Artifacts for detecting timestamp manipulation in NTFS on Windows and their reliability

  • Timestamps have proven to be an expedient source of evidence for examiners in the reconstruction of computer crimes. Consequently, active adversaries and malware have implemented timestomping techniques (i.e., mechanisms to alter timestamps) to hide their traces. Previous research on detecting timestamp manipulation primarily focused on two artifacts: the $MFT as well as the records in the $LogFile. In this paper, we present a new use of four existing windows artifacts – the $USNjrnl, link files, prefetch files, and Windows event logs – that can provide valuable information during investigations and diversify the artifacts available to examiners. These artifacts contain either information about executed programs or additional timestamps which, when inconsistencies occur, can be used to prove timestamp forgery. Furthermore, we examine the reliability of artifacts being used to detect timestamp manipulation, i.e., testing their ability to retain information against users actively tryingTimestamps have proven to be an expedient source of evidence for examiners in the reconstruction of computer crimes. Consequently, active adversaries and malware have implemented timestomping techniques (i.e., mechanisms to alter timestamps) to hide their traces. Previous research on detecting timestamp manipulation primarily focused on two artifacts: the $MFT as well as the records in the $LogFile. In this paper, we present a new use of four existing windows artifacts – the $USNjrnl, link files, prefetch files, and Windows event logs – that can provide valuable information during investigations and diversify the artifacts available to examiners. These artifacts contain either information about executed programs or additional timestamps which, when inconsistencies occur, can be used to prove timestamp forgery. Furthermore, we examine the reliability of artifacts being used to detect timestamp manipulation, i.e., testing their ability to retain information against users actively trying to alter or delete them. Based on our findings we conclude that none of the artifacts analyzed can withstand active exploitation.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Author:David Palmbach, Frank BreitingerORCiDGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:bvb:384-opus4-1175698
Frontdoor URLhttps://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/117569
ISSN:2666-2817OPAC
Parent Title (English):Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation
Publisher:Elsevier BV
Type:Article
Language:English
Year of first Publication:2020
Publishing Institution:Universität Augsburg
Release Date:2024/12/16
Volume:32
Issue:Supplement
First Page:300920
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsidi.2020.300920
Institutes:Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik
Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik / Institut für Informatik
Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik / Institut für Informatik / Lehrstuhl für Cybersicherheit
Dewey Decimal Classification:0 Informatik, Informationswissenschaft, allgemeine Werke / 00 Informatik, Wissen, Systeme / 004 Datenverarbeitung; Informatik
Licence (German):CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0: Creative Commons: Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitung