Abstract: This paper aims to display and explicate in what sense Husserl accepts the thesis (some philosophers call “inseparatism”) that there is no intentionality without phenomenology, and in what sense he rejects the thesis that intentionality can only work via representations. It also aims to show that Husserl is not obviously wrong in that “yes” and in that “no”. A further aim of this essay is to defend Husserlian phenomenal intentionality (and therewith, to a considerable extent, phenomenal intentionality tout court) against the anti-mentalistic and anti-realist criticism raised by the Wittgensteinians (and by Wittgenstein himself), that is, by philosophers who have, in effect, a functionalist (hence anti-phenomenal and anti-Phenomenological) conception of intentionality.

§1 Introduction

In Chapter 30 of The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind, “Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind”, the three authors proclaim and defend the thesis of inseparatism:

[P]henomenology and intentionality are inseparable. [...] In some sense: No phenomenology without intentionality, and no intentionality without phenomenology (ibid., 514).

By the word “phenomenology”, the authors do not mean Husserlian phenomenology, or (in short) Phenomenology; they mean

* In English: “Thus, ‘consciousness of something’ is a very obvious thing and yet, at the same time, a thing supremely hard to understand.” The pun contained in the German sentence (“Selbstverständliches” – “Unverständliches”) is untranslatable. – A general note on the references and quotations in this paper can be found at its end, in front of the Bibliography.
the feature of conscious experience that makes conscious experience conscious: its phenomenology. Its phenomenology is the something it is like to have or undergo an experience (ibid., 513).

To use the word metaphorically in this sense is today normal philosophical jargon, yet slightly absurd, like saying “biology” and meaning animals and plants, or “astronomy” and meaning the stars. Nevertheless, Husserl would have, with qualifications, agreed to the second part of the thesis of inseparatism (the first part he would have, with qualifications, rejected: see Id1, §36, 74–75; §84, 187). For Husserl, too, there is “no intentionality without phenomenology” (though he certainly would not have put it this way). Implicitly presupposed in the cited chapter of the Handbook (see ibid., 513), there is, however, another inseparatist thesis, one that Husserl would not have agreed to, one that he did, in fact, reject (whereas the authors of the cited chapter merely distance themselves from some versions of that other thesis: see ibid., 524–525); it is the thesis that there is no intentionality without representations, that intentionality can only work via representations.

Husserl’s “yes” to (part of) the first inseparatist thesis, and “no” to this second, are among the things that the present essay aims to display and explicate; it also aims to show that Husserl is not obviously wrong in that “yes” and in that “no”. Another aim of this essay is to defend Husserlian phenomenal intentionality (and therewith, to a considerable extent, phenomenal intentionality tout court) against the anti-mentalistic and anti-intentionalist-criticism raised by the Wittgensteinians (and by Wittgenstein himself): by philosophers who have, in effect, a functionalist (hence anti-phenomenal and anti-Phenomenological) conception of intentionality.

§2 A prologue: epoché

How plausible one is going to find Husserl’s views on intentionality may well depend on the extent one has managed to go through a certain cognitive procedure. The procedure is not a thought experiment, for it does not require one to suppose or to imagine anything. In a way, it requires one to abstain from believing in certain things one normally believes in – in a way, for the procedure does not require one to give up any of the beliefs one has, let alone to put other beliefs in their places. In fact, the procedure requires one to change nothing in one’s consciousness – except to adopt a reflexive stance towards it (which, of course, is bound to modify it to a certain degree, but that can’t be helped) and to abstain, while maintaining this reflexive stance, from living in those of one’s beliefs which
are such that they include belief in the existence or non-existence of objects “out there in objective reality”. Husserl would also say: the procedure requires one to bracket [einklammern] such beliefs, and that is perhaps the best way to express, in one word, the procedure’s two-sided intention: that one’s beliefs that include belief in the existence or non-existence of objects “out there in objective reality” are still there, as one’s beliefs, but that, at the same time, one is not living in them but rather is seeing them from above (so to speak), observing them from a detached point of view.

The procedure just described is the basic phenomenological method of epoché (as Husserl called it, appropriating a term of ancient scepticism for his own – entirely non-sceptical – purposes). Epoché serves the purpose of securing the phenomena of one’s consciousness – the “Erlebnisse” (there is no precise equivalent in English for “Erlebnisse”, “experiences” being the relatively best translation of the term, though it would better fit the German “Erfahrungen”) – for one’s inspection without any loss (though, certainly, in a somewhat modified form) and to free, at the same time, one’s inspecting glance from any (often quite unexamined) presuppositions about objective reality. In Phenomenology, one wants to see the phenomena of one’s consciousness – the “Erlebnisse” – in their purity. Curiously, to the extent we manage to do epoché, current theories of intentionality, each one of which is heavily dependent upon presuppositions about objective reality, will fade to the status of being just theory (though we may happen to believe in one of them), whereas what Husserl calls “intentionality” – this intrinsic structural element of the Phenomena [Erlebnisse] themselves – will seem far from being just theory, but will stand out in its purity and undeniable actuality. And then current theories of intentionality, which usually presume that intentionality, properly understood, is a part of nature and which usually are obsessed with naturalizing it physico-causally, may well seem to be more or less missing the point.

§3 Ryle (and Wittgenstein) versus Husserl

The ultimate source of a large part of the current mainstream in intentionality theory is the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. At the end of Part I of the Philosophical Investigations, the abysmal difference between Wittgenstein’s and Husserl’s views on intentionality is evident with complete finality:

‘When I teach someone the formation of the series .... I surely mean him to write .... at the hundredth place.’ – Quite right; you mean it. And evidently without necessarily even thinking of it. This shows you how different the grammar of the verb ‘to mean’ is from that of the
verb ‘to think’. And nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity! Unless, that is, one is setting out to produce confusion. (One might as well speak of an activity of butter when it rises in price, and if no problems are produced by this it is harmless.) (PhI I, §693, 172; tr. modified)

For highlighting the radical opposition of this to Husserl’s views, it suffices to point out that, for Husserl, *occurrent mental intentionality* – the intrinsic intentionality of subjective experiences [*Erlebnisse*], the intentionality of “thinking”: of consciousness – is the basis of all intending/meaning *an object* (in the widest sense), and that intentional experiences were often called “Akte [acts]” by Husserl.

But one can only wonder at the discrepancy between, on the one hand, Wittgenstein’s emphatic conviction that the grammar (or logic) of meaning (meaning *an object*) is fundamentally different from that of thinking, and, on the other hand, the utter weakness of his reasons for holding this. True: one can mean/intend something without thinking of, or about, it. This happens all the time, and cannot be denied even if we look exclusively at *occurrent*, non-dispositional intending. After all, one all the time perceives – i.e., perceptually intends – objects one does not think of, if “to think of” is to mean something more specific than “to be conscious of” (“to be conscious” is, however, the best rendering of Descartes’ “cogitare” in his *Meditations on First Philosophy*: in view of Meditation II, §8, and Meditation III, §1). And if we also look at *non-occurrent*, dispositional intending, then the two kinds of intending – current and dispositional – provide in collaboration (so to speak) the stock example for intending without thinking: one is now (dispositionally) believing (that is, dispositionally doxastically intending) thousands of propositions none of which one is now (occurrently) thinking of (since one is not occurrently intending those propositions, but only dispositionally). And when I teach someone the formation of a number-series, I (dispositionally) mean/intend the correct (numerical) filling of each of its many, usually infinitely many places – yet I (occurrently) think of the filling of only a very few of those places (say, the first three or four). But do these trivial facts show that the grammar of meaning/intending is fundamentally different – categorically different – from that of thinking, as Wittgenstein believes? They do not. Though intending, in its intentionality-use, is not always thinking-of, not even if “to think of” is generalized – as it is by Descartes – beyond its normal meaning and is semantically assimilated to “to be conscious of” (for intending is sometimes dispositional, whereas thinking-of never is), still thinking-of is always intending: whoever thinks of, or about, something (in a certain mode: e.g., specifically or non-specifically, non-verbally or verbally) intends and means *(in that same mode)*, while thinking, what is being thought of in the thinking. Now, is the
(so-called) grammar of “mammal” fundamentally different from the grammar of “dog”? The answer is: emphatically no (or else I don’t know what Wittgenstein means by “grammar” in the above quotation). But then: neither is the grammar of “to mean/intend” fundamentally different from the grammar of “to think of”; for these two verbs stand in the same logical relationship to each other as the nouns “mammal” and “dog”: their instances of truthful application constitute a necessary genus-species relation. Of course: “to mean it” does not mean to think of it – as Wittgenstein reminds himself and his readers in *PhI I, §692, 172/172* But this, again, is a trivial truth, just as trivial as the truth that “mammal” does not mean dog; in neither of the two cases the difference in meaning amounts to a difference in “grammar”.

As there is no justification for Wittgenstein’s conviction that the grammar of “to mean/intend” is fundamentally different from the grammar of “to think”, so there is no justification for Wittgenstein’s further conviction that to call meaning/intending a mental activity is as absurd as to call the increase of the price of butter an activity of butter. Rather, at least to the extent that thinking-of is a mental activity (it always is), intending/meaning must be a mental activity, too: because thinking-of is a species, and intending/meaning a (necessary) genus of that species.

