.[145]:

(19) a. *I **love** the subject Quantum Physics and was sure that [I'd] scored the appropriate mark to allow my entry into the Masters programme.* (e_m_022_1)

b. *Dies spiegelte eigentlich haargenau meine **Liebe** und mein Interesse zu diesen beiden völlig verschiedenen Bereichen.* (g_f_017_2)

[144] Emotion lexemes are printed in bold.
[145] Emotion lexemes are printed in bold. Evaluative cues are underlined.

'*This mirrored in fact exactly my* ***love*** *of and my interest in those two completely different fields.*'

c. *[...] but I knew that she would ask about my result [.] I* ***wished*** *she wouldn't. But she did.* (e_m_006_2)

d. *Ich kann es nicht fassen. Was soll das denn?! "Da hat wohl jemand ganz nach seinen persönlichen* ***Vorlieben*** *bewertet, unglaublich!" denke ich* ***verzweifelt****.* (g_f_009_1)

'*I cannot believe it. What is going on here?! "It seems that somebody has evaluated us according to their own personal* ***preferences****, unbelievable!" I think* ***desperately****.*'

However, it is equally displayed in negative narratives. Rarely, instances of negative construal can be identified (cf. Examples 19 c. and d.). If so, almost always (with one exception) a WISH – WUNSCH is involved that did not come true (such as in Example 19 c.) or, as it is the case for negative construal of LIEBE ('LOVE') in the German dataset, the positive emotion concepts are part of overall negative emotion events, more precisely ÄRGER events (such as in Example 19 d.). The co-occurring negative evaluative cues (triggers) are regarded to give rise to further anger-related implicatures (cf. Chapters 2.2.1, 2.2.3). The prototypically positive emotion lexeme *Vorlieben* ('preferences'/ 'what we like best/ love') is turned into something negative, since *Vorlieben* is displayed in a completely negative context (*nach seinen persönlichen Vorlieben bewerten* 'evaluated us according to their own preferences'). Hereby, the negativity of the Emotion Event (e.g., *Ich kann es nicht fassen* 'I cannot believe it' or *verzweifelt* 'desperately'), more precisely ANGER event is reinforced by this unexpected contrast (cf. the construal of FEAR – FURCHT above, Chapter 7.4.2). This points again at a discursive "prosodic clash", as discussed above (cf. Example 12 or 14), creating further anger-related implicatures and being a sign of a subjective construal of the EE (cf. the construal of JOY – FREUDE, Chapter 7.4.3).
In sum, LOVE – LIEBE displays corroborate the functions of congruent and incongruent EE displays identified above, namely the ones of intensification and a subjective construal of the EE.

7.5 Summary and Conclusions

The functions of the emotion concepts discussed so far can be categorized into ones taken by emotion concepts in congruent or non-congruent EE displays (cf. Chapters

5.4.4, 7.1, 7.2). Congruent EE displays, as is argued here, involve typically (Louw 1993) positive (or negative) emotion concepts that accordingly occur in positive (or negative) narratives, are positively (negatively) construed and are part of positive (negative) emotion concept clusters, i.e. equivalent cluster types. Non-congruent EE displays involve consequently positive (or negative) emotion concepts that are displayed in negative (or positive) narratives, are negatively (or positively) construed or are part of ambivalent or complex emotion concept clusters and blends. The question of congruent vs. non-congruent EE displays is not raised in the case of SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG, which can prototypically be construed both positively and negatively (Bednarek 2008a; cf. Chapter 4). The contextual displays with respect to SURPRISE – ÜBERRASCHUNG can therefore always be regarded as in a way congruent.

Congruent EE displays (e.g., Examples 13 and 17), which are also the most frequent ones, i.e. prototypical ones, have been discussed so far in systemic-functional frameworks, e.g., the Appraisal System, in form of conjoined emotion lexemes or doublets/ triplets and their function has been pinpointed to be one of intensification (cf. Chapter 4.1.2 and 5.4.4; Bednarek 2008a; Martin 2004; Teubert 2004a). SURPRISE has been found to be positively and negatively construed, while disambiguated by contextual evaluative items (Bednarek 2008a). SHOCK has been reported to be a mostly negative emotion concept (Martin & White 2005: 61). However, as the analysis above shows (cf. Examples 10 c.–e.), SHOCK is frequently used as a positive emotion concept in the British dataset and as a negative one in the German dataset. Cross-linguistic differences in general, such as SURPRISE being more often positively construed than ÜBERRASCHUNG have not been reported so far.

Moreover, non-congruent displays haven't been investigated yet, in spite of their particular functions in emotion discourse. Non-congruent displays can, as it is argued here, create discursive "prosodic clash[es]"(Morley & Partington 2009: 146), a term stemming from studies on evaluative harmony/ prosody (Morley & Partington 2009: 146). Prosodic disharmony gives hereby rise to further particularized implicatures (Grice 1975; cf. Chapters 2.2.1, 2.2.3), in Hunston's terminology[146] "collocational inference[s]" (cf. in particular Examples 19 d. and 12 and Hunston 2007a: 259). However, it is argued here that semantic disharmony does not only, as has been found before (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996: 153, citing Louw 1993), lead to figures of speech such as irony or paradox, but may give insights into opinions and beliefs of the text producers (Morley & Partington 2009: 149), i.e. the writers of the EE who import cognitive contexts (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). Semantic disharmony – semantic har-

[146] A differentiation between 'particularized conversational implicatures' in Grice's sense and 'collocational inference' in Hunston's sense can be found in Chapter 7.2.

mony being, in spite of its generally unconscious nature, "most strongly felt when it is missing" (Morley & Partington 2009: 147) – can be a sign for a certain subjectification (cf. Example 12) and perspectivization (cf. Examples 14 b. and c.) of the EE. Moreover, emotion concepts (targets) might be considered to be attenuated by co-occurring evaluative cues (triggers) or emotion concepts (triggers) of opposing valence in blends or concept clusters (cf. Examples 14), which might also be a sign of the participants' strive to capture complex emotional experiences (cf. Example 18). From a contrastive perspective (cf. Chapter 2.5), the construals that were at first sight identified as non-congruent, such as the negative construal of JOY in British EE (cf. Examples 14), for instance, might be actually the appropriate contextual configuration to choose when displaying JOY, whereas the display of SCHADENFREUDE, for instance, might be an appropriate contextual variation in German (cf. Example 15). This would be in line with (e.g., Gumperz 2003) who stated that contextualization conventions might differ between speech communities (cf. Chapter 2.4).

In sum, hypothesis H1 d) (cf. Chapter 4) with respect to language preferences in the construal of emotion concepts has been corroborated. With respect to hypothesis H2, it has been shown that emotion concept cluster types differ across the British and English datasets and that they can have various functions (going beyond the one of intensification), among them a subjective construal of the EE.

All in all, these results, in particular the linguistic and cognitive context of emotion concepts, can be taken into account by the first Extension of the Emotion Event Model (cf. Chapter 2), while bearing in mind that the theoretical model still has to be tested against further data and across various languages. In this respect the major modifications to the Emotion Event Model proposed here that takes the cognitive and linguistic context of emotion concepts into account can be summarized as follows: First, congruent and incongruent subjective construals of EE via congruent/ incongruent evaluative cues (including further emotion concepts) in the more or less immediate linguistic context of the EE have been integrated. Second, congruent contextual configurations fulfill the functions of disambiguation and intensification, incongruent contextual configurations can mark a subjective construal, perspectivization, intensification/ attenuation and language appropriate displays. Incongruent displays might as well point at the complexity of emotional experiences. Third, EE are most of the time not single events but complex experiences, captured by e.g., emotion concept clusters or blends.

Figures 17, 18 and 19 summarize the extensions of the Emotion Event Model proposed (Extended Emotion Model I). In Figure 17, congruent (here positive concepts are chosen, '+') contextual configurations are shown serving the functions of disambiguation and intensification. In Figure 18, non-congruent (negative, '-') emotion concepts or eval-

uative cues co-occur with a positive emotion concept ('+')[147]. Potential functions have been found to comprise a subjective construal, perspectivization and attenuation of the EE. Moreover, incongruent cues might point at the complexity of emotional experiences and might be regarded as appropriate EE displays in one, but inappropriate displays in another language. Figure 19 represents the emotion concept BITTERSWEET that captures JOY and SADNESS at the same time, and can, therefore, be regarded to point at a potential perspectivization of the emotion experienced. Moreover, BITTERSWEET attenuates overall JOY and points at the complexity of emotional experiences.



Figure 17: The Extended Emotion Event Model (Ia): Congruent contextual configurations and their functions. Emotion concepts frequently co-occur with further emotion concepts, i.e. in emotion concept clusters, or with further evaluative items of the same valence. Here, positive emotion concepts co-occur and form a congruent contextual configuration (the valence is symbolized by the mathematical symbol '+'). Congruent displays may serve the functions of disambiguation and intensification.

[147] Non-congruent contextual configurations can also involve positive evaluative cues co-occurring with negative emotion concepts. Here, positive emotion concepts were chosen that are negatively construed, since this seems to be the prevalent pattern in the AWE data.



Figure 18: The Extended Emotion Event Model (Ib): Incongruent contextual configurations and their functions. Emotion concepts frequently co-occur with further emotion concepts, i.e. in emotion concept clusters, or with further evaluative items. Here, a positive emotion concept (symbolized by the mathematical symbol '+') co-occurs with negative emotion concepts/ evaluative items (the valence is symbolized by the mathematical symbol '-'), and forms a incongruent contextual configuration. Incongruent EE displays may point at a subjective construal and perspectivization of the EE. Moreover, incongruent displays may serve the function of attenuating the overall EE display and point at the complexity of emotional experiences. At first sight incongruent displays might be language-specific and appropriate ways of displaying EE.



Figure 19: The Emotion Event Model and Blends (based on e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). The at the same time positive and negative emotion concept (e.g., BITTERSWEET) represents a blended EE ('+ and -'). The lexeme-inherent display comprises both a positive ('+', e.g., JOY) and negative ('-', e.g., SADNESS) emotion concept, giving rise to a blended EE. Possible functions of this lexeme-inherent incongruent display are the same as for lexeme-external incongruent displays, i.e. attenuation and perspectivization. '+/-' points at the complexity of emotional experiences.

8

Emotion Events and Context II[148]

Contents

[148] Parts of this chapter have been recently published or accepted for publication, cf. Fronhofer (2015, 2019, accepted).

This chapter investigates emotion concepts in context, and in particular emotion lexemes co-occurring with (adverbial)[149] modifiers in EE, EM (cf. Chapter 8.3.1) and intensifiers (cf. Chapter 8.3.2), in the British and German datasets. These modifiers have been included in the Extended EE Model, since as is argued here, they can take important functions as CC and markers of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapters 2.3.3, 2.4.3, and Chapters 8.3.1 and 8.3.2). These functions particularly emerge when several modifiers are at play (cf. Chapter 8.4). Moreover, their display varies across languages and genders (cf. Chapters 8.3.1 and 8.3.2).
After viewing the background with respect to markers of un-/certainty, intensification, multiple marking and after presenting the Extended Emotion Event Model, the next sections provide the contrastive results with respect to EM, intensifiers and multiple markers. The analytical sections are organized as follows: Departing from a qualitative analysis of EM and intensifiers in ANGER/ ÄRGER events, the analysis will be extended to a quantitative one, comprising EM and intensifiers in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes. Multiple cues are mainly investigated from a qualitative perspective, since their occurrence is rare in AWE and does not allow for statistical analysis.

8.1 Background: Adverbial Modifiers in Emotion Events

8.1.1 Un-/certainty

The communication of un-/certainty is an intrinsic feature of communication. Following Bognelli & Zuczkowski (2008), who adapt from a psychological point of view Watzlawick & Jackson (1967) and their interactional view rooted in cybernetics to the communication and non-communication of un-/certainty, un-/certainty cannot not be communicated. It is a scalar concept (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007, Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 147 and Huddleston & Pullum 2002)[150] and can be regarded as subsuming the concepts of epistemicity and evidentiality (Bognelli & Zuczkowski 2008). The scalarity is illustrated in Figure 20, where an utterance is gradually modalized by markers of 'low', 'medium' and 'high' certainty and stands in contrast to unmodalized utterances which display certainty.

[149] With respect to EM all POS were included in the analysis, with respect to intensifiers the largest part of modifiers are adverbial subjuncts, but some exceptions were added. The detailed account on which modifiers have been included can be found in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
[150] The probability scale (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 147) has been adapted by inserting a medium level of analysis as suggested in grammars such as Huddleston & Pullum (2002) in order to achieve a more fine-grained picture of utterance modalization by markers of un/certainty.



Figure 20: The Probability Scale.

It is crucial to distinguish epistemicity and evidentiality from an analyst's perspective, and there is still an ongoing debate whether and how to (best) distinguish these categories (e.g., De Haan 1999; Dendale & Tasmowski 2001; Cornillie 2009; Fetzer & Oishi 2014). Epistemicity and evidentiality are difficult to tease apart from a participant's view (Fetzer 2014). This is especially true in "evidentiality$_2$ (E2) languages" (Fetzer 2014: 322) such as British English and German, in which the overt coding of evidentiality is optional. By contrast, evidentiality is obligatorily coded by a closed set of morphosyntactic markers (Fetzer 2014; Aikhenvald 2004) in evidentiality$_1$ (E1) languages. That means that evidentiality has the status of a functional category in evidentiality$_2$ (E2) languages and that "there is an open set of linguistic devices which may code evidentiality, such as lexical verbs, lexical nouns, modal auxiliaries or modal adverbs, and an open set of non-verbal means, such as particular facial expressions or air quotes" (Fetzer 2014: 322).

More precisely, evidentiality has been discussed in broad and narrow terms (e.g., Dendale & Tasmowski 2001). Proponents of the "broad" view of evidentiality understand, in the extremest case, evidentiality to cover all kinds of attitudes the speaker has towards the proposition (e.g., Chafe 1986), i.e. evidentiality would then cover both evidential markers and epistemic markers. The model proposed by Chafe (1986), for instance, can be regarded as broad, since it is more a model on a general theory of knowledge than a model on evidentiality, and, Chafe (1986) includes lexical expressions as well (in contrast to narrow views, i.e. grammatical evidentiality, cf. below). The broad view, and in particular Chafe's model, has been recently criticized (e.g., Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 28), since the categories proposed are not as clear-cut, which renders operationalizations difficult, and because his model lacks a dynamic view, i.e. does not take pragmatic contexts into account in which evidentials are used.

Proponents of the "narrow" view on evidentiality or epistemic modality restrict both categories formally and semantically (e.g., Faller 2002), while taking into account that lexical means of evidential marking do exist and that the categories of evidentiality and epistemic modality might overlap. Interestingly, Faller (2002: 88) introduces the

term "epistentials" for overlapping functions in cases such as *This must be the postman*, where it is difficult to distinguish between epistemic modality and evidentiality. The difficulty of being able to distinguish between these categories has often been brought forward as an argument for a broad view on evidentiality (Palmer 1986: 70). By contrast, Faller (2002) is able to maintain a narrow view on evidentiality by introducing the term epistentials, i.e. expressions that simultaneously express modality and evidentiality, next to evidentials and modals, while being able to explain fore-mentioned functional overlaps.

All in all, there is mostly agreement on the view that "evidentiality is generally seen as referring to the source of information, and epistemic modality is seen as referring to the attitude towards information, and [that] the two overlap in the domain of inference, viz. acquiring the information through reasoning" (Fetzer 2014: 325). Moreover, it can be maintained from the discussion above that is crucial to distinguish between epistemic modality and evidentiality, and that the narrow, form- or semantics-based view on evidentiality or epistemicity, including epistentials (Faller 2002), allows to form more clear-cut categories. Finally, it is important to take pragmatic contexts into account (cf., Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007).

