An antinomy for de re belief

  • This paper presents a logical derivation, from apparently undeniable premises, of a logical contradiction for de re belief – not merely a description of logical irrationality for it. It also presents a way out of this antinomic situation, a way that does not amount to denying the meaningfulness of sentences that express de re beliefs. However, the effectiveness of the favored way out is put into question, and the possibility of there being true contradic­tions looms large. The ideas presented in this paper refer to problems broached by S. Kripke and W. V. Quine decades ago. The literature addressing those problems is vast. The present paper sets the literature aside (except for Quine and Kripke) and takes a fresh view.

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Author:Uwe MeixnerGND
Frontdoor URL
Year of first Publication:2023
Publishing Institution:Universität Augsburg
Release Date:2023/05/08
First Page:1
Last Page:12
Institutes:Philosophisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Philosophisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Philosophie
Philosophisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Philosophie / Lehrstuhl für Philosophie mit Schwerpunkt Analytische Philosophie / Wissenschaftstheorie
Dewey Decimal Classification:1 Philosophie und Psychologie / 10 Philosophie / 100 Philosophie und Psychologie
Licence (German):Deutsches Urheberrecht