But, doubtless, intending/meaning is not always a mental activity; merely consider that meaning/intending is often dispositional. Yet, in those cases where intending/meaning is not an activity, it is still a mental disposition – which will manifest itself under the right circumstances in the right mental occurrences. However, one can count on it, Wittgenstein would not have been happy with this reasonable solution. Ultimately, the problem with the classification of intending/meaning as a mental activity was for Wittgenstein not so much the activity-component in that classification; the problem for him was the component of *mentality* – in the sense in which “mental” is normally understood, which sense essentially involves inwardness and subjectivity.

The same diagnosis is true of Gilbert Ryle, who, indeed, made a large-scale effort in *The Concept of Mind* to replace the “official” talk (in psychology and philosophy) of mental activities and occurrences (“ghostly”, “occult”, and ultimately non-existent for Ryle) by the talk of mental dispositions. But the dispositions that Ryle had in mind were certainly not mental in the normal sense of the word; rather, mentality in this normal sense – essentially involving inwardness and subjectivity (and implying non-physicalness) – was anathema to Ryle (along with “the Ghost in the Machine”):
One of the central negative motives of this book [The Concept of Mind] is to show that ‘mental’ does not denote a status, such that one can sensibly ask of a given thing or event whether it is mental or physical, ‘in the mind’ or ‘in the outside world’ (CoM, 199).

The so-called “mental” dispositions – and abilities, liabilities, inclinations; powers; capacities and tendencies (all of these words are used by Ryle in affirmative descriptive connection with “mind” or “mental”: see CoM, 199; 245; 125) – that Ryle did allow and advocate were, in fact, more or less complex behavioural dispositions (respectively, behavioural abilities, liabilities, etc). Given the normal primary sense of “mental”, such dispositions [R2] “to do and undergo certain sorts of things [...] in the ordinary world” (CoM, 199) can be called “mental” (or “of the mind”) only in a rather secondary, remotely analogical sense of the word. But, needless to say to readers of The Concept of Mind, the normal primary sense of “mental” was for Ryle – likely under the influence of Wittgenstein – not a philosophically correct sense, because of the element of privacy and subjectivity in that sense.

The epistemological worries connected with subjectivity take a special direction when it comes to intentionality; for intentionality is often intersubjective, or objective (so to speak). Accordingly, Wittgenstein remarks about an attempt to explain intersubjective linguistic intentionality by subjective linguistic intentionality:

Only let us take this assumption seriously! – Then we see that it is not able to explain intention.

For if it is like this: that the possible uses of a word float before us in half-shades as we say or hear it – if it is like this, then this simply holds for us. But we communicate with other people without knowing whether they have these experiences too (PhI II, vi, 181°; tr. modified).

Note, in contrast, that it is Husserl’s plan to explain intersubjective, or objective, intentionality on the basis of subjective (or mental) intentionality, and ultimately on the basis of its non-dispositional (or occurrent, or manifest) form, as found in intentional consciousness, in intentional experience. Accordingly, I shall call the intentionality found therein, as interpreted by Husserl, Husserlian basic intentionality. For Husserl, the indicated plan for intentionality explanation is the only viable plan for explaining cognition. This emerges (among other things) from the following passage:

It is clear: only if we resolve to set all prejudices aside and to identify experience [Erfahrung] or intuition [Anschauung] [simply] with self-evidence [Evidenz], with cognition in the salient sense; and only if we embrace the fact that this extended ‘experience’ is nothing else but the having of the intended/meant itself exactly as it is intended/meant – only then
we can seriously plan to understand cognition [Erkennen]; that is, to understand how not only the world of simple non-conceptual experience, but also the logical objectivity, and thus the objectivity of any kind and level with all its real and ideal forms, can have meaning [Sinn] and warrantable being for us. Consciousness in itself, in its essential forms, creates meaning/intending [Sinn] and, in the forms of self-evidence, possible and true meaning/intending [that is: intending of what is possible, of what is true], as the form of a possible fulfilment of unfulfilled intentions of thinking, of a fulfilment in the form of the giving-itself-as-itself [Selbstgebung], respectively, in a form ‘measuring up’ to such a form (EPh1, §19, 138).

Thus, Husserlian basic intentionality, or in other words: Husserlian phenomenal intentionality, is indeed fundamental for Husserl.

Daniel Dennett – no friend of phenomenal intentionality (Husserlian or other) – believes that “[m]ost of Husserl’s topics can be found in The Concept of Mind by anybody who knows what they are, but in these pages you will find no talk of intentionality, no noemata – and no talk of qualia either, I am happy to report” (“Re-introducing The Concept of Mind”, xiv; note that “qualia” is not a term of Husserl’s, but could easily be given a place in Phenomenology: qualia are the aspects of hyletic content). Dennett attributes the absence of those terms in The Concept of Mind to Ryle’s “distrust of philosophical jargon” (ibid.). Dennett is right on both accounts – if one does not subsume too many of Husserl’s topic under Dennett’s “Husserl’s topics”, and if “distrust of philosophical jargon” is read as “distrust of what for him, Ryle, was philosophical jargon”¹.

How utterly different Ryle’s views are from Husserl’s may already be suspected (or known); yet in order to highlight the truly abysmal difference between the two philosophers, I offer an analysis of the following passage:

[R4] Epistemologists have sometimes confessed to finding the supposed cognitive activities of seeing, hearing and inferring oddly elusive. If I descry a hawk, I find the hawk but I do not find my seeing of the hawk. My seeing of the hawk seems to be a queerly transparent sort of process, transparent in that while a hawk is detected, nothing else is detected answering to the verb in ‘see a hawk’. But the mystery dissolves when we realise that ‘see’, ‘descry’ and ‘find’ are not process words, experience words or activity words. They do not stand for perplexingly undetectable actions or reactions [...]. The reason why I cannot

¹ Here goes Ryle inveighing (with some amount of truth and yet deeply unjustly) against the way Husserl wrote: [R3] “When Husserl inherited in the early years of this century his master’s [Brentano’s] ‘Messiasbewusstsein’ he lost what humour he had ever possessed as well as nearly all his original clarity and vigour of style. [...] Deaf to the language of others, he found that the appropriate expressions for his own discoveries required an independent mint, and he accordingly coined a vast jargon of his own which subserves, apparently, the ends neither of brevity nor of perspicuity” (“Review of Marvin Farber: ‘The Foundations of Phenomenology’ “, 222–223).
catch myself seeing or deducing is that these verbs are of the wrong type to complete the phrase ‘catch myself ....’ The questions ‘What are you doing?’ and ‘What was he undergoing?’ cannot be answered by ‘seeing’, ‘concluding’, or ‘checkmating’ (CoM, 152).

Thus, Ryle would surely have agreed with Wittgenstein that “nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning [i.e., intending] a mental activity” – considering that seeing, hearing, inferring, descrying, finding, deducing, concluding, and checkmating are without exception specific forms of meaning/intending something, that is: specific forms of intentionality (though very different such forms). Unfortunately (or fortunately for Husserl), what Ryle says in R4 is just a collection of falsehoods. Firstly, whatever the epistemologists that Ryle has in mind, and Ryle himself, may confess to, there is no such thing as cognitive activities – or more generally speaking: processes in consciousness – appearing (or seeming) to be “transparent”.² As long as I do not explicitly adopt the reflexive stance towards my own conscious activities or processes, I do not explicitly notice them – and thus they do not appear to me to be transparent; but as soon as I explicitly adopt that stance, I explicitly notice them, and notice them as being in no way elusive or easily overlooked – and thus, also in this other case (covering what the first case left open), they do not appear to me to be transparent (and as it is with me, so it is with others, I trust; one merely needs to adopt the reflexive stance). Secondly, conscious processes do not merely not appear to be transparent, they are not transparent (for if they were transparent, then they would appear to be transparent³); if I direct my attention at them (and I can do so at most points of my conscious life), then they neither seem nor are in any way un-

² The idea of the transparency or diaphaneity of consciousness is still extant (for example, according to Bennett & Hacker in The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, 193, “mental images, like thoughts, are all message and no medium”) and is perhaps even more present today than it has ever been before (many Anglo-American philosophers are under the influence of Gilbert Harman and others). The idea is false none the less. Consider the following quotation from Michael Tye’s Consciousness and Persons, 24: “Visual experiences are transparent to their subjects. We are not introspectively aware of our visual experiences any more than we are perceptually aware of transparent sheets of glass. If we try to focus on our experiences, we ‘see’ right through them to the world outside.” Inexplicably, Tye completely ignores the indicators of non-transparency: the perspectival organization of the visual field and the resulting familiar – in fact, omnipresent – illusions (e.g., that the full moon is as big as a silver dollar); the limitedness of the visual field which, strangely, is without visible limits; jumping pictures (occurring when you switch rapidly between closing one eye and then the other); the visual experience that occurs when you cross your eyes; the contrast between foreground and background, between what is in the focus of attention and what is not, between the blurring and sharpening of vision (occurring when you take off your glasses and put them back on).

³ The inverse of this is also true.
noticeable. Thirdly, conscious processes, and specifically the “cognitive activities” Ryle is talking about, are detectable – I merely need to adopt the reflexive stance towards them in order to detect them – and they are, therefore, existent processes (contrary to Ryle’s fairly transparent suggestion of their non-existence). Fourthly, contrary to what Ryle is asserting with such confidence, “see”, “descry” and “find” are, in fact, process words, experience words, or activity words (and so are “hear”, “infer”, “deduce”, “conclude”, “checkmate”): they require for their truthful application – and most conspicuously in the first-person case (and no less for “I find ....” and “I checkmate ....” than for “I see ....” and “I hear ....”) – the occurrence of experiential episodes in (or rather with) the relevant subject, though these episodes of conscious activity may, of course, be very short. Fifthly, contrary to what Ryle believes about himself, I (at least) can very well catch myself seeing or deducing (and this is not as uncommon as it may seem): I suddenly notice that I am seeing – not a scarecrow but – a man who looks like a scarecrow. And even while I am saying “It wasn’t the gardener, it was the butler”, I suddenly notice that I am deducing that it was the butler from (1) the fact that it wasn’t the gardener and (2) from the assumption that it must have been either the gardener or the butler. Sixthly, contrary to what Ryle believes, the questions “What are you doing?” and “What was he undergoing?” can of course be answered by “seeing”, “concluding”, or “checkmating”. Gertrude asks: “What are you doing here, sitting all alone by yourself on the parapet?” – Possible answers: “Just looking [and therefore seeing]”; “I am just now concluding that, all things considered, I should not go to Wittenberg”. Looking at an on-going game of chess, a child asks: “What are you doing?” – Possible answer: “I am checkmating him” (and simultaneously I make the move that checkmates him).

If, as Ryle would have it (contrary to Husserl), we could only see (and find) a hawk, but could not at the same time experience (and find) our seeing it; if we could only hear a cry, but could not at the same time experience our hearing it; if we could only infer that there are infinitely many primes, but could not at the same time experience our inferring this; then it is conceivable, though hardly probable, that even in this case we could and would continue to use the first-person present-tense intentionality way of speaking: “I see a hawk”, “I hear a cry”, “I infer that there are infinitely many primes”. Under Rylean premises, such utterances simply come out of our mouths, we know not why; and under Rylean premises, there remains the task of explaining why they do come out of our mouths. The Rylean premises – to be honest about them and put aside all language-critical paraphernalia (which, as a rule, do not work anyway) – simply amount to the premise, the prejudice that conscious processes (in the traditional sense: as episodes of subjectivity, episodes of the inward mental life) are unde-
tectable and, in fact, non-existent (or, though existent, totally irrelevant, hence dispensable). Ryle did not get far with the mentioned task of explanation (cf. “Phenomenology vs. ‘The Concept of Mind’ “, 195–196); but his student Daniel Dennett – who is certainly no less outspoken than his teacher about that task’s premise (i.e., the non-existence of consciousness; see “On the Absence of Phenomenology”, 95) – applied himself to it with particular enthusiasm, calling the result of his efforts, weirdly, an “explanation of consciousness” (cf. Dennett, Consciousness Explained).

For a first-hand recognition of Husserlian basic intentionality – that is: for a recognition, resulting from what Husserl calls “Evidenz”\(^4\), of the manner of intentionality that Husserl discerns in intentional phenomenal consciousness\(^5\) – reflexive (inner, introspective) perception is necessary, and the acknowledgement of such perception. Therefore, since neither Wittgenstein nor the Wittgensteinians (consider as representative the very prominent ones: Ryle, Dennett, and Bennett & Hacker\(^6\)) acknowledge reflexive perception,\(^7\) there is no first-hand recognition of Husserlian basic intentionality by Wittgenstein and the Wittgensteinians – and without any first-hand recognition of it, a second-hand recognition will not be forthcoming either. Indeed, leaving the intellectual honesty of Wittgenstein and the Wittgensteinians undisturbed, one must speak of their blindness for Husserlian basic intentionality, which is a consequence of their blindness for phenomenal consciousness. This blindness is not constitutional: they can – or could – reflexively perceive as satisfactorily as Husserl or anybody else. Their blindness is an outcome of philosophical prejudice. The great prejudgment – only thinly disguised by language criticism, often markedly arbitrary and highhanded (see the Wittgenstein-inspired pontifical decrees of

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\(^4\) The best, though not perfect, rendering in English of Husserl’s “Evidenz” is “self-evidence” (see H1). The best, though not perfect, rendering in English of Husserl’s “Anschauung” is “intuition” (see again H1). The translations are not perfect, for both Evidenz and Anschauung have a distinctly perceptual dimension (for Husserl, and quite generally for every speaker of German) that is not present in self-evidence and intuition.

\(^5\) There was a time when it would have been otiose to modify, even occasionally, the words “consciousness” or “experience” by the word “phenomenal”. Not so in our time.

\(^6\) These three (or four) thinkers – different though they are from each other – have been inspired in important ways by Wittgenstein’s anti-Cartesian philosophy, which gives them certain family resemblances [Familienähnlichkeiten], as Wittgenstein would say (see PhI I, §67). This is why I call them “Wittgensteinians”. For more on the Wittgensteinian enmity to Husserl’s positions (for the most part it is implicit) than is written about in this essay, see my recent book Defending Husserl.

Bennett & Hacker on what is, and what is not, philosophically correct English in *The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience* — is that there is no such thing as phenomenal consciousness, no such thing as the inward, subjective mental life and its intentionality.

But, as far as Ryle is concerned, the rejection of Husserlian basic intentionality can be found even without anti-Cartesian and anti-introspectionist premises, namely, in Ryle’s article “Phenomenology” from 1932. What Ryle offers in that article is, as a matter of fact, much more interesting than mere anti-Cartesianism and anti-introspectionism. According to Ryle, for Husserl – [R5a] “to employ a misleading expression of which Husserl is fond” (ibid., 173) – [R5b] “the object of an intentional experience, treated as such, is just the intrinsic meaning or sense of the experience” (ibid.; italics mine). Well, yes, this is for Husserl precisely the truth of the matter. But why is the italicized expression in R5b deemed “misleading” in R5a? Ryle:

[R6] He [Husserl] should hold (I believe) that what we miscall ‘the object or content of an act of consciousness’ is really the specific character or nature of that act, so that the intentionality of an act is not a relation between it and something else, but merely a property of it so specific as to be a differentia or in some cases an individualizing description of it. He does in fact, however, continue to speak as if every intentional act is related, though related by an internal relation, to a genuine subject of attributes (ibid., 175; second italics mine).

This quotation still gives no answer to the question just asked. (Did Husserl really not know what he was saying?) And why is the idea of basic intentionality that is described and attributed to Husserl by R5a, R5b, and R6, deemed wrong by Ryle? I shall come back to this question and its answer in due course; for the time being, I merely note that the quotation in R6 proposes an alternative, which Ryle believes correct, to what he thinks Husserl erroneously thinks is the correct way of describing basic intentionality. It is also true: R6 – like R5b – manages to state Husserl’s opinion correctly (though somewhat indirectly: in what it says, in its second sentence, is Husserl’s continued way of speaking). This is not the case with other Rylean reports on Husserl’s opinions, as we shall see.

Husserl does hold that the intentional objects of, say, (outer) perceptions are genuine subjects of attributes (to which perceptions are internally – or intrinsically-essentially – related in the intentionality way). But intentional objects are gen-

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8 Characteristically, Husserl is not mentioned even once in the entire book (461 pages thick).
9 For clear indications of Ryle’s relative friendliness in that article towards phenomenal consciousness and introspection (considering what came later), see ibid., 176–177.
uine subjects of attributes for Husserl certainly not in such a manner that, given any attribute F, either F or non-F can be truthfully attributed to them:

[H2] There is nothing that the tree simpliciter [der Baum schlechthin], the thing in nature, is less [identical to] than this perceived tree as such [dieses Baumwahrgenommene als solches], which, as perceptual intent [Wahrnehmungssinn], belongs inseparably to the perception. The tree simpliciter can burn down, dissolve itself into its chemical elements, and so on. But the intent – intent of this perception, something necessarily belonging to its essence – cannot burn down, it has no chemical elements, no powers [Kräfte], no real properties (Id1, §89, 205).

We may be certain: this perceived tree as such – the intentional object of this perception – is, for Husserl, not only not combustible, but also not incombustible (or else it would have a power, contrary to what is stated in H2). Yet, this does not impugn the ontological status which the perceived tree as such has in Husserl’s eyes: that of being a genuine subject of attributes; after all, it is for Husserl an individual item, no less individual than the perception itself. Note that if an item X fails to fulfil the condition presented immediately before H2, then this fact alone cannot by itself exclude X from the class of genuine subjects of attributes. Otherwise there would be no genuine subjects of attributes. This is so because for every item – hence even for each individual item, even for each actually existing material object – an attribute can be found which is such that neither itself nor its negation can be truthfully attributed to it (thus, each actually existing material object is neither divisible by 3 nor non-divisible by 3, just as, conversely, every natural number is neither orbiting the sun nor non-orbiting it).

This quotation should not mislead one into thinking that when Husserl says [H3] “It is [...] an error in principle to believe that perception [...] cannot get at the thing itself” (Id1, §43, 89), he only means to assert this, say, of the perceived tree as such, not also of the tree simpliciter. Husserl, as a matter of fact, misleadingly overstates (in the perspective of phenomenological reduction: of epoché) the distinction he wishes to make between the two when he says in H2 that there is nothing that the tree simpliciter is less (identical to) than the perceived tree as such (see also Husserl’s all too strong further separative remarks in Id1, §89, 205). In fact, the tree simpliciter (or in other Husserlian words: the actual/“real” tree) is after all – if it exists, and only if it exists – identical, for Husserl, to the perceived tree as such. It is only that the epistemic distance to the latter is much shorter – being zero – than the one to the former, which distance, for Husserl, is unforeseeably long (if a definitive and ultimate determination regarding the tree simpliciter, in particular, regarding its existence, is to be arrived at). Consider, as an analogy, the relationship between the sequence 7777 in the decimal development of π and the sequence 7777: the former – if it exists, and only if it exists – is identical to the latter; but the epistemic distance to the latter is zero, whereas the one to the former is unforeseeably long (but existent and finite if the sequence 7777 in the decimal development of π exists).
Note also, in this connection, that the expression “real properties [reale Eigenschaften]” has a special meaning for Husserl: in Husserl’s sense, it is not synonymous with “actual attributes” but, in effect, with “causal dispositions of real things [things simpliciter]”. (In support of this interpretation, see Id2, §15, 45, 47–48.) Thus, when Husserl asserts in H2 that the perceived tree as such has “no real properties”, he is not saying that it has no actual attributes.

The intentional objects of (outer) perceptions, though inseparable from the perceptions, are, for Husserl, not only individuals and, therefore, genuine subjects of attributes, they are also (numerically) identically recurrent individuals in temporally separate perceptions, and in such perceptions re-identifiable individuals;¹¹ in other words, they are individuals of recurrence in temporally separate perceptions, not individuals of occurrence like the perceptions themselves, which cannot identically recur, recur as numerically the same item, and hence cannot be perceptually re-identified (in their case: re-identified in temporally separate reflexive perceptions). It is an immediate consequence of this that the intentional objects of (outer, non-reflexive) perceptions, though inseparable from the perceptions, cannot be in any real sense parts – pieces [Stücke] or aspects [Momente] – of their perceptions, as Husserl inculcates (and not only for perceptions and their intentional objects):

[H4] [T]he object appearing in the manifold of the experiences and intended in it as existing [seinsgemeinter] is, vis-à-vis these experiences, non-real [irreell]; it is not a real aspect [reelles Moment] of them, for it is identically the same object in immanently temporally separated experiences (ΦΨ, §41, 207–208).

[H5] [H]ere it is first of all necessary to describe faithfully what is here the immediately perceived, purely following the meaning-content [Sinn] that belongs to the perception itself. It is necessary to realize that it [i.e., the immediately perceived] is not a complex of sensual data that belong to the perception in question as real pieces [reelle Bestandstücke], hence come into being with it and disappear with it, but that it is nothing other than, for example, this table here, only at one time coming to be perceived from this side, and then from that side, and becoming, in the further progress of perceptions that synthetically unify themselves, ever more richly, ever more multiformly seen. But it is always itself, this table (the synthetic unity, one and the same object in consciousness), that progressively displays [vorweist] and warrants [ausweist] its content of being and confirms its actual there-being – presupposing only that the occurrence of disharmony does not force us to cross out, so to speak, its there-being and to say: it was a mere illusion. What any conceivable confirmation or warrant of actuality warrants here is, therefore, as I said, the synthetic unity, had in conscious perception with the consciousness character of being-there-itself, and is nothing

¹¹ As A. D. Smith notes: “[W]hen Husserl writes about an experience’s object being inseparable from that experience, he is definitely not talking about a mere kind of object, but an individual, identifiable and re-identifiable object” (“Husserl and Externalism”, 322).
other than the external item itself, the thing-in-space itself; it is from the start the transcendent item itself.\textsuperscript{12} If not, where, supposedly, does knowledge of it ever come from? (\textit{EPht}, §17, 118–119)

And this is what Ryle has to say about the issues that are addressed by H4 and H5:

\begin{quote}
[R7] Husserl [...] denies that what an act is ‘of’ is essentially contained in or adjoined to the act. ‘Contents’ are not real parts of mental functioning. Introspection cannot find them. (This is proved by the fact that two acts of different dates can have the same object.) (“\textit{Phenomenology},” 175).

[R8] The theory of intentionality [Husserl’s] is an attempt not to repudiate, but to modify, elaborate and reform the ‘idea’ epistemology [deriving from Descartes and Locke] (ibid., 174).

[R9] [Husserl holds that] all that I can know about the world is what I can know about my fallible cognizings of the world and my resultant practical and emotional attitudes towards it. And if this were true, Husserl would, I think, have established some sort of primacy for phenomenology (ibid., 177).
\end{quote}

But Husserl did not maintain, and what he maintained does not entail, the view Ryle attributes to him in R9. \textit{That view} is a consequence of what Ryle calls “‘idea’ epistemology” in R8, in other words: a consequence of \textit{mental representationalism}, which involves the assumption [R10] “that what I am aware of when I am aware of something must always be an ‘idea’” (ibid., 174), that is: a \textit{mental representation} (as one says in more recent times than Locke’s). But, contrary to what Ryle (in effect) asserts in R8, Husserl did not maintain, and what he maintained does not entail, a sophisticated version of mental representationalism. That Husserl had no sympathies for mental representationalism and its consequence: \textit{the locking-in of the mind} (lifelong prison with no hope to get out), is sufficiently evident from H3 (see footnote 10) and H5. Even at the time Ryle wrote “Phenomenology”, he ought to have known from Husserl’s published works (notably the \textit{Logical Investigations} and \textit{Ideas I}) that Husserl was \textit{not} a sympathizer with, let alone a modernizer of, Lockean (or Cartesian) representationalism. It is true that the conscious mind is an epistemological and ontological first principle for Husserl; for him, as Ryle says, [R11] “[n]ot merely was the theory of Mind [qua Phenomenology] logically prior to all the other branches of theory, but Mind became the source or home of all existence” (“\textit{Review of Marvin Farber: ‘The Foundations of Phenomenology’},” 221). But this – Husserl’s idealism – does not entail a modernized version of Lockean representationalism; rather,

\textsuperscript{12} Compare H3 and the subsequent comment, both in footnote 10.
it is incompatible with any non-otiose form of mental representationalism about the physical world, since non-otiose mental representationalism about the physical world requires realism (without realism, the cognition of the physical via mental representations of the physical seems a perfectly superfluous detour) and realism is logically incompatible with idealism.

But how can one embrace Husserl’s theory of intentionality – in particular, his theory of basic intentionality – without also embracing his idealism? This may seem a question exceedingly difficult to answer. I hold that Husserl’s theory of intentionality is, in fact, compatible with an unorthodox form of realism: direct realism (which must not be confused with naïve realism); but for reasons of limitations of space I cannot here go into this matter. In any case, Ryle’s unquestioning adherence to realism in combination with a fixed idea of what realism under broadly Cartesian premises (i.e., Husserl’s premises) must be like is likely to be one of the factors responsible for Ryle’s confusion in reporting on Husserl’s philosophy, which confusion is exhibited by R8 and R9, and in no less degree also by R7. True: for Husserl, as Ryle says in R7, “‘contents’ are not real parts of mental functioning”, and true: in a sense Husserl denies, as Ryle says, “that what an act is ‘of’ is essentially contained in or adjoined to the act”. Husserl does deny (with good reason, I think) the real in-being of the intentional object in the intentional experience [Erlebnis], that is: its being in the latter as a real part – piece or aspect – of it: see H4 and H5 (and see also, interestingly, Id1, §90, 207–208, where Husserl denies the real in-being of the intentional object in the intentional experience precisely because it would lead to the absurd doubling of realities one observes in mental representationalism13). However, Ryle would have done well to point out that in another sense Husserl also affirms “that what an act is ‘of’ is essentially contained in or adjoined to the act”: see the inseparably belonging and necessarily belonging that are spoken of in H2, and consider the force of the “eo ipso” in the following:

[H6] If this experience is present in its psychical, concrete fullness, then eo ipso the intentional ‘relation to an object’ is consummated [vollzogen], eo ipso an object is ‘intentionally present’ (V.LU, §11, 32; cf. LU21-subtext, 386).14

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13 One may well wonder: had Ryle not read §§ 90 and 43 of Id1 when he made a mental representationalist out of Husserl?

14 And compare the following quotation, which – being from the second, 1913-edition of Husserl’s Logical Investigations – presents a later version of the quotation in H6, a version that is explicit regarding the essentiality of the intentional object for the intentional experience: [H6a] “If this experience is present, then eo ipso – this, I emphasize, is due to its own essence – the intentional ‘relation to an object’ is consummated, eo ipso an object is ‘intentionally present’” (LU21, V. LU, §11, 386). And just as explicit in the same regard is the following quotation
Ryle apparently did not take notice of that other sense (of the in-being of the intentional object in the intentional experience). At least, he does not mention it. On the other hand, Ryle’s correctly ascribing to Husserl the view that intentionality is an internal relation – see R6 – suggests that that other sense touched at least the fringes of Ryle’s mind. If he did take notice of it, then presumably he did not mention it because he believed that the Husserlian conception of basic intentionality as an inner relation of intentional experiences to intentional objects qua genuine subjects of attributes – is untenable even if intentionality may be taken to be an internal relation that is not a specification of the having-as-a-real-part relation for experiences. We have not yet seen Ryle’s reasons for believing this. But before I get to them, note how very puzzling Ryle’s further remarks in R7 are: “Introspection cannot find them [i.e., the intentional ‘contents’ of mental acts]. (This is proved by the fact that two acts of different date can have the same object.)” But of course introspection can “find them”! It must presumably remain forever unknown to us what made Ryle ascribe the opposite view to Husserl. For the fact mentioned parenthetically in R7, though indeed a fact, does not prove that opposite view – and certainly does not prove it for Husserl. Quite the contrary: that “two acts of different dates can have the same object” is proven true for Husserl (and others) by introspection (involving retrospection) finding the same object “in” two acts of different dates.

But introspectively finding the same object “in” temporally separate mental acts A and B presupposes introspectively finding the object “in” A – and how is even this latter feat possible? In this way: by looking introspectively at the intentional experience, I also look introspectively at the content of that experience, its object, which is essentially implied by the experience and inseparable from it (though not a piece or aspect of it). If I perceive a tree, I may pay no attention to my perception of the tree; but if I concurrently pay attention to my perception of the tree, that is, if I explicitly perceive that perception (thus doing introspec-

from a lecture of 1907: [H6b] “Perceiving this bank or perceiving that house, and so on, or bringing to mind such perceiving, I find that the statement: this perception is a perception of a bank, that perception is a perception of a house, and so on, expresses something that belongs to the essence of the respective perceptions and cannot be separated from them. If we consider [...] other cogitationes, other pure phenomena, then we also find such among them that we, without counting them as perceptions, find nevertheless to be the same as perceptions in the following respect: relatedness to an object belongs to their essence, too; for example, a bringing to mind, in fantasy, of a bank, of a house etc, a bringing to mind of a picture of a house, a thinking of a house, and so on. Even without entering into an essence-investigation of these natures of pure phenomena, we have self-evident knowledge of the fact that here, too, the objectualness [Gegenständlichkeit] which is expressed by the little word of (fantasy of a house, etc) is something that is essential to them” (DuR, §4, 14).
tion *par excellence*), then the tree perceived “in” the perceived perception has of course not suddenly disappeared “from” the perception: the perception has not turned suddenly “meaningless.”\(^{15}\) The tree is still “there”, and I may inspect it together with its perception, learning from that inspection precisely in which manner the tree is presented by its perception. And if I do such introspective inspection, then I do the work that is basic for Phenomenology.

§4 Rylean Husserl and non-Rylean Husserl

Sometimes Husserl came rather close to holding what Ryle says in R6 that he, Husserl, *should* hold:

[H7] Though speaking of a *relation* [*Beziehung*] is not going to be avoidable here, still those [linguistic] expressions must be avoided that positively invite the misinterpretation of the relationship [Verhältnisses] as a relationship that is psychologically real [i.e., real according to the findings and presuppositions of the natural science of psychology], or pertains to the real content [i.e., the pieces or aspects] of the experience. [...] [O]nly one item is present, the intentional experience, whose essential descriptive character is, precisely, the referential [bezügliche] intention. According to its [the intention’s] specific particularization, it fully and solely amounts to the having-in-mind [Vorstellen] of this object, or the making of judgments about it, etc (*LU*\(^2\), V. *LU*, §11, 385–386; with some differences also in *V.LU*, 31–32).

In this quotation, Husserl shows himself somewhat dissatisfied with the designation “relation [*Beziehung*]” for basic intentionality, and avoids a decidedly relational description of it. In fact, the two misinterpretations of (basic) intentionality that Husserl speaks about in *LU*\(^2\) immediately before the passage in H7 may even give one the idea that Husserl is, in effect, rejecting *any* (truly) relational conception of basic intentionality. Yet, immediately following the passage from *LU*\(^2\) in H7, we have in *LU*\(^2\) the statement contained in H6a (in footnote 14), and this latter statement – a modified version of the H6-statement – rather persuasively suggests (and even more so the passage in H6b, also in footnote 14) that basic intentionality is for Husserl *after all* a *relation* to a *genuine subject*.

\(^{15}\) Perhaps Ryle is regarding introspection as a sort of abstractive procedure, analogous to the one that is in operation when, in contrast to one’s normal way of perceiving written words of one’s mother tongue, one is looking exclusively at the graphic appearances of them, abstracting from what they mean. But even if introspection *can* be done in a meaning/intent-abstracting manner, it certainly *need not* be done in that manner.
of attributes, albeit an *internal* relation. However, a few lines further down in *LU*²*21*, we find Husserl saying the following:

[H8] And of course such an experience can be given in consciousness, with its particular intention, without the object existing, perhaps even without it being capable of existing; the object is intended/meant, that is, the intending of it is experience [Erlebnis]; but it is then [i.e., in the case of non-existence] only intended, as supposedly existing [vermeint], and is, in truth, nothing (ibid., 386; verbatim in *V.LU*, 32).

This, again, suggests that Husserl advocates a non-relational view of basic intentionality, a view rather in accordance with Ryle’s ideas in R6, and the impression is strengthened further on in the text:

[H9] That the object is a ‘merely intentional’ one does, of course, not mean that it exists, but only in the *intentio* (hence as its real part), or that there exists in it some shadow of the object; but it means: the intention, the ‘meaning’/intending an object which is such-and-such exists,¹⁶ but *not* the object (*LU*²*21*, V. LU, §21, supplement, 439; verbatim in *V.LU*, 80, disregarding insignificant differences).

Should we, therefore, conclude that for Husserl there is, in the end, *no* intentional object as a genuine subject of attributes that is intrinsic to an intentional experience, but, properly speaking, merely the intentional experience’s (the act’s) intrinsic intending, which, in Ryle’s words (see R6), is “merely a property of it so specific as to be a differentia or in some cases an individualizing description of it” – an intending that attains its object, *if* it attains its object, quite *outside* of the intentional experience itself?

If this is Husserl’s position in *LU*²*21* and earlier (the picture is not entirely clear since Husserl seems to waver somewhat: see H6a, H6b, and H6), it is certainly not his position in *Id1* and later, notwithstanding the fact that *Id1* and *LU*²*21* were both published in *the same year*: 1913. In *Id1* Husserl distinguishes – but note: he does not distinguish in *V.LU* and *LU*²*21* (see *V.LU*, §21, supplement,

¹⁶ In a footnote, Husserl adds: [H9a] “This [i.e., that the meaning/intending an object which is such-and-such exists] does not straightaway say, to emphasize it again, that one is attentive to it [i.e., the meant/intended object], perhaps even thematically concerned with it, although such-like, too, is included in our general talk of meaning/intending” (*LU*²*21*, V. LU, §21, supplement, 439; the footnote is not in *V.LU*). Husserl here implicitly distinguishes between explicit meaning/intending and implicit meaning/intending (meaning/intending *simpliciter* covering both modes) – and at the same time demonstrates implicitly (and presumably unintentionally) how tenacious is an understanding of the expressions “intentional object [intentionaler Gegenstand]” and “meant/intended object [gemeinter Gegenstand]” according to which these expressions are not mere façons de parler.
79–80, and LU²21, 439) – between, on the one hand, the object simpliciter, the actual/“real” object,¹⁷ the object in nature (or, as I shall also say, the object in the world) and, on the other hand, the meant/intended object as such (see Id1, §89, 205, in particular H2, and Id1, §90, 207–208). The meant/intended object as such (for example, the perceived tree as such; cf. H2) exists, and exists as a genuine subject of attributes, along with the intentional experience to which it intrinsically belongs (i.e., it exists as an intentional object); but the corresponding object simpliciter (for example, the tree simpliciter; cf. H2) may well not exist even though the intentional experience and its essentially implied intentional object exist, and exist entirely unscathed by the non-existence of the object simpliciter. But if the corresponding object simpliciter does exist (or in other words: if the meant/intended object as such exists not only as an intentional object, but also as an object in the world: if it is “actual”), then the object simpliciter is, for Husserl, no other object than the meant/intended object as such; that much emerges from H5 and is presupposed by H3. This conditional identification of the object simpliciter with the intended/meant object as such (Husserl’s explicit formulation of this idea can be found in EPh1, §17, 117) is the joint product of Husserl’s rejection, throughout his career, of mental representationalism and of the new direction his thought took with Id1.

Thus, if we look at the position Husserl has in Id1 and later, it is true that the intentional objects of consciousness are for Husserl genuine subjects of attributes to which intentional experiences are intentionally related – precisely this (and not more) can be truthfully asserted, if understood in a certain way, even if one adopts the Rylean position that is ascribable to Husserl in LU²21 and earlier. But the crucial differences between that position and the position that Husserl has in Id1 are the following: (1) according to the former, but not the latter position, intentional experiences can fail (and in fact many of them do fail) to be intentionally related to an intentional object (since there is no actual/“real” object that corresponds to their intention); (2) according to

¹⁷ I have put scare-quotes around the word “real” in “the actual/real object” (already in footnote 10) for the following reason: On the one hand, “real”, as normally understood, is a prima facie correct rendering of Husserl’s “wirklich” in “der wirkliche Gegenstand”, “das wirkliche Objekt”, just like “actual” is, and it is a rendering that carries, considerably less elusively than “actual”, the connotation of non-mentalness and extra-mentalness (in addition to the core content possible-but-not-merely-possible) – a connotation not unwanted, in fact: essential, in the present context. But on the other hand, “real” has a special technical meaning for Husserl (the word “thinglike” could be used for expressing it) that, already in its core, is non-identical to the meaning of “actual” (see Id2, §17, 54, and Id1, §152, 354). Thus, Husserl himself, when speaking Phenomenologically, would not have used “real” instead of “wirklich”. Hence the scare-quotes.

