Verification of Mondex electronic purses with KIV: from transactions to a security protocol

  • The Mondex case study about the specification and refinement of an electronic purse as defined in [SCW00] has recently been proposed as a challenge for formal system-supported verification. In this paper we report on two results. First, on the successful verification of the full case study using the KIV specification and verification system. We demonstrate that even though the hand-made proofs were elaborated to an enormous level of detail we still could find small errors in the underlying data refinement theory as well as the formal proofs of the case study. Second, the original Mondex case study verifies functional correctness assuming a suitable security protocol. We extend the case study here with a refinement to a suitable security protocol that uses symmetric cryptography to achieve the necessary properties of the security-relevant messages. The definition is based on a generic framework for defining such protocols based on abstract state machines (ASMs). We prove the refinementThe Mondex case study about the specification and refinement of an electronic purse as defined in [SCW00] has recently been proposed as a challenge for formal system-supported verification. In this paper we report on two results. First, on the successful verification of the full case study using the KIV specification and verification system. We demonstrate that even though the hand-made proofs were elaborated to an enormous level of detail we still could find small errors in the underlying data refinement theory as well as the formal proofs of the case study. Second, the original Mondex case study verifies functional correctness assuming a suitable security protocol. We extend the case study here with a refinement to a suitable security protocol that uses symmetric cryptography to achieve the necessary properties of the security-relevant messages. The definition is based on a generic framework for defining such protocols based on abstract state machines (ASMs). We prove the refinement using a forward simulation.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Author:Dominik HanebergORCiDGND, Gerhard SchellhornGND, Holger GrandyGND, Wolfgang ReifORCiDGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:bvb:384-opus4-3749
Frontdoor URLhttps://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/450
Series (Serial Number):Reports / Technische Berichte der Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik der Universität Augsburg (2006-32)
Type:Report
Language:English
Year of first Publication:2006
Publishing Institution:Universität Augsburg
Release Date:2006/12/22
Tag:Interactive Theorem Proving; ASM; Mondex; Security Protocol; Prosecco; Refinement
GND-Keyword:Verifikation; Abstrakte Zustandsmaschine
Institutes:Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik
Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik / Institut für Informatik
Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik / Institut für Software & Systems Engineering
Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik / Institut für Informatik / Lehrstuhl für Softwaretechnik
Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik / Institut für Informatik / Lehrstuhl für Softwaretechnik / Lehrstuhl für Softwaretechnik
Dewey Decimal Classification:0 Informatik, Informationswissenschaft, allgemeine Werke / 00 Informatik, Wissen, Systeme / 004 Datenverarbeitung; Informatik