The surprising role of stimulus modality in the dual-task introspective blind spot: a memory account

  • Being able to accumulate accurate information about one’s own performance is important in everyday contexts, and arguably particularly so in complex multitasking contexts. Thus, the observation of a glaring gap in participants’ introspection regarding their own reaction time costs in a concurrent dual-task context is deserving of closer examination. This so-called introspective blind spot has been explained by a ‘consciousness bottleneck’ which states that while attention is occupied by one task, participants cannot consciously perceive another stimulus presented in that time. In the current study, a series of introspective Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) experiments were conducted to identify the determinants of an introspective blind spot; to our surprise, in half of the experiments participants appeared to be aware of their dual-task costs. A single trial analysis highlighted the sensory modality of the two stimuli within the trial as an important predictor of introspectiveBeing able to accumulate accurate information about one’s own performance is important in everyday contexts, and arguably particularly so in complex multitasking contexts. Thus, the observation of a glaring gap in participants’ introspection regarding their own reaction time costs in a concurrent dual-task context is deserving of closer examination. This so-called introspective blind spot has been explained by a ‘consciousness bottleneck’ which states that while attention is occupied by one task, participants cannot consciously perceive another stimulus presented in that time. In the current study, a series of introspective Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) experiments were conducted to identify the determinants of an introspective blind spot; to our surprise, in half of the experiments participants appeared to be aware of their dual-task costs. A single trial analysis highlighted the sensory modality of the two stimuli within the trial as an important predictor of introspective accuracy, along with temporal gaps in the trial. The current findings call into question the claim that attention is required for conscious awareness. We propose a memory-based account of introspective processes in this context, whereby introspective accuracy is determined by the memory systems involved in encoding and rehearsing memory traces. This model of the conditions required to build up accurate representations of our performance may have far-reaching consequences for monitoring and introspection across a range of tasks.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Author:Donna BryceORCiDGND, Daniel Bratzke
URN:urn:nbn:de:bvb:384-opus4-1043168
Frontdoor URLhttps://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/104316
ISSN:0340-0727OPAC
ISSN:1430-2772OPAC
Parent Title (English):Psychological Research
Publisher:Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Type:Article
Language:English
Year of first Publication:2022
Publishing Institution:Universität Augsburg
Release Date:2023/05/11
Tag:Developmental and Educational Psychology; Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Volume:86
Issue:4
First Page:1332
Last Page:1354
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-021-01545-y
Institutes:Philosophisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Philosophisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Psychologie
Philosophisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Psychologie / Lehrstuhl für Psychologie
Dewey Decimal Classification:1 Philosophie und Psychologie / 15 Psychologie / 150 Psychologie
Licence (German):CC-BY 4.0: Creative Commons: Namensnennung (mit Print on Demand)