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UNESCO World Heritage and Global Publics between 'Mankind', Global Minds, and World Opinion

Andrea Rehling

In June and July 2012 the destruction of the mausoleums of Sidi Mahmoud, Sidi Moctar, and Alpha Moya in Timbuktu by the Islamist organization known as Ansar Dine was directly addressed at the meeting of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee in St Petersburg. The committee, which had gathered to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the World Heritage convention, was shocked by the actions taken in Mali, especially as the extremists connected their work of destruction to the World Heritage Committee's decision to put Timbuktu and the Tomb of Askia on the List of World Heritage in Danger. They accused UNESCO of interfering in internal and religious affairs through their work in Mali, which had begun earlier that year.

In May of the same year UNESCO's assistant director-general for Africa, Lalla Aicha Ben Barka, had travelled to Bamako with Kishore Rao, director of UNESCO's World Heritage Centre, Juma Shabani, head of UNESCO's office in Mali, and Lazare Eloundou Assomo, chief of the World Heritage Centre's Africa Desk, to meet representatives of the Mali government, including Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra. The aim of the meetings was to agree measures to safeguard World Heritage properties in the city of Timbuktu, following reports of deliberate damage to mausoleums by Ansar Dine, which viewed the veneration of the mausoleums by local Sufis as idolatry.[1]

[1] 'Government of Mali and UNESCO Move to Protect Timbuktu and Other Heritage Sites in the North of Mali, Thursday', *World Heritage Centre News*, 24 May 2012 ⟨http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/877/⟩ [accessed 11 Apr. 2018]; Tiemoko Diallo and Adama Diarra, 'Mali Islamists Attack UNESCO Holy Site in Timbuktu', *Reuters Africa*, 5 May 2012 ⟨http://af.reuters.com/article/metalsNews/idAFL5E8G50SW20120505?sp=

The World Heritage Committee in St Petersburg reacted by observing a minute's silence. It also passed a resolution

condemning strongly the destruction of the mausoleums which are part of the World Heritage property of Timbuktu and called upon the perpetrators responsible to immediately halt these unacceptable actions. The members of the Committee also rejected any correlation between the recent inscription of the property of the Timbuktu shrines on the List of World Heritage in Danger and the acts of vandalism perpetrated. They called upon the international community to provide the support required at the request of the State Party of Mali in ensuring that its cultural properties are conserved and protected for present and future generations and requested the Director-General of UNESCO to consider the creation of a Special Fund to assist Mali.[2]

The destruction and the statements condemning it were explicitly addressed to a global public and they received global attention and great media interest as a result.[3]

In this essay I investigate what made the UNESCO World Heritage Committee an addressee and target of these attacks. How did the committee and its World Heritage Sites develop into symbols of global society? And what were the committee's options for action? How were its opportunities to act limited? What legitimation was claimed by groups such as Ansar Dine, who professed to speak with sovereignty rights, although they did not recognize the accepted procedures for establishing political legitimation?

true⟩ [accessed 11 Apr. 2018]; UNESCO, Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Thirty-Sixth Session, Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation, 24 June–6 July 2012, Summary Report, WHC-12/36.COM. INF.19 ⟨http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2012/whc12-36com-INF.19.pdf⟩ [accessed 11 Apr. 2018].

[2] UNESCO, Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Thirty-Sixth Session, Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation, 24 June–6 July 2012, Summary Report, WHC-12/36.COM. INF.19.

[3] 'Timbuktu Shrines Damaged by Mali Ansar Dine Islamists', 30 June 2012, BBC News Africa ⟨http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18657463⟩ [accessed 16 Aug. 2018]; 'Ansar Dine Fighters Destroy Timbuktu Shrines', 1 July 2012, Aljazeera Africa ⟨http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/06/201263010174879606.html⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018]; 'A Tombouctou, les islamistes détruisent les mausolées musulmans', 30 June 2012, *Le Monde Afrique* ⟨http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/06/30/ancar-eddine-annonce-la-destruction-des-tous-les-mausolees-de-tombouctou_1727451_3212.html⟩ [accessed 11 Apr. 2018]; Pascal Fletcher, 'Timbuktu Tomb Destroyers Pulverise Islam's History' (Reuters), 3 July 2012 ⟨http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mali-crisis-timbuktu-idUSLNE86202G20120703⟩ [accessed 11 Apr. 2018]; Irina Bokova, 'Opinion: Timbuktu Tomb Attack is an Attack on Our Humanity. Special for CNN', 4 July 2012 ⟨http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/02/opinion/unesco-mali-opinion/⟩ [accessed 11 Apr. 2018].

I argue that the symbolic charge as a symbol of global society is due not least to the World Heritage Committee's performance as a representation of humanity and to its public relations activities, which aimed to create a 'global mind' and change world opinion in its favour. Every attempt to institutionalize an international conservation policy was inextricably linked with the idea of a global public, world opinion, and a collective consciousness of humanity, which were to be influenced by certain techniques and strategies. I will examine the extent to which the World Heritage Committee was able to present itself as a political representative of, and a stage for, world opinion.

In particular, I will look at the moment when the 'family of man', which Roland Barthes criticized as an 'ambitious myth of the human "community"' based on the quasi-religious, naturalized idea of unity in diversity,[4] was confronted by a 'family of public spheres'.[5] My thesis is that this experience of diverse and fragmented publics strengthened the imagination of humanity's 'unity in cultural diversity'.[6] But the emphasis shifted from unity to diversity, the promotion and protection of which as a value in itself had been one of UNESCO's major political aims since the 1980s. This shift challenged narratives rooted in the nineteenth century, which connected the idea of a public with the definition of public goods, the granting of freedom of opinion, the creation of citizenship, and the appreciation of democracy in a very general sense applicable to the nation state but also to an international community of sovereign states. The idea of a public lost its close connection to the nation state or the territory and was opened to individuals as citizens of a world society in a cosmopolitan sense but also to self-declared representatives of 'cultures'. The supposed plurality, fragmentation, and interactivity of this world society were stressed as an integral and valued part of the cultural diversity of humanity.

As a result, the intergovernmental World Heritage Committee's legitimacy in acting on behalf of this diverse and fragmented humanity

[4] Roland Barthes, 'The Great Family of Man', in id., *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers (London, 1972), 100–2.

[5] For the wording see Michael Schudson, 'A Family of Public Spheres', in Social Science Research Council/Institute for Public Knowledge, *Transformations of the Public Sphere* (2009) ⟨http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/schudson-a-family-of-public-spheres⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018]; for the idea in general see id., *The Good Citizen* (New York, 1998).

[6] *Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development* (Paris, 1995), 14 ⟨http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001016/101651e.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

was diminished and placed on the defensive. New or newly contextualized actors entered the political arena. A right to culture was awarded the status of a human right, and cultures as communities in a broad anthropological understanding developed into political entities beside and beyond the nation state.[7] Although the idea of a right to culture was originally emancipatory, now separatist movements—nationalists and fundamentalists as well as racists—discovered the value of a right to culture as an argument for essentialist positions.

