Policy diffusion in a simple Stackelberg game
- Strategic environmental policy games are usually based on simultaneous decision making and reach the conclusion that the policy choices are strategic substitutes. Empirical evidence, however, shows that the introduction of a regulatory instrument usually follows a consecutive pattern that is best described as policy diffusion. To introduce policy diffusion into to a strategic environmental policy game we transform the typical model setup into a Stackelberg game in which we analyze the policy decisions of two governments when one can commit to its choice. We find that the well-known trade-off between rent-seeking and the internalisation of negative externalities from pollution is mitigated when policy diffusion takes place.
| Author: | Peter MichaelisORCiDGND, Thomas ZiesemerGND |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:384-opus4-711109 |
| Frontdoor URL | https://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/71110 |
| Series (Serial Number): | Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe (314) |
| Publisher: | Volkswirtschaftliches Institut, Universität Augsburg |
| Place of publication: | Augsburg |
| Type: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Year of first Publication: | 2010 |
| Publishing Institution: | Universität Augsburg |
| Release Date: | 2020/02/21 |
| Tag: | JEL: F18, D62, Q58 |
| Pagenumber: | 6 |
| Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |
| Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre | |
| Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre / Lehrstuhl für Umwelt- und Ressourcenökonomie | |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| Journals: | Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe |
| Licence (German): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
