Network creation with homophilic agents

  • Network Creation Games are an important framework for understanding the formation of real-world networks. These games usually assume a set of indistinguishable agents strategically buying edges at a uniform price, which leads to the formation of a network among them. However, in real life, agents are heterogeneous and their relationships often display a bias towards similar agents, say of the same ethnic group. This homophilic behavior on the agent level can then lead to the emergent global phenomenon of social segregation. We study Network Creation Games with multiple types of homophilic agents and non-uniform edge cost, introducing two models focusing on the perception of same-type and different-type neighbors, respectively. Despite their different initial conditions, both our theoretical and experimental analysis show that both the composition and segregation strength of the resulting stable networks are very similar, indicating a robust structure of social networks under homophily.Network Creation Games are an important framework for understanding the formation of real-world networks. These games usually assume a set of indistinguishable agents strategically buying edges at a uniform price, which leads to the formation of a network among them. However, in real life, agents are heterogeneous and their relationships often display a bias towards similar agents, say of the same ethnic group. This homophilic behavior on the agent level can then lead to the emergent global phenomenon of social segregation. We study Network Creation Games with multiple types of homophilic agents and non-uniform edge cost, introducing two models focusing on the perception of same-type and different-type neighbors, respectively. Despite their different initial conditions, both our theoretical and experimental analysis show that both the composition and segregation strength of the resulting stable networks are very similar, indicating a robust structure of social networks under homophily.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Author:Martin Bullinger, Pascal LenznerORCiDGND, Anna Melnichenko
Frontdoor URLhttps://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/117095
ISSN:0176-1714OPAC
ISSN:1432-217XOPAC
Parent Title (English):Social Choice and Welfare
Publisher:Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Place of publication:Berlin
Type:Article
Language:English
Year of first Publication:2024
Publishing Institution:Universität Augsburg
Release Date:2024/11/27
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01562-x
Institutes:Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik
Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik / Institut für Informatik
Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik / Institut für Informatik / Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Informatik
Dewey Decimal Classification:0 Informatik, Informationswissenschaft, allgemeine Werke / 00 Informatik, Wissen, Systeme / 004 Datenverarbeitung; Informatik
Latest Publications (not yet published in print):Aktuelle Publikationen (noch nicht gedruckt erschienen)
Licence (German):CC-BY 4.0: Creative Commons: Namensnennung (mit Print on Demand)