

## An Antinomy for *de re* Belief

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*Abstract:* This paper presents a logical derivation, from apparently undeniable premises, of a logical contradiction for *de re* belief – not merely a description of logical irrationality for it. It also presents a way out of this antinomic situation, a way that does not amount to denying the meaningfulness of sentences that express *de re* beliefs. However, the effectiveness of the favored *way out* is put into question, and the possibility of there being true contradictions looms large. The ideas presented in this paper refer to problems broached by S. Kripke and W. V. Quine decades ago. The literature addressing those problems is vast. The present paper sets the literature aside (except for Quine and Kripke) and takes a fresh view.

How can it be secured that a sentence expresses a *de re* belief about a particular item,  $\tau$ ? This cannot be secured by a sentence of the form  $B(N, A[\tau])$  – “N believes that  $A[\tau]$ ” – nor even by a sentence of the form  $B(N, \exists x[x = \tau \ \& \ A[x]])$ , where “ $\exists$ ” stands for proper – for “ontically existential” – existential quantification; for the beliefs expressed by such sentences may not be specifically directed at the particular item  $\tau$ . It is quite otherwise (i) for beliefs expressed by sentences of the form  $\exists x B(N, x = \tau \ \& \ A[x])$ , and (ii) for beliefs expressed by sentences of the form  $\exists x[x = \tau \ \& \ B(N, A[x])]$ , and (iii) for beliefs expressed by sentences of the form  $\exists x[x = \tau \ \& \ B(N, x = \tau \ \& \ A[x])]$ .

However, the three indicated linguistic forms of *de re* belief about a particular item  $\tau$  – (i), (ii), and (iii) – are not logically equivalent. Let us call the *de re* beliefs that have the form (i) “*subjectively*  $\tau$ -targeting beliefs”, the *de re* beliefs that have the form (ii) “*objectively*  $\tau$ -targeting beliefs”, and the *de re* beliefs that have the form (iii) “*objectively-cum-subjectively*  $\tau$ -targeting beliefs”. It is easily seen that every *objectively-cum-subjectively*  $\tau$ -targeting belief is both an *objectively*  $\tau$ -targeting and a *subjectively*  $\tau$ -targeting belief (of the same subject N, with the same content  $A[x]$ ). The converse, however, is not true: a belief (of the subject N, with the content  $A[x]$ ) may be both *objectively*  $\tau$ -targeting and *subjectively*  $\tau$ -targeting without being *objectively-cum-subjectively*  $\tau$ -targeting. Consider: Jill believes of somebody (namely, Jack) that he is Joe and nice [Joe is being *subjectively* targeted]; Jill also believes of somebody who in fact is Joe that he is nice [Joe is being *objectively* targeted]; but Jill believes of no one who is Joe that he is Joe and nice [Joe is *not* being *objectively-cum-*

subjectively targeted]. That a subjectively  $\tau$ -targeting belief need not be an objectively  $\tau$ -targeting belief is shown by the following example: Jodie (like Jill) believes of somebody (namely, Jack) that he is Joe and nice [Joe is being subjectively targeted]; but (unlike Jill) Jodie does not believe of anybody who in fact is Joe that he is nice [Joe is *not* being objectively targeted]. Finally, that an objectively  $\tau$ -targeting belief need not be a subjectively  $\tau$ -targeting belief is shown by the following example: Jenny (like Jill) believes of somebody who is Joe that he is nice [Joe is being objectively targeted]; but (unlike Jill) Jenny does not believe of anybody that he is Joe and nice [Joe is *not* being subjectively targeted].

In what follows, the employed concept of *de re* belief is the concept of *objectively*  $\tau$ -targeting belief. Suppose, then, Ralph sees the man with the brown hat and pointing to him (from afar) sincerely asserts: „I believe this man to be a spy.“ We may therefore put down: „Ralph believes of [i.e., *objectively* of] the man with the brown hat that he is a spy“, or in logical terms:

1.  $\exists x[x = \text{the man with the brown hat} \ \& \ B(\text{Ralph}, x \text{ is a spy})]$ .

