Becoming Europe's Parliament: Europeanization through MEPs' Supranational Activism, 1952–79

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Abstract

The European Parliament (EP) – today one of the most powerful actors at EU level – was intended to be a mere consultative assembly at the founding of the European Communities. This article studies the beginnings of the EP's parliamentarization, from its establishment in 1952 to its first direct elections in 1979. The article uses the concept of Europeanization to analyse what ideational, normative and rationalist factors induced MEPs – delegates from the member states' national parliaments at the time – to invest considerable time and effort into an institution that promised no significant political impact, career improvement, or acknowledgement by voters. In so doing, the article demonstrates that despite the fact that careers were made at the national level, MEPs swiftly began to behave as Euro-parliamentarians rather than national delegates. Inside the EP, MEPs were therefore both themselves Europeanized and pushed for the Europeanization of the EP more generally.

Introduction

The European Parliament (EP) is today one of the most powerful actors at the EU level. Yet it was not intended to be more than a consultative assembly at the founding of the European Communities in the 1950s. This article argues that the relatively swift evolution of the EP from an alleged 'talking shop' into a co-legislator cannot be understood without taking into consideration the crucial role of members of the EP (MEPs) in 'parliamentarizing' the EP. Whereas much research has shed light on the role played by MEPs in the institutionalization and professionalization of the EP since its first direct elections in 1979, and until today (see Daniel, 2015; Kreppel, 2002; Knudsen, 2014; Ripoll Servent, 2018), this article focuses exclusively on the beginnings of this process, namely from the EP's establishment in 1952 until 1979. It demonstrates that many of the processes that have been found to be at the basis of the EP's empowerment post-1979 have their roots in the 1950s–70s. Among them are, in more formal terms, the EP's gain in legislative, budgetary and control power (Rittberger, 2005). This article examines how MEPs' behaviour shaped the empowerment and professionalization of the EP by tracing the Europeanization processes in the EP at a micro (individual MEPs), meso (party groups and committees) and macro (EP) level. It agrees with Daniel (2015, p. 4) that '[i]n the realm of legislative studies, legislators themselves are the closest we can get to observing the pulse of a legislative institution'.

In studying the EP's institutional development prior to 1979 from this perspective, the article focuses on a period of the EP's evolution which is still significantly understudied,

based not least on the misconception that the relatively powerless position of the EP which the Treaties provided corresponded to the EP's actual institutional role in Community policy-making. Those studies that take into account the EP pre-1979 often focus merely on the EP's formal gain in power – notably through Treaty changes (see Kardasheva, 2009; Rittberger, 2005; Viola, 2016) – and on events with a significant impact on the EP's position in relation to other Community institutions, such as the negotiations of a European Defence and Political Community (Corbett *et al.*, 2003; Rittberger, 2006), and the Empty Chair crisis (Lindner and Rittberger, 2003; Krumrey, 2018). This article points out the added value of studying more gradual and often initially informal changes through evolving routines, and the role of individual MEPs in everyday policy-making.[1] This, in particular, adds to the existing literature on the early EP, much of which treats the early parliament as a unitary actor, overlooking the impact of individual delegates on the empowerment of the EP.

The article applies the concept of Europeanization to analyse the ideational, normative and rational factors that induced MEPs – delegates from the member states' national parliaments at the time – to invest considerable time and effort into an institution that promised them virtually no significant political impact, no career improvement, and no acknowledgement by voters. In so doing, the article demonstrates that despite the fact that careers were made at the national level, MEPs swiftly began to behave as Euro-parliamentarians rather than national delegates, based on their shared convictions and ideas of European integration. Inside the EP, MEPs were therefore both themselves Europeanized, and pushed for the Europeanization of the EP more generally.

The article opens with a section outlining the theoretical approach applied in the subsequent analysis – with the concept of Europeanization at its centre, combined with the concepts and tools of sociological and rational choice institutionalism. This theoretical outline is followed by a brief chronology of the EP's institutional evolution prior to 1979, in order to provide the historical context which is necessary to understand MEPs' behaviour and the consequences of their activism for the EP's development.

The following analysis of Europeanization processes in the EP on a micro, meso and macro level focuses on norms, ideas and interests underlying MEPs' behaviour, on important factors in MEPs' socialization prior to entering the EP, and on the delegates' immersion in the EP's internal structure and working procedures, notably within the EP's party groups and committees. Moreover, the article sheds light on the role played by a small group of particularly activist MEPs who became norm entrepreneurs by steering EP policy-making procedures and shaping the norms internalized by the bulk of MEPs as a basis of their Community-level behaviour. These norm entrepreneurs are shown to have significantly propelled Europeanization processes in the EP.

Sources: Archival Documents and Personal Accounts

The article is based on a corpus of about 250 EP documents that was assembled and consulted at the Historical Archives of the EP (HAEP) in Luxembourg (partly by keyword search in the HAEP's internal archival system, and partly by manual consultation of all Official Journals of the European Communities from the period 1952–79), the

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[1]For the area of environmental policy, Meyer (2014) has presented insightful studies of MEPs' everyday attempts to influence Community legislation, and to strengthen the EP's role in Community agenda-setting.

Historical Archives of the EU in Florence, and the *Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe* in Lausanne. This dataset consists of resolutions, reports, parliamentary questions, minutes of debates and working documents on important events and developments in the EP's institutional evolution, concerning, for instance, changes to the EP's rules of procedure, and demands for a strengthened role of the EP in Community politics. An in-depth source analysis of these documents, based on a qualitative content analysis methodology,[2] provides detailed insight into the EP's functioning, its structure and procedures, as well as its members' perception of how their institution should work.