In the next section the public relations activities of the World Heritage Committee come into focus. Issuing resolutions, statements, and moral appeals as well as drafting press releases, launching films, and publishing photographs and reports were well-established instruments and strategies used to address world opinion and create awareness of the need for conservation. They were in the armoury of the World Heritage Committee, which, as an international organization, was unable to apply sanctions to the destruction of World Heritage sites and did not have the power to intervene in internal affairs of state. The sovereignty of the member states was an indispensable prerequisite for the foundation of the UNESCO World Heritage programme in 1972, especially in the context of decolonization and the Cold War, so that the agency of the World Heritage Committee was limited to agenda-setting, moral suasion, and educational or exhortatory efforts right from the start. Thus, every attempt to institutionalize an international conservation policy was inextricably linked with the idea of a global public, world opinion, and a collective consciousness of humanity, which were to be influenced by certain techniques and strategies. Its members perceived themselves as an avant-garde which had to educate a global mass public in order to create a collective awareness and consciousness of the need for conservation and for international co-operation. In this sense they aimed to create a 'global mind'.[8] The experience of diverse

[7] UNESCO (ed.), *Cultural Rights as Human Rights: Studies and Documents on Cultural Policies* (Paris, 1970); for the discourse about human rights see Robert Brier in this volume.

[8] Derrick de Kerckhove, 'From Global Village to Global Mind', *UNESCO Courier*, 48/2 (1995), 20–2; for the precursor 'international mind', see Marilyn Fischer, 'Mead and the International Mind', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 44/3 (2008), 508–31; Jens Wegener, '"An Organisation, European in Character": European Agency and American Control at the Centre Européen, 1925–40', in John Krige and Helke Rausch (eds.), *American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), 37–60; Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia, 2013), 30–1.

publics, the debates about a New World Information and Communication Order in the 1980s, and the growing influence of cultural studies and postcolonialism, especially in media theory, meant that strategies for addressing the global public changed significantly. This altered perception of a global public changed the imaginations of the audience and the recipients to whom public relations activities were addressed.

The Trusteeship of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee: Representing 'Mankind'

The UNESCO World Heritage Committee presented itself as a political representation of 'mankind', conceived of as an international community of sovereign member states—no longer necessarily white, but still imagined as a community of civilized, male, collective entities with a legal conscience and consciousness.[9] It also referred to the idea of 'world opinion' that had to be taken into account and whose concerns had to be addressed in order to ensure the success of conservation policies. In the publications and statements of the committee and its predecessors, the notion of world opinion veers between 'public opinion in all countries of the world'[10] and a global public independent of states and organizations, but framed by a world society which, in most moral appeals, was referred to as mankind or, later, humanity.[11] Its reference to humanity and its aspiration to translate claims formulated in the context of a global public into a global policy meant that the World Heritage Committee portrayed itself as a moral authority and agency of appeal. Expressing these ideas and this self-perception, the members of the committee took a view of the public similar to that of Jürgen Habermas, who developed his idealistic and normative concept in 1962.[12] These similarities resulted from a historical narrative about the genesis of the public and publicity since the eighteenth century.

[9] For the origins of this concepton see Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960* (New York, 2001), 11–178.

[10] Vittorino Veronese, 'A Message from the Director-General of UNESCO', *UNESCO Courier* (Feb. 1960), 3 ⟨http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000645/064522eo.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[11] UNESCO, Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Third Session, Luxor, Arab Republic of Egypt, 23–7 Oct. 1979, Proposals for Promotional Activities 1980, CC-79/CONF003/6.2 ⟨http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1979/cc-79-conf003-6.2e.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[12] Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie*

Popular in the 1960s and 1970s, this narrative connected the idea of a public with the definition of public goods, the granting of freedom of opinion, the creation of citizenship, and the appreciation of democracy in a very general sense.[13]

The committee thus postulated the international organization's trusteeship over world heritage as a global public good. It referred to international law, which knew the concept of 'global commons' as something to be guarded, protected, and managed in solidarity by a global community in various institutional forms.[14] The concept is still popular in environmental debates today. It is also at the centre of geopolitical conflicts, as the issues of the Arctic and the South China Sea illustrate.[15] The close connection of trusteeships with European civilizing missions and their incompatibility with decolonization turned up in the debates from time to time, but did not prevent the concept from experiencing several revivals with a special focus on environmental issues.[16]

In general, the concept of global commons was entangled with the idea of a 'universal society of peoples joined in the pursuit

der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Neuwied, 1962); id., *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass., 1989); Craig Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (London, 1992). For some of the difficulties relating to Habermas's public sphere see Nancy Fraser, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy', *Social Text*, 25–6 (1990), 56–80; and for the difficulties arising in the relationship between humanity, global commons, and a global public sphere in the context of heritage see Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 'World Heritage and Cultural Economics', in Ivan Karp, Corinne A. Kratz, Lynn Szwaja, et al. (eds.), *Museum Frictions: Public Cultures/Global Transformations* (Durham, NC, 2006), 161–202.

[13] See e.g. *Communication and Society Today and Tomorrow: Many Voices, One World. Towards a New More Just and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order*, Report by the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (Paris, 1980), 3–10, 195–200 ⟨http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0004/000400/040066eb.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[14] Susan J. Buck, *The Global Commons: An Introduction* (Washington, 1998); John Vogler, *The Global Commons: Environmental and Technological Governance* (New York, 2000). For a first historical approach see Isabella Löhr and Andrea Rehling (eds.), *Global Commons im 20. Jahrhundert: Entwürfe für eine globale Welt* (Munich, 2014).

[15] Klaus Bosselmann, *Earth Governance: Trusteeship of the Global Commons* (Cheltenham, 2015); Major General Mark Barrett, Dick Bedford, Elizabeth Skinner, and Eva Vergles, *Assured Access to the Global Commons* (Norfolk, Va., 2011); Scott G. Borgerson, 'The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up', *Foreign Affairs*, 92/4 (2013), 76–89 ⟨https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/global-commons/2013-06-11/coming-arctic-boom⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[16] William Bain, *The Idea of Trusteeship in International Society: Unity, Progress, and the Perfection of Humankind* (Vancouver, 2001).

of shared and common ends'[17] as an argument. It presupposed a global public of well-informed citizens, whose debates prepared the political decisions of governments and especially international organizations.[18] This concept of a cosmopolitan citizenry in a global civil society with democracy as a 'model for the larger world'[19] underestimates the strategic implications of claiming a territory, artefacts, or the sea as 'global commons'. Governments or pressure groups usually asserted an international trusteeship in order to exert control and defend against appropriation by competitors.

Even the creation of the World Heritage Convention was rooted in competition for cultural and natural resources in the context of decolonization.[20] As a result, the World Heritage Committee was not structured as a 'parliament of man',[21] but as an intergovernmental organization of sovereign states. These structural conditions limited the World Heritage Committee's opportunities for action. For instance, sites could only be nominated for inscription on the World Heritage list by the member states of the convention on whose territory they were located. If UNESCO wished to take action on a site, to provide technical assistance, or to send an expert to evaluate the current situation, it first needed the approval of the government of the relevant state.[22]

The World Heritage Committee and its secretariat were nevertheless regularly contacted by concerned people who addressed them as a cosmopolitan representation of humanity. These high expectations

[17] Ibid. 165.

