
"Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed," says the editor of this yearbook, Dean Zimmerman. An organ of publication which focuses solely on metaphysics is most welcome (though it is not the first such organ: the journal Metaphysica, now published by Springer, exists since 1999). Whether OSM is "the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field," as is trumpeted by the cover-text, remains to be seen. The third volume of OSM offers rich food for thought—this much is certain.

In this review, I can only give a mere inkling of this richness of metaphysical ideas. Of the ten essays of vol. 3, on five different metaphysical topics (two essays on human personhood, two on modality, two on temporal parts, three on mereology, and one on free will), I have selected five for closer scrutiny—for no other reason than that their topics happen to fall right into the middle of my current circle of philosophical interests and that space for reviews is, unfortunately, limited.


In his stimulating essay, Johnston recurs to an older publication of his (from 1987), the name of which occurs in the title of his essay. He defends the following positions regarding a question that is truly central to philosophy, the question of what it is to be a human person (it is reasonable to assume: if a satisfactory answer to this question is found, the vexed question of personal identity will also have found a satisfactory answer):

(I) We are essentially human beings. (49, 74)

(II) We are human animals, but not essentially so. (48, 52)

(III) Our bodies (organisms) are not animals, but constitute the animals we are. (55)

The argument for (III) is this (55): Our bodies, according to Johnston, wholly constitute us (as animals according to (II)), but are not identical with us; this much is simply assumed by Johnston. Hence our bodies do not think—for otherwise there would be two thinkers (I and my body, for example) where there should be only one. Animals, however, do think (in the relevant broad sense). Hence our bodies are not animals.

The argument for (II) is this: The first part of (II) ("We are human animals") Johnston believes to be established on the basis of the "too many minds" argument of Eric Olson (48):

1. (∃x) (x is a human animal & x is sitting in your chair)
2. (x) ((x is a human animal & x is sitting in your chair) → x is thinking)
3. (x) (x is thinking & x is sitting in your chair → x = you)
4. (∃x) (x is a human animal & x = you)

Johnston is very much impressed by this beautiful piece of reasoning and believes it to be entirely sound. Here is a companion piece:

5. (∃x) (x is a car & x is driving down the street at 2 a.m.)
6. (x) ((x is a car & x is driving down the street at 2 a.m.) → x is passing the red light)
7. (x) (x is passing the red light & x is driving down the street at 2 a.m. → x = you)
8. (∃x) (x is a car & x = you)

The crucial thing to be said about Olson's argument is this: While all its premises can be assumed to be true (given the right situation), it is not beyond reasonable doubt that what it is for a human animal to think is exactly the same as what it is for me to think. Johnston himself believes that human persons (I, for

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example) could still think even though they are no longer human animals (see below). As soon as “thinking” in premise 2 is indexed by “2” and “thinking” in premise 3 is indexed by “1” (the indices reflect the order of primary and derivativeness, as I see the matter), the conclusion of Olson’s argument no longer follows.

The second part of (II) (“We are not essentially human animals”) Johnston believes to be established by the possibility of a human person being reduced to (but surviving as) a mere talking head (47); a head cannot well be considered an animal.—I agree. But at the same time I wonder why the possibility of a human person being reduced to a mere talking head does not also count against the claim that we are essentially human beings. Can a talking head be considered any more a human being than a human animal? A talking head is not a human being in the usual sense of the word, though it is a human being if “human being” just means as much as “human person” or “human entity”—neither of which meanings, however, is helpful for determining what it is to be a human person. Thus Johnston’s very argument for his thesis no. (II) seems to render his thesis no. (I) either false or trivial (that is, trivial in the context of determining what it is to be a human person).

Johnston also describes the view according to which we are “associated with” dependent, brain-emergent mental substances (63). I myself have advocated “emergent mentalism” (though not under this name) in several of my publications, for example, in my book The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism (2004). One version of “emergent mentalism” is this: (1) we are certain brain-emergent mental substances (and not only “associated with” them) and (2) these substances are only anthroponomologically (i.e., according to what we, correctly or not, think are the laws of nature) dependent on—but metaphysically independent of—the human brain. Johnston declares emergent mentalism to be compatible with his view that we are human beings (64). I wonder whether he would also maintain the compatibility of his view with the particular version of emergent mentalism I just described, according to which we are brain-emergent, anthroponomologically dependent, but metaphysically independent, human souls. If not, then the content he associates with the expression “human being” would after all be not as non-illuminating as it seems to me to be in relation to the content of the expression “human person.”

