Deleting collected digital evidence by exploiting a widely adopted hardware write blocker

  • In this primary work we call for the importance of integrating security testing into the process of testing digital forensic tools. We postulate that digital forensic tools are increasing in features (such as network imaging), becoming networkable, and are being proposed as forensic cloud services. This raises the need for testing the security of these tools, especially since digital evidence integrity is of paramount importance. At the time of conducting this work, little to no published anti-forensic research had focused on attacks against the forensic tools/process. We used the TD3, a popular, validated, touch screen disk duplicator and hardware write blocker with networking capabilities and designed an attack that corrupted the integrity of the destination drive (drive with the duplicated evidence) without the user's knowledge. By also modifying and repackaging the firmware update, we illustrated that a potential adversary is capable of leveraging a phishing attack scenario inIn this primary work we call for the importance of integrating security testing into the process of testing digital forensic tools. We postulate that digital forensic tools are increasing in features (such as network imaging), becoming networkable, and are being proposed as forensic cloud services. This raises the need for testing the security of these tools, especially since digital evidence integrity is of paramount importance. At the time of conducting this work, little to no published anti-forensic research had focused on attacks against the forensic tools/process. We used the TD3, a popular, validated, touch screen disk duplicator and hardware write blocker with networking capabilities and designed an attack that corrupted the integrity of the destination drive (drive with the duplicated evidence) without the user's knowledge. By also modifying and repackaging the firmware update, we illustrated that a potential adversary is capable of leveraging a phishing attack scenario in order to fake digital forensic practitioners into updating the device with a malicious operating system. The same attack scenario may also be practiced by a disgruntled insider. The results also raise the question of whether security standards should be drafted and adopted by digital forensic tool makers.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Author:Christopher S. Meffert, Ibrahim Baggili, Frank BreitingerORCiDGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:bvb:384-opus4-1175992
Frontdoor URLhttps://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/117599
ISSN:1742-2876OPAC
Parent Title (English):Digital Investigation
Publisher:Elsevier BV
Type:Article
Language:English
Year of first Publication:2016
Publishing Institution:Universität Augsburg
Release Date:2024/12/16
Volume:18
Issue:Supplement
First Page:S87
Last Page:S96
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2016.04.004
Institutes:Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik
Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik / Institut für Informatik
Fakultät für Angewandte Informatik / Institut für Informatik / Lehrstuhl für Cybersicherheit
Dewey Decimal Classification:0 Informatik, Informationswissenschaft, allgemeine Werke / 00 Informatik, Wissen, Systeme / 004 Datenverarbeitung; Informatik
Licence (German):License LogoCC-BY-NC-ND 4.0: Creative Commons: Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitung (mit Print on Demand)