[18] For a similar vision see Daniele Archibugi, *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Princeton, 2008).

[19] Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 'World Heritage and Cultural Economics', 192.

[20] For the relationship between global publics and global competitions see Tobias Werron in this volume.

[21] For the wording see Paul Kennedy, *Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations* (New York, 2006).

[22] UNESCO, Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Adopted by the General Conference at its Seventeenth Session, Paris, 16 Nov. 1972, English Text (http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf) [accessed 12 Apr. 2018]; for details of the negotiations see Michel Batisse and Gérard Bolla, *L'Invention du 'patrimoine mondial'* (Paris, 2003); Sarah M. Titchen, *UNESCO's World Heritage Convention (Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972) and the Identification and Assessment of Cultural Places for Inclusion in the World List* (Canberra, 1995), 36–73; Christina Cameron and Mechtbild Rössler, *Many Voices, One Vision: The Early Years of the World Heritage Convention* (Farnham, 2013), 1–26; Lynn Meskell, Claudia Liuzza, Enrico Bertacchini, and Donatella Saccone (eds.), 'Multilateralism and UNESCO World Heritage: Decision-Making, States Parties and Political Processes', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 21/5 (2014), 423–40.

were regularly disappointed, though this contact tended to vary dramatically depending on the national publics' access to free media and freedom of speech. In the case of countries in which the media were censored, UNESCO was usually contacted by informants in writing or through a trusted person. In states with a free press or in situations covered by the global media, contact with UNESCO normally occurred as part of a wider public debate, which was also media-driven and made the World Heritage Committee a stage for conflict between interests and claims.

For example, in 1979 the World Heritage Committee secretariat received a copy of a letter from the Canadian Wildlife Service to the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN)—the advisory organization for natural heritage—regarding the Białowieża National Park, which had been nominated for inscription in the World Heritage list by Poland in 1978. The park was famous for reintroducing the European bison into the wild from the early 1950s.[23] The letter reported a telephone call the Canadian Wildlife Service had received from a Canadian businessman

> seeking a source to purchase American bison, allegedly in response to a request from the Polish Government. He said that he has acted as an agent in the sale of Canadian-made forestry machinery to Poland. He informed me that the herd of wisent [European bison] in Poland has been totally lost from Poland in a border incident with the U.S.S.R. He said that some of the animals had been shot and the rest removed to Siberia.[24]

The information, based on rumour, was so sketchy that the only option available to the World Heritage secretariat was to confront the permanent Polish delegate to UNESCO or the Polish delegate to the UNESCO World Heritage Committee. Apart from the fact that the secretariat could not be sure that an answer, if given, would be true, the representative of Poland on the international committee who submitted the nomination was an expert on cultural heritage, and the IUCN doubted that he would be able to respond to the request. As it was at the discretion of the state whether to respond

[23] For the history of Białowieża see Thomas M. Bohn, Aliaksandr Dalhouski, and Markus Krzoska, *Wisent-Wildnis und Welterbe: Geschichte des polnisch-weißrussischen Nationalparks von Białowieża* (Cologne, 2017).

[24] Donald R. Flook, Canadian Wildlife Service, to Dave A. Monroe, Director General, IUCN, 28 Mar. 1979, Correspondences Poland, UNESCO Archive Paris, Culture Sector/World Heritage Committee, CLT/WHC/135.

or not, however, the accusation could remain without any effect, especially if there were doubts concerning the reliability of the informant, as in this case. The caller seemed not to know that it was possible to restock the wisent from zoo sources—well known among biologists and foresters—which already confounded the Canadian Wildlife Service, irrespective of any Polish reaction.[25] Accordingly, the secretariat of the World Heritage Committee did not pursue the case further. Nevertheless, this example is a good illustration of the difficulties experienced by the World Heritage Committee in gathering information about sites in a state-controlled public, especially when it turned out that a member had deliberately withheld information about the state of preservation in order to prevent an inscription in the List of World Heritage in Danger. The committee tried to counter this tendency by monitoring the sites, but nevertheless remained dependent on the goodwill of member states.

Things changed gradually as mass media became involved. When the Yugoslav government started planning for a hydroelectric power station near Durmitor National Park, which was expected to have an impact on the Tara River Canyon, UNESCO was informed by correspondence which several Yugoslav biologists and geographers addressed to the organization and to the international media in 1984. In this instance, the voicing of concerns had a greater impact. Again, the World Heritage secretariat and the committee could only ask the permanent delegate if the information was correct, but as the information was more reliable they were also able to demand that the Yugoslav government report on the matter to the next World Heritage Committee meeting and to make the issue public.

As a result of pressure from the Western, international media, the Yugoslav government co-opted the protest and presented it during the World Heritage meeting in 1985 as an expression of the Yugoslav public's commitment to the programme and to declare its willingness to co-operate:[26]

[25] Ibid.

[26] Correspondences *Yugoslavia*, UNESCO Archive Paris, World Heritage, CLT/WHC/135–136; UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, Ninth Ordinary Session, UNESCO Headquarters, 2–6 Dec. 1985, *Implementation Report of Yugoslavia*, Paris, 10 Oct. 1985: Report on the Implementation of the Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Zagreb, 6 June 1985, UNESCO Archive Paris, SC.85/CONF. 008/Col. 1 ⟨http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000666/066680eb.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

The community of interest for the National Park together with the entire Yugoslav public led a vigorous campaign for the protection of the Tara River Canyon from being flooded due to the construction of a system of hydropower plants, and it is now almost certain that the Durmitor national park as a whole will be protected and preserved.[27]

This reaction illustrates how the imagination of a world opinion motivated the Yugoslav government to change its mind. At the same time, it used the protest as propaganda to show the Yugoslav state as being responsive to public opinion and in favour of freedom of opinion.

When a similar situation arose in Australia, the World Heritage Committee found itself at the centre of media campaigns calling upon it to act. A struggle for media attention and public support ensued, with rallies, blockades, the imprisonment of protesters, and, as a sad climax, the hijacking of an aeroplane. The campaigns were prompted by the decision of the Tasmanian state government to build dams and hydroelectric power stations in the Tasmanian wilderness, even though the Australian national government and the former Tasmanian government had nominated the Western Tasmanian Wilderness National Parks for inscription on the UNESCO World Heritage list in November 1981. The Tasmanian wilderness issue and the alteration in public opinion subsequently developed into a domestic political conflict, when a changing party-political configuration triggered something of a 'World Heritage fever' in Australia. Greg Middleton of the Tasmanian Parks and Wildlife Service reported to Jeff McNeely, executive officer of the Commission on National Parks and Protected Areas (CNPPA) at IUCN and the responsible adviser to the World Heritage programme:

I'm sure you'd be delighted by the publicity this major public debate is giving to the W.H.C. [World Heritage Convention] here. 'World Heritage' have become household words [*sic*] and I'm sure just the existance [*sic*] of the concept and the constant association of the South-West with it must be making many people realize that the area really is special.[28]

This enthusiasm was strengthened by the fact that Ralph O. Slatyer, an Australian biologist at the Australian National University in Canberra, had been chairman of the World Heritage Committee at the

[27] Ibid. 16.

[28] Greg Middleton, Tasmania Parks and Wildlife Service, to Jeff McNeely, Commission on National Parks and Protected Areas (CNPPA), IUCN, 27 Oct. 1982, Correspondences Australia, UNESCO Archive Paris, World Heritage, CLT/WHC/168.

beginning of the conflict.[29] Advocates for the conservation of the Tasmanian Wilderness National Parks sought to resolve the conflict in their favour by mobilizing protest in a national and transnational political public and by appealing to the moral judgement of a world opinion embodied by UNESCO. They tried to change the arena and initiated a media campaign with spectacular protest actions. On the one hand, these activities had the effect of making those responsible for the World Heritage programme in the international organizations celebrate the attention and affirmation the new programme gained. On the other, those responsible were confronted with high expectations which they were unable to meet.

The Australian Conservation Foundation and the Tasmanian Wilderness Society along with other national and international conservation groups called upon UNESCO to intervene, particularly when leading figures of the protest movement were arrested.[30] The World Heritage secretariat and bureau, along with committee members, received many petitions and letters from letter and signature campaigns which received a great deal of media coverage, as well as petitions, rallies, blockades, and protests.[31] Moreover, the Tasmanian Wilderness Society informed them of a poll that was intended to prove that the majority of Tasmanians did not favour the dams, although they had elected the state government responsible.[32] These 'proofs' of public opinion in Tasmania, the rest of Australia, and the wider world were intended to goad UNESCO into action. At all times, however, the World Heritage Committee, its bureau and secretariat, stressed their inability to intervene in internal conflicts. They refused to take responsibility for human rights issues when the detention of demonstrators was brought to their attention and given worldwide publicity.[33] Their attitude disappointed the hopes and expectations of many.

But the secretariat adopted this position, in spite of some sympathy for the actions of the international conservationists, in order to avoid becoming embroiled in the conflict. It always stressed the Australian government's responsibility and declared the delegates of the foreign ministries to the World Heritage Committee or to UNESCO to be its principal contacts. The committee also emphasized that requests by non-state parties or federal states—in this

[29] Ibid. [30] Ibid. [31] Ibid.

[32] Bob Brown, Director of Tasmanian Wilderness Society, to the Secretary of the World Heritage Committee 17 Nov. 1982, ibid. [33] Ibid.

case Tasmania—were not permitted. This question became relevant when the Tasmanian premier Robin Gray and his supporters sought to submit their position to the World Heritage Committee and requested that a Tasmanian representative be allowed to participate in the next meeting.[34] As an answer, the outgoing chairman of the committee and later head of the Australian delegation, Ralph O. Slatyer, declared:

> the Committee in no sense acts as a body hearing evidence from a variety of interested parties. It is, therefore, very unlikely that the Committee would want to hear any view from Australia other than the official view of the Commonwealth Government because, to do so, would put it into the position of having to act in that way.[35]

This, however, did not stop the Tasmanian government from sending Attorney-General Bingham to the meeting. The majority of delegates on the committee objected to his presence, which helped to reinforce the consensus on the intergovernmental nature of the World Heritage programme.[36]

Ultimately, the conflict was decided by the election of a new Australian prime minister. The candidate who favoured intervention by the Commonwealth of Australia and promised to stop the construction of dams in the Tasmanian wilderness was elected. In order to make this intervention, he had to pass a special law regarding World Heritage which had to be approved by the Australian High Court. This was the first law referring to the World Heritage convention worldwide.[37]

Though UNESCO had tried to maintain outward neutrality during the whole conflict, the World Heritage Committee celebrated the law as a victory for the idea of World Heritage. In its statements, it pointed to it as a best-practice example for other governments to follow in enshrining preservation of heritage sites in law. UNESCO's neutrality with respect to the internal affairs of member states allowed for continued co-operation irrespective of domestic political upheavals or, in this case, political shifts. In the framework of the

[34] Compare the numerous clippings ibid.

[35] Ralph O. Slatyer, Chairman of the World Heritage Committee, to Robin Gray, Premier of Tasmania, 26 Nov. 1982, ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.; Doug Lowe, *The Price of Power: The Politics behind the Tasmanian Dams Case* (Melbourne, 1984); Steven John Smith and Maxwell R. Banks (eds.), *Tasmanian Wilderness: World Heritage Values* (Hobart, 1990); Libby Lester, 'We Too are Green: Public Relations, Symbolic Power and the Tasmanian Wilderness Conflict', *Media International Australia, Incorporating Culture & Policy*, 121/1 (2006), 52–64.

Cold War and the emerging North–South divide, the multilateral convention was only able to establish the limited trusteeship of an issue-oriented parliament of sovereign states,[38] although it faced high expectations from an emerging political movement of non-state actors. For them, the World Heritage Committee was supposed to govern the cultural and natural heritage of humanity for the benefit of coming generations and for the sake of intergenerational justice and of a cosmopolitan world society.

This gave rise to conflicting perceptions of the World Heritage Committee and conflicting performances on its part. Concerns regarding the management, deterioration, destruction, or endangering of cultural and natural heritage were to be brought before the committee. This was expected to inform the world, to make protection a global concern, and to act not only as a representative and a trustee, but also as an executive of world opinion. Thus, the organization was confronted with great expectations that interfered with the character of UNESCO as an international organization and the World Heritage convention as an intergovernmental agreement from the start, and some hopes for international co-operation were disappointed. Another reason for this was that the members of the World Heritage Committee and the UNESCO administration had to manage a complex interplay between different publics and their political representations in deliberations and negotiations about the global common goods for which it could, itself, become an arena.

In this context the relationships between different publics and states became visible. The actions of ministries and administrations as part of their respective partial publics, and how they addressed a world opinion or global public in conflict situations, also became apparent. The last two examples in particular suggest that the functional differentiation between ministries with specialized administrations could result in several and conflicting opinions within a government—for example, between the monuments protection authority and the economics ministry. Quite often these conflicts, and the discord between federated and federal governments, were transferred into the international arena of UNESCO. This was later followed by conflicts between groups that claimed cultural sovereignty inside and outside a world of states. In such cases, the limitations of the international organization's capacity to address

[38] Meskell et al. (eds.), 'Multilateralism and UNESCO World Heritage', 423–40; Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London, 2012).

a global public, to represent world opinion, or to become a public arena for deliberations on global commons became explicit. As the intergovernmental organization depended on the support of its member states, it had no difficulty in addressing an abstractly conceived world opinion equated with mankind or humanity, and in calling for it to take action to protect cultural and natural heritage as a moral principle. But when a specific conflict arose, the World Heritage Committee was unable either to generate a global consensus against those who had transgressed their moral principles or to offer an arena for negotiating the competing interests and opinions of governments, state agencies, non-governmental organizations, interest groups, and local populations. As a result, UNESCO was perceived as a party in intra-state conflicts and/or as representative of cultural imperialism.

Nevertheless, these difficulties did not stop the success of World Heritage, not least because of the committee's extensive public information work. Its claim to generate awareness of the imperative to conserve or preserve a 'world cultural and natural heritage', and in this regard to create a global mind, contributed to the unquestioned high moral status which the programme long enjoyed.

The Public Information Activities of the World Heritage Committee: Creating a Global Mind and Addressing World Opinion

As the first twelve World Heritage sites were being inscribed on the World Heritage list in 1978, there was a consensus that the World Heritage Committee would have to support the launch of the new UNESCO programme with well-co-ordinated and concerted publicity campaigns. The Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage stated in Article 11 that a 'World Heritage List, a List of World Heritage in Danger, and a List of properties for which international assistance is granted' was to be published periodically for educational and public information purposes.[39] The International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), the advisory organization for cultural heritage sites, suggested in addition that

[39] UNESCO, Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Adopted by the General Conference at its Seventeenth Session, Paris, 16 Nov. 1972, UNESCO Archive Paris, WHC/72/WS/1 ⟨http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0000/000020/002091mb.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018] (Article 11).

a very small percentage of the [World Heritage] Fund available each year be set aside both to publicize its operation, thus perhaps encouraging contributions to the Fund or to individual Fund projects from the private sector and even additional contributions from governments . . . [and] to educate the public everywhere on the importance of heritage conservation.[40]

There was agreement that the convention needed 'more attention on a world-wide scale' and that UNESCO, in the shape of the World Heritage Committee, was responsible for gaining wider publicity for it.[41] Thus, the member states of the convention and the delegates of the World Heritage Committee regarded raising awareness of safeguarding nature and culture as their principal duty; they formed a subcommittee for 'in-depth study of future public information and educational activities',[42] and were prepared to devote, over time, some 5 per cent of the World Heritage Fund to publicity activities.[43] Additionally, the committee decided to commission an artist to create an emblem which was intended to increase recognition of the listed sites.[44] It has since become a hallmark of quality and a strong trademark in tourism,[45] but to start with it was primarily part of a campaign by UNESCO to advertise the convention and the work of its committee.[46] Thus, the emblem designed by the artist Michel Olyff symbolized

[40] UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, First Session, Paris, 27 June–1 July 1977, Issues Arising in Connection with the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, Paris, 9 June 1977, UNESCO Archive Paris, CC-77/CONF001/4, 11 ⟨http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0003/000309/030934EB.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[41] Ibid.

[42] UNESCO, Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Second Session, Washington, DC (USA), 5 Sept.–8 Sept. 1978, Draft Report, Washington, 8 Sept. 1978, p. 9, UNESCO Archive Paris, CC-78/CONF010/10.

[43] Cf. Public Information Activities in the budgets concerning expenditures of the World Heritage Trust.

[44] UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, Second Session, Washington, DC (USA), 5 Sept.–8 Sept. 1978, Report of Rapporteur on First Meeting of Bureau of Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 8 and 9 June 1978, UNESCO Archive Paris, CC-78/CONF010/3, p. 2 ⟨http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1978/cc-78-conf010-3e.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[45] Dorothee Hemme, Markus Tauschek, and Regina Bendix (eds.), *Prädikat 'Heritage': Wertschöpfungen aus kulturellen Ressourcen* (Berlin, 2007); Noel B. Salazar and Yujie Zhu, 'Heritage and Tourism', in Lynn Meskell (ed.), *Global Heritage: A Reader* (Chichester, 2015), 240–58.

[46] UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, Second Session, Washington, DC (USA), 5 Sept.–8 Sept. 1978, Report of Rapporteur on First Meeting of Bureau of Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 8 and 9 June 1978, UNESCO Archive Paris, CC-78/CONF010/3, 2.

in a form sufficiently simple to be inserted on a map and to identify sites, the interdependence of cultural and natural properties. The central square is a form created by man; the circle represents nature, the two being intimately linked. The emblem is round, like the world, but it is also a symbol of protection.[47]

The committee members agreed that the emblem met 'the criteria of universality and simplicity'[48] that they considered important because they aimed to communicate to the public of present and future generations worldwide.

Conservationists in the World Heritage Committee had become aware of the importance of publicity campaigns to attract financial supporters, and of the need for proven strategies to mobilize public concern, as a result of UNESCO's 'Nubia campaign', its most successful 'safeguarding campaign'.[49] It was launched in 1960 in response to the Egyptian government's decision in 1954 to raise the height of the Aswan Dam with the result that more than twenty temples—among them Abu Simbel, Philae, Kalabsha, and Amada, to name the most famous—and a vast number of archaeological sites were at risk of being inundated by Lake Nasser.[50] The international rescue campaign supported a range of archaeological excavations in the area to be flooded and the translocation of twenty-three temples to higher ground.[51] In his appeal launching the campaign

[47] UNESCO, Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Second Session, Washington, DC (USA), 5 Sept.–8 Sept. 1978, Draft Report, Washington, 8 Sept. 1978, UNESCO Archive Paris, CC-78/CONF.010/10, 17.

[48] Ibid.; UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, Second Session. Washington, DC (USA), 5 Sept.–8 Sept. 1978, World Heritage Emblem, UNESCO Archive Paris, CC-78/CONF.010/8.

[49] UNESCO, Executive Board, Hundred and Twenty-Second Session, Special Committee, Item 5.1.4 of the Agenda, In-Depth Studies Carried Out by the Special Committee on the Basis of the Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organization in 1981–1983, Topic (1) International Campaigns for the Preservation and Safeguarding of the Cultural Heritage of Mankind, Presented by Ian Christie Clark (Canada), Georges-Henri Dumont (Belgium), Donald M. Kusenha (United Republic of Tanzania), Azzedine Guellouz, Deputy for Mr Mahmoud Messadi (Tunisia), UNESCO Archive Paris, 122 EX/SP/RAP/1 Rev.

[50] Fekri A. Hassan, 'The Aswan High Dam and the International Rescue Nubia Campaign', *African Archaeological Review*, 24/3–4 (2007), 73–94.

[51] Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, *Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia: The International Rescue Campaign at Abu Simbel, Philae and Other Sites* (Paris, 1987); Chloé Maurel, 'Le sauvetage des monuments de Nubie par l'Unesco (1955–1968)', *Égypte/Monde Arabe*, 10 (2013), 10 (http://ema.revues.org/3216) [accessed 12 Apr. 2018]; Andrea Rehling, 'Universalismen und Partikularismen im Widerstreit: Zur Genese des UNESCO-

on 8 March 1960 Vittorino Veronese, director-general of UNESCO, emphasized that:

> These monuments, whose loss may be tragically near, do not belong solely to the countries who hold them in trust. The whole world has the right to see them endure. They are part of a common heritage which comprises Socrates' message and the Ajanta frescoes, the walls of Uxmal and Beethoven's symphonies. Treasures of universal value are entitled to universal protection. When a thing of beauty, whose loveliness increases rather than diminishes by being shared, is lost, then all men alike are the losers.[52]

The moral appeal placed Veronese in an existing tradition of calls to safeguard cultural and natural treasures by reference to responsibility on the part of mankind, later humanity.[53]

This tradition had evolved in tandem with a conservation movement from the eighteenth century onwards. Viewing themselves as trustees for future generations, the conservationists addressed an educated audience by publishing articles in academic journals, organizing congresses, and mounting exhibitions in order to educate, to raise awareness and funds, but also to encourage governments and international organizations to support the protection of cultural objects, natural species, and landscapes.[54] But Veronese not only connected with this tradition, he and UNESCO's cultural administration also sought to address a mass audience. As well as using academic journals and exhibitions to communicate with a professional and educated public, they also established a 'Committee of Patrons', headed by Gustaf Adolf VI of Sweden, with the aim of using the public profile of celebrities and elder statesmen to gain attention for the project.[55] They were convinced that opinion-makers were

Welterbes', *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History*, 8/3 (2011), 414–36; Paul Betts, 'The Warden of World Heritage: UNESCO and the Rescue of the Nubian Monuments', in id. and Corey Ross (eds.), *Heritage in the Modern World: Historical Preservation in Historical Perspective* (Oxford, 2015), 100–25.

[52] 'March 8 Appeal by Vittorino Veronese Director-General of UNESCO', *UNESCO Courier* (May 1960), 6–7 ⟨http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0007/000784/078452eo.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[53] Astrid Swenson, *The Rise of Heritage: Preserving the Past in France, Germany and England, 1789–1914* (Cambridge, 2013).

[54] Säve-Söderbergh, *Temples and Tombs*, 77–9; Swenson, *The Rise of Heritage*.

[55] 'Patrons of the International Campaign to Save Nubia's Monuments', *UNESCO Courier* (May 1960), 14–15 ⟨http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0007/000784/078452eo.pdf⟩ [accessed 17 Aug. 2018]; Säve-Söderbergh, *Temples and Tombs*, 71. For the ambivalent character of celebrity activities see Dan Brockington, *Celebrity and the Environment: Fame, Wealth and Power in Conservation* (London, 2009).

vital for promoting awareness of their cause and allowing them to reach a wider public. They continued to pursue the aim of educating an audience, now a mass audience, and of 'civilizing' it or 'developing' a strong moral sense in it, in order to create a global mind.[56] To this extent, the central concept was framed by an elitist concept of public opinion and media originally influenced by Paul Felix Lazarsfeld and Walter Lippmann as well as Manning White and Warren Breed.[57]

UNESCO therefore also organized trips to Aswan for diplomats and journalists. In addition to visits to the construction sites and excavations, boat trips along the Nile were used as opportunities to inform guests about Nubian culture and civilization. There were also visits to Nubian villages to attend demonstrations of local folklore. UNESCO hoped that these trips would result in the publication of reports and photographs, and, in particular, the release of films dealing with the campaign, which would assist their fundraising efforts and strengthen political support for the project internationally. UNESCO itself produced 'a constant flow of press material, films, TV, and radio documentaries'.[58] The activists of UNESCO viewed themselves as part of a modern mass society that had to be addressed through the mass media in order to generate political support for their cause. This seemed very attractive for their purposes because radio and television did not require literacy.[59]

The Nubia campaign, which started in 1960 and ended in 1980, was an unexpected success—a 'victory in Nubia'.[60] Forty-nine governments had contributed to the rescue campaign, which raised a total of more than $40 million. If any correlation can be drawn between financial support and publicity, it is revealing that private

[56] Fischer, 'Mead and the International Mind', 508–31; Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 30–1.

[57] Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922); Paul Felix Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up his Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (New York, 1944); David Manning White, 'The "Gate Keeper": A Case Study in the Selection of News', *Journalism Quarterly*, (1950), 383–90; Warren Breed, 'Newspaper "Opinion Leaders" and Processes of Standardization', *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 32/3 (1955), 277–328.

[58] Säve-Söderbergh, *Temples and Tombs*, 75–9.

[59] Suzanne Langlois, 'And Action! UN and UNESCO Coordinating Information Films, 1945–1951', in Poul Duedahl (ed.), *A History of UNESCO: Global Actions and Impacts* (Basingstoke, 2016), 73–96, at 73.

[60] 'Victory in Nubia: The Greatest Archaeological Rescue Campaign of All Time', *UNESCO Courier* (Feb.–Mar. 1980) ⟨http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0007/000747/074755eo.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

contributions accounted for $7 million, more than $100,000 were raised through the sale of special-edition stamps and medals, and non-governmental contributions amounted to more than $14 million in total.[61] The sheer success of the campaign made it a blueprint for the public relations activities of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee when it started its work in 1977. Like the Nubia campaign, it aimed to address an educated, professional audience as well as a broader mass public. But unlike the Nubia campaign, which was closely connected with the Suez Crisis and the Aswan Dam, the committee had to plan its public relations activities without the help of a global news and media event.[62]

For the professional and educated audience, they relied on the established and traditional channels of academic journals, conferences, and exhibitions. The members of the World Heritage Committee agreed that they also had to target potential multipliers and 'opinion-makers'.[63] To this end, they published brochures and leaflets in French, English, and Spanish to inform 'decision-makers' in the different countries about the new UNESCO convention. The committee also organized World Heritage media seminars for journalists from the press and broadcast media. As the committee was convinced that '[t]he outstanding characteristic of the Convention from the purely promotional point of view is its potential for creating a visual impact',[64] its members paid special attention to the visual component of their promotional activities by creating a photo library of World Heritage sites in order to offer suitable photographs and slides for publication. In addition, its secretariat produced a radio documentary and a slide show with an audio track (both in five

[61] Säve-Söderbergh, *Temples and Tombs*, 232–3; for the stamps see 'Stamps for Nubia', *UNESCO Courier* (Dec. 1964), 42–3 ⟨http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000623/062384eo.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[62] Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, *Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992); Tony Shaw, *Eden, Suez, and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis* (London, 1996); Hussein M. Fahim, *Dams, People, and Development: The Aswan High Dam Case* (New York, 1981); Albert Raccah, 'The Modern Pyramid of Aswan: Sadd el Aali', *UNESCO Courier* (Feb. 1960), 11–5 ⟨http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000645/064522eo.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[63] UNESCO, Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Second Session, Washington, DC (USA), 5 Sept.–8 Sept. 1978, Final Report, Washington, 8 Sept. 1978, pp. 5–6, UNESCO Archive Paris, CC-78/CONF.010/10 Rev.

[64] UNESCO, Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Third Session, Luxor, Arab Republic of Egypt, 23–7 Oct. 1979, Proposals for Promotional Activities 1980, CC-79/CONF.003/6.2.

languages), and tried to initiate a documentary film about the World Heritage convention.