Later Ralph sees a man on the beach, Ortcutt,<sup>1</sup> and pointing to him (again from afar) sincerely asserts: „About this man, Ortcutt, I have no opinion regarding his being a spy or not.“ We may therefore put down: „Ralph does not believe of [i.e., *objectively* of] Ortcutt that he is a spy“, or in logical terms:

2.  $\exists y[y = \text{Ortcutt} \ \& \ \text{not } B(\text{Ralph}, y \text{ is a spy})]$ .

In fact (but unbeknownst to Ralph), the man with the brown hat is Ortcutt, or in other words:

3. Ortcutt = the man with the brown hat.

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<sup>1</sup> The names “Ralph” and “Ortcutt” and the general situation are from Quine 2004; the logically relevant set-up, however, is quite different from the one in Quine 2004.

We therefore obtain from 1. and 3. (by unproblematic substitution of identicals: the substitution – it must be emphasized – is *not* into an intensional or hyperintensional or otherwise referentially opaque context):

4.  $\exists x[x = \text{Ortcutt} \ \& \ B(\text{Ralph}, x \text{ is a spy})]$ .

Putting 2. and 4. together (and reordering) we get:

5.  $\exists x \exists y[x = \text{Ortcutt} \ \& \ y = \text{Ortcutt} \ \& \ B(\text{Ralph}, x \text{ is a spy}) \ \& \ \text{not } B(\text{Ralph}, y \text{ is a spy})]$ .

And therefore (by the principle that what is identical to a third is also identical to each other):

6.  $\exists x \exists y[x = y \ \& \ B(\text{Ralph}, x \text{ is a spy}) \ \& \ \text{not } B(\text{Ralph}, y \text{ is a spy})]$ .

And therefore (by the appropriate instance of  $\forall x \forall y(x = y \ \& \ A[y] \supset A[x])^2$  and by appropriate shortening):

7.  $\exists x[B(\text{Ralph}, x \text{ is a spy}) \ \& \ \text{not } B(\text{Ralph}, x \text{ is a spy})]$ .

Now, 7. does not ascribe contradictory beliefs to Ralph (as are ascribed to Pierre in Kripke's "A Puzzle about Belief"<sup>3</sup>); rather, it states a straightforward *contradiction*, a contradiction of the form  $\exists x[A[x] \ \& \ \text{not } A[x]]$ . If we do not want to acquiesce in their being true contradictions, something that was made use of in the above derivation has to be dropped. What is it? It is hard to say; for each of the logical tools used for obtaining, from the given premises,

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<sup>2</sup> In order to remove any misunderstanding: "&" (conjunction) is here taken to bind stronger than "⊃" (material implication); this convention saves brackets. And what is "the appropriate instance of  $\forall x \forall y(x = y \ \& \ A[y] \supset A[x])$ "? It is this:  $\forall x \forall y(x = y \ \& \ \text{not } B(\text{Ralph}, y \text{ is a spy}) \supset \text{not } B(\text{Ralph}, x \text{ is a spy}))$ .

<sup>3</sup> See Kripke 2011, 145. It is true that Kripke also manages to conclude a contradiction (ibid., 146), and not merely a conjunction of belief-sentences with identical belief-subject and contradictory belief-contents. But *here*, in the present paper, the contradiction is derived *explicitly* for *de re* belief, and – in contrast to Kripke's paper – it is derived quite without using "the strengthened disquotational principle" (ibid., 138: "A normal English speaker who is not reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to 'p' if and only if he believes that p") and quite without using "the disquotational principle" itself (ibid., 137: "If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to 'p', then he believes that p").

the contradiction in 7. appears to be utterly unproblematic, and the premises themselves appear to be quite unobjectionable, describing a situation that is familiar enough to us.

The first idea that comes to mind, as a possible way out, is that the belief ascribed to Ralph in 1. and the nonbelief ascribed to Ralph in 2. are simply *not simultaneous* – and therefore, there is no contradiction between them. But ask Ralph, on the very occasion of his seeing Orcutt on the beach and stating his agnosticism (regarding spyhood) about him, what he thinks about the man with the brown hat. Ralph answers: „I believe that man to be a spy.“ In other words, Ralph *permanently* believes of the man with the brown hat that he is a spy, hence also at time  $t_0$ , when he sees Orcutt on the beach and states his agnosticism about him.

