An antinomy for de re belief
- This paper presents a logical derivation, from apparently undeniable premises, of a logical contradiction for de re belief – not merely a description of logical irrationality for it. It also presents a way out of this antinomic situation, a way that does not amount to denying the meaningfulness of sentences that express de re beliefs. However, the effectiveness of the favored way out is put into question, and the possibility of there being true contradictions looms large. The ideas presented in this paper refer to problems broached by S. Kripke and W. V. Quine decades ago. The literature addressing those problems is vast. The present paper sets the literature aside (except for Quine and Kripke) and takes a fresh view.
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| Author: | Uwe MeixnerGND |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:384-opus4-1042646 |
| Frontdoor URL | https://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/104264 |
| Type: | Lecture |
| Language: | English |
| Date of Publication (online): | 2023/05/08 |
| Year of first Publication: | 2023 |
| Publishing Institution: | Universität Augsburg |
| Release Date: | 2023/05/08 |
| First Page: | 1 |
| Last Page: | 12 |
| Institutes: | Philosophisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät |
| Philosophisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Philosophie | |
| Philosophisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Philosophie / Lehrstuhl für Philosophie mit Schwerpunkt Analytische Philosophie / Wissenschaftstheorie | |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 1 Philosophie und Psychologie / 10 Philosophie / 100 Philosophie und Psychologie |
| Licence (German): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