These publicity activities were intended to 'help to inform the public of the importance of conserving world heritage; to accelerate adherences by Member States to the Convention; to stimulate contributions to the Fund from foundations and commercial firms; and to generally fulfil the educational mandate outlined in the Convention'.[65] Pursuing this twofold aim, they also supported special-edition stamps, postcards, posters, and other collectable objects such as coins, medals, and glass and silverware depicting animals, monuments, or scenes in a sentimental or emblematic way.[66] It is difficult to tell to what extent the choice of aesthetic and emotional subjects in combination with pleading texts featuring calls to action to prevent undesirable future scenarios was influenced by Carl I. Howland's study of persuasion.[67] In any event, the choreography followed some of his assumptions. Additionally, the committee translated its publications into the five UNESCO languages, though cultural or political differences between the publics of world regions or between national publics were not perceived to be an issue. The main divide was seen to be between a global educated, professional audience and a broader mass public whose awareness had to be stimulated by politicians and journalists in their role as 'opinion-makers'.[68]

This does not mean that cultural differences were not an issue

[65] UNESCO, Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Second Session, Washington, DC (USA), 5 Sept.–8 Sept. 1978, Final Report, Washington, 8 Sept. 1978, UNESCO Archive Paris, CC-78/CONF.010/10 Rev., 5.

[66] World Heritage Convention, Publications/Press, UNESCO Archive Paris, CLT/WHC/175; UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, Third Session, Cairo and Luxor, 22–6 Oct. 1979, Report of the Rapporteur, Paris, 30 Nov. 1979, UNESCO Archive Paris, CC-79/CONF.003/13 ⟨http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1979/cc-79-conf003-13e.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018]; UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, Fourth Session, Paris, 1–5 Sept. 1980, Item 9 of the Provisional Agenda: Public Information Activities, 25 Aug. 1980, UNESCO Archive Paris, CC-80/CONF.016/7 ⟨http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1980/cc-80-conf016-6e.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[67] Carl I. Hovland, Janis L. Irving, and Kelley H. Harold, *Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change* (New Haven, 1953); for the iconography of conservation campaigning see Anna-Katharina Wöbse, 'Bilderwelten: Zur visuellen Geschichte der Naturschutz- und Umweltbewegung', in Franz-Josef Brüggemeier and Jens Ivo Engels (eds.), *Natur und Umwelt in Deutschland nach 1945* (Frankfurt a.M., 2005), 222–48.

[68] UNESCO, Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Second Session, Washington, DC (USA), 5 Sept.–8 Sept. 1978, Final Report, Washington, 8 Sept. 1978, UNESCO Archive Paris, CC-78/CONF.010/10 Rev., 5.

inside UNESCO. They were, but initially they were mainly discussed in the context of communications policy and media markets with a special focus on technological and economic inequalities caused by colonialism and the hegemonic effects of the global 'terms of trade'. 'Cultural imperialism' was discussed as one result of these disparities and was identified as a threat to cultural diversity, which manifested itself in traditions and cultural heritages.[69] Initiated by the Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of 77, debates about hegemonies in economics and the mass media, their communication or 'cultural imperialism', and the impact of the dominance of Western media on culture entered the arena of UNESCO. These debates were reflected in the idea of a 'New World Information and Communication Order' and the 'Many Voices, One World' report of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems chaired by Sean MacBride.[70] They were influenced by dependency theory,[71] and a rereading or rediscovery of Antonio Gramsci's theory of 'cultural hegemony', which seemed to tally with the warnings issued by Claude Lévi-Strauss and other anthropologists about the 'westernization' of indigenous peoples,[72] and Marshall McLuhan's prediction of an ultimate 'Gutenberg galaxy' and the emergence of a 'global village'.[73]

In addition to technological transfer, the Non-Aligned Movement sought to eliminate imbalances and inequalities in information and

[69] John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction* (London, 1991); id., 'Cultural Imperialism', in George Ritzer (ed.), *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization*, 5 vols. (Hoboken, NJ, 2012), i. 371–4.

[70] *Many Voices, One World*; Jürgen Dinkel, *Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten: Genese, Organisation und Politik (1927–1992)* (Munich, 2015), 212–26; id., 'Dekolonisierung und Weltnachrichtenordnung: Der Nachrichtenpool bündnisfreier Staaten (1976–1992)', in Frank Bösch and Peter Hoeres (eds.), *Außenpolitik im Medienzeitalter: Vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Göttingen, 2013), 211–31; Jürgen Dinkel, '"Third world begins to flex its muscles": The Non-Aligned Movement and the North–South Conflict during the 1970s', in Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Janick Schaufelbuehl, et al. (eds.), *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?* (London, 2016), 108–23.

[71] Raúl Prebisch, *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems* (Lake Success, NY, 1950); Hans Singer, 'The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries', *American Economic Review*, 40 (1950), 473–85.

[72] Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Race and History: The Race Question in Modern Science* (Paris, 1952), 31, *see also* 46–9; id., 'Today's Crisis in Anthropology', *UNESCO Courier* (Nov. 1961), 12–17 (http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000642/064255eo.pdf) [accessed 17 Aug. 2018].

[73] Marshall McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man* (Toronto, 1962); id., Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel, *War and Peace in the Global Village* (New York, 1968).

news in order to improve the representation of the so-called developing countries in the media and allow them to gain control over their own media image under the banner of fighting imperialism.[74] The Non-Aligned Movement suggested that national news markets should be protected, but this sort of protectionism was unacceptable to the US and UK governments, whose countries also happened to be home to the largest and most important news agencies in the world.[75] They argued that governmental control constituted a threat to the 'free flow of information', which, they claimed, was a prerequisite for freedom of speech. The USA and UK left UNESCO in protest in 1984 and 1985 respectively, accusing UNESCO of 'politicization' and bureaucratization.

The World Heritage programme was a latecomer to these debates. In 1978 Richard Hoggart, founding director of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham and assistant director-general of UNESCO's Sector of Social Sciences, Human Sciences and Culture between 1971 and 1975, evaluated UNESCO's protection of monuments and nature and the work 'in the general area of "culture" where [in the developing countries] that word is used in its anthropological senses: work on the meaning of cultural diversity, on the needs and rights of minorities, and on the pressures on oral cultures'.[76] He saw this as one of the organization's 'indisputably useful activities', although he deplored the organization's shift from intellectual co-operation to political argument in other fields.[77] His appraisal, however, already indicated a pluralization of culture and a new appreciation of cultural diversity as a value in itself, along with an early hint at the supposed European nature of monuments, seen as separate from the dominance of the intangible heritage of the rest of the world.

The World Heritage Committee did not reflect shifts in concepts of a global public and culture in the debates about New World Orders before 1984 and 1985, when the USA and the UK withdrew from UNESCO.[78] These developments changed the policies of the World Heritage Committee in two correlated ways. First, its members faced a period of financial insecurity because it was uncertain whether the

[74] Dinkel, 'Dekolonisierung und Weltnachrichtenordnung'.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Richard Hoggart, *An Idea and its Servants: UNESCO from Within*, with a new introduction by John R. Bolton (New Brunswick, 2011; 1st edn. 1978), 32.

[77] Ibid. 31–5, 38–9.

[78] Ibid.

USA and the UK would continue to contribute to the World Heritage Fund.[79] And second, over the longer term they faced growing criticism of the elitism and Eurocentrism of their 'trusteeship', which was coupled with calls for broader participation and more cultural sensitivity. Initially, financial concerns caused them to question whether a 'full-scale promotion policy' supported by public relations experts was still possible.[80] This led them to question whether publicity work aimed at an undifferentiated global public was appropriate. Their doubts were reinforced by an in-depth study of UNESCO international rescue campaigns, which came to the conclusion that the crucial factor in their success had not been UNESCO's activities, but the culturally and politically adjusted promotional activities of the states.[81]

As a consequence of the evaluation and the ongoing debates about cultural sovereignty, as well as the experience of managing sites in different societies and publics, it was decided to decentralize promotional activities. Now the committee emphasized the member states' responsibility to support promotional activities.[82] With this change of policy, the committee achieved two goals simultaneously. It took theoretical debates about the plurality and fragmentation of world opinion and culturally diverse publics into account and recognized a human right to culture also in media. At the same time, it managed to avoid further conflicts about communications policies and keep the USA, in particular, in the World Heritage programme. This

[79] UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, Ninth Ordinary Session, Paris, 2 Dec. 6 Dec. 1985, Report of the Rapporteur, Dec. 1985, UNESCO Archive Paris, SC-85/CONF008/9 ⟨http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1985/sc-85-conf008-9_e.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[80] UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, Ninth Ordinary Session, Paris, 2 Dec. 6 Dec. 1985, Item 12 of the Provisional Agenda: Review of Promotional Activities and Means of Strengthening These Activities at the National Level, 26 Nov. 1985, UNESCO Archive Paris, SC-85/CONF008/07.

[81] UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, Tenth Session, Paris, 24 Nov. 28 Nov. 1986, Item 9 of the Provisional Agenda: Relations between the World Heritage List and the International Campaigns for the Safeguarding of the Cultural Heritage, Paris, 3 Nov. 1986, UNESCO Archive Paris, CC-86/CONF003/5 ⟨http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1986/cc-86-conf003-5e.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[82] UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, Eleventh Session, Paris, 7 Dec. 11 Dec. 1987, Item 12 of the Provisional Agenda: Report on and Proposal for Promotional Activities, Paris, 4 Nov. 1987, UNESCO Archive Paris, SC-87/CONF005/8 ⟨http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1987/sc-87-conf005-8e.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018]; UNESCO, Report of the World Heritage Committee, Eleventh Session, Paris, 7 Dec. 11 Dec. 1987, Paris, 20 Jan. 1988, UNESCO Archive Paris, SC-87/CONF005/9 ⟨http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1987/sc-87-conf005-9_e.pdf⟩ [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

was accomplished by addressing a 'variety of publics',[83] described as culturally and politically diverse, fragmented, and plural, this very diversity forming a unified global public. Insisting on the idea of 'unity in diversity' allowed the World Heritage Committee to save itself from the UNESCO crisis and to prevent the US and UK governments from leaving the World Heritage programme.[84] This led to the paradoxical situation that the committee increasingly had to prove its ability to act owing to changed expectations of effective politics, but withdrew as soon as cultural rights were in the picture in order to be sensitive to culture and to escape the accusation of Western cultural imperialism. As a consequence it lost interpretative sovereignty in favour of cultural sovereignty claims with very different policy objectives. A gap arose, which destructively separatist, nationalist, or fundamentalist groups such as Ansar Dine tried to use to legitimate themselves when they addressed their work of destruction to the World Heritage Committee as a representation of a cosmopolitan world society.

Conclusion

The examples presented here powerfully illustrate the impact of the shifts in the relationship between political institutions, the public, and world opinion. It is therefore crucial to analyse their complexity, multiple levels, and entanglements. In the case of the UNESCO World Heritage programme, UNESCO and its World Heritage Committee portrayed themselves as spokespeople of world opinion and as the cosmopolitan representation of a world society. But their position as trustees of 'global commons' and shapers of world opinion remained relatively ineffective because of the keenly defended sovereignty of the member states and the variety of transnational and national publics. Restricted in this respect, UNESCO and its World Heritage Committee had to confine themselves to very

[83] UNESCO, Report of the World Heritage Committee, Twelfth Session, Brasilia, Brazil, 5 Dec.–9 Dec. 1988, 23 Dec. 1988, UNESCO Archive Paris, SC-88/CONF.001/13, p. 9 (http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1988/sc-88-conf001-13_e.pdf) [accessed 12 Apr. 2018].

[84] Peter Billing, Gabriele Kittel, Volker Rittberger, and Frank Schimmelpfennig, *State Properties and Foreign Policy: Industrialized Countries and the UNESCO Crisis* (Tübingen, 1992); Gabriele Kittel, Volker Rittberger, and Frank Schimmelpfennig, *Between Loyalty and Exit: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Industrialized Countries in the UNESCO Crisis (1978–1987)* (Tübingen, 1995); Dinkel, *Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten*, 206–63.

general moral appeals and attempts to create awareness by promoting international conservation in order to enable the international co-operation of states against the backdrop of the Cold War and the North–South divide. Thus, they had to deal with a 'family of publics' without becoming party to internal or bilateral conflicts, and without the capacity to intervene. The strategy for dealing with this lack of power was to raise awareness in order to initiate a change in behaviour by persuasion and to create a global mind. In this aim they assumed the position of world teachers, using emotional identification with personified or emblematic monuments and animals, and classifying those responsible for destruction as 'vandals' or 'barbarians' breaking away from civilization, in order to illustrate their message and underline a need for conservation and sustainability policies.

Public relations activities subsequently became very important. Perceiving themselves as an avant-garde tasked with educating a mass public worldwide, the members of the committee hoped to overcome their inability to intervene through information and persuasion. But the experience of diverse publics, the debates about a New World Information and Communication Order in the 1980s, and the growing influence of cultural studies and postcolonial theory, as well as the shortage of money caused by political and economic crises, meant that the strategies for addressing a global public changed. Cultural sensitivity found its way into the public activities of the World Heritage Committee. A first step was to reinstate the nation state as responsible for informing and educating its publics—now plural—to consider cultural diversity and differences. Thus, the committee avoided importing conflicts about international communications policies and managed to keep the US and UK governments inside the programme by setting aside the issue of the political system and differing interpretations of freedom of speech and opinion with reference to cultural differences.

Another result of these processes was that the spectrum of potential political actors, public opinions, and publics was extended. The right to culture was awarded the status of a human right and cultures developed into political entities inside and beyond the state. Over time, the language of identity politics, initially oriented towards emancipation and civil rights, was increasingly occupied and transformed by right-wing groups of all stripes in order to legitimize policies of exclusion. They tried to turn the World Heritage

Committee's cosmopolitan rhetoric against it, accused it of taking a culturally imperialistic position, and declared it an opponent of their claims to cultural sovereignty. With the help of this volte, groups such as Anse Dine tried to justify their supposedly religiously motivated work of destruction and hold the World Heritage Committee responsible. The sad irony of the UNESCO World Heritage programme's success story, which made the World Heritage Committee a representative of a diverse humanity equated with a global public, is that World Heritage status itself has now become a threat to World Heritage sites.