Johnston criticizes that, in the discussion of personal identity, “fringe cases” are being given too much weight (38–41). But evidently the possibility he puts forward against Animalism (i.e., the thesis that we are essentially animals) is itself a fringe case (his use of a fringe case is, however, honored by the designation “philosophical reflection” (51)). Finally, Johnston urges the method of “real definition” in philosophy against the method of “conceptual analysis”. The first method is supposed to involve “using all of the relevant knowledge and argumentative ingenuity we can muster in order to say what it is to be the given item or phenomenon” (34; this description of the method is repeated on p. 41). Well, is any honest philosopher willingly doing less than that? Conceptual analysis is a part of it; for without conceptual analysis we won’t even know which pieces of knowledge are “relevant knowledge”. It is somewhat at odds with Johnston’s downplaying of conceptual analysis that he nevertheless advances “ordinary logical grammar” in favor of his position no. (III) (56).

2. Denis Robinson, Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival

Robinson’s essay refers to the same earlier article of Johnston’s (“Human Beings”) that Johnston’s essay refers to. (Robinson’s and Johnston’s two contributions together are called “Symposium: Human Beings”; using the term “symposium” for just two essays seems to me a bit of an exaggeration.) Robinson’s sympathies (3–4) in the debate about personal identity lie with psychological reductionism, the view “that the constitutive criteria for personal identity over time are predominantly psychological” (4), rather than with animalism, “the view that the familiar persons of our acquaintance are strictly and literally identical with members of a particular animal species” (5). But Rob-
inson’s main business in his essay is, after all (30), not a defense of psychological reductionism (Locke’s legacy), but to show that Johnston’s attempt (in “Human Beings”) to stay clear of animalism is not successful. As we have seen above, Johnston unequivocally asserts in his new essay that we (the human persons) are human animals—but only contingently so. Thus the current issue with Johnston, regarding his intent to abstain from animalism, can only be whether or not he has in fact successfully shown that we are not essentially human animals—animalism being taken to be a thesis about our essence. I, for my part, do believe that Johnston has successfully shown that we are not essentially human animals. But in this, I am of course—as is Johnston—relying on a certain view of what it is to be an animal, an interpretation that is revealed to me (as it is to Johnston) by conceptual analysis (which Johnston, however, is officially contemptuous of) on the basis of “ordinary logical grammar”. Robinson, however, points out that Olson—the animalist—considers a brain that is removed from its skull and kept alive by artificial means an “animal” (14–15). Well, why not say this, or that a living separated head is an animal? What’s wrong with these ways of speaking? After all, those separated body parts are living things, even animated things (which one would not say of a cell, for example, even though it is alive). For Johnston, who has higher aspirations for philosophy than to be “a sort of advanced lexicography” (34), it is not befitting to appeal to conceptual analysis. But what does he have to offer instead? To the extent that Johnston has not shown with the means that he allows himself to use what is wrong with Olson’s way of using the term “animal”, his case against animalism—as a thesis about our essence—has not been successful. Robinson also points out that, according to Johnston, “a creature consisting of the living body of a tiger onto which a living human brain had been successfully transplanted” would be a human being (30). Should not someone who is ready to assert something as astonishing as this also be ready to assert the far less astonishing thing that already a separated living human head or brain would be a human animal (though not a complete one)?

Surprisingly, in his response to Robinson (starting with p. 59), Johnston does not address these matters. Instead he offers an argument against psychological reductionism (the “Wide Psychological View”, as Johnston calls it). The gist of his argument is this (cf. 73): psychological reductionism tolerates the intermittent existence of human persons, hence it requires human persons to be psychologically continuous cross-time bundles—which, however, human persons are not, since human persons, but not such bundles, are reliably traceable by our nature-giving means of tracing (by “offloading”, as Johnston calls such tracing; see p. 36). But are those nature-given means of tracing philosophically respectable? Do they deserve to be accepted as factors that must be honored in philosophical argument (as they are accepted by Johnston)? Are they rationally reliable? Note that philosophical skepticism has always tended to undermine the reasonableness of our trust in Mother Nature (hence also the reasonableness of our trust in “offloading”). How can I be rationally certain—on the basis of a mere glance (that’s “offloading” in the extreme)—that the man who walked out of the room five minutes ago (and whom I did not follow) is the same person as the man now coming back into the room? David Hume maintained, long ago, that I have, in fact, no rational justification for my certainty at all. And Johnston has not answered Hume. In fact, he has overlooked the philosophical—epistemological and ontological—question that is implicit in Hume’s challenge.

3. Mark Heller, Worlds, Pluriverses, and Minds

According to Heller (78), “[t]he concrete world is not a possible world at all, and in particular it is not the actual world.” According to him (78), the words “possible”, “actual” and “merely possible” are restricted in their application to abstract, representational worlds: “Representational worlds are abstract objects that represent the one concrete world. . . . The accurate representation is the actual world. All the other abstract worlds are merely possible. They misrepresent the concrete
world." And what, according to Heller, are his abstract worlds? This (78, fn. 5): "[M]y worlds are just sets of sets constructed from the null set."

I am not a friend of Lewis-type modal realism. But I am not a friend of representationalist modal anti-realism, either. That position misses the point of modality, I believe. If it is true that I could have gone through the left door though I went through the right door, then this does seem to be true on other grounds than that there is a false story according to which I went through the left door and not through the right. You can have as many false stories as you like—this seems entirely irrelevant to making true modal statements (in accordance with their meaning) true, and false ones false. (My own views on modality are presented in my book The Theory of Ontic Modalities (2006).)

There are a couple of queries and objections that an "ersatz" like Heller—"ersatz" is David Lewis's somewhat disparaging term for modal constructivists, but Heller implicitly accepts the title (77)—should be able to answer satisfactorily:

(1) Ersatz possible worlds alone merely justify ersatz possibilities. Why should we be content with ersatz possibilities?
(2) Why this misleading talk of "abstract worlds" and "representational worlds" when all we literally have before us, by Heller's lights, is abstract representations of the one concrete world?
(3) Why this misleading talk of "merely possible worlds" and "the actual world" when all we literally have before us, by Heller's lights, is one accurate—or true—abstract representation of the concrete world and many inaccurate—or false—abstract representations of that same world?
(4) If applying the expression "world" to what is, properly speaking, a representation of the concrete world is deemed to be unproblematic, and if the application of the expressions "merely possible world" and "the actual world" to what is, properly speaking, a false or true representation of the concrete world is likewise deemed to be unproblematic, then why not also say "false worlds" instead of "merely possible worlds" and "the true world" instead of "the actual world"? But worlds are neither true nor false.

(5) Here is an argument against Hellerian representationalist ersatzism: Suppose "It is merely possible that A" means what according to Hellerian ersatzism it must mean, namely: that according to the true representation of the concrete world it is not the case that A, but according to some false representation of the concrete world it is the case that A. But there is a false representation of the concrete world according to which 1=5, while according to the true representation of the concrete world it is not the case that 1=5. Hence it is merely possible that 1=5. But, of course, it is not merely possible that 1=5; it is impossible.

Heller will perhaps respond that there is no false representation of the concrete world according to which 1=5. Well, how does he know that there is no false representation of the concrete world according to which 1=5? Presumably his answer will be that representations of the concrete world must—qua representations of the concrete world—be consistent, and a representation of the concrete world according to which 1=5 just isn't consistent. The "must" seems a bit arbitrary, since there are representations of other things than the concrete world which are inconsistent. But, more importantly, "1=5" is evidently an inconsistency not on the basis of its logical form—it is an inconsistency because it is (in the strongest sense) impossible that 1=5. Thus, the fact of impossibility is, in this case, more fundamental than the fact of inconsistency: the latter fact is grounded—epistemologically and ontologically—by the former fact. Hence the impossibility that 1=5 (for example) is prior to the conceptual resources of representationalist ersatzism, and therefore this position does not offer an adequate account of modality.

Heller may well have responses to all these queries and objections, but they are not the concern of the presently considered essay of his, which is dedicated to demonstrating, among other things, the possibility of (psychophysical) dualism (90). I very
much sympathize with this latter aim of Heller’s (unfortunately, he merely can be said to aim at the ersatz possibility of dualism). I even agree with the following principle of his: “[I]f something can be represented consistently in a sufficiently powerful language, then that something is possible” (98). And I do think, like Heller, that dualism can be consistently represented in a sufficiently powerful language. All I take exception to is Heller’s ersatzist position that consistent representability in a sufficiently powerful language grounds possibility ontologically. The correct relationship of ontological grounding between possibility and consistent representability in a sufficiently powerful language is, I submit, generally the very inverse of what Heller takes it to be.