In addition to the dataset of archival documents, the following analysis builds on personal accounts by contemporary witnesses. The author conducted 24 semi-structured interviews and e-mail exchanges with former MEPs and EP staff. Interviews were between half an hour and 5 hours long, with an average length of approximately 2 hours. Contacts were established with the help of the HAEP and the EP's Former Members Association, and later with the help of the interviewees themselves. The author sought to speak to as many MEPs as possible or reachable. Eventually, statements were collected from former MEPs from all member states and party groups represented in the EP prior to 1979. Unfortunately, for practical reasons, the sample of interviewees is biased in terms of the period it covers. Most interviewees sat in or worked for the EP in the 1970s, and some in the second half of the 1960s. Due to the number of years that have passed since the period under examination, the author had difficulties finding MEPs who held a European mandate in the 1950s or early 1960s.

All interviewees were asked the same list of questions. Among other issues, they were asked about their personal, educational and professional background, their way into and out of the EP, the positions they held within and outside the EP, the structure and working procedures of the EP and its committees and party groups, their perceptions of the EP's role and powers in Community politics, and MEP and EP relations with other Community institutions as well as with national parliaments and parties. In addition to these questions, the author discussed with interviewees in more detail their unique experiences as MEP and EP staff, and in several cases also as members or staff of other Community institutions.[3]

The additional insights acquired through the interviews were crucial to this research, given that much EP activism prior to 1979 took place in informal settings, and was not recorded on any medium. The interview material was analysed based on an oral history methodology (see McGrath, 2009; Ritchie, 2015; Thompson and Bornat, 2017): the material was contextualized, if necessary filtered, and most importantly cross-checked as far as possible through consultations of secondary literature, the above-mentioned written primary sources, and through similar questions to other MEPs as well as follow-up interviews with individual interviewees. This careful treatment of the interviewees' statements was necessary because, for one reason or other, some contemporary witnesses tend to

[2]Following Mayring (2014), the sources were conitextualized, divided into content analytical units, categorized with regard to different formal and contentual aspects and levels, and interpreted within the framework set by the previous steps of content analysis, by the chosen theoretical approach, and by the underlying research question.
[3]More detailed information on the dataset of this article, which forms a part of a larger research project on the EP's institutional evolution prior to 1979, can be found at the author's website: https://mechthildroos.eu/research/the-european-parliament-prior-to-1979-told-by-former-meps-and-staff/.

generalize, exhibit nostalgia, mix up details, or present some facts in a way to appear in the best possible light.

Evolution of the EP through the Lens of Europeanization

This article draws on the theoretical approach of Europeanization, defined by Featherstone (2003, p. 3) as 'a process of structural change [closely identified with some form of an integrated 'Europe'], variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests'. In its analysis of the EP's institutional evolution prior to its first direct elections, this study does not approach Europeanization in the usual terms as a *vertical* two-way process of European integration with an impact on domestic policies and polities, or of the influence of domestic policies and polities on European integration. With Radaelli (2003, p. 41), this article focuses instead first and foremost on the *horizontal* Europeanization of national actors at the supranational level, that is, processes of 'change triggered by [...] the diffusion of ideas and discourses about the notion of good policy and best practice' among actors at the European level.

The only element of *vertical* Europeanization in the following analysis concerns the background of MEPs at the time. Prior to 1979, all MEPs were national parliamentarians who were delegated by their home parliaments to the EP. This implies not only that an EP mandate was a part-time occupation, but also that MEPs' political careers remained formally dependent on national – not European – parties, politics and performance evaluation. Despite this fact, MEPs acted like Euro-parliamentarians rather than national representatives from the 1950s, as discussed below. The MEPs' background as national parliamentarians was relevant not only from their career point of view, but also with regard to their perceptions of what constituted a typical west European parliament. The following analysis examines the subsequent dimension of vertical Europeanization. MEPs sought to transfer procedures and structures that typically shaped the work of national parliaments to the Community level, in order to 'parliamentarize'[4] the EP. In the process of adapting such procedures and structures so as to improve the EP's involvement in Community politics, the process of vertical transfer blended into horizontal implementation and adjustment processes, given the major differences in tasks and powers between national parliaments and the EP, and between the political and institutional systems of member states, on the one hand, and the Communities, on the other.

To operationalize the broad concept of Europeanization beyond a distinction of vertical and horizontal processes, the following analysis draws on the conceptual toolbox of institutionalism. The compatibility of institutionalist and Europeanization approaches has been shown in previous research, as discussed by Featherstone (2003, p. 12). Regarding the analysis of the early EP's institutional evolution, this article argues with Mühlböck and Rittberger (2015) that a combination of different institutionalist schools provides significant analytical added value: applying rational choice and sociological institutionalist concepts allows the analyst to highlight a wider variety of factors influencing institutional dynamics and institutionalization processes than either of these approaches would achieve if applied on its own. Combining them within the framework of Europeanization, in turn,

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[4]Thus expressed by the interviewee Horst Seefeld (Interview 1). All interviewees are quoted in this article in English. Quotes from interviews that were not conducted in English (but in German, French, or Italian) have been translated by the author.

allows the following analysis to trace processes 'of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things", and shared beliefs and norms' (Radaelli, 2003, p. 30). In other words, this hybrid theoretical approach provides the opportunity to emphasize the importance of informal processes alongside formal ones, to study the interaction of norms and interests, of logics of appropriateness and logics of consequentiality.[5] Thus, these different institutionalist concepts drive the analysis below.

It should be noted that this article assumes with Featherstone (2003, p. 4) that Europeanization is 'not necessarily permanent or irreversible', and that the development of MEPs' behaviour was consequently not a one-directional process towards an ever more Europeanized code of conduct. In the institutional evolution of the EP this is visible, for example, in the impact of the Communities' first enlargement on the unity and integration-related attitudes among MEPs, as outlined below. This article traces processes of 'negative' or de-Europeanization triggered by such incisive events, as well as following socialization and re-Europeanization developments.

Brief Chronology of the EP's Institutional Evolution before 1979
When studying the Europeanization of the early EP through its parliamentarization, it is important to understand the beginning of the institution's evolution. The EP was not formally intended to be anything like a parliament when it was founded as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community in the Treaty of Paris, signed on 18 April 1951. This Treaty stipulated the EP's main – and almost only – task was to control the European Coal and Steel Community 's executive, the High Authority. Up until the EP's first direct elections in June 1979, all MEPs were national parliamentarians, delegated to the Community level by their home parliaments, and consequently holding a double mandate. Given limited remit of the EP provided by the Treaty, EP mandates were considered to be a part-time task, roughly comparable with a delegate's membership of a parliamentary committee at the national level.

From the EP's first plenary session in September 1952, MEPs rejected the limitations of its scope, as stipulated in the Treaty, and frequently expressed their opinions both on proposals for Community legislation, and on issues that, in the delegates view, deserved attention at Community level. In order to work as efficiently as possible within the limited time and resources available to them, within the first year of the EP's existence the early MEPs set up a parliamentary structure of committees (European Parliament, 1953a) and party groups(European Parliament, 1953b). This structure allowed delegates to cope with their gradually increasing (and self-assigned) workload.

The 1957 treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) to some extent changed the scope of the EP tasks and responsibilities. Most importantly, the EP's previously vaguely defined right of consultation was extended to a number of concrete policy areas (see i.a. Arts. 7, 43, 54, 57, 63, 75, 201, 235 and 238 of the EEC Treaty; and Arts. 31, 85, 96, 203 and 206 of the Euratom Treaty). Yet, even though the EP obtained a right to express its opinion before decisions in the respective areas could be made, its opinion had no binding force: the

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[5]For an in-depth definition and conceptualization of both logics, see March and Olsen (2011). Their analytical compatibility in the context of Europeanization is discussed by Börzel and Risse (2003).

Council was not obliged to act any differently from the way it would have done without consulting the EP. This changed to some extent with the two budget treaties of 1970 and 1975, which allowed the EP to reject the newly created Community budget. Moreover, alongside the 1975 Treaty, a conciliation procedure was introduced that granted the EP some decision-making power on budget-related issues. Even though the Council retained the last word, this procedure became crucial in the evolution of the EP's co-legislative power. Table 1 provides an overview of the powers and tasks formally attributed to the EP in the different treaties prior to 1979.

Micro-level Europeanization through Socialization
Prior to the EP's first direct elections, the matter of combining their national and European mandate was not easy to solve for many of the MEPs. Some struggled to convince their voters that the time they spent away both from the constituency and the national parliament was spent in a meaningful and relevant way – after all, as the former liberal MEP Werner Zywietz stated, 'the democratic basis demanded that their interests were sufficiently attended to' (Interview 9), meaning that delegates had to account for their distribution of time and efforts between different levels. Ole Espersen, a Danish Socialist MEP, remembered that although he 'had a safe constituency where I was always elected', several colleagues were confronted with constituents who asked: 'Why do you spend so much time on something that gives us no support? – That was a very common difficulty in being a member' of the EP (Interview 2). The British Conservative John Corrie (Interview 12), for instance, had to answer criticisms from his constituents for spending too much time 'in Europe'.

Other delegates had to explain to their fellow national parliamentarians why they spent so much time at the European level. The former Communist MEP Vera Squarcialupi, for instance, remembered that her national-level colleagues considered her European work less important than that in the national parliament (Interview 10). This perception was shared among members of small national parties, as the Dutch former MEP and D66 member Maarten Engwirda recalled from his own experience:

I was at the time in the Dutch Parliament member of a modest group of only 11 persons, so there was a vote whether the group would allow me to go to Strasbourg and to the European Parliament – and it was a very close vote, six to five, not because my colleagues were not pro-European, but they thought: well, if he is away half the time in Strasbourg, it gives us more work. (Interview 3)

Given the EP's weak role as provided by the Treaties, most national delegates who were about to become MEPs did not expect any career gain from investing their time in the EP. For many parliamentarians, going to the EP seemed 'a waste of time' (Interview 2) in the first place; after all, careers were made at the national level. The MEPs' significant investment of time and effort in EP-related work led a number of interviewees to consider their European engagement as 'mandate-endangering' (Interview 9) rather than conducive to their careers; indeed, some felt their European mandates had a negative impact on their national-level positions.[10] To some extent, MEPs were in this regard

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[10]The interviewees Maarten Engwirda (Interview 3) and Hans-Werner Müller (Interview 4) reported having lost out on a political opportunity through their EP mandates: Engwirda lost a good place on his party's list in the 1973 national election (which cost him his seat both in the national parliament, but consequently also in the EP), and Müller a prestigious committee seat.

Table 1: The Evolution of the EP's Formal Powers Prior to 1979

Treaty of Paris (1951)	Treaties of Rome (1957)	Budget Treaties (1970, 1975)
To dismiss the High Authority once a year (Art. 24)	To dismiss the Commission at any time (Art. 144 EEC, Art. 114 Euratom)	(Treaties of Rome still apply)
Vague right of consultation (Art. 22)	To draw up proposals for direct elections (Art. 138 EEC, Art. 108 Euratom)	To amend and reject the budget of the Communities (Art. 1–9; 1970; Art. 2, 4, 9, 12–13, 17, 20–21 and 25/1975)
To put questions to the High Authority (Art. 23)	To put questions to the Commission (Art. 140 EEC, Art. 110 Euratom)	To initiate a conciliation procedure in case of disagreement between the EP and Council[1]
Power over its own rules of procedure (Art. 25)	Power over its own rules of procedure (Art. 142 EEC, Art. 112 Euratom)	
	Power of consultation (numerous articles in both the EEC and the Euratom Treaty)	
	To propose amendments to budget (Art. 203 EEC, Art. 177 Euratom)	

[1] The conciliation procedure was established not directly in the budget treaties, but through a Joint Declaration of the EP, the Council and the Commission of 4 March 1975 (OJ C89, 22.4.1975), pp. 1–2.

confronted with a level of vertical Europeanization of domestic parliaments and parties that was too low, in the shape of insufficient knowledge on the side of their national-level party colleagues, leading to a lack of interest or appreciation at the domestic level for the work of the EP and its members.

