Compliance, environmental regulation, and quota markets

  • Market-based instruments are widely promoted for their efficiency in achieving environmental goals, but their effectiveness depends on enforcement and compliance, which are often imperfect. We develop a theoretical model in which agents face both technological standards and quota regulations, with the possibility of non-compliance with both at the risk of fines. Within this model, we investigate how intrinsic motivation to comply with different regulations affects investment behavior in quota markets. We find that a greater willingness to invest in quotas can result from either a strong intrinsic motivation to comply with quota regulations or a weak motivation to comply with technological standards. To test these predictions, we use survey data and incentivized economic experiments with Norwegian fishers. The empirical results confirm the theory predictions: Fishers who find technological violations less acceptable tend to invest less in quotas, while those who disapprove of quotaMarket-based instruments are widely promoted for their efficiency in achieving environmental goals, but their effectiveness depends on enforcement and compliance, which are often imperfect. We develop a theoretical model in which agents face both technological standards and quota regulations, with the possibility of non-compliance with both at the risk of fines. Within this model, we investigate how intrinsic motivation to comply with different regulations affects investment behavior in quota markets. We find that a greater willingness to invest in quotas can result from either a strong intrinsic motivation to comply with quota regulations or a weak motivation to comply with technological standards. To test these predictions, we use survey data and incentivized economic experiments with Norwegian fishers. The empirical results confirm the theory predictions: Fishers who find technological violations less acceptable tend to invest less in quotas, while those who disapprove of quota violations tend to buy more quotas. These findings highlight the critical role of compliance attitudes for quota market behavior and offer insights for designing more efficient environmental regulations.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Author:Florian DiekertORCiDGND, Yuanhao Li, Linda Nøstbakken, Andries Richter
URN:urn:nbn:de:bvb:384-opus4-1304902
Frontdoor URLhttps://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/130490
ISSN:0095-0696OPAC
Parent Title (English):Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Publisher:Elsevier BV
Place of publication:Amsterdam
Type:Article
Language:English
Year of first Publication:2026
Publishing Institution:Universität Augsburg
Release Date:2026/05/19
Volume:138
First Page:103345
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2026.103345
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Fakultätsübergreifende Institute und Einrichtungen
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
Fakultätsübergreifende Institute und Einrichtungen / Zentrum für Klimaresilienz
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre / Professur für Umweltökonomik
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Licence (German):CC-BY 4.0: Creative Commons: Namensnennung