4. Michael Jubien, Analyzing Modality

Jubien’s critical points against David Lewis’s well-known analysis of modality are justified—and seem to me to be almost as well-known as is the object of Jubien’s criticism: I will not repeat them here. But Lewis’s analysis of modality serves Jubien merely as an example. The weak points of that analysis are intended by Jubien to help make plausible a general tenet of his: “But in fact I think any possible-worlds analysis would be doomed, regardless of the intrinsic nature of the postulated worlds.” (103) Here, I believe, we would do well to distinguish one possible-worlds analysis of modality from another; according to whether or not it is intended to be reductive. If such an analysis aims at a reductive analysis of modality (as does Lewis’s), then it is as likely to be “doomed” as most extra-scientific projects of reductionism are. If, however, a possible-worlds analysis merely uses the concept of possible worlds in order to elucidate the concepts of modality (perhaps after having been founded on other ways of elucidation, as is the case with my deduced possible-worlds analysis in The Theory of Ontic Modalities), then such an effort of analysis may well be crowned with considerable success. Three questions must be distinguished: (1) What are possible worlds? (2) Are there non-actual possible worlds? (3) Is the concept of possible world useful for the analysis of modality? Note that one cannot answer question (3) positively without also giving a positive answer to question (2) and an answer with substantial content to question (1). (Note, however, that one can give a negative answer to question (3), while giving a positive answer to question (2) and an answer with substantial content to question (1)). It seems to me that the ultimate basis of Jubien’s rejection of possible-worlds analyses of modality is simply his belief that there are no non-actual possible worlds (i.e., his denial of (2)). This actualist motivation of his is clearly visible in the following passage: “[I]f there’s a plausible way of understanding modal facts without going beyond what is actual, then it ought to be preferred to any account that makes them depend on (or be identical with) other-worldly matters. Thus I will later strive to analyze these modal concepts in a way that appeals only to what actually exists.” (104) Jubien, it seems to me, is striving for the impossible—for there just is no “plausible way of understanding modal facts without going beyond what is actual.” Is not ‘merely possible’ a modal concept? Certainly it is. This modal concept, ‘merely possible’, is defined as ‘possible, but non-actual’. Now, it seems to me an undeniable modal fact that some entity is merely possible, that is: possible, but non-actual. If it were otherwise, what would be the point in having the concept ‘possible’ besides the concept ‘actual’? But here are two straight arguments (the second one is ad personam; both arguments are well-considered, but this is not the place to defend them):

(A) If there is no possible but non-actual entity, then this is not contingently so, but necessarily. Therefore: if it is possible that there is a possible but non-actual entity, then there is a possible but non-actual entity. Now, U.M. is actual, but it is possible for U.M. to be non-actual. Therefore the following is possible: U.M. is non-actual and it is possible for U.M. to be actual. Therefore: it is possible that there is a possible but non-actual entity. Therefore finally: There is a possible but non-actual entity, and hence it is a modal fact that some entity is merely possible.
(B) Jubien is a friend of properties, in fact: he is a friend of properties of the abundant and Platonic variety of properties (106–107). So am I. So here's a property we both accept: being a man-eating mummy. This property is not actually instantiated (thank God!), though it is not necessary (in the strictest sense) that it be not actually instantiated. Therefore this property is possible (in the broadest sense), but non-actual; that is: merely possible. Hence, again, it is a modal fact that some entity (for example, being a man-eating mummy) is merely possible.

And this modal fact certainly cannot be understood without going beyond what is actual: who does not accept non-actual entities or does not understand what "non-actual" means cannot grasp the fact that some entity is merely possible.

But according to Jubien (106), modality does not have to do with non-actual possible worlds or other mere possibilities; according to him, "modality has to do with relations involving the abstract part of the world, specifically with relations among (Platonic) properties." What does he have in mind? For example, the necessity of all horses being animals is founded on the relationship of primitive intrinsic entailment between the property of being a horse and the property of being an animal (119–120). For me, this is readily understandable. I have made a somewhat similar proposal for analyzing modality, one that centrally involves primitive intrinsic entailment between states of affairs; I call this latter relation (or rather its inverse) "intensional parthood" (see The Theory of Ontic Modalities, where I also use intrinsic entailment between states of affairs to define intrinsic entailment between properties, thereby reducing the theory of intrinsic property-entailment to the theory of intrinsic entailment between states of affairs). But—at least on the face of it—entailment between properties does not carry as far as intrinsic entailment between states of affairs. What does Jubien, on the basis of his property-theory of modality, make of the following modal fact: It is possible (in the broadest sense) that there is a man-eating mummy? He does not discuss possibility-facts (sticking exclusively to the analysis of necessity-facts—the area where his theory has most of its plausibility), but by his lights the analysis of the mentioned modal fact can only be this: being a mummy does not intrinsically entail non-man-eating. Can we be content with this? I don't think so. For it is not clear what this fact of non-entailment—a negative fact—has to do with the positive fact of (broad, metaphysical) possibility. Or what does Jubien make of the following modal claim: It is possible that something instantiates F, where F is an unanalyzable and uninstantiated property? Presumably this: F does not intrinsically entail non-F. But again the relevance of this for the claim that it is possible that something instantiates F is unclear. Thus Jubien, too, has a certain "problem of relevance" (100), though I believe it is not as severe as the one that he sees (correctly) for the modality-analysis of David Lewis, or the one that the modality-analysis of Mark Heller has (see above). (According to my own analysis of modality, it is possible that A if and only if the state of affairs that A does not intrinsically entail its negation, or in other words, as can be proven in the theory of intrinsic entailment, if and only if there is some maximal possible—i.e., not its own negation entailing—state of affairs that intrinsically entails the state of affairs that A.)

5. Ted A. Warfield, Metaphysical Compatibilism's Appropriation of Frankfurt

Warfield distinguishes between metaphysical compatibilism, according to which metaphysical freedom is compatible with causal determinism, and responsibility compatibilism, according to which moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism (285). He then goes on to examine the following plausible argument, which moves from responsibility compatibilism to metaphysical compatibilism (286):

P1 Moral responsibility is consistent with causal determinism.

P2 Moral responsibility requires metaphysical freedom.

C1 So, metaphysical freedom is compatible with causal determinism.
As Warfield points out, this argument is formally valid. He goes on to consider the plausibility of its two premises, and P1 gets most of his attention—rightly so. Indeed, it seems to me overly cautious of Warfield when he notes that common practices of self-excuse suggest “at a minimum” that P2 “has considerable intuitive appeal” (287).

Clearly, P1—the Frankfurt premise—is the controversial premise. P1 is widely thought to being made plausible by so-called Frankfurt-scenarios—stories which seem to consistently present a person as having, under the given circumstances and at the given time, no alternative to what she actually does, but as being nevertheless morally responsible for what she does. What Warfield has to offer in order to undermine the presumption that Frankfurt-scenarios support P1 suggests to me—irresistibly—that even a metaphysical debate that is of the highest degree of interest for us human beings can become so argumentatively delicate and dialectically complicated as to make one tired of it.

To my mind, Frankfurt-scenarios either surreptitiously include implicit alternative possibilities for the acting person, or if they really don’t, then they fallaciously exploit our common epistemic practice to presume (i.e., to accept as true lacking evidence to the contrary—lacking, in particular, a proof that causal determinism is true) that X is morally responsible for Y already on the basis of X’s having done Y “of his own accord,” willingly, without being forced by outer or inner factors—not even by ignorance of relevant facts—to do it “against his will.” It just does not follow, (though it may seem to follow) that this basis of our presuming that X is morally responsible for Y amounts, in fact, to what it is for X to be morally responsible for Y. Moral compatibilists believe this, but their belief is not true: our criteria for presuming that X is morally responsible for Y are not all that it takes for X to be morally responsible for Y. Thus, a killer who really had no alternative to killing when he committed his killings is not morally (but, at most, causally) responsible for them, even if he committed them willingly, joyfully, deliberately, without being forced in any way against his will—that is, against that which, all considered, he wants to be and wants to do—to commit them. If it were otherwise, then also a shark would be morally (and not merely causally) responsible for tearing a swimmer to pieces—provided that this happened willingly, joyfully, and deliberately on the shark’s part—, although the shark had, at the time, no swimmer-sparing alternative whatsoever.

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