The fact that national parliamentarians nonetheless decided (or agreed) to take on an EP mandate, and to spend more time in the EP than their national peers expected, suggests a certain level of Europeanization of their 'mental frameworks' (Graziano and Vink, 2013, p. 40) prior to entering the EP. Indeed, the former MEPs and EP staff interviewed for this research indicated that very few delegates who were not generally in favour of closer integration had agreed to go to the EP in the first place.[11] An important basis of the MEPs' openness to getting involved and socialized into the EP hence lay in MEPs' mind-sets upon entering. While every MEP was evidently shaped by their individual experiences, some recurring aspects can be traced in the delegates' pre-EP socialization. Importantly, most MEPs prior to 1979 had active memories of the Second World War, and a considerable number even remembered the First World War[12] and were united in fundamental agreement that Europe should never see such a war again (Interviews 6, 7, 8 & 9).

Driven by this greater objective, many of the MEPs had become engaged at transnational and international level before they were delegated to the EP, in different international assemblies such as those of the Western European Union, NATO or the Council of Europe, in transnational trade union organizations or in party associations like the Socialist International (Knudsen, 2014). Moreover, many spoke one or more foreign languages, often based on their experiences in other European states during their school or university education. Indeed, several interviewees indicated that they were sent to the EP because of their language skills (Interviews 4, 9 & 10). In short, the EP itself was not the first experience of international or transnational cooperation and exchange for many of these MEPs; so that the ground of a fundamental openness to cross-border policy-making had already been laid among MEPs for the norms and shared ideas of closer political and institutional integration with which the delegates were confronted upon entering the EP.

It should not be assumed, however, that all delegates came to the EP as pro-Europeans. The former British Conservative MEP John Corrie, for instance, voted against Britain's continued Community membership in the 1975 referendum 'because I did not know enough about it'. However, he reflected in the interview with the author, 'having been there for a short time, I could see the whole principle and ideals were absolutely right, if you kept it at sort of trade level and cooperation as we now have' (Interview 12). The former Danish Socialist MEP Ole Espersen went through a similar

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[11]This was also confirmed for the 1950s by Haas (2004), p. 437. Krumrey (2018, pp. 115-116) states that the MEPs who were sent to the EP in the 1950s 'were the parties' European experts and were often prone to federalist attitudes', making the EP 'a congregation of self-avowed Europeans'. The interviewee Arnaldo Ferragni, working for the Christian Democratic Group from 1960 and its Secretary-General from 1966 to 1972, said of the EP's staff members that 'before the entry of the UK, all staff members of the EP were pro-European. From the Secretary General to the last usher or driver, everyone considered themselves engaged in the construction of Europe' (Interview 5).

[12]All parliamentarians who held an EP mandate prior to 1979 were born before or – in two cases – in 1945; only about a dozen were born in the 1940s (this information stems from an unofficial list of MEPs from the period 1952–79 provided by the Historical Archives of the EP). Given that all member states were involved in both World Wars it can be assumed that all those MEPs old enough to remember either of the wars had active memories of the war years.

experience: 'I voted against being a member of the European Communities, but by and large I became convinced' (Interview 2).

Considering the dominating shared basis of generally Europeanized 'mental frameworks' among MEPs, it is not surprising that controversy in the early EP was relatively low concerning attitudes on political and institutional integration.[15] One of the most important – and almost unanimously shared – ideas was the perceived need and justness of turning the EP into a fully-fledged supranational parliament (Roos, 2017). This idea had both normative and rational dimensions: on the one hand, MEPs hoped that a powerful, democratically elected parliament that represented the citizens' interest would provide necessary democratic legitimacy to Community politics and policies, and would at the same time bring the Community project closer to the citizens as constituents of the MEPs. On the other hand, MEPs had an interest in carving out a more powerful position for their institution, in order to gain more influence on Community legislation and the overall integration process. MEPs' activism towards the vertical Europeanization of the EP – in the sense of bringing it closer to the role and powers usually held by parliaments in liberal democracies – thus followed both a logic of appropriateness and one of consequentiality.

One indicator of the aspiration shared by most MEPs to turn the EP into a fully fledged supranational parliament is the way they referred to their institution. In the EP's inaugural plenary session after the treaties of Rome entered into force, the MEPs adopted a resolution substantiating their self-understanding as Euro-parliamentarians. The 'Assembly', to which the Treaties referred, was renamed the '*European Parliamentary* Assembly' in French and Italian.[16] In German and Dutch, MEPs went a step further by officially calling their institution the *Europäisches Parlament* or *Europees Parlement*, as in these languages the term 'assembly' lacked the necessary significance and prestige that the EP deserved, in the delegates' view (Krumrey, 2018, p. 139). During a plenary session on 30 March 1962, in an 'informal change [...] of major symbolic importance' (Judge and Earnshaw, 2008, p. 35), the EP adopted a resolution officially renaming the Communities' Assembly as the European Parliament in all Community languages (European Parliament, 1962). This resolution had, like all EP resolutions, no legally binding character and constituted first and foremost an expression of the delegates' self-understanding. Nonetheless, the EP's name changes signify steps in the horizontal Europeanization of the EP from an assembly of national delegates towards a supranational parliament.