The second idea that comes to mind, as a possible way out, is that it is not true that Ralph believes of the man with the brown hat that he is a spy, and that it is also not true that Ralph does not believe of Orcutt that he is a spy. All that is true is that Ralph believes of the man with the brown hat//*under the guise 'man with the brown hat'* that he is a spy, and that Ralph does not believe of Orcutt//*under the guise 'Orcutt on the beach'* that he is a spy. The final outcome is, therefore, *not* the contradiction “ $\exists x[B(\text{Ralph}, x \text{ is a spy}) \ \& \ \text{not } B(\text{Ralph}, x \text{ is a spy})]$ ”; the final outcome is merely the non-contradiction “ $\exists x[B(\text{Ralph}, x//\textit{under the guise 'man with the brown hat' is a spy}) \ \& \ \text{not } B(\text{Ralph}, x//\textit{under the guise 'Orcutt on the beach' is a spy})]$ ”.

It might seem that a problem with this approach is this: “Ralph believes [at  $t_0$ ] of the man with the brown hat//*under the guise 'man with the brown hat'* that he is a spy” certainly appears to entail “Ralph *simpliciter* believes [at  $t_0$ ] of the man with the brown hat that he is a spy”; and “Ralph does not believe [at  $t_0$ ] of Orcutt//*under the guise 'Orcutt on the beach'* that he is a spy” certainly appears to entail “Ralph *simpliciter* does not believe [at  $t_0$ ] of Orcutt that he is a spy”. But appearances deceive here. For what does it mean that Ralph *simpliciter* believes of the man with the brown hat that he is a spy? It can only mean: he believes so *under every guise* of that man.<sup>4</sup> But then, of course, “Ralph believes [at  $t_0$ ] of the

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<sup>4</sup> What is meant by “under every guise [of the object of belief for the subject of belief]” is *relative* to the situational context, comprising past and present of the object of belief in its appearances to the subject of belief. Note that in certain situational contexts belief-under-every-guise is virtually impossible. This is true even if the object of belief is perfectly familiar to the subject of belief: Make up and dress someone’s wife skillfully in an outlandish way to the point of rendering her unrecognizable to her husband at any distance that is not the shortest distance, and he will not believe of his wife//*under that (dis)guise* that he ever met her before (rather, he will believe of her//*under that (dis)guise* that he *never* met her before – which, of course, he does not believe of her//*under other guises*).

man with the brown hat//under the guise ‘man with the brown hat’ that he is a spy” does not entail “Ralph *simpliciter* believes [at  $t_0$ ] of the man with the brown hat that he is a spy”. Correspondingly, “*simpliciter* does not believe of [the object of disbelief] ” must be understood to mean “does not believe *under any guise* of [the object of disbelief]” – and then “Ralph does not believe [at  $t_0$ ] of Ortcutt//under the guise ‘Ortcutt on the beach’ that he is a spy” does not entail “Ralph *simpliciter* does not believe [at  $t_0$ ] of Ortcutt that he is a spy” (for “Ralph does not believe [at  $t_0$ ] of Ortcutt//under the guise ‘Ortcutt on the beach’ that he is a spy” does not entail “Ralph does not believe [at  $t_0$ ] of Ortcutt//under any guise that he is a spy”).

It seems to me that all further ideas one might have with the aim of solving the problem presented by the deduction 1. – 7. above will offer a rather more unattractive solution than the second idea just put forward. For, should we follow W. V. Quine after all and consider quantification into belief-contexts – and therefore *de re* belief – to be meaningless?<sup>5</sup> Or should we repudiate Leibniz’s Law even in its fully quantified (or: *de re*) first-order formulation: should we repudiate  $\forall x\forall y(x = y \ \& \ A[y] \supset A[x])$ ?<sup>6</sup> I say “no” to both these suggestions.