¹⁸ That intentional objects are genuine subjects of attributes to which intentional experiences are intentionally related – precisely this (and not more) can be truthfully asserted, if understood in a certain way, even if one adopts the Rylean position that is ascribable to Husserl in LU²21 and earlier. But the crucial differences between that position and the position that Husserl has in Id1 are the following: (1) according to the former, but not the latter position, intentional experiences can fail (and in fact many of them do fail) to be intentionally related to an intentional object (since there is no actual/“real” object that corresponds to their intention); (2) according to
may wish to ask Ryle in consideration of what he says in R6. I finally get to Ryle’s reasons against interpreting talk of the object of an intentional experience (according to Ryle, misleading talk: cf. R5a, b, and R6) as being talk of a genuine subject of attributes to which an intentional experience is internally related (cf. R6) – which interpretation is, to have a brief designation for it, the Id1-intentionality-view. This view, which we must regard as Husserl’s definitive view on basic intentionality (definitively defining Husserlian basic intentionality), is called “erroneous” by Ryle (“Phenomenology”, 175) – and here is why: Ryle, in effect, believes that that view is either non-Meinongian and (hopelessly) unclear (Scylla), or Meinongian and inconsistent (Charybdis):

Scylla:
[R12] [A]s Husserl seems, anyhow latterly, to reject Platonic or Meinongian subsistence theories, it becomes very hard to see in what sense he holds that ‘intentional objects’ really are genuine objects or subjects of attributes at all (“Phenomenology”, 175).

Charybdis:
[R13] [T]he phrase ‘the object of Jones’ desire or fancy’, e.g., is not necessarily a referentially used ‘the’-phrase [...] For there is nothing of which we can say truly or even falsely ‘that is the object of Jones’ desire or fancy’. We can indeed state which attributes Jones is imagining something to be characterized by or what are the features of his situation, the absence or alteration of which Jones desiderates. But these statements will not require us to employ descriptive phrases referring to queer non-actual objects. Such references could not be made, for they would be self-contradictory (ibid.).

As in every Scylla-and-Charybdis argumentation, it is also in the present instance of one the decisive question whether its two monstrous alternatives are all the relevant still open – i.e., not already definitively excluded – alternatives. Might the Id1-intentionality-view not also be non-Meinongian and clear (and consistent)? Or Meinongian and consistent (and clear)? Let me first consider the chances – of not being definitively excludable – of the second of these two non-monstrous alternatives.

The Id1-intentionality-view in Meinongian perspective is the Id1-intentionality-view combined (1) with Meinong’s assumptions that some objects do not exist and that existence is actuality (for references, see footnote 19), and (2) with the readiness to employ non-existent objects in the description of intentionality. Ryle believes (as I understand R13) that for many instances of inten-

the former, but not to the latter position, if an intentional experience is intentionally related to an intentional object (since there is an actual/“real” object – therefore: a genuine subject of attributes – that corresponds to its intention), then that relationship is not internal to the intentional experience itself.
tional experience (in particular, of the desiring or fancying kind, and we might also consider the hallucinating kind) the \textit{Idt}-intentionality-view in Meinongian perspective requires us, when we try to implement it in describing those experiences, to refer to non-actual objects, which referring, however, is self-contradictory, according to Ryle, and therefore impossible. Ryle is right with respect to what the \textit{Idt}-intentionality-view in Meinongian perspective requires us to do here; but what he finally concludes – namely, the impossibility of doing what it requires us to do – is questionable. For obtaining that conclusion, Ryle relies (unquestioningly) on the assumption of the identity, or at least the necessary co-extensiveness, of existence and actuality and on the assumption that (successful) reference necessarily requires the existence of what is, allegedly, being referred to. Ryle can be regarded to be implicitly arguing in R13, on the basis of those two implicitly made assumptions, against the possibility of reference to the non-actual, and therefore also against the \textit{Idt}-intentionality-view in Meinongian perspective. As follows:

Suppose one refers to a non-actual X. This entails that X exists (for reference necessarily requires existence). But the supposition that X is non-actual has the further necessary consequence that X does not exist (for actuality is identical to, or at least necessarily coextensive with, existence).

But it is entirely reasonable to hold against this attempted \textit{reductio} of reference to the non-actual that existence and actuality are not the same, are not even co-extensive; after all, the state of affairs that London is flooded by a tsunami is a state of affairs, and of course an \textit{existent} state of affairs, but, fortunately, not an actual (or obtaining) one. And even if actuality and existence were the same – and it must be admitted that many, perhaps most, people cannot help identifying them and that, indeed, Meinong himself identified them – it is still entirely reasonable to hold against Ryle’s attempted \textit{reductio} that reference does not necessarily require existence; for of course one can refer to the non-existent (the non-existent being nothing other than the non-actual if existence and actuality are the same). Let me give an example, one that, in fact, emerges from R13 itself – assuming for the sake of the argument, as Meinong assumes, that actuality and existence are the same. Somebody asks: “\textit{What} is it that Jones desires most?” Answer: “He most desires travelling to the moon. That is the object of Jones’ strongest desire.” Contrary to what is implied by what Ryle tells us (see R13), the person who gives this answer can reasonably be taken to be making a statement that is true or false of \textit{something} – even in case Jones never in fact travels to the moon, which not unlikely outcome renders the state of affairs of Jones’ travelling to the moon (perpetually) non-actual, that is, non-existent (as-
suming identity of actuality and existence). For if Jones never travels to the moon, then the phrase “the object of Jones’ strongest desire” can *none the less* be reasonably taken to be used referentially in the above-described brief dialogue, namely, to refer to the state of affairs of Jones’ travelling to the moon, which, if Jones never travels to the moon, is an object (of Jones’ desire) that is (perpetually) *non-actual* and (assuming identity of actuality and existence) *non-existent*.

It is safe to conclude that the *Id1*-intentionality-view in Meinongian perspective is *consistent* (and clear). It is also safe to presume that only a small minority of philosophers will find such a perspective attractive (in spite of Meinongianism having found able defenders). “The prejudice in favour of the actual” that Meinong noted in 1904 (“On Object Theory”, 485) is still alive and flourishing, although *today*, when non-actual objects are being commented on, the frequency of discriminatory epithets – like “queer” (see R13), “fleshless”, “other-worldly” (for the latter two, see *CoM*, 245) – is somewhat lower (it seems to me) than it was in Ryle’s times.

How fortunate, then, that Husserl, in having the *Id1*-intentionality-view, is not committed to a Meinongian perspective and, in fact, does not adopt a Meinongian perspective! This is correctly noted by Ryle in R12; but, contrary to what Ryle believes, having the *Id1*-intentionality-view in non-Meinongian perspective does not render it *unclear*, so as to make true what Ryle also says in R12: that “it becomes very hard to see in what sense he [Husserl] holds that ‘intentional objects’ really are genuine objects or subjects of attributes at all”. The *Id1*-intentionality-view can be – and is in Husserl’s hands – *non-Meinongian and clear* (and consistent). This is best seen when we consider an example: a visual experience of a golden mountain, which is, however, a hallucination. As a preliminary, I note (a) that Husserl, unlike Meinong (see footnote 19), does not identify existence and actuality, but uses “actual [wirklich]” (*not* always, but when he employs the word to characterize the *not-merely-intentional*) to express exist-

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19 A few pages further on, Meinong speaks of the “just now touched on prejudice in favour of existence” (“On Object Theory”, 489). Thus: the prejudice in favour of existence is, for Meinong, the prejudice in favour of the actual. This indicates that Meinong belongs with those who identify existence and actuality (as does Ryle). But Meinong is debarred (or perhaps saved) from joining the vast multitude of the orthodox – the host of the *actualists* – by his heterodox belief that *some objects do not exist* (for the notorious paradoxical formulation of this belief – a formulation that Meinong meant merely playfully, and not as the formulation of a substantial paradox – see “On Object Theory”, 490). Note that by his asserting that some objects do not exist, Meinong did not mean to assert that some objects are *nothing*, that is: not identical with anything (not even with themselves). He merely meant to say that *some objects*, though they are each *something* (that is, identical with something), are *not actual*. 
tent-as-an-object-in-the-world, which is a concept that exceeds both the concept existent and the concept possible-but-not-merely-possible (we may also use “real” for expressing that Husserlian concept, though this option is closed to Husserl himself: see footnote 17); and (b) that Husserl, unlike Meinong (see footnote 19), does not believe that there are non-existent objects or anything non-existent. (Husserl, therefore, is neither an actualist nor a Meinongian.)

