

The New Monadology

1. Consciousness is a relation – x is conscious of y – of which the first relatum, x , is an individual that is neither an event, nor a physical object, nor an abstract object. For neither (*subjectively*) *for* an event, nor *for* a (purely) physical object, nor *for* an abstract object can there be anything.
2. The causality of individuals, insofar as it is intended to be *active realization* – individual x *making* y *actual* or *real* –, is also such a relation: a relation of which the first relatum is an individual that is neither an event, nor a physical object, nor an abstract object. For events, physical objects and abstract objects are essentially (*causally*) *passive*.
3. There are instances of consciousness, just as there are instances of individual realization.
4. Therefore, there is something that is a subject of consciousness, and something that is a subject of individual realization; in both cases it is an individual, but neither an event, nor a physical object, nor an abstract object.
5. There is a *global conflict* of realization.
6. Therefore, there are many subjects of individual realization, and because of 2. these subjects are neither events, nor physical objects, nor abstract objects. Let them be called “acting substances” – *substantiae agentes*.
7. Everything that *occurs* is an event, or a constituent of an event: a physical or mental object.
8. Whatever is a subject of realization or of consciousness is not a mental object. For also *for* mental objects there is nothing, and they, too, are essentially *passive*.
9. Consequently, acting substances do not occur (because of 6., 7. and 8.).
10. What does not occur may yet *exist*; it is merely *not in the world*, that is, not in the totality of real events.
11. Acting substances *exist* because they are *realizing something*; but they are *outside of the world*.

12. However, acting substances are *manifested* in the world in their *deeds*, that is, in the events that they realize. But they are not their deeds, nor are they *in* them (they are not constituents of them); otherwise they would *occur* (contradicting 9.).
13. Many, if not all, acting substances also have manifestations that *are not* produced by them, which, in a manner, are their anchors in the world through which they efficiently act: their bodies, certain physical objects.
14. I am an acting substance that is manifested in its deeds and in its body.
15. Many complexes of events and complexes of physical objects in the world are significantly *like my manifestations*.
16. Therefore, to these occurrences there correspond many acting substances *like me*, namely, as substances manifested in those occurrences: they are manifested in bodies and deeds that, although different from mine, are significantly like mine.
17. I am a subject of consciousness.
18. Consequently, on the basis of 15. and in analogy to 16., there are many subjects of consciousness *like me*, the very same individuals that are acting substances *like me*. Let them be called "human substances" – *substantiae humanae*. And that is what *we* are.
19. Let subjects of consciousness in general be called "thinking substances" – *substantiae cogitantes*, where it is necessary to add that "thinking" (*cogitans*) is not to be taken in the narrow sense of abstract thinking, but in the wide sense of actual active and passive conscious experience, including, for example, *feeling*.
20. On the basis of the analogy to *us*, it can be concluded that there are many non-human acting and thinking substances.
21. That there are acting substances that are not thinking is more probable than that there are thinking substances that are not acting; for acting seems to be more essential to substances than thinking.
22. If one refrains from calling some physical objects "substances," as one should do, then there is no reason to assume that there are substances that neither think nor act.
23. Thinking substances are (because of 1. and 8.), like acting substances, neither events, nor physical objects, nor mental objects, nor abstract objects. Hence they do not occur (because of 7.). Nevertheless they *exist* (even those of them that, perhaps, do not act), be-

- cause they *have consciousness*. However, they are *outside of the world*.
24. But thinking substances are *manifested* in entities which are parts of the world: in their respective streams of consciousness, which are certain actual events.
 25. Everything that a thinking substance is conscious of *as it is in itself* is a part or constituent of the thinking substance's stream of consciousness, and therefore in the world.
 26. Consequently, since thinking substances do not occur (23.), are not in the world, they do not have consciousness of themselves *as themselves*, in other words, no *direct* consciousness of themselves. However, they do have consciousness of themselves in partial representation, "as in a mirror": they are, in a certain way, *included intentionally* (included in the sense of *intentionality*) in their streams of consciousness, and therefore they are indirectly conscious of themselves. (What is included *intentionally* in a stream of consciousness need, therefore, not be included in it *as a part or constituent*.)
 27. The stream of consciousness of a thinking substance which is *like me* is a manifestation of it that is partially the substance's deed, but partially (and for the greater part) it is not. Insofar as our streams of consciousness are not our deeds, they are like our bodies, which, as has been said in 13., are not produced by us.
 28. Consequently, each human substance has three complete manifestations: the sum of its deeds (an event), its stream of consciousness (an event), its body (a physical object, hence a constituent of events). The sum of its deeds and its stream of consciousness intersect (have events as common parts), and some of its deeds are, like its body and like itself, intentional contents of its stream of consciousness (that is, something the substance is *indirectly* conscious of); its body, moreover, is always a constituent of its *outer* deeds. (As the third complete manifestation of a human substance one could also, instead of its body, regard the sum of its bodily events (events being taken to include processes); in this sum the body is contained as a constituent.)
 29. *The world* for a thinking substance is its stream of consciousness, and everything that *as part or constituent* or *as intentional object* is included in it. There is no reason to assume that *the world* for a thinking substance is identical with the totality of everything that is

as part or constituent included in *the world*. But doubtlessly: only *via the world for me* do I cognize *the world*, and its parts and constituents, insofar as I cognize them at all. (The cognitive contact to the physical world is based on the fact that many, although not all, of the *intentional objects* for a thinking substance – that is, of the objects that it is indirectly conscious of – are in fact constituents or parts of the physical world.)