It remains to (begin to) examine the logic of the expression “N believes of  $\tau$ //under the guise  $D$  that it [or: he, she; “it” will be used as a stand-in also for the latter pronouns] is  $F$ ”. The most important observation is that the locution “under the guise  $D$ ” expresses primarily a qualification of  $N$ ’s *belief* about  $\tau$ , not of  $\tau$  itself. The employed singular term for  $\tau$  may contain a purely objective description (namely, if that singular term is a, so-called, “definite description”), and that description may be used again in the phrase “under the guise  $D$ ” (for example, (a) “the man with the brown hat” – (b) “under the guise ‘man with the brown hat’”);<sup>7</sup> but in this second use, the description does no longer have the function of purely objective characterization. The usefulness of the relativizing expression “under the guise  $D$ ” for solving the belief-antinomy under consideration derives, of course, from the fact that “N believes of  $\tau$ //under the guise  $D_1$  that it is  $F$ ” need not contradict “N does not believe of

<sup>5</sup> See Quine 2004.

<sup>6</sup>  $\forall x\forall y(x = y \ \& \ A[y] \supset A[x])$  is used in the final step of the derivation of the contradiction “ $\exists x[B(\text{Ralph}, x \text{ is a spy}) \ \& \ \text{not } B(\text{Ralph}, x \text{ is a spy})]$ ”. Note that *no* substitution of a singular term for another singular term (and *no* substitution of a singular term for a bound variable) is involved in that use. Thus, describing the step from 6. to 7. as “involving a substitution of identicals” is, strictly speaking, *incorrect*, given the usual acceptance of the expression “substitution of identicals”.

<sup>7</sup> “Under the guise  $D$ ” is, in this context, a better locution than “under the *description*  $D$ ”; for  $D$  need not be conceptualized in  $N$ ’s mind, let alone be verbalized by  $N$  (after all,  $N$  may be a nonhuman animal). My use of “guise” here has much to do with one of the dictionary definitions of this word (“outward aspect; semblance”) – and nothing with Castañeda’s *guise theory*.

$\tau$ //under the guise  $D_2$  that it is F” – given that  $D_1$  and  $D_2$  are different guises. Thus, Ralph believes of Ortcutt (that is, of the man with the brown hat)//under the guise ‘man with the brown hat’ that he is a spy; but it is also true (without contradiction) that Ralph does not believe of Ortcutt//under the guise ‘Ortcutt on the beach’ that he is a spy.

Unsurprisingly, the relativized locution “N believes of  $\tau$ //under the guise  $D$  that it is F/not F” is helpful also for solving Kripke’s puzzle about belief (cf. footnote 3). The gist of the solution of that puzzle for *de re* belief – the solution here advocated – is that Pierre believes of London//under the guise ‘pretty from point of view I’ that it is beautiful; and that Pierre believes of London//under the guise ‘ugly from point of view II’ that it is not pretty. This would constitute a (content-)contradictory *de re* believing on the part of Pierre, if “N believes of  $\tau$ //under the guise  $D$  that it is F/not F” entailed “N *simpliciter* believes of  $\tau$  that it is F/not F”; for then we would have: Pierre believes of London that it is pretty, and Pierre believes [*in the same sense*] of London that it is not pretty. However, there is no such entailment, since we have:

(A)

“N *simpliciter* believes of  $\tau$  that it is F/not F” means as much as “N believes of  $\tau$ //under every guise that it is F/not F”.<sup>8</sup>

Above – *not* in Pierre’s, but in Ralph’s case – the following was made use of:

(B)

“N *simpliciter* does not believe of  $\tau$  that it is F/not F” means as much as “N does not believe of  $\tau$ //under any guise that it is F/not F”.

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<sup>8</sup> There is, of course, a significant difference in meaning between “believes that not” and “does not believe that”, even though ordinary language tends to gloss it over. The meaning-difference can be strikingly illustrated: “N believes of  $\tau$  that A[ $\tau$ ], and N believes [*in the same sense!*] of  $\tau$  that not-A[ $\tau$ ]” is *not* a contradiction and can be true: it is descriptive of contradictory *de re* believing on the part of N – of which believing there are instances, we may be sure, though Pierre’s beliefs about London do not constitute such an instance *after all*. On the other hand, “N believes of  $\tau$  that A[ $\tau$ ], and N does not believe [*in the same sense!*] of  $\tau$  that A[ $\tau$ ]” is a contradiction and must be false (*presupposing* classical logic, which, understandably, one is reluctant to discard); consequently, considerations which seem to demonstrate the truth of such a contradiction (like the considerations leading to 4. and 2. in the deduction 1.–7.) must be defective in some way.