This study adopts Bognelli & Zuczkowski (2008) and their approach of subsuming evidentiality and epistemicity under the umbrella term un-/certainty, while acknowledging the fact that the distinction between the categories of evidentiality and epistemic modality is important, but sometimes impossible (cf., Faller 2002). The study investigates the role of markers of un-/certainty, i.e. EM, following Coates (1995: 55) definition, in the immediate context of emotion lexemes, viz. in Emotion Events, i.e. where the writers commit themselves to a certain degree to the sincerity of the (emotion/-al) statement, while judging the reliability of the sincerity and/or providing the source of information. The markers of un-/certainty are operationalized (cf. Chapter 3) via various linguistic devices with a clear operationalization including nouns, adverbs, verbs (esp. cognitive verbs), adjectives, modal auxiliaries and prepositional phrases (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 180, 771). The focus hereby lies, however, on adverbs, more precisely, content disjuncts (Quirk et al. 1985: 620), that can be well integrated as grammatical structures into the Emotion Event Model. Lexical means, that have nevertheless been included, were not very frequent (cf. Table 34). Moreover, I am particularly interested in how EM are used in the immediate linguistic context of emotion lexemes, i.e. their (rhetorical) functions (cf., Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007) in Emotion Events. Epistemic markers are therefore regarded as either boosting or attenuating emotion/-al utterances, and, in the framework of intersubjective positioning (White 2003), to be either dialogically expansive or contractive resources (cf. Chapter 2.3.3). The next section provides the background to adverbial subjuncts of intensification.

8.1.2 Intensification

Intensification by adverbial subjuncts has received not much attention in emotion research so far, although already Labov (1984) emphasized the inter-relatedness of emotion and intensity (not intensification!)[151] with respect to spoken discourse:

> At the heart of social and emotional expression is the linguistic feature of intensity... Intensity by its very nature is not precise: first, because it is a gradient feature, and second, because it is most often dependent on other linguistic structures. (Labov 1984: 43)

Among studies on intensification one can name Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson (2010), who find cross-linguistic differences in the emotion concept of SURPRISE in English and Polish with respect to intensification, which is again understood in a larger sense but adverbial intensification in Quirk's sense (Quirk et al. 1985: 589), but define the latter as being part of the cognitive semantics of the emotion concept SURPRISE operationalzed by the notion of sub-unit emotion parameters in the framework of EE (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). In another, both corpus-based and intuitive study, Fellbaum & Mathieu (2014) construct emotion verb intensity scales on particular English Experiencer verbs such as *surprise*, *fear* and *astonish*. The researchers's goal in this study is to semantically classify emotion verbs, which might find applications in lexical resources (natural language processing/ NLP or WordNet) and can potentially improve automatic text processing (Fellbaum & Mathieu 2014: 100). The latter study is based on the idea that intensity scales can be semantically inherent in lexemes (Horn 1989; Claridge 2001: cf. Example 20):

(20) a. *like — love — adore*
b. *pensiveness — sadness — grief*

In Examples 21, however, it becomes clear that lexeme-external intensification, i.e. the intensification of emotion lexemes by adverbial subjuncts (Quirk et al. 1985), also plays and important role in EE (cf. Chapter 2.3.3). The optional use (VanMulken & Schellens 2012) of the intensifier, here the adverbial subjunct, more precisely the booster *so*, increases the degree of the emotion displayed (in contrast to Example 21 a., where no intensifier use can be noted):

(21) a. *I was **annoyed** by this because [...]* (e_f_016_1)

[151] As has been stated in the methodological section (cf. Chapter 5), only grammatical intensification by adverbial subjuncts (Quirk et al. 1985: 589) is investigated in this study, and not pragmatical intensification via lexical means or repetition to name but two possible options. 'Intensity' is often referred to as the modification of the illocutionary force of a speech act in a communicative exchange (e.g., Labov 1984; Blum-Kulka 1989; Holmes 1990).

b. *I' m* ***so annoyed*** *right now [...]* (e_f_033_1)

In a recent case study drawing from a corpus on 'trouble-tellings' of L2 (second language) English-speaking adult immigrants in the US and Canada, the importance of "adverbs" (e.g., *really*) as "lexical devices speakers use to carry out their intensification", has, been pointed out (Prior 2016: 205). Based on the idea that "[i]ntensity operates on a scale centered about the zero, or unmarked expression, with both positive (aggravated or intensified) and negative (mitigated or minimized) poles" (Labov 1984: 44, cited in Prior 2016), intensification by adverbial subjuncts can also be conceived of as a scalar concept. In Figure 21, the emotion concept ANNOYANCE is intensified, i.e. upgraded or downgraded by adverbial subjuncts (*almost* and *very*), modulating overall negativity.



Figure 21: Intensification. The scale comprises a negative EE, ANNOYANCE, which is downgraded by the adverbial subjunct *almost*, and upgraded by the adverbial subjunct *very*, rendering the EE display less or even more negative (Fronhofer 2015).

Already Bolinger (1972) defined the term intensifier, i.e. adverbial subjunct, as covering both increase and decrease and indicating "a point on an abstractly conceived intensity scale [which] may be relatively low or relatively high" (Quirk et al. 1985: 589). Quirk et al. (1985: 589) also comment on the scope of intensification when stating that the underlying scale applies "to a predicate or to some part of a predicate, such as the predication, the verb phrase or even an item within the verb phrase."
Following Quirk et al. (1985: 598ff.), intensifiers can be further classified into upgraders (i.e. amplifiers: boosters and maximizers) and downgraders (i.e. downtoners: diminishers, minimizers, approximators, compromisers) and can modify either adjectives (and adjective based-adverbs) or verbs within the verb phrase (Allerton 1987). The modification of adverbs is rare[152] but possible. Example 22 taken from the German dataset illustrates this rare use:

[152] Adjectives are the most commonly intensified forms in language (Bäcklund 1973).

(22) *Dementsprechend teilen Studenten [...] nur* ***sehr ungern*** *Vorlesungsmitschriften [...]* (g_m_005_2)
'*Thus students share [...] their lecture notes only* ***very reluctantly*** *[...]*'

Equally rare are intensifiers acting as premodifiers of determiners (*absolutely no reason*), pronouns (*absolutely nothing*) and prepositional phrases (*quite at ease* Quirk et al. 1985; Lorenz 1999). These minor usages are not considered in this investigation. In the next section, the modification by multiple marking, a so far largely neglected phenomenon, is introduced.

8.1.3 Multiple Marking by Intensifiers and/ or Un-/certainty Markers

Multiple marking by intensifiers has not received much attention so far. In studies where it was necessary to cope with this phenomenon from a methodological point of view, i.e. annotation procedures (e.g., Taboada et al. 2014), often only the element with wider scope was considered in the analysis. An instance of multiple intensifier use, i.e. the use of two different types of intensifiers, can be found in the following corpus example:

(23) *At first I am* ***just really upset*** *that I didn't do well.* (e_f_027_1)

Here, the two types of intensifiers (adverbial subjuncts) have to be taken into account, since leaving them out, such as in *At first I am upset [...]*, for instance, would constitute a differential emotion display via differential triggering of implicatures. However, if one followed the methodology proposed in former studies (e.g., Taboada et al. 2014), only *just* would have been taken into account, whereas *really* would not be annotated or analyzed. In another study, which observes also the wider context, the researchers conclude that "really is used both as an intensifier and as a hedge" (Stenström et al. 2002: 149), the apologetic function of *just* rubbing off on *really*. The researchers provide the following example from COLT:

(24) *[...] well he wasn't ugly he was* ***just really gormless*** *[...]*

These reflections are not very satisfactory and, similar to the multiple use of un-/certainty markers, which will be laid out in the next paragraph, it is argued here that multiple intensifier use is not at all redundant or meaningless but communicatively meaningful (cf. the findings summarized in Chapter 8.4).
Multiple cues or the accumulation of un-/ certainty markers have been recently addressed against the background of the apparent paradox of modal marking (Simon-

Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 32), i.e. the fact that the marking of epistemic certainty actually might imply that the speaker/ writer is not certain, since only relevant and evident information should be communicated by participants in talk exchanges that follow the Gricean Cooperative Principle (Grice CP, 1975; cf. Chapter 2.2.1). However, when they use multiple cues, they flout some of the Gricean maxims, more precisely the maxims of quantity and manner. The category QUANTITY of information subsumes two maxims: 1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange) and 2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required (Grice 1975: 45). The category MANNER can be considered to subsume maxims such as the supermaxim "Be perspicuous", "Avoid obscurity of expression" or "Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)" (Grice 1975: 46). By using multiple cues, the participants are therefore more "informative than required" and not as "brief" as possible, and trigger therefore implicatures (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). Then, markers of certainty "flag something special" (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 33) or, in other words, "marked expression warns pragmatically special situation" (Traugott & Dasher 2002: 19).[153] Furthermore, the question arose whether an unmodalized sentence expresses a higher degree of certainty than one containing one or several un-/ certainty markers (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 32).[154] However, multiple EM marker use in the immediate context of emotion lexemes has not been discussed before. The functional contribution of multiple EM use to EE will be the focus of Chapter 8.4.2.
Before turning to the contrastive findings on multiple intensifier and EM use, however, the next section focusses on how the EE model can be extended (Extension II, cf. Chapter 2.3.3) taking the modification of emotion lexemes by EM and intensfiers into account.

8.2 Extending the Emotion Event Model (II)

Markers of Un-/certainty and Intensification in EE as Means of (Inter-) subjective Positioning

It is argued here that EM and intensifiers, since they are quite frequent in emotion discourse and in particular in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes, can be considered to be sub-units of analysis of Emotion Events, comparable to what Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson (2010) call sub-unit emotion parameters. While the latter provide informa-

[153] So called "harmonic combinations" (Coates 1983: 137) of "double epistemic modal marking involving hedge and modal" (e.g., *perhaps...might*) are not considered here, but rather rare, unusual and unexpected ones.
[154] Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer (2007: 32) provide the example *I certainly obviously am keeping* [...] for the accumulation of markers of modal certainty.

tion on the lexical senses of the respective emotion concepts, EM and intensifiers in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes provide usage information, i.e. context is construed/ imported (cf. Chapter 2.3.3). Epistemic markers and intensifiers are of course not exclusively used in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes, but if they are, speakers/ writers can display the same emotion and construe (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011) it with 'high' (cf. Example 25 a.[155]), 'medium' (cf. Example 25 b.) or 'low' (cf. Example 25 c.) certainty, i.e. different degrees of probability (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: for 'medium probability'), and with 'upgraded' or 'downgraded' intensity, i.e. different degrees of intensity:

(25) a. [...] *it was clearly visible that he was* ***angry*** [...] (e_f_16_1)

b. [...] *and I think probably a bit* ***jealous*** [...](e_f_033_2)

c. *Perhaps, then, the thing that* ***irritates*** *me most* [...] (e_m_020_2)

d. *Ich weiß, dass er mich* ***nicht leiden kann****, aber dieser Blick... und mein Herz rutschte in meine Hose.* (g_f_029_2)
'*I know that he does* ***not like*** *me, but this look in his eyes...and I was shaking in my shoes.*'

e. *I'm so* ***angry****.* (e_f_023_1)

f. *[...], I would be slightly* ***irritated*** *of sorts.* (e_f_038_1)

In this way, the emotion can be either boosted (as in Example 25 a. and e., where the EM *clearly visible* is co-occurring with ANGER and the booster *so* modifies *angry*) or attenuated (as in Examples 25 b., c. and f. where JEALOUSY and IRRITATION are modified by *I think probably*, *perhaps* and *slightly/ of sorts*) by the EM or intensifiers that are under the scope (cf. scope adverbials, Chapters 3 and 4; Ungerer 1988) of the emotion lexemes.
Moreover, the writers intersubjectively position themselves to the reader (White 2003). This approach to intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapter 2.3.2) is inspired by Bakhtin (1935 [1981]) and Vološinov (1995), who underline, as summarized by White (2003: 261), that

[155] Emotion lexemes are printed in bold. Epistemic markers and intensifiers under the scope of the emotion lexemes are underlined.

> all verbal communication, whether written or spoken is 'dialogic' in that to speak or write is always to refer to, or to take up in some way, what has been said/ written before, and simultaneously to anticipate the responses of actual, potential or imagined readers/ listeners

According to White, the dialogic resources used can be divided into dialogically "contractive" resources, i.e. those that "suppress or close down the space [for dialogic alternatives]" (White 2003: 259) such as *naturally*, *obviously* or *of course* (cf. Examples 25 a. and d. White 2003: 269), and dialogic "expansive" resources such as *perhaps* (White 2003: 273), i.e. those that "entertain or open up" dialogic alternatives (cf. Examples 25 b. and c. White 2003: 259). Dialogically expansive resources can further be subdivided into the modes of entertain and attribute (White 2003: 274), and dialogically contractive resources into the modes disclaim and proclaim (White 2003: 272). Especially relevant to this study are the modes entertain (cf. Examples 25 b. and c.), pronounce (cf. Example 25 d., e., f.) and concur (cf. Example 25 a.), the last two being subcategories of proclaim (White 2003: 272), and counter-expectancy (cf. Example 1 b. in Chapter 2; Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 280). Entertain stands for dialogic stance where "the textual voice is represented as entertaining alternative positions to that currently being referenced" (White 2003: 273); pronounce is concerned with "intensifications, authorial emphases or explicit authorial interventions or interpolations" (White 2003: 269), and the mode concur captures instances where "the textual voice [is] taking up some generally held position and thereby [is] concurring with the reader" (White 2003: 269). Counter-expectancy for the adverb *surely* has been discussed by Downing (2001) and Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer (2007). Thus, EM and intensifiers in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes can be taken into account in the Extended Emotion Event Model as sub-units of analysis.

Figures 22 and 23 illustrate the extensions of the EE model by the dialogic view discussed (White 2003). Figure 22 shows the modification of the prototypical EE ANGER by markers of un-/certainty. The marker of low probability *perhaps* and medium probability *probably* mark dialogic expansion, whereas dialogic contraction is marked by the high probability marker *certainly*. In Figure 23, the prototypical ANGER event is modified by intensifiers. Intensifiers in attenuating function such as *almost* promote alternative views, i.e. dialogic expansion, whereas boosters such as *very* promote the writer's/ participant's viewpoint.



Figure 22: The Extended Emotion Event Model (IIa): Intersubjective positioning by markers of un-/certainty. Markers of un-/certainty can modulate EE and display them with low, medium or high probability. Hereby, dialogic expansion is achieved by markers of 'low' probability (*perhaps*) or 'medium' (*probably*) probability, dialogic contraction by 'high' probability markers (*certainly*).



Figure 23: The Extended Emotion Event Model (IIb): Intersubjective positioning by intensifiers. Intensifiers can either downgrade (*almost*) or upgrade (*very*), i.e. attenuate or boost the EE (ANGER). Hereby, the participants intersubjectively position themselves (intersubjective construal in bold) towards potential readers or alternative views (in bold) on the same event, i.e. make room for alternative positions (dialogic expansion) or promote their viewpoint (dialogic contraction).

8.3 Results I: Modifiers in Emotion Events

8.3.1 Modifiers of Modal Un-/certainty

Markers of Un-/certainty and ANGER – ÄRGER — qualitative analysis

From a qualitative point of view, important differences with respect to EM between British English and German ANGER –ÄRGER events have been identified (cf. Examples[156] 26 and 27).