30. Some acting substances, in particular the human substances, are *free*, that is, they sometimes, in realization, have alternatives open to them. However, an acting substance may also have *no alternative* (but “only one way”).
31. If an acting substance is not a thinking substance, then it is likely that it is not free. But if an acting substance is a thinking substance, then it is likely to be free. For to what purpose consciousness if the acting subject never has non-indifferent alternatives open to it, hence never has the choice of doing something to its relative (objective) advantage or its relative (objective) disadvantage? (Where there is consciousness, there also is rationality, however primitive; but where there is rationality, there is also freedom of choice, however limited.)
32. The unity of the world, that is, the unity of the totality of real events, and hence also of everything that is intrinsically connected to real events, is constituted by the integration of all real events into one single total connection, maximal in space and time (which, therefore, differs from my stream of consciousness, for example), a connection which is in its entirety shot through with the unifying order of natural laws.
33. And all this in the presence of overwhelming abundance: the world is a *cosmos*.
34. That there are real events and that their totality is of the form just described is contingent and needs an explanation.
35. If the resplendence of the cosmos is not absurdly paired with its *ultimate* unintelligibility, then the real-existence and *unity-abundance* of the world is *not* a groundless fact.
36. Therefore, there is an explanation for the real-existence and unity-abundance of the world.
37. An explanation purely on the basis of laws, of whatever kind, is, however, impossible. For such an explanation would carry nomolo-

gical necessity with it (more precisely, *unconditional* nomological necessity, that is not referred to an antecedent – or “initial” – condition). But the real-existence and unity-abundance of the world are not necessary, not even nomologically necessary, but completely contingent.

38. An explanation purely on the basis of laws is impossible also for the reason that an explanation of the real-existence and unity-abundance of the world must be, among other things, a *causal* explanation. But laws do not have any causal efficacy: *they do not make real*.
39. An explanation of the real-existence and unity-abundance of the world on the basis of laws *and antecedent conditions* that attributes the requisite causal efficacy to the antecedent conditions is also impossible. For these antecedent conditions must consist in *extraworldly* real events, or *extraworldly* facts, *with causal efficacy*. But there are no extraworldly real events, and extraworldly facts have no causal efficacy.
40. Rather, *that* events are real and *which* events are real is the doing of all the acting substances.
41. Therefore, the world (more precisely, that a world really exists and that it is *just this* world, to whose character, among other things, *this unity* and *this abundance* belongs) is the doing of all the acting substances.
42. However, the plurality of the *competing* acting substances (cf. 5. and following theses) is to some extent in opposition to the *unity* of the world.
43. The best way to overcome this tension is to assume the existence of *one single substance* among the many acting and thinking substances, all others far-surpassing in power and knowledge, which guarantees the unity of the world, in representation of itself and for the sake of the ontological value of ordered abundance, and which arbitrates every (otherwise irresolvable) conflict of realization.
44. It is not certain that *the central substance* is perfectly good, but it is (rationally) possible to assume its perfect goodness, in spite of the fact that this world is not the best of all possible worlds.
45. For the value of the character of the world is not the only measure for measuring the doings of the central substance. Rather, the perfect goodness of the central substance and the dignity of the other substances as potential images of the central substance – po-

tentially to such and such an extent likenesses of it – would require that the central substance concedes to every other substance the *prima facie* right to contribute to the determination of the character of the world, to the extent that the substance, qua being the substance it is, can do so.

46. Let it be as has just now been deliberated. But henceforth the perfect character of the world is left at stake and can no longer be guaranteed. For the *prima facie* right just described is in no case abolished, it is only limited by the interest in the real-existence and the unity-abundance of the world (that is, by the central substance's *own proper interest*) and by the *neutrality* of the resolution of conflicts of realization.
47. The central substance prefers, in the becoming of the world, in the resolution of conflicts of realization, neither the good nor the bad substance, neither the high nor the low. For all substances other than the central substance are, in the measure of their abilities and liberties, images of the central substance, more or less similar to it, and each stands for a possible aspect of the central substance: each is *a little god*.
48. It is contingent that the central substance is perfectly good. For, if this were necessary, then it would also be necessary that the world exists; for the good is in its own nature that which communicates itself. But the real-existence of the world just is not necessary.
49. The central substance itself has *chosen* its own perfect goodness, and in consequence thereof the *creation of the world* (as *communication of reality to it* and as securing its unity-abundance, *but not as a complete determination of reality*) and the *creation of all other substances* (as their installation into realization and/or consciousness).
50. Because the central substance has chosen to be perfectly good, it has chosen the good, and insofar as the becoming of the world depends on the central substance alone, it has communicated the good. Nevertheless, in the becoming of the world, insofar as that becoming does not depend on the central substance alone, but *precisely because of its perfect goodness* also on all the other substances, the central substance has not preferred the good to the bad. In this manner this world has come into being, and is still coming into being.
51. Every substance that chooses the good and communicates it does as the central substance does and becomes an *eminent* image of it.

52. That the central substance has chosen the good is not adequately *honored* in the becoming of the world, nor is, in the becoming of the world, the choosing of the good by substances other than the central substance adequately honored, nor *can* this choosing be adequately honored in the becoming of the world. For, because of the dignity of all substances that are different from the central substance, a dignity which is inviolable by the perfectly good central substance and which subsists in particular with respect to the realizing-relationship to the world (see 45. – 47.), the bad has *de facto* found entrance into the world to a large extent, by the substances' contingent factual choosing, but also by the necessities under which they stand. *Moreover*, in the world good is widely opposed to good *inevitably*. (The foundering of the good *because of the good* is also something bad.)
53. But the world is not all there is.