It is evident from the two meaning-analyses offered (and important to stay aware of the fact) that “N *simpliciter* does not believe of  $\tau$  ...” means *something else* than “It is not the case that N *simpliciter* believes of  $\tau$  ...” or, in other words, “N does not *simpliciter* believe of  $\tau$  ...”. A sentence of the form “N *simpliciter* believes of  $\tau$  that it is F” and a sentence of the form “N *simpliciter* does not believe of  $\tau$  that it is F” may both be *false* (as, in fact, we have seen in Ralph’s case), whereas the two sentences “N *simpliciter* believes of  $\tau$  that it is F” and “It is not the case that N *simpliciter* believes of  $\tau$  that it is F” *cannot* both be false (since they are contradictories of each other). Clearly, for the latter pair of sentences, analysis (A) is quite sufficient, but for the former pair, analysis (A) *and* analysis (B) are needed.<sup>9</sup>

It is a phenomenological fact of human consciousness that *in our own case* we human beings often (though not unfailingly) unreflectedly, automatically, “unconsciously” infer “*simpliciter* believe of  $\tau$  that it is F/not F” from “believe of  $\tau$ //under the guise D that it is F/not F”, and “*simpliciter* do not believe of  $\tau$  that it is F/not F” from “do not believe of  $\tau$ //under the guise D’ that it is F/not F”. (Indeed, it would be more appropriate here to say “... is inferred *in us* from ...” than “we infer ... from ...”.) Normally, our nonreasoning use of the described peculiar form of deductively nonvalid – on analysis, *broadly inductive* – inference has no unfortunate consequences. But sometimes it does have such consequences: (I) if one of us believes of  $\tau$ //under the guise D that it is F, and of  $\tau$ ’//under the guise D’ that it is not F – in spite of the fact that  $\tau$ ’ happens to be identical with  $\tau$ ; *or worse*: (II) if one of us believes of  $\tau$ //under the guise D that it is F, and does not believe of  $\tau$ ’//under the guise D’ that it is F – in spite of the fact that  $\tau$ ’ happens to be identical with  $\tau$ .

Now, it seems that these consequences are *somewhat unfortunate*, but, after all, due to *simple error*: nothing to worry about in a philosophically deep way; in fact, we may be sure that neither Pierre nor Ralph, even if they happen to be philosophers,<sup>10</sup> will be much shaken when they discover where they went wrong; they will simply move on to consistency

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<sup>9</sup> Some readers may want a completely explicit logical analysis. Here it is (implicitly referring to some fixed time-point):

N *simpliciter* believes of  $\tau$  that it is F/not F =<sub>Def</sub>  $\forall D$ (D is a guise of  $\tau$  for N  $\supset$  N believes of  $\tau$ //under D that  $\tau$  is F/not F) =<sub>Def</sub>  $\forall D$ (D is a guise of  $\tau$  for N  $\supset$   $\exists x$ [ $x = \tau$  & B(N,  $x$ //under D is F/not F)]).

N *simpliciter* does not believe of  $\tau$  that it is F/not F =<sub>Def</sub>  $\forall D$ (D is a guise of  $\tau$  for N  $\supset$  N does not believe of  $\tau$ //under D that  $\tau$  is F/not F) =<sub>Def</sub>  $\forall D$ (D is a guise of  $\tau$  for N  $\supset$   $\exists y$ [ $y = \tau$  & not B(N,  $y$ //under D is F/not F)]).