According to the Id1-intentionality-view in Meinongian perspective, the just-mentioned visual experience (and via the experience also the subject of it) is internally intentionally related to a golden mountain, but to a non-existent golden mountain. In contrast, according to the Id1-intentionality-view in Husserl’s non-Meinongian perspective, the visual experience is not internally or otherwise intentionally related to anything non-existent (for there is no such thing). Rather, what is true according to that view, in that perspective, is this: the visual experience is, qua this visual experience, internally intentionally related to something that exists as an intentional object, namely, to this (visually experienced) golden mountain (as such, that is: as visually experienced), a genuine subject of attributes;²⁰ but the visual experience, being a hallucination, is not intentionally related to any golden mountain that exists as an object in the world (or as one also says: to an “actual” or “real” golden mountain). It follows that the (visually experienced) golden mountain (as such), though existing as an intentional object, does not exist as an object in the world. But this does not imply that Husserl is on Meinongian tracks after all, as little as being on Meinongian tracks is implied by saying that a horse exists as a horse, but does not exist as a dog – for it does not follow from this that the horse is a non-existent object. Regarding the object which, according to Id1, corresponds to (and is not – as it would be according to V.LU, 79–80, LU²21, 439 – unconditionally identical to)²¹ the visually experienced golden mountain as such, namely, the golden mountain simpliciter, the actual/“real” golden mountain, the golden mountain in nature (or in the world) – regarding this “object” (but, you may ask, why the scare-quotes?), the thing to be said according to the Id1-intentionality-view in Husserl’s non-Meinongian perspective is this (given the hallucinatory nature of the experience considered): it is neither an existent object nor a non-existent object (hence the scare-quotes!); it is for Husserl, in his later Id1-guise no less than in his earlier LU²21-guise, [H10] “not at all [überhaupt nicht]” (LU²21, V.LU, 387; verbatim in

²⁰ If it were not a genuine subject of attributes, it would be impossible that it be identical with the actual golden mountain, which, however, is possible and would be the case if the golden mountain existed as an object in the world.

²¹ But neither should “corresponds to” here be taken to imply a duality of objects.
V.LU, 32), “nothing [nichts]” (see H8, the end of the quotation).²² And Husserl would also say: it does not exist. That Husserl would use this latter way of speaking – the simple predication of simple non-existence – is shown by the end of the quotation in H9, and that he would use it specifically and explicitly with respect to the object simpliciter, in contrast to the intentional object as such, is shown by Id1, §90, 207. But “the golden mountain simpliciter does not exist” does not mean for Husserl: the golden mountain simpliciter is an object and does not exist. This latter, precisely, is what that sentence would mean for Meinong, on the basis of his property-conception of existence and, derivatively, non-existence, which conception has that sentence entail that some object does not exist, and very naturally leads (by the conjunction of several true statements of singular non-existence, each understood to be about yet another object) to the tenet that some, indeed many objects do not exist. (Thus, Meinong is speaking of the many, which share one and the same: non-existence.) In contrast, the meaning that Husserl attaches to “the golden mountain simpliciter does not exist” is that the “the golden mountain simpliciter” – this designator – has no referent, or what is for this designator (with this sense) saying the same thing: no referent among the objects in the world. (Consequently, “the golden mountain simpliciter does not exist” and “the golden mountain simpliciter does not exist as an object in the world” are, in their Husserlian interpretation, logically equivalent.)

Husserl would not have needed Ryle to tell him that a ‘the’-phrase “is not necessarily a referentially used ‘the’-phrase” (cf. R13); for he would have asserted (as true) the statement “the golden mountain simpliciter does not exist [or in view of H10: is not at all, is nothing]” precisely because the ‘the’-phrase “the golden mountain simpliciter” had in his eyes no referent, and thus, since that ‘the’-phrase has indeed no referent (as everyone knows), he would have used

²² The difference at this point between Id1 and LU²1 is this: in the latter, but not in the former, the nothingness of the actual object is transferred to the intentional object – due to the unconditional identity of them that is assumed in V.LU and LU²1, but not in Id1. Thus, Husserl would say in LU²1 that the had-in-mind golden mountain is nothing, just as the actual golden mountain is nothing; all that exists is the intention (see H9). Not so in Id1. – The emphaticalness of the earlier, unconditional identification of intentional and actual object is truly remarkable and well worth quoting: [H10a] “One only needs to say it, and everybody must acknowledge it: that the intentional object of the having-in-mind [der Vorstellung] is the same object as its actual and, if applicable, its outer object, and that it is absurd to distinguish between the two” (V.LU, §21, supplement, 79; verbatim in LU²1, 439, disregarding insignificant differences). In the German original, the italicized passage is printed spaced out, and the words “derselbe [the same]” and “widersinnig [absurd]” are, in addition to being printed spaced out, italicized (already). Husserl’s emphasis could hardly be greater.
it non-referentially and would have known that he is doing so. Accordingly, Husserl would not have inferred from the statement “the golden mountain simpliciter does not exist” the (literally understood) statement “something does not exist” (and compare the behaviour of the negated existence-predicate in modern free logic).

On the other hand, given that a golden mountain is visually experienced by him, Husserl would have asserted (as true) “the visually experienced golden mountain as such exists” precisely because the ‘the’-phrase “the visually experienced golden mountain as such” had in his eyes a referent (in, or relative to, the situation), or what is for this designator (with this sense) saying the same thing: a referent among the intentional objects. (Consequently, “the visually experienced golden mountain as such exists” and “the visually experienced golden mountain as such exists as an intentional object” are, in their Husserlian interpretation, logically equivalent.)

It may be helpful to give a schematic description of the \textit{Idt}-intentionality-view (always taken now in Husserl’s own, non-Meinongian perspective, which, qua Husserl’s perspective, is also non-representationalist\textsuperscript{23}, to the extent that this view has here been examined:

(1.) Suppose you have an intentional experience, \(P\). \(P\) is internally (intrinsically-essentially) related to a genuine subject of attributes: \(P\)’s intentional object, \(O\) [e.g., the experienced tree as such]. \(O\) cannot fail to exist as long as \(P\) itself exists.

(2.) Existence, for \(O\), means existence as an intentional object. But if \(O\) not only exists – i.e., exists as an intentional object – but also exists as an object in the world, then the object that in the world corresponds to \(O\)\textsuperscript{24} [e.g., the tree simpliciter, the actual tree] is simply \(O\). If, however, \(O\) does not exist as an object in the world, then the object that in the world corresponds to \(O\) is not \(O\), but nothing, that is: the just formulated (italicized) ‘the’-phrase does not refer to anything.

(3.) Existence, for the object that in the world corresponds to \(O\), means existence as an object in the world. But if the object that in the world corresponds to \(O\) exists – i.e., exists as

\textsuperscript{23} That is, basic intentionality is taken by Husserl to be directed, in consciousness, \textit{immediately} at the intentional object itself, which, in turn, is taken to be \textit{in no sense} a representation (mental or other) – unless, of course, we are dealing with \textit{representational consciousness} (e.g., perceiving a picture, symbol, etc).

\textsuperscript{24} Since the expression “corresponds to” \textit{does} suggest a \textit{duality} of objects (of intentional objects and the objects “out there”), I herewith explicitly warn against connecting this idea with it; it is as un-Husserlian as can be. Instead of “the object that in the world corresponds to \(O\) [i.e., to the intentional object of \(P\)]” one can simply say, \textit{entirely avoiding the notion of correspondence}, “the object that exists in the world and is identical to \(O\)”, but must firmly keep in mind that this latter definite description need not have a referent, let alone one that is identical to \(O\), the intentional object of \(P\). However, the notion of correspondence – due to its unspecified nature (very different in this respect from the notion of identity) – \textit{does} have its advantages in the present context.
an object in the world – then the object that in the world corresponds to O is simply O (cf. footnote 10). If, however, the object that in the world corresponds to O does not exist – i.e., does not exist as an object in the world – then the object that in the world corresponds to O is not O, but nothing.

(4.) Given P, it is self-evident that O exists – exists as an intentional object. But it may take unforeseeably long to find out definitively whether or not O exists as an object in the world, and unforeseeably long to find out definitively whether or not the object that in the world corresponds to O exists (cf. footnote 10). (Note that according to (2.) and (3.) O exists as an object in the world if, and only if, the object that in the world corresponds to O exists.)

(5.) The nature of the correspondence between O and the object that in the world corresponds to O is such that – according to a systematic ambiguity – one and the same singular term may be meant to refer to the one, but may also be meant to refer to the other. For example, if O is the experienced golden mountain as such, then “the golden mountain” may be meant to refer to O, and if it is meant to refer to O, then the golden mountain exists (for then “the golden mountain” refers to O, and O exists); but instead it may be meant to refer to the object that in the world corresponds to O, and if it is meant to refer thus, then the golden mountain does not exist (for then “the golden mountain” refers, in fact, to nothing – assuming, of course, that there is no such thing as a real golden mountain).

(6.) The nature of the correspondence between O and the object that in the world corresponds to O is also such that it can be said that the object that in the world corresponds to O is, like O, an intentional object of P.²⁵ If the object that in the world corresponds to O exists, one can even say that P is intentionally related to the object that in the world corresponds to O (for then that object is simply O, according to (3.)).²⁶ This is not possible if the object that in the world corresponds to O does not exist; in that case, calling “it” an intentional object of P is a mere façon de parler (and any relation to it is impossible); for in that case all we really have to do with is this: P’s intending – in intending O (projected to be appropriately recurring in further experiences) – an object that in the world corresponds to O, though there is no such thing.

