Changing collective action: nudges and team decisions

  • Nudges are widely used and a broad literature documents that they successfully affect individual behavior. However, in most settings where nudges are needed to change collective action, teams – not individuals – determine outcomes. Because team decision making is pervasive, learning whether nudges work with teams in social dilemmas is important, especially when formal enforcement is difficult. Here, we show that a nudge increases team cooperation by 14 to 16 percentage points in a social dilemma among fishing crews at Lake Victoria, Tanzania. The nudge is particularly effective when team decisions are made by a team member with leadership experience. Our findings are a proof of concept that expands the toolkit of empirical researchers and policy makers that address social dilemmas among teams.

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Metadaten
Author:Florian DiekertORCiDGND, Tillmann Eymess
URN:urn:nbn:de:bvb:384-opus4-1149814
Frontdoor URLhttps://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/114981
ISSN:1090-2473OPAC
Parent Title (English):Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher:Elsevier
Type:Article
Language:English
Year of first Publication:2024
Publishing Institution:Universität Augsburg
Release Date:2024/08/26
Volume:147
First Page:388
Last Page:406
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.009
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Fakultätsübergreifende Institute und Einrichtungen
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
Fakultätsübergreifende Institute und Einrichtungen / Zentrum für Klimaresilienz
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre / Professur für Umweltökonomik
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Licence (German):CC-BY 4.0: Creative Commons: Namensnennung (mit Print on Demand)

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