(26) *A mixture of confusion,* ***anger****, and* ***shame*** *overcame me when I received my Oxford LNAT result. Partially because I felt that the mark wasn't an accurate representation of my ability to analyze literature, and partially because I felt as though I had* ***disappointed*** *a number of people — including myself. [...] Perhaps, then, the thing that* ***irritates*** *me the most about the mark isn't the final verdict but the lack of justification and explanation for it. The lack of interest from the people who I needed the support from. Possibly even the failure for me to offer an explanation and a justification for what may have been a poor performance. Irrespective, I gave one hundred per cent and in hindsight worse things happen at sea.* (e_m_020_1)

In example 26, a British student writes about his complex emotions after having received an unfair mark in an exam. ANGER, IRRITATION (*anger*, *irritates*), SHAME (*shame*) and DISAPPOINTMENT (*disappointed*) are part of the emotion cluster. The student makes a concluding strong point and provides the main reason for his IRRITATION, which is foregrounded by the comparative *most* (Quirk et al. 1985: 467)[157] which itself is attenuated by the EM *perhaps*. In general, the whole narrative is colored by markers of uncertainty (*I felt, I felt as though, perhaps, possibly, may*) which downtone the overall narrative. In the framework proposed by White (2003), the narrative can therefore be regarded as dialogically expansive (cf. Chapter 8.2), i.e. in using "distancing" (White 2003: 274) resources such as *perhaps*, *possibly* or *may*. Moreover, it is made clear, through recurring references to 1st person subjects in co-occurrence with the cognitive verb *felt*, which contribute to the subjectification (Fetzer 2011b: 261) of the narrative, that the student's personal opinion is displayed. This is comparable to the use of cognitive verbs with first person subjects such as *I think* (Fetzer 2011b: 261). By contrast, a comparable German narrative (Example 27) reads as follows:

[156] Emotion lexemes are printed in bold. Relevant EM and intensifiers are underlined, their functions are discussed in the main text.
[157] *Most* has been included in the analysis of intensifiers (Fronhofer 2015), cf. Chapter 4.

(27) *Wenn mich ein Dozent unfair benotet, würde ich mich sicherlich* ***ärgern*** *und das Gespräch suchen. Natürlich kommt es dabei [darauf] an, wie die Klausur gestellt wurde. [...] Innerlich wäre ich natürlich* ***sauer****, auch* ***niedergeschlagen****. Ich würde reflektieren, wieso der Dozent wohl so handelt. Ob er mich* ***unsympathisch*** *findet und ob er das im Seminar auch schon zum Ausdruck gebracht hat. [...] Im zweiten Fall würde ich mich natürlich auch* ***ärgern****. [...] Wenn das nicht so der Fall wäre würde ich sicherlich die Klausureinsicht in Anspruch nehmen, [...].* (g_m_032_1)

'*If a teacher gives me an unfair mark, I would certainly get* ***angry*** *and try to talk to him/ her. Naturally, it [my reaction] depends on how the exam questions were. [...] My inner reaction would of course be to be* ***angry****, also to be* ***depressed****. I would reflect on why the teacher acts like this. If he/ she does* ***not like*** *me and if he/ she has already expressed this feeling during the course. [...] In the second case, I would also naturally be* ***angry****. [...] If this wasn't the case, I would certainly go and have a look at the corrected exam, [...].*'

Here, the student explains his ÄRGER ('ANGER') and NIEDERGESCHLAGENHEIT ('DEPRESSION') after having received an unfair mark and uses mainly markers of certainty (*sicherlich*, *natürlich*) in co-occurrence with the ÄRGER ('ANGER') lexemes. Also, the more global context is colored by the same markers of certainty (*sicherlich*, *natürlich*). Overall, ÄRGER ('ANGER') is boosted and also foregrounded (*natürlich sauer*, 'naturally angry') while other emotions such as NIEDERGESCHLAGENHEIT ('DEPRESSION') are backgrounded (*auch niedergeschlagen*, 'also depressed'). In the approach by White (2003), the German narrative can be said to be dialogically contractive: in using resources such as *natürlich* ('naturally'), the participant explicitly displays the textual voice as being aligned with the construed reader, i.e. they have the same "belief or attitude or 'knowledge"' (White 2003: 269). Being angry is therefore displayed as being a natural response to unfair marking.

In sum, the British English and German Emotion Events differed in their modalization by EM (cf. Hypotheses in Chapter 4.2), the British participants tending to display EM of low certainty, and the German participants EM of high certainty. From the perspective of intersubjective positioning, the British narrative extracts were dialogically expansive, whereas the German extracts were dialogically contractive.

The next section investigates the distribution of EM in general, and the distribution of high, medium and low EM in particular that co-occur with emotion lexemes and ANGER lexemes in AWE. Moreover, their respective discourse functions (boosting vs. attenuating and pronounce, concur vs. entertain) are under scrutiny, and it will

be tested if language preferences with respect to these Modifiers in Emotion Events emerge in the quantitative analyses.

Forms and Functions of Markers of Un-/certainty

EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes did not differ across languages (the Germans using 7% EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes, the British 6.9%), but did differ across genders (cf. Table 32), the males (11%, cf. median, Figure 24) using more EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes (relative to the respective narrative's total emotion lexeme count) than the females (6.9%, cf. median, Figure 24).



Figure 24: Relative occurrence of EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes across genders. All relative occurrences are reported, their distribution (grey boxplot) as well as the best model fit (black horizontal line) with confidence intervals (grey shaded area). Language is shown as square as against cross point characters (see legend).

AICc-based model selection on binomial GLMMs suggested that males (N=62, N/Narratives=124) displayed more EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes relative to the respective narrative's total emotion lexeme count in comparison to females (N=68, N/Narratives=136). This is supported by the AICc weights and the non-overlapping confidence intervals (cf. Figure 24 and Table 32). The relative importance of variables was 0.83 for gender, 0.31 for language and 0.07 for a gender-language interaction. Raw frequencies of EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes are summarized in the Appendix (cf. Table 32).

Table 32: Glmer model selection based on AICcs and AICc weights with respect to relative occurrence of EM + [Emotion] across genders.

model	df	ΔAICc	W_{AICc}
gender	4	0.00	0.564
language + gender	5	2.08	0.200
null model	3	3.07	0.121
language*gender	6	4.16	0.070
language	4	5.09	0.044

With respect to the number of EM in co-occurrence with ANGER lexemes, no effects could be detected. Raw frequencies of EM in co-occurrence with ANGER can also be found in the Appendix (cf. Table A6).



Figure 25: Relative occurrence of emotion lexemes with co-occurring EM of a given probability. AICc-based model selection on binomial GLMMs suggested that German narratives (N=136) displayed more EM of high probability (H) in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes relative to the respective narrative's total emotion lexeme count in comparable British narratives (N=120), which displayed more EM of low probability (L). This is supported by the AICc weights and the non-overlapping confidence intervals (cf. Table 5a and main text). There was no effect with respect to medium probability markers (M). However, a gender effect could be detected, the males using more EM than the female. Gender is shown as round and triangular point characters (see legend). All relative occurrences, their distribution (grey boxplot) as well as the best model fit (black horizontal line) with confidence intervals (grey shaded area) are reported.

The best model selected by AICcs with respect to the number of high, medium and low EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes (relative to the respective narrative's total emotion lexeme count) reported a probability, gender and language effect as well

as a probability-language interaction (cf. Table 33) with more low probability markers being used, with males displaying more EM than females (cf. also Table 32 and Figure 24 above), Germans using slightly more EM than the British (cf. also Table 32 and Figure 24 above), and, most importantly, the Germans using rather high probability markers (German females 3.7%, German males 6.2% vs. British females 2%, British males 3.4%), and the British using low probability markers (German females 1.8%, German males 3.1% vs. British females 3.4%, British males 5.7%; cf. Figure 25).

Table 33: Glmer model selection based on AICcs and AICc Weights with respect to high, medium and low EM + [EMOTION] across British English and German and genders. Model components and corresponding codes are: 1 for probability, 2 for gender, 3 for language, 4 for probability*gender, 5 for probability*language, 6 for gender*language and 7 for probability*gender*language.

model components	df	ΔAICc	W_{AICc}
1,2,3,5	10	0.00	0.58
1,2,3,5,6	11	2.05	0.21
1,3,5	9	3.47	0.10
1,2,3,4,5	12	4.07	0.08
1,2,3,4,5,6	13	6.14	0.03
1,2,3,4,5,6,7	15	10.11	0.00
1,2	7	10.67	0.00
1,2,3	8	12.64	0.00
1	6	14.04	0.00
1,2,4	9	14.50	0.00
1,2,3,6	9	14.69	0.00
1,3	7	16.07	0.00
1,2,3,4	10	16.49	0.00
1,2,3,4,6	11	18.55	0.00
2	5	39.97	0.00
2,3	6	41.95	0.00
null model	4	43.29	0.00
2,3,6	7	43.98	0.00
3	4	45.32	0.00

The relative importance of variables was reported as 1 for probability, 1 for language, 0.99 for the probability-language interaction and 0.9 for gender; the gender-language interaction received 0.24, and the probability-gender interaction 0.11. Table 34 lists all EM types, categorized into markers of 'high', 'medium' and 'low' certainty, in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes and their frequencies.

Table 34: EM + [EMOTION] (H stands for 'high', M for 'medium' and , L for 'low' probability). The table indicates raw frequencies (fq) and normalized values (fq) per 10,000 words with respect to EM in co-occurrence with an emotion lexeme.

	BrE EM	**fq**	**fq/N**	**Ger EM**	**fq**	**fq/N**
H	I know*/ knowledge	11	2	natürlich ('naturally)	32	5.2
	naturally	5	0.9	sicher, sicherlich		
	definitely	3	0.5	mit Sicherheit/ bestimmt		
	obvious/-ly	3	0.5	auf jeden Fall ('certainly')	12	1.9
	I think	2	0.3	*cf. footnote		
	undoubtedly	1	0.1	Tatsache/ klar/		
	surely	1	0.1	Fakt ('clearly/ fact')	7	1.1
	without doubt	1	0.1	Ich weiß/ wusste/		
	of course	1	0.1	bekanntlich ('I know/ knew/		
	it is safe to say	1	0.1	as you know')	3	0.4
	apparently	1	0.1	definitiv ('definitely')	1	0.1
	surely	1	0.1	offensichtlich ('obviously')	1	0.1
	I'm sure	1	0.1	anscheinend ('apparently')	1	0.1
	certainly	1	0.1			
	surely	1	0.1			
	likely	1	0.1			
	clearly	1	0.1			
	clear evidence	1	0.1			
M	probably	11	2	wahrscheinlich ('probably')	7	1.1
	seem/ seems/ seemed	5	0.9	scheinen/ wirken ('seem')	3	0.4
	should	1	0.1			
	likely	1	0.1			
	unlikely	1	0.1			
L	I think	14	2.6	vielleicht ('perhaps')	10	1.6
	can/ could	11	2	wohl ('perhaps')	7	1.1
	I feel/ felt	8	1.5	Ich weiß (gar) nicht	3	0.4
	may/ might	8	1.5	('I don't know')		
	perhaps	5	0.9	Ich glaube ('I think')	1	0.1
	I guess	2	3	könnte ('could')	1	0.1
	maybe	2	0.3	Ich hatte den Eindruck	1	0.1
	I got the impression	1	0.1	('I had the impression')		
	I doubt	1	0.1	Möglichkeit('possibility')	1	0.1
	I'm not sure	1	0.1	soll ('allegedly')	1	0.1
	possibililty	1	0.1	vermutlich ('presumably')	1	0.1
	you never know	1	0.1			

The frequencies of German *natürlich* and *sicherlich* in contrast to British English *naturally*, *surely*, *of course* and *certainly* are strikingly high. Moreover, in the British dataset, a higher frequency of the cognitive verbs *I know/knew/knowing* and *I think*[158] in contrast to German *Ich weiß/wusste* and *Ich glaube* have to be noted. In the British dataset, more EM types than in the German dataset seem to have been used. The German *vielleicht* is far more frequent than the British *perhaps* or *maybe*.
For EM co-occurring with ANGER the sample size was too small to permit statistical analysis and therefore a qualitative approach was preferred. Table 35 displays the raw frequencies of high, medium and low markers across languages and genders.

Table 35: Occurrence of 'high', 'medium' and 'low' probability markers + [ANGER]/ [ÄRGER] across British English and German (H stands for 'high', M stands for 'medium' and L stands for 'low' probability). The percentages indicate the number of high, medium and low EM of each category (language or gender) relative to the overall high, medium and low EM in co-occurrence with ANGER or ÄRGER in each language.

	BrE f	%	**BrE m**	%	**Ger f**	%	**Ger m**	%
H	2	11	2	11	5	17	10	36
M	3	17	1	6	1	4	1	4
L	6	33	4	22	4	14	7	25

As the frequency data show, the pattern detected for EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes (cf. Figure 25) might also be revealed for EM in co-occurrence with ANGER in a larger dataset (cf. e.g., the raw frequencies of German high certainty markers). Tables 36 and 37 give all the EM types in co-occurrence with ANGER – ÄRGER.
Assuming that the EM of high, medium and low certainty fulfill the discourse functions of attenuation (low and medium certainty markers), boosting (high certainty markers) and intersubjective positioning (low and medium certainty markers functioning as entertaining resources, high certainty markers as concurring or pronouncing resources) respectively, the cross-linguistic differences identified for EM forms are also valid for EM discourse functions.

[158] *I think* has been coded depending on its contextual configurations as boosting or attenuation device, cf. Fetzer & Johansson (2010); Fetzer (2014). Overall, only two instances of *I think* as a booster have been noted (British dataset).

Table 36: EM + [ANGER] (H stands for 'high', M for 'medium' and L for 'low' probability.)

	BrE EM	**ANGER**
H	know	frustrating
	obvious	animosity
	surely	anger
	clearly	angry
M	probably	bitter, jealous
L	think	annoying, jealous
	might	anger
	may	resent, displeased
	could	annoyed, upset
	can	frustrating
	possibility	resentment
	perhaps	irritate

In other words, the German narratives display more concurring and pronouncing resources, i.e. are dialogically contractive, while the British narratives display more entertaining resources, i.e. are dialogically expansive (cf. Hypotheses Chapter 4.2). The raw frequencies of the discourse functions of EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes and ANGER – ÄRGER can be viewed in the Appendix (Tables A7 and A8). Table A9 in the Appendix lists all EM displayed in the AWE-corpus.

The next section investigates the occurrence of intensifiers in EE, again departing from a qualitative analysis of intensifiers in ANGER/ ÄRGER events, and enlarging the perspective to intensifier use in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes.

Table 37: EM + [ÄRGER] (H stands for 'high', M for 'medium' and L for 'low' probability).

	Ger EM	**ÄRGER**
H	weiß/ wusste ('know/knew')	nicht leiden/ mögen ('dislike')
	natürlich ('naturally')	Ärger ('rage'), nicht mögen ('dislike'), frustriert ('frustrated'), sauer ('angry'), ärgern ('to anger'), ärgerlicher ('more annoying'), wütend('angry'), verärgert ('annnoyed')
	offensichtlich ('obviously')	ärgerlich
	anscheinend ('apparently')	nicht mögen
	sicher ('certainly')	neidisch
	sicherlich ('certainly')	ärgern
	mit Sicherheit ('certainly')	wütend
	Fakt ('fact')	aufregen
M	wahrscheinlich ('probably')	ärgern
L	glaube ich ('I think')	neidisch
	wohl ('perhaps')	nicht mögen
	könnte ('could')	unsympathisch
	Möglichkeit ('possibility')	Unzufriedenheit
	vielleicht ('perhaps')	nicht mögen, neidisch, stinksauer

8.3.2 Modifiers of Intensification

Intensifiers and ANGER – ÄRGER — qualitative analysis

Congruent negative evaluative cues such as *harsh/ not a true reflection* or *unfair* have been demonstrated to contribute to a negative construal of ANGER/ ÄRGER and to reinforce the negative emotion concept in the case of ANGER — ÄRGER displays (cf. Chapter 7.4, Examples 17). Intensifiers play a key role in this respect. In Examples 17[159] (Chapter 7.4), the upgraders *so — so* ('so'), *so was von* ('so'), *echt* ('really') boost the overall emotion displayed (*annoyed — sauer* 'angry', *genervt* 'annoyed', *gefrusted* 'frustrated'). The frequent use of first-person subjects *I* and *Ich* points at the fact that the upgraders are part of the participants' (inter-)subjective positioning (cf. Chapter 2.3.2), more precisely the mode pronounce (White 2003: 269), i.e. dialogic contraction, where "the textual voice puts on display its personal investment in the viewpoint being advanced and accordingly increases the interpersonal cost for any who would advance some dialogic alternative" (White 2003: 271). With respect to upgraders co-occurring with anger lexemes, this is the case across both British and German datasets.
In the German narratives, however, ÄRGER is also often downgraded such as in Example[160] 28. In the present example, the downgraders are part of an emotion concept cluster, in which *ziemlich* ('quite') downgrades TRAUER ('SADNESS') (*niedergeschmettert*, 'crushed') and *etwas* ('a bit') downgrades ÄRGER ('ANGER') (*wütend*, 'angry') and a slighter version of ÄRGER is later again downgraded by *etwas* 'a bit' (*als sich die Wut etwas setzte*, 'when the anger wore off a bit'). The downgraders are attenuation devices that additionally open up room, following (White 2003), for another perspective which is further constantly contextually indexed by first-person cognitive verbs such as *ich [...] empfand* ('I felt') and *Ich meinte* ('I thought') and verbs of subjective feeling (*Ich hatte mich [...] gut gefühlt* 'I had felt [...] good'), the latter foregrounding the fact that subjective feelings, and not reason, led to the view put forward in the beginning of the extract. The alternative position, the lecturer's point of view, that might also be the one shared (cf. the German modal particle *doch* that has been discussed drawing on the framework of grounding and common ground by e.g., Fischer 2007) by others (e.g., potential readers) is finally, presented, even if only tentatively (cf. the marker of uncertainty *vielleicht*, the downgrader *nicht so*) and accepted at the end of the extract (*musste ich anerkennen*, 'I had to admit').