And accordingly:

N does not *simpliciter* believe of  $\tau$  that it is F/not F  $\leftrightarrow$   $\exists D$ (D is a guise of  $\tau$  for N & N does not believe of  $\tau$ //under D that  $\tau$  is F/not F)  $\leftrightarrow$   $\exists D$ (D is a guise of  $\tau$  for N &  $\forall x$ [ $x = \tau \supset$  not B(N,  $x$ //under D is F/not F)])  $\leftrightarrow$   $\exists D$ (D is a guise of  $\tau$  for N &  $\exists x$ [ $x = \tau$  & not B(N,  $x$ //under D is F/not F)]).

<sup>10</sup> In fact, Pierre “is a leading philosopher and logician” (says Kripke 2011, 145).

in their respective belief-systems.<sup>11</sup> Yet, there are open questions: The notion of *guise*, as here employed, certainly needs further analysis. And there is one big question: Even though Ralph is making a mistake, is he not – due to that mistake – at a certain time *simpliciter* believing of a certain person – Orcutt – that he is a spy *and simpliciter* not believing of that same person that he is a spy? Is there, therefore, not a contradiction in the world *which is true* after all?

Indeed, this *seems* to be the case. But we have to keep in mind that the logical conflict between “Ralph *simpliciter* believes of Orcutt that he is a spy” and “Ralph *simpliciter* does not believe of Orcutt that he is a spy” is not the same logical conflict as the logical conflict between “Ralph *simpliciter* believes of Orcutt that he is a spy” and “Ralph does not *simpliciter* believe of Orcutt that he is a spy” (as was, in a general way, already pointed out above). The conjunction of the latter pair of sentences is a contradiction properly speaking (if referred to the same point in time): it is a *contradiction<sub>1</sub>*; under classical logic, its two conjuncts cannot both be true and cannot both be false. The conjunction of the former pair of sentences is only a *conditional contrariety*: under classical logic *and a certain condition* (see footnote 12), its two conjuncts cannot both be true, but they can both be false. That conjunction is a conditional contrariety that masquerades as a contradiction<sub>1</sub>: it is a *contradiction<sub>2</sub>*. (Note that neither conjunction is a matter of Ralph having *contradictory(-in-content) beliefs* about Orcutt; Ralph having contradictory beliefs about Orcutt would be a different story – a story structurally similar to Pierre’s.)

Thus, if the above considerations show that there is a contradiction which is true, then this contradiction is, after all, only a contradiction<sub>2</sub>. And *yes*, it is a contradiction – *of sorts* – which is true regarding the “inner realm”, not regarding the “outer realm”: Orcutt is not both a spy and not a spy, it is just that Ralph – at a time before recognizing his error – *simpliciter* believes of Orcutt that he is a spy and *simpliciter* does not believe of Orcutt that he is a spy. Still, although the matter concerns the “inner realm” (the realm of the mind), we have here a logically objective contrariety (though not a contradiction<sub>1</sub>), a conditional contrariety whose condition is fulfilled – for, no doubt, there are guises of Orcutt for Ralph<sup>12</sup> –

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<sup>11</sup> They will do so without discarding (they will not even think about discarding) the deductively nonvalid *generalizing* way of inference which is in part responsible for their error – and rationally so. After all, the deductively nonvalid generalizing way of inference called “scientific induction” is also not discarded – and rationally so – *despite* countless counterexamples (consisting in true premises followed by a false conclusion).

<sup>12</sup> That there is at least one guise of Orcutt for Ralph is *the condition* of the *conditional contrariety* under consideration, as can easily be gathered from footnote 9. Conditional contraries are something very familiar. For



and which therefore (its condition being fulfilled) ought not to be true (that is, its two conjuncts ought not to be true together) but is found to be *true* nonetheless (or so it seems).

Is this a reason for abandoning classical logic? Conditional contrarieties *whose condition is fulfilled* and which, nonetheless, are true would certainly be as bad news for classical logic as would be contradictions<sub>1</sub> that are true. Disconcertingly, *de re* belief-and-nonbelief conjunctions (their two conjuncts – the positive conjunct and the negative – concerning the same time, the same subject [of belief], the same object, the same content) seem not uncommon, they usually being triggered by the subject’s unawareness of an obtaining identity (as in Ralph’s case). It is, for example, common enough (presumably) that somebody believes that Cicero is a famous Roman author but does not believe that Tully is a famous Roman author. Will not some of these numerous cases be also describable as cases where somebody *simpliciter* believes of Cicero [objectively targeting Cicero] that he is a famous Roman author, and *simpliciter* does not believe of Tully [objectively targeting Tully, that is: Cicero] that he is a famous Roman author?