Obviously, this schematic description of the Id1-intentionality-view firmly belongs with what is often called the “East Coast interpretation” of Husserlian intentionality (it comes, so to speak, from the extreme “East Coast”). It has no truck with the “West Coast interpretation”: there is no need in it for Fregean senses, and it is not a mediator-theory of intentionality (cf. David Woodruff Smith’s

²⁵ Note that Husserl in at least one place speaks of the had-in-mind or thought object simpliciter [vorgestellten oder gedachten Objekt-schlechthin] of a having-in-mind [Vorstellung] besides its had-in-mind object as such [sein Vorgestelltes als solches]: see Id1, §90, 207.
²⁶ Note that an – in some sense – external description of a relatum in an internal relationship does not turn that relationship into an external one. Smaller-than between numbers is an internal relation, and 7 is intrinsically-essentially smaller than 8; these truths are not abolished by the fact that 8 can be arithmetico-externally described as “the number of the planets”.
and Ronald McIntyre’s influential book *Husserl and Intentionality*). It is simply true to Husserl.

One may well wonder why Husserl moved from his rather Rylean non-Meinongian *LU*\textsuperscript{21}-intentionality-view to his still non-Meinongian, but essentially non-Rylean *Id1*-intentionality-view – the view that has just been described (but only in a schematic way, and far from completely). But doubtless it has to do with – is itself an aspect of – Husserl’s strengthening of the ontological significance of consciousness in *Id1*, a strengthening that prominently concerns the subject of consciousness (the ego) and the objects of consciousness (the objects of basic intentionality), to the point that consciousness, for Husserl, came to carry within itself – as emerging in it – *the world*. Very likely, Husserl tended in this direction from the very beginning of his mature philosophy; this is suggested by his famous remark that

[H11] [t]he first breakthrough of this universal a-priori-correlation of object of experience and modes of givenness [Gegebenheitsweisen] (while working on my ‘Logical Investigations’, roughly in the year 1898) shook me so deeply that since then my entire life-work has been ruled by this task of working out systematically this a-priori-correlation (Crisis, §48, 169fn).

Quite possibly, all that prevented Husserl from adopting the *Id1*-intentionality-view even before *Id1* was the philosophically accidental circumstance that before *Id1* he did not see as clearly as he did in *Id1* how an intentional object can be taken to be in consciousness without also taking it, absurdly, to be a real part – an aspect [Moment] or piece [Stück] – of (the process of) consciousness. A striking indication of the existence of that accidental circumstance can be read out of the quotation in H9. When Husserl says in this *LU*\textsuperscript{21}-quotation (also to be found in *V.LU*) that “the object is a ‘merely intentional one’ does, of course, not mean that it exists, but only in the *intentio* (hence as its real part)”, he obviously repudiates the interpretation of “X is a merely intentional object” as “X is an object existing merely in the *intentio*” *because* he takes the latter to entail “X is a real part of the *intentio* [therefore, of the intentional experience]”: see the parenthetical explanatory phrase “hence as its real part”. Even in *V.LU* and *LU*\textsuperscript{21} Husserl seems to have sometimes known better than to assume the inevitability of *that* entailment, as is indicated by the *V.LU*-quotation in H6 and its *LU*\textsuperscript{21}-version in H6a. But his state of insight was certainly unstable. By and large, *before Id1*, being a real part of the intentional experience seemed to Husserl the only conceivable way of existing in, and of existing merely in, the intentional
experience a way, however, that is not viable for intentional objects (since such objects are identical in temporally separated experiences). Thus, before Id1, it seemed to Husserl that there is no way for a merely intentional object to be in the intentional experience; and, of course, there is also no way for a merely intentional object to be outside of it: [H13] “But neither is he [Jupiter] extra mentem, he is not at all” (LU²21, V. LU, §11, 387; verbatim in V.LU, 32; the first quotation in H10 are the three last words of the quotation in H13). For Husserl in LU²21, talk of “a merely intentional object” is in the Rylean way a mere façon de parler, for there is, in fact, nothing there to speak of, not even a shadow (see H9; for Husserl’s interpretation of non-existence as nothingness, see the end of H8). And yet, at the same time it is also true for Husserl in LU²21 that [H14] “[f]or consciousness, what is given is essentially the same, whether the had-in-mind object exists, or is fictitious and perhaps even absurd” (ibid.; verbatim in V.LU, 32, disregarding insignificant differences). What is given – the had-in-mind object, the object that is eo ipso “intentionally present” when the intentional experience is present (see H6, H6a) – is essentially the same whether that object exists or not? This manner of speaking certainly does not fit well with Husserl’s Ryleanism (avant la lettre) in LU²21. It even sounds Meinongian. The conflict is resolved in Husserl’s very own non-Meinongian and non-representationalist way in Id1, where he could consistently say, and only a few lines apart, the following two things (for the way to say them consistently, see the propositions (1.) – (6.)):  

[H15a] I perceive the thing, the object of nature, the tree there in the garden; this, and no other item, is the actual object of the perceiving ‘intention’. A second, immanent tree, or an ‘inner picture’ of the actual tree, of the tree standing out there before me, is not given [to consciousness] in any manner, and to suppose the like hypothetically only leads to absurdity (Id1, §90, 207–208).  

[H15b] And thus we ask quite generally [...] what is it that ‘lies’ self-evidently in the whole ‘reduced’ phenomenon [that is: the phenomenon considered without employing any assumptions regarding outward existence, existence in the world]? Well then, there lies in

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27 In Id1, Husserl no longer concludes being a real part of the intentional experience from being in the intentional experience: [H12] “It is only too tempting to say: in the experience the intention is given with its intentional object, which, as such, belongs inseparably to it, hence really inheres in the intention itself” (Id1, §90, 207). In this quotation, what Husserl is no longer attached to (though attached to in LU²21) is merely the inferential transition marked by the occurrence of “hence [in German: also]”. What comes before the “hence”, Husserl is still attached to (as the further context shows). Thus, Husserl was, at bottom, attached in LU²21, and remains attached in Id1, to the idea that the intentional object is inseparable from the intention and the intentional experience itself.
the perception also this: that it has its noematic sense, its ‘perceived as such’, ‘this flowering tree there in space’ – understood with the quotation marks – [that is: the object taken without employing any assumptions regarding outward existence, existence in the world] precisely the correlate belonging to the essence of the phenomenologically reduced perception (Id1, §90, 209).

There are many open questions, of course. In the rational elucidation of how an object with its properties is itself in the mind, it is only the first step to say that an object – the object itself – is, as intentional object, in the mind not as a real part, but in the sense of an experience being intrinsically-essentially related to it, it being inseparable from it. Whether one speaks of constitution (as Husserl did) or of intrinsic grasp (as a direct realist would), a true understanding of the matter can only be reached by describing the details of how an object as intentional object, and, as may be the case, also as real object for the mind, arises from (or is captured in) the correlative experiential modes of givenness [Gegebenheitsweisen]. This description was the task to which Husserl dedicated the, by far, greatest part of his life-work (cf. H11). A self-respecting philosophy of mind cannot afford to ignore it.

Note on the references and quotations

In all cases of books and articles originally published in German, references are to editions that contain the original German text. For references to Husserl, the editions in the Husserliana series have been used – with one exception: a separate edition of the original Fifth Logical Investigation of 1901 (but the matching bibliographical data from the Husserliana volume that contains the original Fifth Logical Investigation as a subtext have also been provided).

All references are by title or by a short italicized label that is indicative of title; the labels can each be found in square brackets at the end of the corresponding bibliographical entry. Often, in addition to page-numbers, paragraph-numbers have been provided. Paragraph-numbers are either standard – as in the case of Wittgenstein – or make it easier for readers to find a quotation.

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28 Since Husserl is an idealist, a real object for the mind is, for him, simply a real object (or in his diction: an actual object, an object simpliciter). Whether an object is real for the mind (or in idealist interpretation: real) is, usually, not the matter of one experience alone, but emerges only in the long, and intersubjective, course of experience.

29 I would like to thank Michael Wallner from the University of Graz, Austria, for his perceptive and inspiring comments on an earlier version of this paper.
(if they use a book-edition that is different from the one I used). Purely non-English titles have been translated into English by me, sometimes in abbreviated form (see, in the Bibliography, the titles inserted in square brackets). The translated titles are sometimes used in the paper for the general mention of a work; but in the case of Meinong, the translated title is also used for specific – page-indicating – reference to a German-language edition.

All translations of quotations from Meinong or Husserl into English are my own translations. In the case of Wittgenstein, Anscombe’s (original) translation has, in places, been modified by me in order to achieve a greater semantic nearness to the German original.

I always represent by *italics* the typographic devices of emphasis in quotations (in particular, double-spacing between letters). The devices are always already present in the originals – unless otherwise indicated. Square brackets are used in this paper, among other things, for insertions in quotations: insertions of interpretative remarks, of hard-to-translate German expressions right beside their translations, etc.

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