(28) *Ich bekam die Note für mein Referat eine Woche später in einem persönlichen Gespräch mit dem Dozenten am Ende des Seminars gesagt und ich war*

[159] Emotion lexemes are printed in bold. Intensifiers and relevant items discussed are underlined.
[160] Emotion lexemes are printed in bold. Intensifiers and relevant items discussed are underlined.

ziemlich ***niedergeschmettert*** *und etwas* ***wütend****. Ich bekam für meinen Vortrag nur ein "ausreichend" was ich als mehr als unfair* ***empfand****, zumal mir kurz nach meinem Vortrag jeder der anderen Seminarteilnehmer auf meine Anfrage versicherten, dass das ein ziemlich gutes Referat[e] war. Ich hatte mich auch tatsächlich gut* ***gefühlt*** *und meinte an der Mimik des Dozenten zu erkennen, dass dieser ebenso dachte. [...] Ein paar Tage später als sich die* ***Wut*** *etwas setzte und ich wieder einigermaßen neutral auf die ganze Situation blicken konnte und nochmal darüber nachdachte, wie es zu solch einer schlechten Noten gekommen sein konnte, und auch das Referat noch einmal durchging, musste ich anerkennen, dass der Dozent mit seiner Benotung vielleicht doch nicht so falsch lag.* (g_m_007_1)

'*I received the grade for my presentation one week afterwards in a personal conversation with the lecturer at the end of the seminar and I was quite* ***crushed*** *and a bit* ***angry****. I received for my presentation only a "D" what I felt to be more than unfair, because shortly after my talk everybody who took part in the seminar assured me when I asked them that this was a rather good presentation. Actually, I had* ***felt*** *rather good as well and I thought to be able to spot in the lecturer's face that he thought the same. [...] Some days later when* ***the anger wore*** *a bit off and I could look at the situation from a relatively neutral angle and when I thought again about the question how I could have received such a bad mark, and when I went again through my presentation, I had to admit that the lecturer was perhaps not so wrong with his grading.*'

The downgraders have consequently been shown to attenuate the emotion display and to mark (inter-)subjective positioning (cf. Chapters 2.3.2, 2.3.3), i.e. they are resources of the mode entertain (White 2003). The use of downgraders in co-occurrence with ANGER in the British dataset was rare; it will be further discussed in Chapter 8.4, more specifically in Examples 34. Downgrading of ANGER might be not a prototypical way of displaying this EE in British narratives.

The next section investigates whether the qualitative differences between intensifier display in co-occurrence with ANGER/ ÄRGER lexemes and overall emotion lexemes, i.e. differential upgrader and downgrader use, and their respective discourse functions (boosting vs. attenuating, dialogic contraction vs. expansion) can be corroborated from a quantitative perspective.

Forms and functions of intensifiers

The best model selected by AICcs with respect to the number of intensifiers in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes (relative to the respective narrative's total emotion lexeme count) reported a language-gender interaction (cf. Table 38) with more intensifiers being used by the German participants and more intensifiers being used by the female British participants (cf. medians, 30.2% for German females, 27.2% for German males vs. 27.3% for British females and 14.8% for British males, Table 38 and Figure 26). The relative importance of variables was reported as 0.95 for gender, 0.93 for language and 0.56 for the language-gender interaction.



Figure 26: Relative occurrence of intensifiers in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes across languages and genders. All relative occurrences are reported, their distribution (grey boxplot) as well as the best model fit (bold red or blue horizontal lines) with confidence intervals (red and blue shaded areas). Gender is shown as square against cross point characters (see x-axis).

Table 38: Glmer model selection based on AICcs and AICc Weights with respect to relative occurrence of Intensifiers + [Emotion] across XXX. Model components and corresponding codes are: 1 for gender, 2 for language, 3 for gender*language.

model components	df	ΔAICc	W_{AICc}
gender*language	6	0.00	0.56
gender+language	5	1.08	0.33
gender	4	4.40	0.05
language	4	5.20	0.04
null model	3	7.80	0.01

With respect to the discourse functions of intensifiers, assuming that upgraders and downgraders fulfil the discourse functions of boosting and attenuation or are means of dialogic contraction and expansion (White 2003), AICc-based model selection yielded the full model as best model fit (cf. Table 39), comprising all possible model components. Females and British males were detected to display more upgraders than downgraders (relative to the respective narrative's total emotion lexeme count), i.e. boost more or open up less space for dialogic alternatives, whereas German males used more downgraders than their British counterparts (cf. medians and non-overlapping confidence intervals in Figure 27, British female downgraders 7.9%, British males downgraders 3.7%, British female upgraders 21.3%, British males upgraders 10.9 % vs. German female downgraders 9.3%, German male downgraders 13.1%, German female upgraders 24.8% and German males upgraders 17.2%), i.e. attenuated more and opened up room for alternative positions. Relative importance of variables was reported as 1 for intensification, as 1 for gender, as 0.99 for language, as 0.90 for the intensification-gender interaction, as 0.73 for the gender-language interaction, as 0.7 for the intensification-language interaction and 0.34 for the intensification-gender-language interaction.



Figure 27: Relative occurrence of downgraders (Down) and upgraders (Up) in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes across languages and genders. All relative occurrences are reported, their distribution (grey boxplot) as well as the best model fit (bold red or blue horizontal lines) with confidence intervals (red and blue shaded areas). Gender is shown as point against triangle characters.

Table 39: Glmer model selection based on AICcs and AICc Weights with respect to relative occurrence of Upgraders and Downgraders + [Emotion] across languages and genders. Model components and corresponding codes are: 1 for intensification, 2 for language, 3 for gender, 4 for intensification*gender, 5 for intensification*language, 6 for gender*language and 7 for intensification*gender*language.

model	df	ΔAICc	W_{AICc}
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	11	0.00	0.36
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	10	1.37	0.17
1, 2, 3, 4, 6	9	1.50	0.16
1, 2, 3, 4, 5	9	2.06	0.12
1, 2, 3, 4	8	2.43	0.10
1, 2, 3, 5, 6	9	4.38	0.04
1, 2, 3, 5	8	5.48	0.02
1, 2, 3, 6	8	5.72	0.02
1, 2, 3	7	6.84	0.01
1, 2, 4	7	7.01	0.01
1, 3, 5	7	9.43	0.00
1, 3	6	10.68	0.00
1, 2	6	11.54	0.00
1	5	14.24	0.00
2, 3, 6	7	79.82	0.00
2, 3	6	80.70	0.00
2	5	84.87	0.00
3	5	85.22	0.00
null model	4	88.22	0.00

When one investigates the intensifier types and tokens in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes, differences between the subcorpora can be detected. Table 40 shows the three most frequent upgraders across both the British and German AWE datasets are *so*, *very* and *really* — *so*, *sehr* and *wirklich*. The German narratives, however, seem to display a wider range of upgrader types that are also sometimes part of colloquial German (e.g., *tierisch* 'terribly' or *verdammt* 'damn') or also of a creative type (e.g., *um [...] mehrere Zehnerpotenzen mehr gefreut* '[...] to a degree of several decimal powers more happy') which is not the case for the British upgraders.

Table 40: Upgraders + [EMOTION]. The table provides raw frequencies (fq) as well as normalized values (fq/N), normalized per 10,000 words.

BrE upgrader	fq	fq/N	Ger upgrader	fq	fq/N
so	49	9.2	so ('so')	30	4.9
very	42	7.9	sehr ('very')	59	9.6
really	27	5.8	wirklich ('really')	13	2.1
more	17	3.1	*mehr ('more')	13	2.1
extremely	12	2.2	total ('totally')	6	0.9
how	8	1.5	riesig ('enormously')	6	0.9
actually	5	0.9	umso ('the ... the')	6	0.9
much	5	0.9	echt ('really')	6	0.9
too	4	0.7	unglaublich ('incredibly')	4	0.6
incredibly	4	0.7	zu ('too')	3	0.4
most	4	0.7	ganz ('completely')	3	0.4
but	2	0.3	nie ('never')	3	0.4
genuinely	2	0.3	richtig ('properly')	3	0.4
thoroughly	2	0.3	völlig ('completely')	3	0.4
never	2	0.3	wahnsinnig ('madly')	3	0.4
ever	2	0.3	offensichtlich ('visibly')	3	0.4
a lot	1	0.1	gar ('very')	2	0.3
particularly	1	0.1	vollkommen ('completely')	2	0.3
overwhelmingly	1	0.1	besonders ('particularly')	2	0.3
especially	1	0.1	am meisten ('the most')	2	0.3
literally	1	0.1	absolut ('absolutely')	2	0.3
especially	1	0.1	enorm ('enormously')	2	0.3
absolutely	1	0.1	verdammt ('damn')	1	0.1
honestly	1	0.1	viel ('much')	1	0.1
openly	1	0.1	weiter ('more')	1	0.1
massively	1	0.1	ziemlich ('quite')	1	0.1
pleasantly	1	0.1	mindestens genauso ('at least similarly')	1	0.1
totally	1	0.1	tief ('profoundly')	1	0.1
tremendously	1	0.1	derartig ('such')	1	0.1
abhorrently	1	0.1	eigentlich ('actually')	1	0.1
overly	1	0.1	(je) desto ('the ... the')	1	0.1
			voll ('completely')	1	0.1
			wesentlich ('essentially')	1	0.1
			rundum ('completely')	1	0.1

Continued on next page

BrE upgrader	fq	fq/N	Ger upgrader	fq	fq/N
			überaus (‘greatly’)	1	0.1
			zum Zerreissen (‘rippingly’)	1	0.1
			furchtbar (‘terribly’)	1	0.1
			etwas (‘a bit’)	1	0.1
			tierisch (‘terribly’)	1	0.1
			derart (‘such’)	1	0.1
			völlig (‘completely’)	1	0.1

Table 41 lists the downgraders of AWE in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes. Among the most frequent downgrader types across the British and German datasets are *just*, *quite* and *a bit* — *einfach*, *ziemlich* and *etwas* in slightly different frequencies, however, one could conclude that these make the core downgraders across both datasets. The overall frequencies and variety of the British downgrader types are lower than the German downgrader types. Negated upgraders that result in a downgrading of the emotion concept such as *not really* and *nicht wirklich*, i.e. overall downgraders are relatively frequent across both language datasets.

For intensifiers co-occurring with ANGER/ ÄRGER the sample size was too small to permit statistical analysis and, therefore, a qualitative approach was preferred. Table 42 provides the raw frequencies of upgraders and downgraders co-occurring with ANGER/ ÄRGER in AWE across languages and genders. In a larger dataset, the patterns revealed in the statistical analysis of intensifiers + [EMOTION], i.e. the higher frequency of upgraders used by British and German females and British males and the higher number of downgrader use by German males in comparison to British males, might also emerge with respect to intensifier + [ANGER/ ÄRGER]. The observation that the British participants used very rarely downgraders in co-occurrence with ANGER might point at the fact that ANGER might be prototypically upgraded in the British dataset, whereas the ÄRGER prototype might include both upgraded and downgraded ÄRGER lexemes.

Table 43 provides the British intensifier types that co-occur with ANGER in AWE. *So*, *very* and *really*, the core upgraders (see above), are used with quite a wide range of ANGER lexemes (ranging from 4 to 7 types). The other types displayed represent less frequent, and hence peripheral, intensifiers, among them some that trigger in co-occurrence with ANGER lexemes particular anger-related inferences (e.g., *thoroughly pissed*). Downgrading of ANGER was rare in the English dataset. A large number of the intensifiers listed in this respect are special cases, i.e. upgraders used in non-affirmative contexts resulting in overall downgrading.

Table 41: Downgraders + [EMOTION]. The table provides raw frequencies (fq) as well as normalized values (fq/N), normalized per 10,000 words.

BrE downgrader	fq	fq/N	Ger downgrader	fq	fq/N
just	9	1.6	etwas ('a bit')	20	3.2
quite	9	1.6	einfach ('just')	17	2.7
not at all	4	0.7	ziemlich ('quite')	11	1.8
a bit	4	0.7	ganz und gar/ überhaupt nicht	7	1.1
a little	4	0.7	('not at all')		
less	4	0.7	ein wenig ('a bit')	6	0.9
slightly	4	0.7	ein bisschen ('a bit')	5	0.8
almost	3	0.5	nicht ganz ('not completely')	5	0.8
somewhat	3	0.5	fast ('nearly')	4	0.6
not much	2	0.3	nicht gerade ('not quite')	3	0.4
humbly	2	0.3	nur ('just')	3	0.4
near enough	1	0.1	nicht wirklich ('not really')	3	0.4
not excessively	1	0.1	nicht besonders ('not particularly')	3	0.4
fairly	1	0.1	leicht ('slightly')	2	0.3
rather	1	0.1	ned so ('not so')	2	0.3
not really	1	0.1	recht ('quite')	1	0.1
not that	1	0.1	eher ('rather')	1	0.1
not too	1	0.1	alles andere als	1	0.1
to an extent	1	0.1	('anything different than')		
pretty	1	0.1	nie ('never')	1	0.1
not so	1	0.1	nicht mehr ('not more')	1	0.1
			kaum ('hardly')	1	0.1
			zu einem gewissen Teil	1	0.1
			('to a certain extent')		
			lieber ('rather')	1	0.1
			gar keine ('no')	1	0.1
			nicht so ('not so')	1	0.1
			überhaupt nicht('not at all')	1	0.1
			lediglich('simply')	1	0.1
			bedingt('partly')	1	0.1
			großteils('largely')	1	0.1

Table 44 gives an overview over the German intensifier types that co-occur with ÄRGER in AWE. A slightly different distribution of German upgrader types can be observed when comparing to the British upgrader types in AWE (cf. Table 43). The core inten-

sifiers used in German are *sehr* ('very'), *einfach* ('just') and *so* ('so'). The upgraders *wirklich* and *echt* ('really') are more peripherally used compared to the English counterpart *really*. Some further rare, peripheral uses of upgraders such as *gar* ('very'), which is a stylistic variation of *sogar* (literally 'even' in the sense of 'very') functioning as intensifier (Fronhofer 2015; Zifonun et al. 1997: 882), attract attention in the German dataset.

Table 42: Occurrence of intensifiers + [ANGER]/ [ÄRGER] across British English and German. The percentages indicate the number of upgraders or downgraders of each category (language or gender) relative to the overall number of intensifiers in co-occurrence with ANGER or ÄRGER in each language.

	BrE f	%	**BrE m**	%	**Ger f**	%	**Ger m**	%
upgrader	26	54	14	29	22	35	13	21
downgrader	6	13	2	4	14	22	14	22

Overall, the qualitative differences between British and German ANGER/ ÄRGER events, i.e. the frequent use of British upgraders but not downgraders in co-occurrence with the emotion lexeme, has been partly confirmed (cf. Hypotheses Chapter 4) in the quantitative investigation in which British males revealed to use less downgraders in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes. Otherwise, important language and gender contrasts have been highlighted. The next sections, investigate multiple markers in EE that can function as CC, which is laid out particularly in Chapter 8.4.1, and as means of intersubjective positioning, which will be the focus of Chapter 8.4.2.

Table 43: Intensifier + [ANGER].

BrE Intensifier	ANGER
upgrader	
so	angry, annoyed, bothered, upset
very	aggravating, angry, annoyed, frustrated, indignant, unpleasant, upset
(just) really	angry, annoyed, bother, enraged, hated, upset
even more	angry, frustrating
especially	upset
extremely	angry
incredibly	frustrating
overly	frustrated
particularly	annoying
how	frustrating
thoroughly	pissed
just	don't like
downgrader	
almost	annoyed
never much	bothered
near enough	hated
a bit	jealous
not excessively	upset
slightly	irritated

Table 44: Intensifier + [ÄRGER].

Ger Intensifier	ÄRGER
upgrader	
(so) sehr	aufgebracht ('upset'), ärgern ('to be angry'), frustriert, ('frustrated'), geladen ('upset'), sauer ('upset'), ungern ('reluctantly') unzufrieden ('dissatisfied'), wütend ('irate')
einfach ('simply')	frustrierend ('frustrating'), nicht ausstehen/ nicht leiden/ nicht mögen ('not like')
so	drangsalieren ('torment'), genervt ('annoyed'), unsympathisch ('unsympathetic'), ungern ('reluctantly'), wütend ('irate')
total	aufgelöst ('upset'), aufgeregt ('venting one's anger'), frustriert ('frustrated')
echt ('really')	sauer ('anrgy'), wütend ('irate')
wie ('how')	hassen ('hate'), nicht leiden ('not like')
unglaublich ('incredibly')	aufgewühlt ('agitated'), frustriert ('frustrated')
wirklich ('really')	genervt ('annoyed')
viel zu sehr ('way too')	ärgern ('to be angry')
umso ('the...the')	wütender ('more irated')
so was von ('so')	gefrusted ('frustrated')
richtig ('really')	sauer ('angry')
gar ('very')	unverschämt ('impertinent')
downgrader	
etwas ('a bit')	empört ('indignent'), erbost ('incensed'), irritiert ('irritated'), verärgert ('annoyed'), wütend ('irate')
einfach ('just')	nicht leiden/ ausstehen/ nicht mögen ('not like'), frustrierend ('frustrating'), neidisch ('jealous')
(einfach) ein wenig ('just a bit')	ärgerlich ('upset'), irritiert ('irritated'), neidisch ('jealous')
ziemlich ('quite')	ärgerlich ('upset'), sauer ('angry'), wütend ('irate')
nicht weiter ('not further')	ärgern ('to be angry'), aufregen ('to rant')
fast ein bisschen ('nearly a bit')	wütend ('irate')
schon leicht ('already slightly')	wütend ('irate')
nicht ganz so ('not completely')	frustriert ('frustrated')
relativ ('relatively')	unbefriedigend ('dissatisfying')

8.4 Results II: Multiple Modifiers in Emotion Events

Multiple markers in EE are communicatively meaningful, which will be shown in the following sections (cf. Chapters 8.4.1 and 8.4.2). They fulfill various functions in emotion discourse, they can be regarded to be contextualization cues (cf. Chapters 2.4.3, 8.4.1) and resources of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapters 2.3.3, 8.4.2). Their forms might vary across British English and German datasets (cf. Chapter 8.4.1 and 8.4.2), but also important parallels have been identified across the language subcorpora with respect to contextualization cues/ markers of intersubjective positioning that might be regarded to be indispensable in particular contextual configurations (cf. 'contextualization conventions', Chapter 2.5.2), for instance with respect to JEALOUSY — EIFERSUCHT (cf. Chapter 8.4.2).
After presenting the frequency and distribution of the multiple intensifier use and multiple EM use in AWE, each section will focus on the functional contribution of the multiple markers in EE. Multiple intensifier and EM marker use should therefore be integrated in models on emotion discourse (cf. Chapters 2, 8.5 and 8.6).

8.4.1 Multiple Modifiers of Intensification

Frequency and Distribution of Multiple Intensifiers

The marking by multiple intensifiers is rare in AWE and has also been found to be generally a rare phenomenon with respect to certain emotion concepts drawing on BNC and DeReko corpus data (Fronhofer 2015). Although the quantitative data is not immense (cf. Table 45[161]), a tendency of German participants more frequently displaying two upgraders in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes might be revealed in a larger dataset comprising more occurrences of multiple intensification. Also, the types of multiple intensification involving the use of two downgraders or two upgraders seems to be not very common for the British dataset, whereas the German dataset, however, comprises some few more instances of these types. This as well would have to be cross-checked in an investigation drawing on more data.
All in all, the focus will, therefore, be of qualitative nature in this investigation, zooming in on the functional contribution the display of two intensifiers can provide to the EE. In the following section, it is argued that particularly contextual configurations involving multiple intensifiers prove intensifiers to function as contextualization cues (Gumperz 1992a; Chapter 2.4.1) that potentially foreground or background certain emotion concepts in a cluster of co-occurring emotion lexemes (Fronhofer 2015).

[161] Due to the few occurrences of multiple intensification in AWE, statistical modeling, e.g., chi-square statistics, normalized values or even more complex models, with respect to British English – German contrasts are not possible.

Table 45: Occurrence of multiple intensifiers +[EMOTION] across British English and German. The percentages indicate the number of multiple intensifiers in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes relative to the overall number of emotion lexemes in AWE.

+[EMOTION]	BrE	%	Ger	%
upgrader + downgrader	2	0.2	2	0.2
upgrader + upgrader	1	0.1	7	0.7
downgrader + upgrader	6	0.6	4	0.4
downgrader + downgrader	1	0.1	3	0.3
total	10	1	16	1.6

Functions of Multiple Intensifiers

First, one EE (cf. Example 29[162]) taken from the German subcorpus will be under discussion. A student has just received the best mark possible and writes about her emotions:

(29) *Ich bin so* ***erleichtert****. [...] Ich bin wirklich so* ***froh*** *diese Klausur bestanden zu haben und dann noch so gut, das hätte ich nie erwartet. Das gibt mir wirklich wieder Kraft und neuen Mut für die nächsten Prüfungen.[...] Ich* ***freu mich*** *wirklich so sehr über die 1. [...] Ich* ***freu mich*** *so über dieses Klausurergebnis und bin auch etwas* ***stolz*** *auf mich, [...]* (g_f_002_2)
'*I am so* ***relieved****. [...] I am really so* ***happy*** *that I have passed this exam, and then so well, I would have never expected this to happen. This gives me really new strength and courage for the next exams. [...] I am really so* ***happy*** *about receiving an A*. [...] I am so* ***happy*** *about this result and am also a bit* ***proud*** *of myself, [...]*'

Multiple intensifiers, more precisely two, are used twice in this EE (*wirklich so*, 'really so', *freu mich wirklich so sehr*, 'I am really so happy'). The emphasizers *wirklich* ('really') and the booster (*so*) *sehr* ('very') co-occur with *froh* and *freu mich* ('happy'). Taking the whole EE into consideration, i.e. the global context in which the emotion lexemes are displayed, it can be argued that *wirklich* ('really') has an additional or more prevalent function to that of being an emphasizer and does not merely have scope over the booster and the emotion lexeme (as Taboada et al. (2014), for instance would analyze). *Wirklich* ('really') rather serves to foreground HAPPINESS which clusters with RELIEF (*erleichtert*, 'relieved') and PRIDE (*stolz*, 'proud') which are themselves upgraded (*so*, 'so') or downgraded (*etwas*, 'a bit'). It is also worthy to note that *freu mich/ froh* ('happy') occurs three times in this short extract adding up

[162] Emotion lexemes are printed in bold. Intensifiers and multiple intensifiers are underlined.

to this effect. The booster *(so) sehr* ('very') in this case of multiple marking by two intensifiers consequently fulfills the main grading function (upgrading). In contrast to previous analyses, which mainly simplified the marking by multiple intensifiers, it is argued that this contextual configuration has the function of foregrounding (Gumperz 1992a) the prevalent emotion concept in a complex cluster of several emotion concepts. In the English dataset, comparable examples can be found. In the following JOY event (cf. Example 30[163]), the diminisher *just* is used together with the booster *so* in co-occurrence with the emotion lexeme *happy* and also foregrounds HAPPINESS:

(30) *I am so* ***happy*** *that I could scream and dance with* ***joy*** *in the middle of everyone [...] It was all too* ***exciting***. *[...] It makes me want to do more exams so I can experience this amazing feeling again and again. [...] I think the most* ***shocking and surprising*** *thing about this whole experience is that I got full marks. [...] Everyone is so* ***happy*** *and* ***proud*** *of me for getting my grades. I have received many well done cards and just friendly texts. [...] My parents are very, very* ***pleased*** *for my [sic]. They know I worked really hard to get the results that I did and they know I will continue to work hard for my next exam. I'[m] just so* ***happy*** *that I have been able to complete an exam that is so tough that a lot of students are not normally able to pass it. This has really given me a boost of* ***confidence*** *and also made me believe that next time I can achieve the same results and that I can pass extremely difficult exams once again.* (e_f_024_2)

HAPPINESS is the prevalent emotion here and clusters with EXCITEMENT (*all too exciting*), SHOCK (shocking), SURPRISE (*surprising*), PRIDE (*proud*), CONFIDENCE (*a boost of confidence*) and PLEASURE (*pleased*, the latter experienced by the parents) all being part of the EE. Again, the emotion lexeme *happy* occurs two times more (*so happy*), intensified by the booster *so*, providing further proof for the foregrounding taking place.

Apart from the fact that intensifiers can, in case of multiple intensifier use, function as foregrounding devices, they might also background certain emotion concepts. This conclusion can be drawn from the following example (cf. Example 31[164]), an EE where a student who has received an unfair mark vents her feelings. She is particularly annoyed about the fact that the supervisor seems not to have read her work properly and that another student who apparently has written down the same arguments received a

[163] Emotion lexemes are printed in bold. Intensifiers, multiple intensifiers and discussed items are underlined.

[164] Emotion lexemes are printed in bold. Intensifiers, multiple intensifiers and discussed items are underlined.

better grade:

(31) *Ich bin sehr* ***enttäuscht****. [...] Ich versuche Verständnis dafür aufzubringen, dass Dozenten ja sehr viel zu korrigieren haben [...], merke aber [...], dass ich auch wirklich* ***genervt*** *bin, da Dozenten ja auch erwarten, dass man wissenschaftliche Artikel sehr genau liest. [...] Ich werde dann fast ein bisschen* ***wütend****, weil ich mich nicht ernst genommen fühle, [...] Mich* ***nervt*** *es [sic] dass ich jetzt mit der Arbeit zum Dozenten gehen muss [...].* (g_f_012_1)

'*I am very* ***disappointed****. [...] I try to show understanding that lecturers have to do a lot of corrections, [...] but realize [...] that I am also really* ***annoyed****, as lecturers also expect you to read research papers in detail. [...] I then get nearly a bit* ***angry****, because I feel that I am not taken seriously [...] I am* ***annoyed*** *that I have to go to the lecturer now to discuss my work [...].*'

Fast ('nearly') and *ein bisschen* ('a bit'), two downgraders, more precisely approximators, co-occur here with *wütend* ('angry'). However, it is argued again that the analysis of *fast* ('nearly') as downgrader having scope over *ein bisschen* ('a bit') is insufficient. The prevalent function of *fast* ('nearly') seems to be not that of intensification but that of backgrounding ANGER. The foregrounded emotions of the cluster explicated in this EE are DISAPPOINTMENT (enttäuscht, 'disappointed'), intensified by the booster *sehr* ('very') and especially ANNOYANCE, which is repeated twice (*genervt* 'annoyed', *mich nervt es* 'it annoys me') and emphasized by *wirklich* ('really').
In the English dataset, backgrounding a certain emotion, here by using one downgrader and one upgrader (*a little bit too proud*), seems also possible. In the following EE (cf. Example 32[165]), a student talks about his feelings after having received full marks:

(32) *Initially, I would be in* ***shock****. "How on earth did this happen?" I would think to myself. [...] I would probably tell a lot of people. Back in school, I was terrible at keeping my good grades a secret; not much has changed since then. I get a little bit too* ***proud*** *when I do something I deem to be impressive. I've tried to reel that in a little bit these days, but it still sneaks out on special occasions. [...] In the longer term, such success may not necessarily be a good thing — I've gotten into a habit recently of doing just enough to get by, so a good grade like this might lead to a little bit of* ***complacency*** *on my part, but in general I would be very* ***happy*** *— and*

[165] Emotion lexemes are printed in bold. Intensifiers, multiple intensifiers and discussed items are underlined.

> *very lucky — if such a situation was to occur at this stage of my university career.* (e_m_026_2)

The approximator *a little bit* and the booster *too* co-occur here with the emotion lexeme *proud*. Again, analyzing *a little bit* as taking scope over *too proud* or as operating on the clause level seems to provide only one part of the overall picture. *A little bit* can certainly be assigned a hedging and an apologetic function — this is supported by the fact that *a little bit* is also directly repeated in the following line, co-occurring with *to reel that in* — but it is argued that it also serves to background PRIDE in the overall EE. Additionally, COMPLACENCY, an emotion closely related to PRIDE, is premodified and hedged by the quantifier *a little bit of*. The foregrounded emotions in this cluster are therefore SHOCK (*shock*) and HAPPINESS (*I would be very happy*), the latter being intensified by the booster *very*.
In sum, marking by two intensifiers is used both in the English and German EE clusters in order to foreground or background (by using a first intensifier) certain emotions concepts which might also be intensified (by using a second intensifier). This is why, drawing on the definition of contextualization cues (cf. Chapter 2.4.1), intensifiers can be regarded to function as contextualization cues (Gumperz 1992a). In the next section, the functional contribution of multiple EM use to EE is discussed after a short section on their frequency and distribution in AWE (cf. Chapter 8.4.2).

8.4.2 Multiple Modifiers of Epistemic Un-/certainty

Frequency and Distribution of Multiple EM

The multiple marking of emotion lexemes by EM is very rare in AWE. Table 46[166] gives an overview over the frequency of multiple EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes, categorized into different combinatory types across the British and German subcorpora. The focus of the investigation lies, therefore, in the following on a qualitative analysis that gives insights into the functional contribution multiple EM can provide to emotion discourse. As will be argued in the following section, their display is communicatively meaningful, comparable to multiple intensifiers that have been shown to function as contextualization cues (cf. Chapters 2.4.1, 8.4.1).

[166] Due to the few occurrences of multiple marking by EM in AWE, statistical modeling, e.g., chi-square statistics, normalized values or even more complex models, with respect to British English – German contrasts are not possible.

Table 46: Occurrence of multiple markers of un/-certainty +[EMOTION] across British English and German. The percentages indicate the number of multiple markers of un/-certainty in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes relative to the overall number of emotion lexemes in AWE.

+[EMOTION]	BrE	%	Ger	%
'low' + 'low'	2	0.2	2	0.2
'low' + 'high'	1	0.1	–	–
'low' + 'medium'	1	0.1	–	–
total	4	0.4	2	0.2

Functions of Multiple EM

From a discourse functional perspective, it is important, as has been highlighted before, to investigate the use of more than one EM in co-occurrence of emotion lexemes across British English and German, to consider the intricate interplay of multiple un-/certainty cues and to pinpoint their different functional contribution to the overall (emotion/ -al) utterance or even (emotion) discourse (cf. Chapter 2). Fetzer (2011b), for instance, investigated two or more co-occurring EM against redundancy, an information-theoretical framework, and identified multiple EM also as CC (cf. Chapter 2.4.1) in Gumperz' sense (Gumperz 1992a) giving rise to inferences (Fetzer 2011b) and having a specific interactional communicative purpose. The idea of multiple cues being at play, originally suggested in Gumperz' definition (Gumperz 1992a), seems to be compatible with what Majid (2012: 439) points out when talking about sound symbolism and the inference of emotions in discourse (cf. Chapter 2.4.1):

> Arguably, it is not a single sound that gives rise to an emotional effect, but rather a sound in the context of a stretch of discourse. [...] This highlights the fact that emotion can be inferred from larger stretches of narrative.

However, the function of multiple EM as contextualization cues might only be one possible function of multiple EM in emotion discourse, as will be laid out in the following paragraphs.
The following two parallel examples (cf. Examples 33 a. and b.[167]) identified in AWE contain each two uncertainty cues in co-occurrence with ANGER – ÄRGER lexemes, more precisely JEALOUSY — EIFERSUCHT:

(33) a. *I'd been told that I did do best and even though some of them were upset, and I think probably a bit* ***jealous****, they were still very* ***happy*** *for me and we all* ***cheered****.* (e_f_033_2)

[167] Emotion lexemes are printed in bold, EM and multiple EM are underlined.

b. *Wenn ich an meine Kollegen denke, dann glaube ich sind sie vielleicht* ***neidisch****, aber vor allem etwas* ***wütend****, da ich mich in die gleiche schlechte Position gestellt hatte wie sie auch.* (g_m_031_2)
'*When I think about my colleagues, then I think they are perhaps* ***jealous****, but above all* ***angry****, because I had put myself in the same bad position.*'

In Examples 33, one British and one German student responded to the second elicitation task, i.e. a positive scenario, where they should imagine having received the highest mark possible. In both narratives, JEALOUSY – EIFERSUCHT is displayed, modified by two EM (*I think*, *probably* and *glaube ich* ('I think'), *vielleicht* ('perhaps')). In 33 a., the global EE contains also another emotion clustering with ANGER and JEALOUSY, viz. HAPPINESS. Similar to cases of multiple intensifier use (cf. Chapter 8.4.1 and Fronhofer 2015), it is argued here that the adverbs co-occurring with JEALOUSY (*probably*, *a bit*) fulfil different functions, i.e. the proceeding adverbial subjunct foregrounds or backgrounds an emotion in a cluster of co-occurring concepts. In our example, *probably*, a marker of epistemic uncertainty that distances the writer from the sincerity of the emotion/ -al statement, i.e. the others are "a bit jealous", while judging the reliability of the sincerity of the information, primarily backgrounds JEALOUSY against the prevalent emotion, i.e. (upgraded) HAPPINESS. The following adverbial subjunct (*a bit*) primarily provides information on the intensity of the emotion (JEALOUSY) and downgrades it. It is further argued that the cognitive-verb-based EM *I think*, the third cue positioned before the two adverbial subjuncts here, also attenuates the force of JEALOUSY, backgrounds it and distances the writer from the sincerity of the emotion/-al statement. However, it is not superfluous, but communicatively meaningful, since it additionally fulfills another function that can be taken into account against the framework proposed by White (2003). *I think*, as prototypical marker of (inter-) subjective positioning can be regarded to primarily open up the dialogical space for other, perhaps differing, views (mode: entertain). This is also true for 33 b., and the German example is in many ways analogous to the British ANGER event in 33 a. — *glaube ich* ('I think') opens up the dialogical space, *vielleicht* ('perhaps') backgrounds NEID ('JEALOUSY') — however, NEID (*neidisch*, 'jealous') is not downgraded and the prevalent emotion is (downgraded) WUT ('ANGER') and not HAPPINESS. The fact that we find this parallel example across British English and German, employing nearly the same cues, might point at the cues being indispensable in this specific contextual configuration (cf. Chapter 2.5.2), i.e. the display of (others') JEALOUSY – EIFERSUCHT.
Another reason why *I think* and *glaube ich* ('I think') in Examples 33 a. and b. are

communicatively meaningful is that the emotional utterances comprise third person experiencers (*some of them*, *meine Kollegen*, 'my colleagues') and the participants take into account that they could not have known what the others actually thought or felt. The EM under discussion are not in the same way redundant as the intensifiers in Examples 34[168], where the participants "overdo" (Fronhofer accepted) the downgrading of (his/ her, i.e. first person experiencer) ANNOYANCE/ IRRITATION by the intensifiers *To an extent*, *almost* and *slightly*, *of sorts*. The participants hereby flout the Gricean maxims (Grice 1975: 45f.; cf. Chapter 2.2.1) of quantity and manner, since they are more "informative than required" and are not as "brief" as possible. They hence trigger, instead of a low-intensity-ANGER anchored (generalized) implicature, a high-intensity (particularized) implicature (i.e. *I was very annoyed* [...]), while importing cognitive context to the ANGER event (cf. Chapter 2.2.3).

(34) a. *To an extent I was almost* ***annoyed*** *at her myself [...]* (e_m_006_2)

b. *If it were the opposite [...], I would be slightly* ***irritated*** *of sorts.* (e_f_038_1)

So, in sum, all three cues in Examples 33 can be regarded to be multifunctional. One possible function is, however, prevalent in each of them in specific contextual configurations, involving the clustering with further cues. In Example 33 *I think* serves therefore primarily to intersubjectively position (cf. Chapter 2.3.3) the writer/ reader, *probably* is primarily a backgrounding device and *a bit* primarily downgrades the intensity of the emotion. In this, (one or more) EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes, perfectly fit the definition of CC (cf. Chapters 2.4.1, 2.4.3) provided by Gumperz (1992a). Moreover, they have been proven to be means of intersubjective positioning (White 2003).

8.5 Discussion

When the immediate linguistic context of emotion lexemes, in particular EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes or ANGER lexemes, is examined, language and gender differences were identified (cf. Hypotheses Chapter 4). The expectation that in British narratives more EM should be displayed than in the German narratives, based on results reported in Kranich (2016), Fetzer (2009), Becker (2009) and Taboada et al. (2014), has at first sight not been corroborated. The findings of the present study might be explained by a genre-specific display — Kranich (2016), for instance, investigated

[168] Emotion lexemes are underlined. Multiple intensifiers are underlined.

popular science texts and letters to shareholders. However, the main reason for this result lies in the operationalization of EM. Kranich (2016: 106), to take her study again as an example, investigated in her LeSh (Letters to Shareholders) corpus a slightly smaller corpus than AWE and coded "all expressions signaling that the speaker asserts only that it is possible or probable that the proposition is true", i.e. she investigated hedging strategies in Talbot's sense (Talbot 2010), i.e. all linguistic strategies and markers used by the speaker/ writer that contribute to weakening the force of the utterance. The study at hand, however, also included epistemic modal marking of certainty (cf.20) in order to cover a fuller and more fine-grained functional spectrum (cf. the division of the probability scale into 'high', 'medium' and 'low' certainty markers). Moreover, the separate coding of discourse functions allowed high or low probability contexts to be taken into account that might have an impact on the particular function of an EM such as *I think*. The latter, for instance, has been reported to be an attenuating device in contexts colored by probability and to be a booster in high certainty contexts (Fetzer 2014).

Ultimately, the results corroborate Kranich (2016), Fetzer (2009), Becker (2009) and Taboada et al. (2014) and contradict Markkanen & Schröder (1989) as well as Clyne (1991), since in the British narratives low certainty markers are more frequent than in German narratives. Differing results, e.g. with respect to Becker (2009), for instance, might be also due to genre-specificities, Becker investigating political interviews. Additionally, it has been shown, as hypothesized, that high certainty markers are mainly used in German narratives. Overall, I agree with Kranich (2016) that the differing results are due to the operationalization of epistemic modal marking, or rather, hedging. From the perspective of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapter 2.3.3), the German participants are rather dialogically contractive (concur and pronounce), whereas the British employ resources of dialogic expansion (entertain). This can be related to the five dimensions of communicative contrasts postulated for English and German (House 2006) which have been largely confirmed by several studies (Kranich 2016: 47-49). German discourse is attributed the property of being more direct (1), oriented towards self (2) and content (3), more explicit (4) and more ad-hoc in their formulations (5) in contrast to the British, who communicate more indirectly (1), are other-oriented (2) and addressee-oriented (3), implicit (4) and use more verbal routines (5) (House 2006a: 252). The high frequency of low probability markers for British English, and hence the mode entertain, points to its addressee-orientation (House 2006a), while the high frequency of high certainty markers and hence the modes concur and pronounce, to the content-orientation of German (House 2006a) and its uncertainty avoidance tendency

(Hofstede 1980, 2001)[169].

Gender differences, with the males using more EM in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes have not been discussed in previous studies, but some very few studies on gender-differential use of EM do exist such as Holmes (1990) who identified, for instance, a higher frequency of *sort of* or *you know* as means of uncertainty used by men, which opposes Lakoff (1973b), who judges hedges to be characteristic for female language only. However, the letter findings and analyses are not data-based and rely on intuition (Lakoff 1973b). Gender differences in this respect should clearly be under more scrutiny in future research. Apart from this, language-specific as well as gender-specific emotion displays including EM might be due to a differential cognitive entrenchment, i.e. the "frequency of occurrence of such units" (Langacker 1987 [1991]: 52) across languages and genders, having been initiated from the very beginning of (affective) language socialization (Oatley et al. 2006; Planalp 1999).

The high frequency of German *natürlich* versus the practical absence of the corresponding British *of course* or *naturally*, emerging from the analysis of EM types across British English and German, could be explained by the fact that *naturally* is more restricted with respect to stance-marking (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 235). *Naturally* means "in the normal cause of events" or "as one may predict from the natural order of things" (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 235) and is therefore very close in its meaning to the corresponding adverb of manner (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007). *Naturally* is moreover not very frequent in ICE-GB (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 235). *Of course*, by contrast, developed into a heteroglossic marker meaning "as we all know" (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 235-236) and could have potentially been used in the British narratives. However, it was not frequent at all in AWE. The German *natürlich* seems to have already developed into a marker of heteroglossic engagement (dialogic contraction), frequently displayed in the German dataset.

Consequently, heteroglossic marking is not possible with *naturally* but has to be achieved by other markers such as *of course* or the cognitive-verb-based *I know*. This also potentially explains the higher type frequency of EM in British than in German, heteroglossic function being expressed in British English by not one or two prominent, high-frequency adverbs, but various other markers.

This, moreover, underlines the importance of taking different POS into account when investigating epistemic modal marking across languages. The results suggest, for instance, the importance of epistemic modal marking by cognitive verbs, such as *I know / I think* in British English. The role of cognitive-verb-based parentheticals has been

[169] As has also been cited by Kranich (2016: 27).

pointed out before (Fetzer 2009). Kranich (2016: 110) found important language-specific differences with respect to lexico-grammatical categories identified in the LeSH corpus, the Americans (USA) using, for example, more lexical verbs for epistemic modal marking than the Germans. All in all, the findings underline the importance of considering EM in Emotion Events, especially from a contrastive perspective (cf. Chapter 2).

This is equally true for intensifiers as modifiers in EE. The contrastive analysis revealed important differences between the language and gender corpora, corroborating House & Kasper (1981: 182) and their finding of Germans having a "stronger tendency to intensify" (cf. Hypotheses Chapter 4). This could be related to the dimensions of communicative contrasts (cf. Chapter 3), reported and discussed before with respect to EM in EE, more precisely the tendency of Germans to be more direct and explicit (House 2006a). However, the results of the present investigation contradict House's and Kasper's results of downgraders being more frequent in English (House & Kasper 1981), since only German males used more downgraders than German females and than British males and females in the present investigation. This could be due to the operationalization of "downgrader" under the headline of "modality markers" in House & Kasper (1981: 166), which is a wider category than the one used in this investigation. The category of downgraders established by House & Kasper (1981) does not only comprise downgraders in Quirk's sense (Quirk et al. 1985). They are spread over the categories formed by House & Kasper (1981); they can be, for instance, found in "downtoners", cf. *just*, "understaters", cf. *a little bit*, and even "hedges", cf. *ziemlich*, but also hedges such as *kind of* or *sort of*. All in all, in spite of the differing operationalizations, this investigation contradicts House & Kasper (1981) with respect to more frequent downgrading in Quirk's sense (Quirk et al. 1985). This is supported, when one considers the results with respect to EM of medium or low certainty in EE of the present investigation, where, as well, no language effect was identified (see above). To put it simply, the British participants did not use more downgraders or EM of medium or low certainty in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes, i.e. there was no language effect. However, one result that should be highlighted is that the German male participants used more downgraders (Quirk et al. 1985), while the British males used more epistemic markers (see above). Consequently, one could hypothesize that German and British males attenuate EE at similar frequencies, but that the German males recur to linguistic devices of intensification, while the British males use linguistic devices of epistemic marking in order to do so, i.e. the language effect might be leveled out when looking at overall attenuation, but not with respect to intensification or epistemic marking. This again, underlines the importance of the operationalization of intensifiers and epistemic markers and the formation of clear-cut categories in investigations on such

devices (cf. Chapter 4). Moreover, it should not only be investigated whether speakers or writers upgrade OR downgrade OR use epistemic markers of certainty OR uncertainty in order to boost OR attenuate, but investigations should integrate, firstly, both upgrading AND downgrading or epistemic certainty AND uncertainty, and secondly, depending on the focus of the investigation, integrate both resources of intensification AND epistemic marking in order to receive unskewed results.

Apart from this, in the light of the findings on intensifiers in EE of this study, the findings by Grieve (2010), who identified more softeners (downgraders and downtoners) in face-threatening acts for German (cf. the relatively high number of overall German downgraders in this investigation and also in ÄRGER events) seem plausible, and Taboada et al. (2014), who observed a high complexity and creativity of graduation types for German (cf. complex intensifiers such as *um gefühlt mehrere Zehnerpotenzen glücklicher* and the variety of German intensifier types, see above), can be confirmed. The complexity and variety of German intensifier types can further be linked to the dimension of communicative contrasts, namely that Germans are more ad hoc in their formulations (House 2006a). The finding of more emphasizers being used than downtoners (Taboada et al. 2014) is only partly corroborated in this study, where only British and German females and British males used more upgraders than downgraders. Moreover, the occurrence of more softeners in English negative reviews than in positive reviews as identified by Taboada et al. (2014), cannot be, when cross-checking (drawing on raw frequencies) the occurrences of downgraders in the positive and negative British narratives of AWE, corroborated, where downgraders and epistemic markers of low/ medium certainty are less frequent in negative texts (22 occurrences for downgraders and 22 occurrences for epistemic markers of low and medium certainty) than in positive texts (37 occurrences for downgraders and 35 occurrences of epistemic markers of low and medium certainty).

Gender differences with respect to intensifier use have been discussed before but are either out-dated (e.g., Stoffel 1901), or rely only on constructed or introspective data (e.g., Jespersen 1922; Key 1975) or do not include quantification (Lakoff 1973a). Some studies which comprise a quantification of results focus, unfortunately, not on gender differences in the first place and only comprise investigations into some few intensifiers such as *so*, *very* or *really* (Tagliamonte & Roberts 2005). Overall, in spite of some few contradictory results, the use of intensifiers has been found to be a characteristic of female speech (e.g., Tagliamonte & Roberts 2005; Stenström et al. 2002). This investigation only partly corroborates these findings with respect to more intensifiers being used by females, since this was true only for the British subcorpus (cf. the overlapping confidence intervals of the German subcorpus and the identified gender-language interaction). Moreover, the present results are more nuanced with respect to discourse

functions, and British and German females were detected to use more upgraders than downgraders (alongside British males, however). All in all, further investigations into gender-differential intensifiers use are needed.

The distribution of intensifier types and tokens, more precisely the importance of the three most frequent types *very — sehr*, *really — wirklich* and *so — so* across the British and German dataset, can be regarded to be a relatively recent snapshot of intensifier use (cf. compilation of AWE), since the use of intensifiers can be linked to questions of fashion or innovation and is subject to rapid changes (e.g., Tagliamonte & Roberts 2005). Moreover, particular intensifier use, such as some colloquial intensifier use identified in the German subcorpus, can be linked to questions of identity and group membership (e.g., Lorenz 1999; Stenström et al. 2002).

Multiple markers in EE are a rare phenomenon (cf. Chapters 8.4.1, 8.4.2 and Fronhofer 2015) and the question arises in light of their low frequencies if they matter at all in overall emotion displays, if they are only exceptions to the rule, and if they should be taken into account by models on emotion discourse. However, as has been shown above, the display of multiple cues provides intriguing insights into the functional contribution intensifiers and EM can have to British and German emotion discourse (cf. Chapters 8.4.1, 8.4.2 and Fronhofer 2015). They should not only be regarded as tricky configurations posing methodological problems in corpus annotation (cf. for instance Taboada et al. 2014). They have been hypothesized and found to be communicatively meaningful before (Traugott & Dasher 2002; Fetzer 2011b; Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007) and this investigation corroborated their function as contextualization cues (cf. Chapters 2.4.1, 2.4.3) by highlighting their role in clustering emotion concepts as foregrounding and backgrounding devices (cf. Chapter 8.4.1) and as means of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapters 2.3.3, 8.4.2). The display of multiple intensifiers or EM might even be indispensable in some contextual configurations of some British and German EE (cf. Chapters 2.5.2, 8.4.2). Therefore, multiple intensifier and EM use should be integrated in recent models on emotion discourse (cf. Chapter 2). The latter should take into account that two or even more EM or intensifiers can co-occur with emotion lexemes and models should provide answers to questions about the functional contribution of such cues to emotion discourse. The overlays of subsystems of the Appraisal System, as mentioned and discussed before (cf. Chapters 1, 1.2 and Alba-Juez 2018), might, in appraisal-theoretical terms (cf. Chapter 2.3), therefore, not only involve the overlay of resources of affect with resources of graduation or engagement (Alba-Juez 2018), but multiple overlays with the affect system involving sometimes up to three (and perhaps even more) resources of both graduation and engagement (cf. Examples 33).

8.6 Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has viewed emotion concepts in context, and in particular (adverbial) modifiers in an Extended Model of EE (cf. Chapter 2), markers of un-/certainty and intensification across the British English and German datasets. They have been shown to fulfil important functions as CC and markers of intersubjective positioning (cf. Chapters 2.3.3, 2.4.3), which particularly emerge in multiple modifier use. The use of markers of un-/certainty and intensification has been found to differ across languages and genders (cf. Hypotheses Chapter 4). The most important findings with respect to language preferences in EM and intensifiers use in EE are summarized in the following.

Males have been identified to use more markers of un-/certainty in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes than females in the AWE EE (cf. Hypothesis H3 a) was not corroborated, i.e. there was no language effect). In the German dataset, more high probability markers were displayed in contrast to the British narratives, where low probability markers were prevalent. Consequently, the German participants used more resources of dialogic contraction than the British participants who used more resources of dialogic expansion (cf. Hypothesis H3 b) and c) were confirmed).

With respect to intensification, the Germans were found to use more intensifiers than the British and the British females used more intensifiers than the British males (H4 a). German males used more downgraders that the British males, British and German females and British males used more upgraders than downgraders (H4 b) was partly confirmed).

Viewing multiple modifiers corroborated the functional contribution of EM and intensifiers in EE as contextualization cues and resources of intersubjective positioning (H3 c) and H4 c) were confirmed; cf. Chapters 2.3.3, 2.4.3). All in all, these contrastive results underpin, from a theoretical point of view, the necessary revision of the EE in form of an Extended Emotion Event Model, taking linguistic and cognitive context into account. This is synthesized in Figure 28, which provides the functions (multiple) modifiers can fulfill in EE (cf. boxes).



Figure 28: The Extended Emotion Event Model (II): The modification of EE by (multiple) intensifiers or markers of un-/ certainty fulfills important functions in emotion discourse such as intersubjective positioning of writers/ readers or foregrounding/ backgrounding of certain emotion concepts by contextualization cues.

Part IV. Summary and Conclusions

Emotion Events in Context

The Emotion Event Model

The Emotion Event Model (cf. Chapter 2.1.2) allowed us to investigate emotion concept frequencies, POS-membership, syntactic realizations and emotion event chains comprising Experiencers and CAUSES of EE in AWE (cf. Chapter 6). Figure 29 provides the illustration of the EE model further developed in this investigation on the basis of Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson (e.g., 2010). The contrastive results of this study are presented below (cf. Emotion Events in British English and German).



Figure 29: The Emotion Event Model (based on e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). The model comprises prototypical emotion concepts (cf. EMOTION) hierarchically organized ($EMOTION_1$ and $EMOTION_2$). EE are grounded in space and time and comprise experiencer, agent, appraisal (value judgments), cause and arousal. Further event-intrinsic properties are viewing arrangement and linguistic construal (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011). The boxes highlight the parts of the model investigated here.

The Extended Emotion Event Model (I)

The Extended Emotion Event Model (I), which has been newly developed here (cf. Chapter 2), allowed to investigate emotion concepts in 'context' (cf. Chapters 1, 2), in particular their linguistic and cognitive context, which contributes to overall functional event construal. Congruent and incongruent contextual configurations (cf. Chapter 7.2) are taken into account in contrast to the EE model proposed by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (e.g., 2011). This is illustrated in Figures 30 – 32. The functional contribution of congruent and incongruent contextual configurations to emotion discourse is summarized (cf. Chapter 7). Contrastive findings with respect to functional Emotion Event construal are recapitulated below (cf. Emotion Events in British English and

German).



Figure 30: The Extended Emotion Event Model (Ia): Congruent contextual configurations and their functions. Emotion concepts frequently co-occur with further emotion concepts, i.e. in emotion concept clusters, or with further evaluative items of the same valence. Here, positive emotion concepts co-occur and form a congruent contextual configuration (the valence is symbolized by the mathematical symbol '+'). Congruent displays may serve the functions of disambiguation and intensification. The functional contribution of the contextual configurations is summarized in the box.



Figure 31: The Extended Emotion Event Model (Ib): Incongruent contextual configurations and their functions. Emotion concepts frequently co-occur with further emotion concepts, i.e. in emotion concept clusters, or with further evaluative items. Here, a positive emotion concept (symbolized by the mathematical symbol '+') co-occurs with negative emotion concepts/ evaluative items (the valence is symbolized by the mathematical symbol '-'), and forms a incongruent contextual configuration. Incongruent EE displays may point at a subjective construal and perspectivization of the EE. Moreover, incongruent displays may serve the function of attenuating the overall EE display and point at the complexity of emotional experiences. At first sight incongruent displays might be language-specific and appropriate ways of displaying EE. The functional contribution of the contextual configurations is summarized in the box.



Figure 32: The Emotion Event Model and Blends (based on e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk & Wilson 2010). The at the same time positive and negative emotion concept (e.g., BITTERSWEET) represents a blended EE ('+ and -'). The lexeme-inherent display comprises both a positive ('+', e.g., JOY) and negative ('-', e.g., SADNESS) emotion concept, giving rise to a blended EE. Possible functions of this lexeme-inherent incongruent display are the same as for lexeme-external incongruent displays, i.e. attenuation and perspectivization. '+/-' points at the complexity of emotional experiences. The functional contribution of the contextual configurations is summarized in the box.

The Extended Emotion Event Model (II)



Figure 33: The Extended Emotion Event Model (II): The modification of EE by (multiple) intensifiers or markers of un-/ certainty fulfills important functions in emotion discourse such as intersubjective positioning of writers/ readers or foregrounding/ backgrounding of certain emotion concepts by contextualization cues. The functional contribution of the contextual configurations is summarized in the box.

The second Extension to the Emotion Event Model (Extended Emotion Event Model II; cf. Chapter 8.2), as illustrated in Figure 33, enabled to investigate emotion concepts in 'context' (cf. Chapters 1, 2), in particular their linguistic and cognitive context in form of co-occurring (adverbial) modifiers in EE (cf. Chapter 8). The latter fulfill important functions in emotion discourse (cf. Chapters 8.3.1, 8.3.2). Modifiers in EE and their respective functions were, as well, not included in the original Emotion Event Model (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2011). Contrastive results with respect to (multiple) modification (cf. Chapter 8.4) are summarized in the next section (cf. Emotion Events in British English and German).

Emotion Events in British English and German

The contrastive investigations of the present study were guided by hypotheses formulated based on previous, related research (cf. Chapter 3, 4). The findings that emerged from the study of British English and German Emotion Events in AWE are summarized in the following referring back to these hypotheses.

Language preferences in Emotion Event displays (H1, cf. Chapter 6)
The hypothesis with respect to language preferences regarding type and token frequencies of emotion lexemes was partly corroborated. Although, overall, no differences in emotion lexeme display could be identified across the British English and German datasets (H1a), emotion lexeme frequencies differed when investigating specific emotion concepts (H1b). ÄRGER lexemes were more frequent in the German narratives, whereas in the British narratives SADNESS and FEAR lexemes were more frequent. Additionally, gender differences were identified, the females using more FEAR – FURCHT lexemes than the males.
Moreover, a language preferences with respect to POS-membership (in particular verbs, adjectives and adverbs) and syntactic realizations (present tense and comparative) of emotion lexemes was detected. While in the British EE, more emotion adjectives and emotion adverbs were used, German narratives displayed more often emotion verbs in present tense and emotion adjectives in comparative. These differences have been interpreted as being potentially related to language preferences in the construal (verbs/ adjectives) of EE as actions vs. states (which has been further investigated in different form in Chapter 6), language preferences in performance styles (conversational present tense), and language preferences in intensification (comparatives and construal of cognitive context) in the narratives (which has been further investigated in different form

in Chapter 7).
A language preference in minimal emotion scenarios involving EXPERIENCERS and CAUSES has been identified and corroborates hypothesis H1c). The display of EXPERIENCERS and the nature of experiencer types was discussed against the background of general characteristics of (British) English and German discourse, e.g., implicitness vs. explicitness and verbal routines vs. creativity/ ad hoc formulations (cf. Chapter 3.1). The British participants named more often the CAUSE of the emotional experience. The differential naming and omitting of CAUSES has been hypothesized to be related to language preferences with respect to contextual construal, and in particular intersubjective positioning (further investigated in different form in Chapter 7).

Language preferences in the functional construal of Emotion Events (H1d, H2a-c, cf. Chapter 7)
The contrastive analysis of Emotion Event construal in the British and German narratives revealed important differences. The descriptive overview over the frequencies of specific emotion concepts in positive and negative narratives showed that SURPRISE, which can be either positively or negatively construed, was more often displayed in positive narratives in the British subcorpus. Moreover, SADNESS – TRAUER and FEAR – FURCHT were displayed in both British English and German positive narratives.
The descriptive overview over the positive and negative construal of specific emotion concepts corroborated that SURPRISE is more often positively construed in the British dataset. Moreover, JOY – FREUDE can be negatively construed, and this is more often the case in the British narratives. The negative emotion concepts SADNESS and FEAR are more often positively construed, or to be more precise, play more often a role in JOY construals, in the British dataset.
The qualitative analysis of specific emotion concepts with respect to their construal corroborated the tendencies identified in the descriptive overview. Moroever, British English SHOCK was identified as both positive and negative emotion concept, whereas the German concept SCHOCK was mostly used as negative emotion concept. The analysis of FEAR – FURCHT corroborated the tendency of German discourse to be more creative and verbose. The co-occurring emotion concepts in FEAR – FURCHT emotion concept clusters differed. In the British emotion concept clusters, the co-occurrence of a positive emotion concept (EXCITEMENT) with FEAR was possible. The analysis of JOY – FREUDE construals revealed a tendency of British participants to construe JOY negatively, and hereby attenuate the JOY event. The negative construal of JOY has also been linked to the other-orientedness and perspectivization of the emotion displays in the British narratives. The German FREUDE displays, by contrast, revealed

to be more ego-oriented and the display of SCHADENFREUDE was possible. ANGER – ÄRGER displays were equally negatively construed across the British and German narratives. However, the nature of the evaluative cues that contributed to the negative construal were shown to differ across the British and German EE.

All in all, H1 d) and H2c) that hypothesized language preferences in the construal of emotion concepts via evaluative cues and further emotion concepts in emotion concept clusters was confirmed. H2 a) and b) on language preferences with respect to the display of emotion concepts clusters have to be partly refuted. However, it has been shown that emotion concepts in emotion concept clusters contribute to EE construals, and various functions, apart from intensification via equivalent emotion concept clusters, have been identified.

Language preferences in (adverbial) modification of Emotion Events (H3, H4, cf. Chapter 8)

Hypotheses H3 and H4 that predicted language preferences in the displays of markers of epistemic modality, i.e markers of high, medium and low probability, and markers of intensification, i.e. upgraders and downgraders, in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes were confirmed in the present investigation. Modifiers of un/-certainty in EE were identified to differ qualitatively and quantitatively in the AWE datasets. A gender effect could be detected with respect to the relative occurrences of emotion lexemes with co-occurring epistemic markers, the males using more markers of un-/certainty than females. Moreover, language preferences were identified with respect to low, medium and high probability markers. In German narratives, a higher number of EM of high probability was identified in comparison to the British narratives that displayed more markers of low probability.

Intensifier use in EE was also identified to differ qualitatively and quantitatively in the AWE datasets. The German participants used more intensifiers in co-occurrence with emotion lexemes than the British participants. Moreover, an interaction with gender was identified, the females (in particular British females) using more intensifiers than the males. Females and British males were identified to use more upgraders, German males were detected displaying more downgraders.

Multiple modification by intensifiers or markers of un-/certainty was equally rare in the British and German data. However, multiple intensifiers/ markers of un-/certainty have been shown to fulfill important functions in the British English and German emotion narratives. As contextualization cues multiple modifiers can foreground or background certain emotion concepts in clusters of several emotion concepts. Moreover, multiple modifiers can contribute to an intersubjective positioning (dialogic contraction and expansion) of writers/ readers.

Theoretical Implications

Overlays of emotion talk and emotional talk (Bednarek 2008a), as well as overlays of Affect resources with resources of Graduation, or resources of Affect with Engagement resources (cf. Chapters 1.1, 1.2), which have been identified and discussed before (e.g., Alba-Juez 2018; Thompson 2015), have been frequently detected in the AWE datasets and can be taken into account by the Extended Emotion Event Model. Drawing on appraisal-theoretical terminology (cf. Chapter 2.3.1), the following overlays can be said to have been investigated: 1) An overlay of Affect with Affect, in form of emotion concept clusters such as *I am proud and happy* or *I feel proud [...] and pleased [...], although a little guilty* (e_f_018_2), discussed in Chapter 7; 2) an overlay of Affect with Judgment such as in *I am so happy that I could scream and dance with joy [...] But I doubt that would go down very well* (e_f_024_2), discussed in Chapter 7; 3) an overlay of Affect with Graduation such as in *I am so annoyed* (e_f_033_1), discussed in Chapter 8; and finally 4) an overlay of Affect with Engagement as in *My anger was justified surely?* (e_m_029_1) included in Chapter 8.

And still, these overlays identified provide only a glimpse into the complexities of emotion discourse that also comprises multiple overlays, for example multiple resources of Affect such as in *There was anger [...], despair, pride, guilt, joyousness, and surprise to name but a few* (e_m_006_2), provided in Chapter 7, or an overlay of Affect with several Graduation and/ or Engagement resources like in *I think probably a bit jealous* (e_f_033_2), discussed in Chapter 8.

In light of these results, Bednarek's conceptualization and categorization into emotion language and emotional language (Bednarek 2008a) as well as the Appraisal Framework (Martin & White 2005) should be refined (cf. Chapters 1, 2.3.1). Overall, the functional contribution of such overlays to emotion discourse as captured by the Extended Emotion Event Model (cf. above) and applied to English and German should, however, be viewed drawing on more data and drawing on investigations involving further languages.