Europeanization through Parliamentarization at the Meso Level
The horizontal Europeanization of the EP depended to a significant extent on the structure that the early MEPs gave their institution. Fulfilling the EP's original task of holding the High Authority and later the Commission accountable once a year would not have required the formation of party groups. Committees were also not strictly necessary, although they were helpful in competently assesses the different policy areas covered in the executive's annual report. The fact that MEPs decided as early as 1953 to establish

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[15]The Dutch former MEP Doeke Eisma recalled one controversy in the early EP: 'You cannot compare the style of making policy now and in that time. Because that was more of a nice gathering of people who would talk about the future and the problems in Europe' (Interview 11). Similar statements were made by Alain Terrenoire, who spoke of a 'club atmosphere' in the EP (Interview 8), and also in Interviews 2, 3, 12, 13 and 14.
[16]This is discussed for instance by Krumrey (2018): 128-129.

a party group and committee system is therefore a strong indication of the delegates' aim to turn their assembly into a fully fledged supranational parliament and to act as Euro-parliamentarians rather than merely national delegates.[18]

The EP's meso-level structure swiftly determined parliamentary work in all its particulars. The main factor determining the distribution of posts such as committee chairmanships and rapporteurships was the relative strength of the party groups. Nationality played some role, as an attempt was made to avoid major imbalances;[19] however, group membership was more decisive. The former Dutch Socialist Arie van der Hek, for instance, recalled an moment when he was given a committee chairmanship

> under the influence of the Germans. That was quite reasonable, because I was of the same opinion on monetary affairs [as the majority of the German delegates]. I was more or less a German [laughs]. Therefore they said: well, we can't claim this chairmanship. So we put [...] Arie there, because he has the same opinion. (Interview 15)

Given that the EP party groups and committees were based on models in the member states' national and regional parliaments, the EP's institutional structures were familiar to MEPs through their national mandates.[20] Consequently, MEPs' socialization into the EP's institutional structure and into parliamentary working procedures was generally swift and simple. The only noteworthy instance of colliding conceptions of parliamentary work unfolded in the direct aftermath of the Communities' first enlargement, with the entry of British, Irish and Danish MEPs. The British delegates, in particular, were used to a parliamentary system of openly confrontational exchanges between the executive and the legislative, whereas much of the work in the EP took place in non-public committee and party group meetings, with plenary sessions serving a mostly representative purpose. Initially, 'the British did not like this at all', according to the interviewee Arie van der Hek, 'so they always tried to put things as soon as possible to the plenary. If you have to make compromises: in the plenary! Not before!' (Interview 15) Over time, however, most of them came to appreciate the efficiency of non-public talks, notably when it came to establishing and upholding contacts with the Commission and the Council – another example of micro-level horizontal Europeanization.[21]

The effects of the first enlargement on the EP's everyday functioning show that the Europeanization processes in the early EP did not follow a one-directional development towards an ever more supranational parliament. This becomes clear when we look at the changing constellation of party groups in the EP prior to 1979, in which two instances in particular of 'negative' or de-Europeanization – or re-intensification of the relevance of MEPs' national background – stand out. First, in January 1965, the EP reduced the minimum number of MEPs required to form a party group from 17 to 14, thereby allowing a number of French parliamentarians to found an own group (European Parliament, 1958 and 1965). The resulting *Union démocratique*

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[18]This was also discussed by Murray (2004), p. 104; Haas (2004), p. 390-391.

[19]Fionnuala Richardson remembered that 'there was always a kind of pecking order in terms of nationality' (Interview 13). The interviewee Heinz Schreiber also recalled that a balance of party groups and nationalities was always pursued in the distribution of important posts (Interview 16); see also Hagger and Wing (1979): 120-121.

[20]The importance of MEPs' national-level parliamentary experience prior to 1979 is discussed, amongst others, by Forsyth (1964): 70-71.

[21]This is visible in the engagement of British MEPs in EP committees' work, as can be deduced from numerous EP minutes of debate, committee reports, drafts and working documents.

européenne had a strongly nationalist character, based on the political attitude and national background of its members – who were in the vast majority French Gaullist MEPs. Second, the British Labour and Tory MEPs entering the EP in the 1970s following the Communities' first enlargement made the EP and its party group landscape considerably more heterogeneous – and to some extent less Europeanized. The newly formed Conservative Group was heavily dominated by British delegates. The Labour delegates joined the EP's Socialist Group.[23] However, as several of them were – unlike the group's other members – rather eurosceptical upon entering, they initially increased significantly the level of controversy in the group, although many of them underwent horizontal Europeanization processes of adapting their behaviour to EP routines, and also of developing more pro-integrationist attitudes.[24]

Many MEPs – both from old and new member states – entered the EP with rather vague ideas of concrete policies and the Communities' institutional functioning. The former French Socialist MEP Jean-Pierre Cot recalled: 'When I was in the national parliament, Europe was quite far away in terms of the mechanics. I was a committed European on policies, but the mechanics I didn't know anything about'.[25] Such knowledge was swiftly acquired through the EP's parliamentary structure of party groups and committees. The swift socialization of new members into working procedures as well as into the sets of norms and ideas promoted by fellow group members – a meso-level vertical Europeanization process – is visible in the persisting intra-group unity that can be traced throughout the EP's pre-elections history (Roos, 2019). This intra-group unity is particularly noteworthy not only because the groups consisted of a wide variety of national parties, but also because they held but a fraction of the means usually held by western European national parties to enforce party group discipline. The groups' options to keep their members in line were limited to offering incentives rather than a real whip, for instance, in the distribution of parliamentary posts. As the party groups bargained over the distribution of positions such as rapporteurships and committee memberships, MEPs knew that they were more likely to get their preferred position if they played by their group's rules. The inner unity of the EP's party groups was thus – in the absence of a whip – sustained to some extent by a logic of consequentiality: MEPs could expect to attain their preferences more swiftly and easily by being good members of their respective groups. The former MEP John Corrie, for instance, recalled:

> I learned to swim with the tide. Because if you were a good European People's Party member, and I genuinely was at heart, then you got all the rapporteurships and the posts that were going. Whereas if you were a hard-line British nationalist, [and didn't] like

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[23]The delegates of the British Labour party entered the EP did not immediately follow the first enlargement of the Communities, but only after the British population had confirmed the UK's membership in a nationwide referendum on 5 June 1975 (Pollack, 2009).

[24]The interviewees Jean-Pierre Cot, Liam Kavanagh, Heinz Schreiber, Horst Seefeld and Fionnuala Richardson reported such tensions specifically among British Labour MEPs within the EP's Socialist Group (of which they were members, except Richardson, who worked for the group), but Seefeld and Richardson also recalled later adaptation processes (Interviews 1, 13, 16, 17 & 18).

[25]The interviewees John Corrie, Ole Espersen and Hans-Werner Müller also remembered that they knew little about the EP upon entering (Interviews 2, 4 & 12). Fionnuala Richardson confirmed that many delegates had little prior knowledge of the treaties and the EP's working procedures, and it was part of her task to help them get acquainted with the EP's functioning (Interview 13).

> Europe, well, then, you know, they could make it more difficult for you to get good rapporteurships.

Intra-group unity was also in the MEPs' own interest for another reason: having only limited capacities for the fulfilment of their roles as MEPs due to their double mandate, MEPs usually developed an expertise in only a few and rather narrow policy fields. Yet they wanted their group to shape Community policies on a broader bandwidth. It hence served their interests to be able to rely on party-group colleagues with an expertise in other areas, but sharing a common basis of general political preferences and ideas (Ringe, 2010, p. 34).

The logic of consequentiality to follow the own group's lines contributed hence to an intra-EP horizontal Europeanization both at the micro and macro level. It made individual MEPs adapt their behaviour so as to support their group's strength and position, while at the same time consolidating the EP's party-group structure, thus increasing its resemblance to a parliament. Most of the MEPs interviewed confirmed the existence of intra-group unity, and stated that voting lines were followed except for 'very rare' (Interview 17) occasions in which individual MEPs had the impression that national interests were being undermined. Even then, however, MEPs would usually leave the plenary during the vote, rather than vote against their group, in order to not impair the internal unity displayed by their group.[27] Such behaviour suggests a commonly accepted logic of appropriateness among MEPs in terms of intra-group behaviour.

At times, the learning processes that the MEPs underwent in the EP's group and committee system reached beyond the Community level, for instance, in the occasional transfer of EP procedures back to national parliaments. The Irish former MEP Charles McDonald recalled such a case of vertical Europeanization of domestic parliamentary procedures. He claimed in an interview with the author that he had introduced in the Irish Parliament a rule he had learnt to appreciate in the EP; namely that civil servants – advisors, researchers or officials – could join MPs in committee meetings to provide detailed background information on proposals and draft legislation (Interview 7).[28] This had previously not been allowed in the Irish Parliament.

Meso-level vertical Europeanization processes also took place via the EP's party system. By group meetings in the capitals of the member states' and collaboration within the EP, MEPs got to know their colleagues' respective national parties, as well as their European and transnational party families. The former Italian Socialist MEP Renato Ballardini, for instance, declared in an interview with the author that he considered that getting to know European social democracy was the biggest gain of his time in the EP. Before entering the EP, he (and the Italian Socialists more generally) had a rather negative image of social democratic parties in western Europe, assuming them to be too close to – and possibly financed by – capitalism. Meeting French, German and Benelux peers at Community level and on the EP Socialist Group's trips, however, led him to understand that they came from parties that represented and fought for workers' interests just like his own party, and that they shared the same ideas and 'did exactly what we did in Italy'

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[27]So recalled by Alain Terrenoire and Horst Seefeld (Interviews 1 & 8; Seefeld spoke specifically about British Labour MEPs unwilling to support certain voting lines of the EP's Socialist Group).
[28]The EP practice was confirmed in an interview with Fionnuala Richardson, who frequently joined the EP's Committee on Social Affairs as member of staff of the EP's Socialist Group (Interview 13).

(Interview 19). This learning process had a socializing – and indeed Europeanizing – effect: it induced Ballardini to identify over time primarily as a European Socialist, rather than as an Italian one.

Intensified Macro-level Europeanization through Norm Entrepreneurs
Europeanization processes in the EP were propelled by a small group of MEPs who learned to use the political tools available to them, their multilevel contacts and their increasing knowledge of procedures and policies to pursue political and institutional aims. These activist MEPs promoted norms and ideas of closer political and institutional integration and taught new delegates how to make use of the opportunities coming with their EP mandates to influence Community decision-making through their exemplary behaviour, and by involving other delegates in their activism. In particular, they advocated that of the EP should play a stronger and more parliamentary role, both by assimilating EP structures and working procedures to national parliaments, and through a strengthened involvement of the EP in Community politics. Inexperienced delegates who entered the EP with few concrete expectations were heavily influenced by such pre-eminent figures. Thus, activist MEPs in particular played an intensifying role both in the macro-level Europeanization of the EP as a whole, and in the micro-level Europeanization of their peers. Given their impact on the 'construction of cognitive frames' in the EP, this small group of activist MEPs can be considered *norm entrepreneurs* within the EP, that is, 'agents having strong notions about appropriate behavior in their Community' who were 'critical for norm emergence because they call[ed] attention to issues or even 'create[d]' issues' through the verbalization and dramatization of their aims (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 896-897).

MEPs in the role of norm entrepreneurs faced no major obstacles in convincing their peers to join their activism: to dominantly pro-European delegates, the idea of more EP parliamentary powers seemed entirely appropriate. Although the normative claims for more legitimacy through an empowerment of the EP had no direct Treaty basis,[29] these norm entrepreneurs could refer to the norm of parliamentary legitimacy that was generally accepted at the national level, facilitating the establishment of similar institutional norms at the Community level.[30] Horizontal macro-level Europeanization happened in this regard through the transfer of norms that were well established at the national level to the supranational institutional system.

It might be assumed that MEPs' socialization into the EP under the influence of norm entrepreneurs' activism was constrained by the delegates' double mandate, considering that national parties might have expected their delegates to act in certain ways, or represent certain positions at Community level. On the contrary, however, the EP offered fertile ground for norm entrepreneurs to influence the socialization of MEPs. Firstly, the pressure of control by the MEPs' national parties was weak, because the

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[29]As pointed out, for instance, by the British Labour MEPs Lord Donald Bruce of Donington and John Leslie Prescott during the plenary debate on 6 July 1977 with regard to the EP's upcoming first direct elections (European Parliament, 1977, p. 163 & 173).
[30]This confirms the findings by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 908) that norm entrepreneurs are able to establish new normative claims more easily if they can able to refer to existing norms.

interest in EP activities of most of the MEPs' national colleagues was low to non-existent.[31] Consequently, MEPs adjusted their actions mostly to the logics of appropriateness and consequentiality determined by the EP's party groups and committees and by their own consciences. Secondly, control by the MEPs' electorates as well as their national and regional media was similarly weak. Unless the MEPs themselves approached them on their own initiative, it was unlikely that either their constituents or the media would show particular interest in what they were doing.[32] Based on these two preconditions, MEPs prior to 1979 could afford to focus on the desired outcomes of their EP activism not only in the short, but also in the mid-term and long term. Given that they were not re-elected based on their Community-level activities, delegates did not have to focus on the next national elections and the attractiveness of their actions in the EP for their electorate, but could pursue aims that they knew might take years to achieve, and even longer to be publicly noticed – that is, until the EP's first direct elections in 1979.

Conclusion

In 1966, a report by the EP's Committee on Political Affairs stated that 'the position and the influence of the European Parliament depends to a large extent on itself'(Committee on Political Affairs, 1966, p. 11).[33] This quote aptly summarizes the self-perceptions of MEPs prior to the EP's first direct elections, as well as their resulting activism, which aimed at turning the EP from an assembly with limited consultative and control powers into a supranational parliament. Based on the point of view that it was up to them to try and develop the role for their institution they thought it deserved, MEPs acted like Euro-parliamentarians rather than as delegates of national parliaments. This article has analysed the impact of MEPs' behaviour on the EP's institutional development through the lens of Europeanization. It has traced both vertical and horizontal Europeanization processes in the EP at different levels: the article sheds light on MEPs' individual actions and their socialization within the EP (at the micro level), on the formation, functioning and relevance of party groups and committees within the EP (at the meso level), and on the gradual parliamentarization of the EP as a whole through such micro and meso-level processes (at the macro level).

The conceptualization of these processes was facilitated by applying analytical tools from sociological and rational choice institutionalism within the broader theoretical framework of Europeanization. Drawing notably on the concepts of logics of appropriateness and consequentiality, and tracing the impact of norms (promoted by a group of norm entrepreneurs), ideas and interests, institutionalization processes in the early EP could be identified and explained. Given that there was no electoral pressure for MEPs to achieve presentable results in the short term, they could afford to pursue long-term institutional and political aims. The achievement of these aims was facilitated through

[31]This was stated in Interviews 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, 17 & 19. Georges Clerfayt, Doeke Eisma, Lothar Ibrügger and Heinz Schreiber reported at least some interest of their national party colleagues in their work at Community level (Interviews 6, 11, 16 & 20).
[32]Arnaldo Ferragni emphasized that the EP's gradual empowerment prior to 1979 'took place without pressure from public opinion or the media, which at the time – as today – did not have the Community institutions on their list of priorities' (Interview 5).
[33]Translated by the author.

the relative unity among MEPs with regard to their shared norms and ideas of European political and institutional integration more generally, but also through MEPs' individual interests with regard to work efficiency and political impact within the EP, as this article has discussed. Such agreement on logics of appropriateness and consequentiality regarding their behaviour in the EP helped MEPs to successfully contest Treaty-given rules and procedures delimiting the EP's role, and thus expand this role beyond Treaty paragraphs.

The present analysis has been limited to the study of internal processes in the EP, especially of the everyday working procedures, MEPs' behaviour and their underlying ideas and interests. In this focus lies one of the article's main contributions to the literature on the institutional development of the EP prior to 1979, which has so far mostly examined the EP's formal gains in power through Treaty changes, and its relations to – and dependence on – other Community institutions and national governments. This article sought to show, however, that the remarkable evolution of the EP's powers, its role in and influence on Community policy-making cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration the role played by the individual delegates and the importance of evolving everyday working procedures.

The article thus confirms that previous findings in the literature on the EP concerning the impact of micro, meso and macro-level processes on the parliament's empowerment after 1979 (Daniel, 2015; Hix *et al.*, 2003; Ringe, 2010) apply similarly to the period prior to 1979. The analysis above has demonstrated that many of these processes – such as voting behaviour, the distribution of posts, or the dominance of certain policy and polity-related norms and ideas of the EP's role and closer integration – have their roots in the EP's very beginnings as a part-time assembly, rather than emerging only at the point when an EP mandate became a full-time job. The behaviour of delegated MEPs prior to 1979 differed from that of directly elected MEPs post-1979 to the extent that the latter had far more resources – in terms of time, staff and finances – at hand, and did not have to justify the time they spent at the European level before constituents and national party colleagues to the same extent as delegates prior to 1979. General patterns of MEP activism, however, show remarkable continuity.

The EP's transition into the supranational parliament it is today arguably depended to a significant extent on the early MEPs' efforts to make their institution look and operate much like a typical legislature. Later generations of MEPs learned from the strategic behaviour of the early MEPs – amongst others, through their socialization into previously established parliamentary procedures, and through the exemplary activism of MEPs who had been delegated to the EP prior to 1979, and became elected members thereafter. Not only did such behaviour increase the efficiency of EP working procedures; it was also conducive to convincing member state governments incrementally to provide the EP with more and more parliamentary powers. After all, only a parliament was considered to have the power to provide democratic legitimacy to Community politics (Rittberger, 2005). Such parliamentarization and empowerment processes built – and build – on patterns of institutional procedures developed early on in the EP's history, which show strong similarities in the pre and post-1979 period. Hence, the findings of this article are highly relevant for a general understanding of the Communities' shifting balance of powers, which has shaped the EU's institutional landscape until today.

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Annex 1: Interviews

Name	Date and place interview	National party	EP party group	MEP or EP staff member
Renato Ballardini	Riva del Garda, 17 Jan 2017	Partito Socialista, Italy	SG	1969–74
Georges Clerfayt	Phone interview, 12 July 2017	Front démocratique francophone, Belgium	NA	1975–77
John Alexander Corrie	Phone interview, 21 Sept 2016	Conservative and Unionist Party, Scotland	ConG	1975, 1977–79, 1994–2004
Jean-Pierre Cot	Hamburg, 25 Sept 2017	Parti socialiste, France	SG	1978–79, 1984–99
Karen Marie Dahlerup	Copenhagen, 1 April 2017	Socialdemokratiet, Denmark	SG	1977–79, 1979–80
Doeke Eisma	Phone interviews, 21 and 27 Oct2016	Democraten 66, the Netherlands	SG	1973–74, 1981–84, 1994–99
Maarten Engwirda	Phone interview, 12 May 2017	Democraten 66, the Netherlands	NA	1971–73
Ole Espersen	Phone interviews, 1 June 2017	Socialdemokratiet, Denmark	SG	1974–77
Arnaldo Ferragni	Series of e-mails, March 2018	-	CDG	1960–72
Colette Flesch	Luxembourg-Ville, 13 Oct 2016	Demokratesch Partei, Luxembourg	LAG	1969–79, 1979–80, 1984–85, 1989–90, 1999–2004
Lothar Ibrügger	Brussels, 18 Feb 2017	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Germany	SG	1978–79
Liam Kavanagh	Phone interview, 2 Sept 2016	Labour Party, UK	SG	1973–79, 1979–81
Astrid Lulling	Schifflange, 30 Sept 2015	Sozialistesch Aarbechterpartei, then Sozialdemokratische Partei, then Chrëstlech-Sozial Volkspartei, Luxembourg	SG	1965–74, 1989–2014
Charles McDonald	Dublin, 14 Feb 2017	Fine Gael, Ireland	CDG	1973–79
Hans Werner-Müller	Wadern, 12 June 2017	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, Germany	CDG	1977–79
Fionnuala Richardson		-	SG	1974–88

(Continued)

Name	Date and place interview	National party	EP party group	MEP or EP staff member
	Dublin, 14 Feb 2017			
Jacques Santer	Luxembourg-Ville, 12 Sept 2016	Chrëstlech-Sozial Vollekspartei, Luxembourg	CDG	1974–79, 1979, 1999–2004
Heinz Schreiber	Phone interviews, 27 and 28 June and 11 Aug 2017	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Germany	SG	1977–79, 1984–89
Horst Seefeld	Series of phone interviews and e-mails, Feb–Oct 2017	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Germany	SG	1970–9, 1979–89
Vera Squarcialupi	Milan, 18 Jan 2017	non-affiliated, Italy	ComG	1976–79, 1979–89
Dick Taverne	London, 10 Nov 2016	Labour Party, then Social Democratic Party, then Liberal Party, UK	NA	1973–74
Alain Terrenoire	Paris, 20 Jun 2017	Union des Démocrates pour la République, France	EPDG	1973–78
Arie van der Hek	Phone interview, 19 Oct 2016	Partij van de Arbeid, the Netherlands	SG	1973–77
Werner Zywietz	Phone interview, 21 Sept 2016	Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands, Germany	LAG	1977–79

CDG, Christian Democratic group; ComG, Communist group; ConG, Conservative group; EP, European Parliament; EPDG, European Progressive Democratic group; LAG, Liberals & Allies group; MEP, member of the European Parliament; NA, non-affiliated; SG, Socialist group

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Interview 2: Ole Espersen (Danish MEP 1974-77, Socialist Group), phone interviews (1 June2017).

Interview 3: Maarten Engwirda (Dutch MEP 1971-73, non-affiliated), phone interview (12 May 2017).

Interview 4: Hans-Werner Müller (German MEP 1977-79, Christian Democratic Group), Wadern (12 June 2017).

Interview 5: Arnaldo Ferragni (Italian member of staff 1960-72, from 1966 Secretary-General, Christian Democratic Group), series of e-mails (March 2018).

Interview 6: Lothar Ibrügger (German MEP 1978-79, Socialist Group), Brussels (18 Feb 2017).

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Interview 8: Alain Terrenoire (French MEP 1973-78, European Progressive Democratic Group), Paris (20 June 2017).

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Interview 10: Vera Squarcialupi (Italian MEP 1976-79 and 1979-89, Communist Group), Milan (18 Jan 2017).

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Interview 15: Arie van der Hek (Dutch MEP 1973-77, Socialist Group), phone interview (19 Oct 2016).

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Interview 17: Jean-Pierre Cot (French MEP 1978-79 and 1984-99, Socialist Group), Hamburg (25 Sept 2017).

Interview 18: Liam Kavanagh (Irish MEP 1973-79 and 1979-81, Socialist Group), Skype interview (2 Sept 2016).

Interview 19: Renato Ballardini (Italian MEP 1969-74, Socialist Group), Riva del Garda (17 Jan 2017).

Interview 20: Georges Clerfayt (Belgian MEP 1975-77, non-affiliated), phone interview (12 July 2017)