Consider, finally, a famous example where a *de re* belief-and-nonbelief conjunction is *not* triggered by the subject’s unawareness of an obtaining identity. We can be sure that Frege (like most of us) never ever believed of the number 1 that it is self-different. And yet it may well have been the case that, when he had received Russell’s letter – the *famous* letter – and was perusing it, there came the moment,  $t_0$ , when he realized that he had been believing and was *now* (oh, the horror of this realization!) still believing of the number 1 that it is self-different – while, of course, all the time *not* believing of the number 1 that it is self-different.<sup>13</sup> Thus, we have:

$\exists x[x = 1 \ \& \ B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, x \neq x)] \ \& \ \exists y[y = 1 \ \& \ \text{not } B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, y \neq y)]$ , hence

$\exists x \exists y[x = 1 \ \& \ y = 1 \ \& \ B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, x \neq x) \ \& \ \text{not } B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, y \neq y)]$ , hence

$\exists x \exists y[x = y \ \& \ B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, x \neq x) \ \& \ \text{not } B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, y \neq y)]$ , hence

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example, “Every unicorn exists, and every unicorn does not exist” is a conditional contrariety, its condition being “Something is a unicorn”.

<sup>13</sup> Frege’s logicist system of arithmetic was inconsistent, hence entailed (due to the classical logic Frege was using) “ $1 \neq 1$ ”. And Frege had trusted his system completely, without reservations, hence had accepted *all* of its (classical) logical consequences. He, therefore, had been believing that  $1 \neq 1$  – *implicitly*; and at  $t_0$  this believing may – likely enough – have turned *explicit* for a moment (before ending forever):  $B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, 1 \neq 1)$ , that is (if, like Frege, one is a realist about numbers),  $\exists x[x = 1 \ \& \ B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, x \neq x)]$  – *alongside* the truth of  $\exists y[y = 1 \ \& \ \text{not } B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, y \neq y)]$ .

$\exists x[B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, x \neq x) \ \& \ \text{not } B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, x \neq x)]$ , which is a contradiction – and apparently a true one.

There is a *way out*, one suggested by what has been said in this paper antecedently to this (second) deduction of an ostensible straight contradiction from ostensibly true premises, namely the following: One is not entitled to assume the truth of “ $\exists x[x = 1 \ \& \ B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, x \neq x)]$ ” and of “ $\exists y[y = 1 \ \& \ \text{not } B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, y \neq y)]$ ”; one is only entitled to assume the truth of “ $\exists x[x = 1 \ \& \ B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, x//\text{under the guise } D_1 \neq x//\text{under the guise } D_1)]$ ” and of “ $\exists y[y = 1 \ \& \ \text{not } B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, y//\text{under the guise } D_2 \neq y//\text{under the guise } D_2)]$ ”. Then the final outcome is the truth of “ $\exists x[B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, x//\text{under the guise } D_1 \neq x//\text{under the guise } D_1) \ \& \ \text{not } B_{t_0}(\text{Frege}, x//\text{under the guise } D_2 \neq x//\text{under the guise } D_2)]$ ” – which is *not* a contradiction, since  $D_1$  and  $D_2$  are *different* guises:  $D_2$  is ‘arithmetical common sense’,  $D_1$  is ‘Frege’s system for founding arithmetic on logic’. However, the indicated *way out* can, obviously, only be as acceptable for us as it is acceptable for us that Frege neither *simpliciter* [under every guise] believed at  $t_0$  of 1 that it is self-different nor *simpliciter* [under any guise] did not believe at  $t_0$  of 1 that it is self-different. But it *is* tempting to assume that Frege *simpliciter*, under any guise, did not believe at  $t_0$  of 1 that it is self-different, that he, therefore, did not believe at  $t_0$  of 1//under the guise  $D_1$  that it, 1, is self-different – whereas it seems clear that Frege *did* believe at  $t_0$  of 1//under the guise  $D_1$  that it is self-different.