With respect to implicit emotion displays that have been claimed (Schwarz-Friesel 2015) to be a research area that has been underinvestigated so far (cf. Chapter 2.2.2), the investigation of overlays in the present study provides a suitable starting point. Implicit emotion displays have been viewed taking the linguistic and cognitive context of emotion lexemes into account, i.e. instances where the explicit meaning can be regarded to overlap with implicit meaning. The role of evaluative items and modifiers in the immediate linguistic context of emotion lexemes in overall EE displays, as contextual import (cf. Chapters 2.2.3, 2.3.3, 2.4.3), as resources of subjective event construals or intersubjective positioning for instance, has been demonstrated. Overall, explicit and

implicit emotion displays go hand in hand and contribute to the display of the EE. Lately, the question has been raised whether emotion in discourse should at all be viewed and analyzed within the framework of Appraisal Theory, i.e. as a phenomenon of evaluative language (pers. communication Alba-Juez & e.g., Alba-Juez 2018). Alternative views argued, in light of the frequent overlays discussed above, for an independent theory on emotion that might even be superordinate to evaluative phenomena, the latter contributing to emotion displays (e.g., Fronhofer 2019). These questions have still to be tackled in future investigations on emotion discourse. Reviewing theories on the (inter-) subjective nature of discourse (e.g., White 2003) and integrating them into theories on emotion discourse, such as in the Extended Emotion Event Model, might provide further answers to such questions, and a suitable vantage point for developing a unifying theory on emotion and evaluation in discourse.

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Appendix

Table A1: Self-rated authenticity of narratives in AWE.

authenticity	**BrE**	%	**Ger**	%
authentic	22	18	18	13
mixed	67	56	56	41
fictional	15	13	26	19
NA	16	13	36	27
total	120	100	136	100

Table A2: British emotion lexemes in AWE.

Concept	**Lexeme**
LOVE	awe, desire (n), desired, desirable, love, lovingly, like, respect, tantalisingly, wish
JOY	amusing, bittersweet, blessed, calm (v), cheer, cheerful, chuffed, complacent, complacency, confidence, confident, content, contented, courage, delighted, ease, ecstatic, elated, elation, encourage, enjoy, enjoyment, enthuse, excited (adj), excitement, exciting, gloat, gratification, happy, happily, happiness, haughtiness, hope (n, v), hopeful, hopefully, joy, joyful, joyousness, jubilation, optimism, optimistic, over-confidence, please (v), pleased, pleasant, pleasantly, pride, proud, reassure (v), reassurance, reassuring (adj), relax, relaxed, relief, relieved, relieve (v), relieving (adj), satisfaction, satisfy, satisfied,satisfying, secure, self-assured, self-confidence, self-esteem, self-worth, smug, smugness, stress-free, thrilled, triumph
SURPRISE	amazingly, astonishing, astound (v), surprise (n, v), surprised, surprising, surprisingly, wonder (n), shock, shocking, shockingly, stunned

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Concept	Lexeme
ANGER	aggravating, anger, angry, angrily, animosity, annoyed, annoying, annoyance, antagonising, bitchy, bitter, bitterness, bother, bothered, disgruntled (n), disgusting, dislike, displeased, distaste, enraged, envy, envious, furious, furiously, frustrated, hate, infuriate, irritate, irritated, irate, ire, indignant, indignation, jealous, frustrating, frustration, outrage, pester, pissed, rage, resent, resentment, sulk, sullen, unsatisfied, worked up, wrath
SADNESS	agonising, apathy, ashamed, bittersweet, comfort (v), console, consoling (adj), consolation, demoralizing (adj), depressed, depression, depressing, despair, desperately, disappointed (adj), disappointing (adj), discomfort, discontent, discouraged, discouraging, disgrace, dismay, distress, downhearted, embarrassed (adj), embarrassing (adj), embarrassment, empathetical, emphasise, guilt, guilty, gutted, heartache, heartbreaking, humiliation, hurt, inconsolable, let down, melancholy, miserable, mortified (adj), pessimistic, plagued, regrettably, sad, saddened, sadness, shame, shy, solace, sorry, soul-crushing, suffer, sympathy, sympathetic, unhappy, upset, upsetting
FEAR	anxiety, anxious, anxiously, apprehensive, bother, bothered, care (v), concern, daunting, disquiet, dread (v), fear, frantically, fright, horror, horrible, horrific, intimidated, nerves, nervous, nervously, panic, panicking, petrified, self-consciously, scared, stress, stressed, stressful, stressing, terrified, terrifying, traumatised, trepidation, unsure, worry, worried, worriedly, worrying, worryingly, wound up

Table A3: German Emotion Lexemes in AWE.

Concept	Lexeme
LIEBE	Begierde, beliebt, erwünscht, geliebt, gewünscht, Liebe, lieben, liebhaben, mögen, Respekt, Sympathie, Sympathiepunkte, sympathisch, Sympathieskala, Themenwunsch, verliebt, Vorlieben, wünschen, Wunsch, Wunschliste, Wunschträume, Wunschvorstellung
FREUDE	amüsant, Ansporn, anspornen, anspornend, aufgeregt, aufregend, Aufregung, aufheitern, auskosten, befriedigt, begeistern, begeistert, Begeisterung, beglückwünschen, beruhigen, beruhigt, eingebildet, entspannt, entzückt, erfreuen, erfreulich, erfreut, erhoffen, erleichternd, erleichtert, Erleichterung, ermutigend, Euphorie, euphorisch, Freude, Freudenschreie, Freudentanz, freudestrahlend, freudig, freuen, froh, fröhlich, genießen, Genugtuung, genüsslich, gespannt, Glück, glücklich, Glücklichmacher (n), Glücklicher (n), Glückshormone, Glücksgefühl, gut gelaunt, happy, heiter, hoffen, hoffentlich, Hoffnung, Hoffnungsschimmer, Jubel, jubeln, Jubelpose, mitfreuen, Mut, optimistisch, Optimismus, Schadenfreude, schadenfroh, selbstbewusst, Selbstbewusstsein, Selbstüberschätzung, selbstüberzeugt, Selbstvertrauen, sicher, Spannung, stolz, Stolz, stressarm, spannend, Triumph, überglücklich, überheblich, unbeschwert, zufrieden, Zufriedenheit, zuversichtlich
ÜBERRASCHUNG	erstaunt, erstaunlicherweise, fassungslos, Fassungslosigkeit, geschockt, perplex, Schock, schockiert, Schockmoment, Schockstarre, staunen, überraschen, überraschend, überraschenderweise, überrascht, Überraschung, sich wundern, verblüfft, Verblüfftsein, verdutzt, verwunderlich, Verwunderung

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Concept	Lexeme
ÄRGER	Abneigung, Antisympathie, ärgern, ärgerlich, aufgebracht, aufgewühlt, aufregen, Aufregung, beleidigt, beleidigend, bitter, empört, Empörter (n), Entrüstung, erbost, erregt, Frust, Frustration, frustriert, frustrierend, gefrustet, geladen, genervt, Groll, Hass, hassen, irritiert, Missgunst, Neid, neidisch, nerven, nicht ausstehen können, nicht leiden können, nicht mögen, quälen, Rage, stinksauer, unbefriedigend, unerfreulich, ungern, Unmut, unsympathisch, unzufrieden, Unzufriedenheit, sauer, Verachtendes, verärgern, verärgert, Wut, wütend, Zorn, Zornestränen
TRAUER	aufbauend, bedauern, Bedauern, bedrängend, bedrückend, beschämend, betrübt, deprimiert, deprimierend, desolat, enttäuscht, enttäuschend, Enttäuschung, Ernüchterung, geknickt, geplagt, Leid, leidtun, leidtragend, Mitleid, mitleidig, mitfühlen, Mitgefühl, Mitleid, Nachfühlen (n), niedergeschlagen, schämen, Schuld, schuldig, Schwermutsgefühl, Trauer,traurig, Trost, trösten, Unglücklicher (n), Verschulden, verzweifelt, Verzweiflung
FURCHT	abschrecken, angespannt, Anspannung, Angst, ängstlich, aufgeregt, Aufregung, befürchten, beunruhigt, einschüchternd, erschüttert, entsetzt, Entsetzen, enttäuscht, entmutigt, erschreckend, erschrocken, Existenzangst, fürchten, Horror, Horrorgeschichte, Horrorklausur, Nachtrauern (n), nervös, Nervosität, niederschmetternd, niedergeschmettert, panisch, Panik, Panik-Experten, Prüfungsangst, Schauergeschichte, schreckgeweitet, Sorge, Stress, unsicher, Unsicherheit, Versagensangst, verunsichern

Table A4: British emotion concept clusters in AWE (the co-occurring cluster lexemes are separated by '/').

First Concept	Cluster Lexemes
LOVE	love/ wish
JOY	pride/ happiness/ excitement, elated/ smug, happy/ hope, happy/ relieved, happy/ relieved/ pride, happy/ proud, proud/ happy, ecstatic/ excited, relieved/ pleased, proud/ pleased/ guilty, joy/ disappointment/ sadness, proud/ confident, excitement/ joy, blessed/ happy/ ecstatic, happy/ excited, happy/ cheer, happy/ pleased, happy/ pleased, happiness/ elation, happier/ relieved, relax/ pleased, pride/ confidence, relief/ sympathy, relief/ exultation, optimism/ confidence, extatic/ smug, pride/ reassurance, pride/ excitement, relief/ awe, self-esteem/confidence, satisfaction/ relief, confidence/ self-esteem, joy/ excitement, complacency/ happy, happy/ surprised
SURPRISE	surprised/ happy, shock/ proud, shocking/ surprising, shocked/ worried
ANGER	angry/ frustrated/ upset, angry/ irate, ire/ sadness/ humiliation, hate/ worked up, frustration/ worry/ anger, anger/ frustration/ sadness, angry/ hurt, annoyed/ upset, frustration/ indignation, anger/ despair/ pride/ guilt/ joyousness/ surprise, bitterness/ distaste, anger/ bitterness, anger/ annoyance, resentment/ guilt, anger/ shame, infuriate/ rage, anger/ discontent
SADNESS	sad/ worried/ sorry, disappointing/ demoralising, upset/ worried, sad/ annoyed, sad/ happy, disappointed/ happy, disappointment/ sadness, sad/ discouraged, sad/ angry/ disappointment, upset/ jealous, bittersweet,upset/ angry, sad/ relieving, downhearted/ disappointed, disappointment/ embarrassment upset/ traumatised, dismay/ worry, upset/ worked/ up, upset/ disappointed,sympathy/ pride, discomfort/ embarrassment

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First Concept	Cluster Lexemes
FEAR	bother/ miserable, horror/ trepidation, scared/ embarrassed, nervous/ scared, panic/ stress, fear/ panic, nerves/ embarrassment, panicking/ worrying fear/ terrified, worried/ downhearted, apprehensive/ excited

Table A5: German emotion concept clusters in AWE (the co-occurring cluster lexemes are separated by '/').

First Concept	Cluster Lexemes
LIEBE	liebe/ zuversichtlich
FREUDE	aufgeregt/ ängstlich, stolz/ Freude, Erleichterung/ sich freuen, begeistern/ unsicher, stolz/ freuen, froh/ stolz, freuen/ stolz, erleichtert/ zufrieden, Hoffnung/ Optimismus, Hoffnung/ freuen, glücklich/ zufrieden, freue/ stolz/ entspannter, Mut/ Versagens- angst, jubelt/ stolz, überglücklich/ erleichtert, freue/ irritiert, Selbstbewusstsein/ sicherer, freue/ Freude/ mitfühlen, jubelt/ beglückwünscht, Freude/ Zufriedenheit/ auszukosten, freue/ Stolz, freut/ Ansporn, Freude/ Erleichterung/ Euphorie, erfreu- ter/ erleichterter, Freude/ Genugtuung, schadenfroh, stolz/ freuen, Jubelpose/ Triumph, Freude/ Glück/ Zufriedenheit, glücklich/ gut gelaunt, stolz/ euphorisch
ÜBERRASCHUNG	geschockt/ wütend, überraschende/ freue, überraschend/ erfreulich, überrascht/ erleichtert/ stolz/ glücklich, überrascht/ erleichtert, überrascht/ erbost, verdutzt/ geknickt, geschockt/ enttäuscht, überraschend/ Zufriedenheit/ Freude, überrascht/ glücklicher, schockierter/ fassungsloser

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First Concept	Cluster Lexemes
ÄRGER	wütend/ enttäuscht, Frust/ Ärger, Frust/ Stolz[170]/ Abneigung, wütend/ wütend, ärgerlich/ unerfreulich, frustriert/ beleidigt, quälen/ quälen, Wut/ Abneigung, Wut/ Enttäuschung, verärgert/ enttäuscht, sauer/ frustriert, aufgewühlt/ frustriert, Entrüstung/ Hasses, Frust/ Wut, neidisch/ wütend, sauer/ niedergeschlagen
TRAUER	enttäuscht/ sauer, Leid/ Missgunst/ Neid, enttäuscht/ wütend, Enttäuschung/ Wut, Nachfühlen/ Nachtrauern, niedergeschmettert/ wütend, Mitleid/ traurigen/ freuen Mit[l]eid/ Freude, Mitleid/ Trost
FURCHT	angespannt/ nervös, aufgeregten/ panischen, nervös/ wenig Hoffnung, Stress/ Anspannung, angespannte/ Nervosität, Anspannung/ Angst

Table A6: Occurrence of markers of un-/certainty + [EMOTION] and + [ANGER] across British English and German (raw frequencies).

	BrE f	BrE m	Ger f	Ger m
EM + [EMOTION]	52	57	37	57
EM + [ANGER]	11	7	10	18

Table A7: Occurrence of discourse functions + [EMOTION] across British English and German (raw frequencies).

+[EMOTION]	BrE f	BrE m	Ger f	Ger m
entertain	34	39	16	24
pronounce	4	12	6	12
concur	10	6	16	22
counter-expectancy	–	1	–	–

[170] Here, it was completely unclear, whether *Stolz* ('pride') was used in its emotion meaning. Therefore, I included it in the emotion concept cluster corpus. Another reading, such as *Stolz* in the meaning of 'self-esteem' is also plausible.

Table A8: Occurrence of discourse functions + [ANGER]/ +[ÄRGER] across British English and German (raw frequencies).

+[ANGER]/[ÄRGER]	BrE f	BrE m	Ger f	Ger m
entertain	9	5	7	8
pronounce	–	–	2	3
concur	1	1	3	7
counter-expectancy	–	1	–	–

Table A9: List of markers of un-/certainty (types) in AWE.

	Un-/certainty markers
BrE	I (don't) think, I doubt, I guess, I'm (not) sure, I know, he knows, I should be, I/ the teacher felt, I had the impression, possibility, I knew, knowing, the knowledge that, without doubt, it is safe to say, may, might, seem/-s/-ed, it/something that can be, could, certainly, definitely, naturally, of course, unlikely, likely, perhaps, maybe, probably, it is obvious, obviously, undoubtedly, surely, clear evidence of, clearly
Ger	Ich weiß (gar nicht, ob) 'I don't know if', jeder wusste, dass 'everybody knew that', ich glaube 'I think', es könnte sein 'it could be that', wirken 'seem', scheint/ schien 'seem', ich soll 'alledgedly', ich hatte den Eindruck 'I had the impression that', es bestand die Möglichkeit 'there was the possibility of', die Tatsache, dass/ zu + Infinitiv 'the fact that/ to + infinitive', der Fakt, dass 'the fact that', mir ist klar, dass 'it is clear to me that', bestimmt 'certainly', bekanntlich 'as is known', definitiv 'definitely', natürlich 'of course', vielleicht 'perhaps', wahrscheinlich 'probably', sicherlich, mit Sicherheit, sicher 'certainly', offensichtlich 'obviously', vermutlich 'supposedly', anscheinend 'apparently', wohl 'probably', auf jeden Fall 'definitely'