Threshold-dependent tax enforcement and the size distribution of firms: evidence from Germany

  • This paper investigates firms’ responses to threshold-dependent intensity of tax enforcement. We use administrative tax return data over the entire population of German firms and exploit industry variation in firm size thresholds applied by the tax administration. In our setting, each threshold marks a considerable spike in audit intensity and hence should create strong incentives to bunch below the threshold. However, we find no such effect in our large sample analysis. We attribute this empirical observation to optimization costs, particularly to the costs associated with the operational implementation of size management and to information costs. Our paper adds to the emerging field of studies on potential distortions created by threshold-dependent firm regulation. The findings are also relevant for policymakers, as they suggest that the specific design of threshold-dependent policies might allow governments to increase the efficiency of tax audits without distorting the firm sizeThis paper investigates firms’ responses to threshold-dependent intensity of tax enforcement. We use administrative tax return data over the entire population of German firms and exploit industry variation in firm size thresholds applied by the tax administration. In our setting, each threshold marks a considerable spike in audit intensity and hence should create strong incentives to bunch below the threshold. However, we find no such effect in our large sample analysis. We attribute this empirical observation to optimization costs, particularly to the costs associated with the operational implementation of size management and to information costs. Our paper adds to the emerging field of studies on potential distortions created by threshold-dependent firm regulation. The findings are also relevant for policymakers, as they suggest that the specific design of threshold-dependent policies might allow governments to increase the efficiency of tax audits without distorting the firm size distribution.show moreshow less

Download full text files

Export metadata

Statistics

Number of document requests

Additional Services

Share in Twitter Search Google Scholar
Metadaten
Author:Drahomir Klimsa, Robert UllmannGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:bvb:384-opus4-953572
Frontdoor URLhttps://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/95357
ISSN:0927-5940OPAC
ISSN:1573-6970OPAC
Parent Title (English):International Tax and Public Finance
Publisher:Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Place of publication:Berlin
Type:Article
Language:English
Year of first Publication:2023
Publishing Institution:Universität Augsburg
Release Date:2022/05/16
Tag:Economics and Econometrics; Finance; Accounting
Volume:30
Issue:4
First Page:1002
Last Page:1035
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-022-09732-2
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre / Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerlehre
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Licence (German):CC-BY 4.0: Creative Commons: Namensnennung (mit Print on Demand)