In this aporetic situation, the saving insight, I submit, is this: it is not so easy as it may seem to come by a *simpliciter de re* belief, respectively disbelief. *True*, in our own case we often “unconsciously” infer “*simpliciter* believe of  $\tau$  that it is F/not F” from “believe of  $\tau//\text{under the guise } D$  that it is F/not F”, and “*simpliciter* do not believe of  $\tau$  that it is F/not F” from “do not believe of  $\tau//\text{under the guise } D'$  that it is F/not F”; but of course it does not follow that the conclusion of such an inference (made by us) is correct – it just follows that we believe it to be correct in our own case. Now, whereas there is an inescapable logical conflict between “N *simpliciter* believes of  $\tau$  that it is F” and “N *simpliciter* does not believe of  $\tau$  that it is F” (*presupposing* that there is a guise of  $\tau$  for N), and also between the latter locution and “N believes of  $\tau//\text{under the guise } D$  that it is F”, there is *no* such conflict between “N believes of itself [“itself” standing in also for “himself” and “herself”] that it *simpliciter* believes of  $\tau$  that it is F” and “N believes of itself that it *simpliciter* does not believe of  $\tau$  that it is F”, and *no* such conflict between the latter locution and “N believes of  $\tau//\text{under$

*the guise D* that it is F". For example, based on his having no opinion regarding the spyhood or non-spyhood of Ortcutt//*under the guise 'Ortcutt on the beach'*, and automatically making the generalizing inference to nonbelief-*simpliciter*, Ralph believes of himself that he *simpliciter* does not believe of Ortcutt that he is a spy. But what Ralph believes to be the case of himself is not the case; for, in fact, he does believe of Ortcutt//*under the guise 'man with the brown hat'* that he is a spy. There is no logical conflict here, it is just that Ralph does not recognize Ortcutt under the guise 'man with the brown hat'; he is unaware of the identity of Ortcutt with the man with the brown hat. Furthermore: Based on his believing of the man with the brown hat//*under the guise 'man with the brown hat'* that he is a spy, and automatically making the generalizing inference to belief-*simpliciter*, Ralph believes of himself that he *simpliciter* believes of the man with the brown hat that he is a spy. But, again, what Ralph believes to be the case of himself is not the case; for he does not believe of Ortcutt//*under the guise 'Ortcutt on the beach'* that he is a spy, and therefore – the man with the brown hat being identical with Ortcutt, without Ralph being aware of this – also not of the man with the brown hat//*under the guise 'Ortcutt on the beach'* that he is a spy.

Clearly, in the story of Ralph and Ortcutt, there is no logical conflict, as is perfectly apparent once the relativization to guises is introduced *and* belief-*simpliciter* and nonbelief-*simpliciter* are carefully distinguished from believed-to-be-belief-*simpliciter* and believed-to-be-nonbelief-*simpliciter*. And Frege's story, too, is now seen to contain no logical conflict. Frege does not believe of the number 1//*under the guise 'arithmetical common sense'* that it is self-different; on this basis, and automatically making the generalizing inference to nonbelief-*simpliciter*, Frege believes of himself that he *simpliciter* does not believe of the number 1 that it is self-different. But what Frege believes to be the case of himself is not the case; for, in fact, he does believe of the number 1//*under the guise 'Frege's system for founding arithmetic on logic'* that it is self-different.

In contrast to Ralph, Frege is not unaware of an obtaining identity; what he is unaware of is the inconsistency of the deductive system to which he has committed himself without reservation. The flaw his oversight produces in his *de-re*-belief-system seems worse than the flaw produced in Ralph's *de-re*-belief-system by Ralph's oversight; but in neither of the two cases are we confronted with the catastrophe we would be confronted with if a con-

tradition among belief-sentences<sup>14</sup> (be it a contradiction<sub>1</sub>, or be it a contradiction<sub>2</sub> with its condition fulfilled).

### Bibliography

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<sup>14</sup> Since the confusion is so easily committed, I repeat: A contradiction between belief-sentences *is not* a conjunction of belief-sentences with contradictory contents.